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  3. Paradoxes of Belief and Strategic Rationality
  • Cited by 45
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    • Publisher:
      Cambridge University Press
      Publication date:
      06 January 2010
      31 January 1992
      ISBN:
      9780511625381
      9780521412698
      9780521100595
      DOI:
      https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625381
      Dimensions:
      (228 x 152 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.42kg, 192 Pages
      Dimensions:
      (229 x 152 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.29kg, 192 Pages
      • Subjects:
      Economics, Economic Thought, Philosophy and Methodology, Philosophy: General Interest, Philosophy of Science, Philosophy
      Series:
      Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction and Decision Theory
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    Subjects:
    Economics, Economic Thought, Philosophy and Methodology, Philosophy: General Interest, Philosophy of Science, Philosophy
    Series:
    Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction and Decision Theory
    Information

    Book description

    This book develops a framework for analysing strategic rationality, a notion central to contemporary game theory, which is the formal study of the interaction of rational agents and which has proved extremely fruitful in economics, political theory and business management. The author argues that a logical paradox lies at the root of a number of persistent puzzles in game theory, in particular those concerning rational agents who seek to establish some kind of reputation. Building on the work of Parsons, Burge, Gaifman and Barwise and Etchemendy, Robert Koons constructs a context-sensitive solution to the whole family of liar-like paradoxes including, for the first time, a detailed account of how the interpretation of paradoxical statements is fixed by context. This analysis provides an understanding of how the rational agent model can account for the emergence of rules, practices and institutions.

    Reviews

    "The approach is powerful, original, and very substantial from an intellectual point of view. The work seems to me deeper and better thought through than the vast majority of work in this area." Tyler Burge, University of California, Los Angeles

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