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  • Publisher:
    Cambridge University Press
    Publication date:
    15 April 2026
    01 May 2027
    ISBN:
    9781009729017
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    Weight & Pages:
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Selected: Digital
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Book description

Coalition formation is an important problem in economics, politics, and a broad range of other social situations. Examples of coalitions range from those at the level of individuals (families, couples, teams, employers, workers) through to those at the level of organisations and countries (political parties, free trade agreements, environmental agreements, military alliances). Traditionally, game theory has been divided into non-cooperative and cooperative games. The former approach scrutinizes individuals' rational behaviour under a well-specified process of a game. The latter presents various cooperative solutions based on collective rationality. Games and Coalitions draws on both approaches, providing a bridge between cooperative and non-cooperative analyses of coalition formation. Offering a useful research monograph regarding the models, results and applications of non-cooperative coalitional bargaining theory, this book illustrates how game theory applies to various economic and political problems, including resource allocation, public goods, wage bargaining, legislative bargaining, and climate cooperation.

Reviews

‘In this excellent book, Okira Okada gives a coherent presentation of the non-cooperative approach to coalition formation. He covers an impressive range of issues, including the incorporation of externalities, renegotiation and incomplete information. His style, both pedagogical and rigorous, is likely to benefit a great many researchers in this fascinating area.'

P. Jean-Jacques Herings - Tilburg University, The Netherlands

‘The result of decades of research, this book clarifies the difference between cooperative and non-cooperative game theory and makes a compelling case that they are complements rather than substitutes. Starting with simple examples and definitions before introducing the formal concepts and results, the book contains both applications and advanced topics such as externalities, incomplete information and gradual expansion of coalitions through renegotiation. An excellent state-of-the art book for graduate students and researchers interested in coalition formation and cooperation.'

Maria Montero - School of Economics, University of Nottingham

‘Okada's Games and Coalitions is not only a comprehensive and thorough textbook on game theory, but also one that offers a holistic approach to its two main branches: cooperative and non-cooperative game theory. While most game theory books treat these branches as separate, if not opposing, Okada reveals the intimate connection between them.'

Eyal Winter - the Silverzweig Professor of Economics, The Hebrew University, and the Andrews and Brunner Professor of Economics, Lancaster University

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