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  3. Lotteries, Knowledge, and Rational Belief
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  • Publisher:
    Cambridge University Press
    Publication date:
    January 2021
    February 2021
    ISBN:
    9781108379755
    9781108421911
    9781108433051
    DOI:
    https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108379755
    Dimensions:
    (228 x 152 mm)
    Weight & Pages:
    0.556kg, 280 Pages
    Dimensions:
    (229 x 152 mm)
    Weight & Pages:
    0.4kg, 280 Pages
    • Subjects:
    Epistemology and Metaphysics, Logic, Philosophy
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    Subjects:
    Epistemology and Metaphysics, Logic, Philosophy
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    Book description

    We talk and think about our beliefs both in a categorical (yes/no) and in a graded way. How do the two kinds of belief hang together? The most straightforward answer is that we believe something categorically if we believe it to a high enough degree. But this seemingly obvious, near-platitudinous claim is known to give rise to a paradox commonly known as the 'lottery paradox' – at least when it is coupled with some further seeming near-platitudes about belief. How to resolve that paradox has been a matter of intense philosophical debate for over fifty years. This volume offers a collection of newly commissioned essays on the subject, all of which provide compelling reasons for rethinking many of the fundamentals of the debate.

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