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17 - Modals and Conditionals

from Part VIII - Implying and (Pre)supposing

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 October 2022

By
Matthew Mandelkern
Edited by
Daniel Altshuler
Daniel Altshuler
Affiliation:
University of Oxford
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Summary

Modals and conditionals play a starring role in philosophical and linguistic research. The ability to think modally distal thoughts is central to the human capacity to plan and choose; and the ability to express such thoughts is central to the human capacity for collective action. Modals and conditionals have yielded a rich bounty of puzzles about logic, semantics, and pragmatics. I organize this chapter around three topics: the interpretation of epistemic modals, particularly how they interact with their local information; the interpretation of conditionals, with a focus on logical questions; and, finally, practical modality, with discussion of a potentially unified perspective on practical modality as essentially involving reference to actions.

Keywords

modalsconditionalsepistemic modalslogic of conditionalsrestrictor analysispractical modalsability
Type
Chapter
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Linguistics Meets Philosophy , pp. 502 - 533
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2022

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