Rejecting Compromise: Legislators' Fear of Primary Voters

Sarah E. Anderson; Daniel M. Butler; Laurel Harbridge-Yong

doi:10.1017/9781108768375

Legislative solutions to pressing problems like balancing the budget, climate change, and poverty usually require compromise. Yet national, state, and local legislators often reject compromise proposals that would move policy in their preferred direction. Why do legislators reject such agreements? This engaging and relevant investigation into how politicians think reveals that legislators refuse compromise - and exacerbate gridlock - because they fear punishment from voters in primary elections. Prioritizing these electoral interests can lead lawmakers to act in ways that hurt their policy interests and also overlook the broader electorate's preferences by representing only a subset of voters with rigid positions. With their solution-oriented approach, Anderson, Butler, and Harbridge-Yong demonstrate that improving the likelihood of legislative compromise may require moving negotiations outside of the public spotlight. Highlighting key electoral motives underlying polarization, this book is an excellent resource for scholars and students studying Congress, American politics, public policy, and political behavior.

‘… well-written and well-researched book …’

D. P. Franklin Source: Choice

'Why won’t legislators accept compromises, even ones that move policy in the direction they favor? This book identifies not only a primary culprit - the fear of a backlash by primary voters - but a possible solution. It deserves to be read by scholars and politicians alike.'

John Sides - Professor of Political Science at Vanderbilt University

'Anderson, Butler, and Harbridge-Yong make a compelling case that the threat of electoral punishment by primary voters is deterring politicians from supporting compromise policy proposals. This book also makes an important contribution to the broader debate over the mechanisms and consequences of polarization - the effects of elite perceptions of primary voters on legislative behavior is a critically important topic that has received too little scholarly attention.'

Brendan Nyhan - Professor of Government, Dartmouth College

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Rejecting Compromise

Legislators' Fear of Primary Voters

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Contents

Rejecting Compromise
pp i-ii

Rejecting Compromise - Title page
pp iii-iii

Copyright page
pp iv-iv

Contents
pp v-v

Figures
pp vi-vii

Tables
pp viii-viii

Acknowledgments
pp ix-x

1 - Rejecting Compromise, Getting Gridlock
pp 1-14

2 - Legislators Reject Half-Loaf Compromises
pp 15-36

3 - Legislators Reject Half-Loaf Compromises Because They Fear Voter Retribution
pp 37-54

4 - Primary Voters as the Source of Punishment
pp 55-81

5 - Voter Punishment Is Rare but Real
pp 82-105

6 - Structuring Negotiations in the Shadow of Primary Voter Punishment
pp 106-128

7 - Compromise, Voter Punishment in Primaries, and Legislative Gridlock
pp 129-146

References
pp 147-167

Index
pp 168-172

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Rejecting Compromise

Legislators' Fear of Primary Voters

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