Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
  1. Home
  2. Books
  3. Consciousness and the Self
  • Cited by 2
      • Edited by JeeLoo Liu, California State University, Fullerton, John Perry, Stanford University, California
      Show more authors
      • You may already have access via personal or institutional login
    • Select format
    • Publisher:
      Cambridge University Press
      Publication date:
      05 December 2011
      17 November 2011
      ISBN:
      9780511732355
      9781107000759
      9781107414716
      DOI:
      https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511732355
      Dimensions:
      (228 x 152 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.57kg, 270 Pages
      Dimensions:
      (229 x 152 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.37kg, 272 Pages
      • Subjects:
      Philosophy of Mind and Language, Philosophy
    You may already have access via personal or institutional login
    • Selected: Digital
    Add to cart View cart Buy from Cambridge.org
    Subjects:
    Philosophy of Mind and Language, Philosophy
    Information

    Book description

    'I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception.' These famous words of David Hume, on his inability to perceive the self, set the stage for JeeLoo Liu and John Perry's collection of essays on self-awareness and self-knowledge. This volume connects recent scientific studies on consciousness with the traditional issues about the self explored by Descartes, Locke and Hume. Experts in the field offer contrasting perspectives on matters such as the relation between consciousness and self-awareness, the notion of personhood and the epistemic access to one's own thoughts, desires or attitudes. The volume will be of interest to philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists, cognitive scientists and others working on the central topics of consciousness and the self.

    Reviews

    "...The main important point of this book is the capacity of the editors to put together different accounts about self-awareness that perfectly mix traditional and contemporary points of view about conscious states and the self. The diversity of thesis and conclusions included between the different chapters permits to take a panoramic look to the actual debate in philosophy of consciousness and self-awareness."
    --Juan J. Colomina, PhD, The University of Texas at Austin and LEMA Research Group (University of La Laguna, Tenerife, Spain), Metapsychology Online Reviews

    "...I'll lay my cards on the table right away and say that this is a good book. It's not too often that I read a collection such as this cover to cover, and I found doing so with this volume very rewarding. The book contains plenty of chewy philosophical argumentation and the, admittedly only occasional, references between papers were illuminating. There's a lot to learn, and to engage with, here.... It's a good book, with lots of careful papers and serious arguments. Anybody with even a passing interest in self-consciousness, consciousness or the self, cannot fail to learn something from its pages."
    --Joel Smith, University of Manchester, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

    Refine List

    Actions for selected content:

    Select all | Deselect all
    • View selected items
    • Export citations
    • Download PDF (zip)
    • Save to Kindle
    • Save to Dropbox
    • Save to Google Drive

    Save Search

    You can save your searches here and later view and run them again in "My saved searches".

    Please provide a title, maximum of 40 characters.
    Cancel
    ×

    Contents

    Contents
    • Chapter 1 - Awareness and identification of self
      pp 22-50
    • View abstract

      Summary

      The higher-order thought (HOT) theory holds that a state's being conscious consists in one's having a suitable thought that one is, oneself, in that state. The HOT theory explains not only how we are aware of our conscious mental states, but also how it is that we are thereby aware of ourselves. This chapter shows how HOTs can accommodate essentially indexical awareness of oneself without invoking any special, antecedent self-awareness. It argues that a crucial assumption that underlies the claim of immunity to error through misidentification is unfounded, namely, the assumption that no self-identification figures in our awareness of our own conscious states. Finally, the chapter discusses the particular kind of identification of self that figures in our higher-order awareness of our conscious states and how that relates to the self-identification that underlies our first-person thoughts generally.
    • Chapter 2 - Self-representationalism and the explanatory gap
      pp 51-75
    • View abstract

      Summary

      According to self-representationalism, a mental state is phenomenally conscious when it represents itself in the right way. The motivation for this view is a conception of phenomenal consciousness as involving essentially a subtle, primordial kind of self-consciousness. A consequence of this conception is that the alleged explanatory gap between phenomenal consciousness and physical properties is eo ipso an explanatory gap between self-consciousness and physical properties. This chapter first explains how self-representationalism can address this explanatory gap. It opens with a presentation of self-representationalism and the motivation for it. Then, it describes the most promising self-representational approach to the explanatory gap. This approach is threatened by an objection to self-representationalism, raised by Levine, which the author calls the "just more representation" objection. Finally, the chapter shows how the self-representationalist might approach the objection.
    • Chapter 3 - Thinking about the self
      pp 76-100
    • View abstract

      Summary

      This chapter first constructs an account of self-beliefs that distinguishes them from beliefs that are merely about the person one happens to be. Next, it considers issues raised by David Rosenthal in his chapter in this book about what he calls the "essential indexicality" of Higher-Order Thoughts (HOTs). Rosenthal's account involves giving up Sydney Shoemaker's principle that a person is immune to certain sorts of errors about her own mental states, namely, whether it is she that is having them. The chapter argues that we should not give up Shoemaker's principle, and that we need not do so to account for the feature of HOTS that Rosenthal calls their "essential indexicality". These issues are crucial for those who are inclined to accept Rosenthal's account of consciousness, in which HOTS play a crucial role.
    • Chapter 4 - Ordinary self-consciousness
      pp 101-122
    • View abstract

      Summary

      This chapter explores the nature of ordinary self-consciousness (OSC) and offers an analysis to identify its key components. Its main aim is to identify and look closely at the phenomenon. The chapter suggests that the phenomenon has a crucial role to play in explaining and understanding the nature of the self-conscious emotions of guilt, shame, pride and embarrassment. It distinguishes between OSC understood as a conscious mental attitude and OSC understood as a way of acting. It also helps identifying the particular character of OSC. Having tabled some ideas about the structure and dimensions involved in OSC, the chapter provides answers to questions about the relationship between OSC and self-conscious emotions. OSC is treated as a distinct self-conscious emotion, and may have a claim to being the core self-conscious emotion in relation to which the others can be better understood.
    • Chapter 5 - Waiting for the self
      pp 123-149
    • View abstract

      Summary

      Hume offers his introspective report in a discussion of personal identity, which is traditionally regarded as a metaphysical issue. This chapter focuses on the phenomenal thesis that Hume advances in the course of addressing the metaphysical question of what it is to be a self and how a single self can endure changes over time. Philosophical thinking about self-consciousness got a major boost when Descartes formulated his cogito. In saying "I think" in the first person, and declaring that this is indubitable, Descartes implies that there is an I, which is directly accessed in consciousness. Descartes' account is a paradigm case of a non-reductive theory of the phenomenal self because it implies that the self is present in experience but not reducible to anything else. Body ownership has been intensively studied in cognitive neuroscience. The notion of ownership has been contrasted in cognitive neuroscience with the notion of authorship.
    • Chapter 6 - I think I think, therefore I am – I think
      pp 150-164
    • skeptical doubts about self-knowledge
    • View abstract

      Summary

      In this chapter, the author expresses his interest in the epistemological status of Descartes' premise, that is, in how we know, or what reason we have for thinking, that we think. Thinkers have no reason, to which they have privileged access, for thinking they think. If thinkers have a reason to think they think, it is a reason their family, friends and neighbors have equal access to. Before explaining why he believes this, the author makes a few remarks on the very special kind of thought, that is, the thought that one thinks. The thought that one thinks is self-verifying, but having this self-verifying thought does not provide one with a reason to think one thinks unless one has reasons to think one has self-verifying thought. Everyone who thinks has a reason to believe what he thinks because he is acquainted with a proposition.
    • Chapter 7 - Knowing what I want
      pp 165-183
    • View abstract

      Summary

      Knowing that one wants to go to the movies is an example of self-knowledge, knowledge of one's mental states. The term "privileged access" is due to Gilbert Ryle; on the Cartesian view that he is concerned to attack, "mind has a two-fold privileged access to its own doings". The distinction between privileged and peculiar access is one thing; the claim that we actually have one or both sorts of access is another. This chapter briefly reviews some evidence. One leading theory of self-knowledge classifies it as a variety of perceptual knowledge, in many respects like our perceptual knowledge of our environment. Belief, if true, offers a satisfying explanation of both privileged and peculiar access. Privileged access is explained because BEL is strongly self-verifying. According to the circularity objection, in order to follow DES, one has to have some knowledge of one's desires beforehand.
    • Chapter 8 - Self-ignorance
      pp 184-197
    • View abstract

      Summary

      Philosophers tend to be impressed by human self-knowledge. Perhaps the most prominent writer on self-knowledge in contemporary philosophy is Sydney Shoemaker. From Descartes to the present, the philosophical literature on self-knowledge of consciousness and attitudes has focused, with a few exceptions, on statements of or attempted explanations of the fact that we know ourselves remarkably well. Personality trait attributions, skill attributions, and attitude attributions can all be seen as shorthand ways of talking about patterns of inward and outward action and reaction. The philosophical focus on how impressive our self-knowledge is gets the most important things backwards. Self-knowledge is pretty good about narrow and concrete matters. In a classic article, Shelley Taylor and Jonathon Brown, reviewing a broad range of literature, suggest that positive illusions about oneself are the ordinary concomitant of mental health.
    • Chapter 9 - Personhood and consciousness
      pp 198-213
    • View abstract

      Summary

      The term "self" is used to refer to a person as that person conceives and knows itself. Locke's definition asserts a close connection between the nature of selves, or persons, and the access they have to themselves and their identities. The contents of self-consciousness, which includes both introspective awareness of one's current psychological states and memory awareness of one's past, are neutral with respect to the metaphysical nature of the self. There are memory demonstratives that enable one to refer to specific things remembered in the past; and these things can include persons, and these persons can include oneself. This chapter addresses the question of what gives memories their first-person content. It uses the example of the Parfit people rather than a more realistic, and more often discussed, case of fission, namely that in which it involves transplanting the two hemispheres of someone's brain into two different bodies.
    • Chapter 10 - My non-narrative, non-forensic Dasein
      pp 214-240
    • the first and second self
    • View abstract

      Summary

      The Experience Principle is warranted on semantic grounds: Most every, but possibly not all, usages of words such as PERSON or SELF assume a first-personal, subjective, experiential component. To get the concept of forensic person out of the schema that mentions only psychological items and connectedness and continuity relations between the items, one needs to be looking for the items and the connection kinds that are suited primarily for our legal and moral practices. One possibility that emerges is that the way we self-express and self-represent in modern social worlds, because it depicts persons in forensic and narrative ways. It also produces the illusion that this is the way most persons always have and always will experience themselves. Thinking carefully about the ways we are all Persons and, more than a few of us also Persons, might make us skeptical that Person is the right analysis of personhood.
    References
    References
    Adolphs, Ralph 2002 Recognizing emotion from facial expressions: Psychological and neurological mechanismsBehavioral and Cognitive Neuroscience Reviews 1 21
    Alston, William P. 1971 Varieties of privileged accessAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 8 223
    Anscombe, G.Elizabeth, M. 1975 The first personGuttenplan, SamuelMind and LanguageOxford University Press45
    Aristotle, 1907 De AnimaHicks, Robert DrewCambridge University Press
    Armstrong, David M. 1963 Is introspective knowledge incorrigible?Philosophical Review 72 417
    Armstrong, David M. 1968 A Materialist Theory of the MindLondonRoutledge & Kegan Paul
    Armstrong, David M. 1980 What is consciousnessArmstrong, DavidThe Nature of MindSt. Lucia, QueenslandUniversity of Queensland Press55
    Ashwell, Lauren 2009
    Astington, Janet W. 1993 The Child’s Discovery of the MindCambridge, MAHarvard University Press
    Ayer, Alfred J. 1959 PrivacyProceedings of the British Academy 45 43
    Ayer, Alfred J. 1963 The Concept of a Person and Other EssaysLondonMacmillan
    Bar-On, Dorit 2004 Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-KnowledgeOxford University Press
    Bartsch, KarenWellman, Henry M. 1995 Children Talk About the MindOxford University Press
    Bayne, TimothyMontague, MichelleCognitive PhenomenologyOxford University Press
    Bennett, Jonathan 1991 How to read minds in behavior: A suggestion from a philosopherWhiten, AndrewNatural Theories of Mind: Evolution, Development and Simulation of Everyday MindreadingOxfordBasil Blackwell97
    Berger, Jacob
    Bermúdez, José Luis 1998 The Paradox of Self-ConsciousnessCambridge, MAMIT/Bradford
    Berridge, KentRobinson, Terry 2003 Parsing rewardTrends in Neurosciences 26 507
    Biran, IftahChatterjee, Anjan 2004 Alien hand syndromeArchives of Neurology 61 292
    Blakemore, Sarah-JayneWolpert, DanielFrith, Chris 2000 Why can’t you tickle yourselfNeuroReport 11 R11
    Blanke, OlafMetzinger, Thomas 2009 Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhoodTrends in Cognitive Science 13 7
    Block, Ned 1995 On a confusion about a function of consciousnessBehavioral and Brain Sciences 18 227
    Block, NedStalnaker, Robert 1999 Conceptual analysis, dualism, and the explanatory gapPhilosophical Review 108 1
    Block, NedFlanagan, Owen J.Güzeldere, Güven 1997 The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical DebatesCambridge, MAMIT Press
    Boër, Steven E.Lycan, William G. 1980 Who, mePhilosophical Review 89 427
    Boghossian, Paul 1997 What the externalist can know a prioriProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 161
    Botvinick, MatthewCohen, Jonathan 1998 Rubber hands ‘feel’ touch that eyes seeNature 391 756
    Breitmeyer, Bruno G.Öğmen, Haluk 2006 Visual Masking: Time Slices through Conscious and Unconscious VisionOxford University Press
    Brentano, Franz 1874 Psychology from an Empirical StandpointKraus, OscarMcAlister, Linda L.Rancurello, Anto C.Terrell, D. B.McAlister, Linda L.LondonRoutledge & Kegan Paul
    Buras, Todd 2009 An argument against causal theories of mental contentAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 46 117
    Burge, Tyler 1979 Individualism and the mentalMidwest Studies in Philosophy 4 73
    Burge, Tyler 1988 Individualism and self-knowledgeJournal of Philosophy 85 649
    Burge, Tyler 1996 Our entitlement to self-knowledgeProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 91
    Burge, Tyler 2003 Memory and personsPhilosophical Review 112 289
    Byrne, Alex 2005 IntrospectionPhilosophical Topics 33 79
    Byrne, Alex 2011
    Carpendale, JeremyLewis, Charlie 2006 How Children Develop Social UnderstandingMalden, MABlackwell Publishing
    Cassam, Quassim 1994 Self-KnowledgeOxford University Press
    Castañeda, Hector-Neri 1966 He: A study in the logic of self-consciousnessRatio 8 130
    Castañeda, Hector-Neri 1968 On the logic of attributions of self-knowledge to othersJournal of Philosophy 65 439
    Castañeda, Hector-Neri 1969 On the phenomeno-logic of the IProceedings of the 14th International Congress of Philosophy200
    Chalmers, David J. 1996 The Conscious MindOxford University Press
    Chalmers, David J. 2002 Consciousness and its place in natureChalmers, David J.Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary ReadingsOxford University Press247
    Chalmers, David J. 2010 The Character of ConsciousnessOxford University Press
    Chalmers, David J.Jackson, Frank C. 2001 Conceptual analysis and reductive explanationPhilosophical Review 110 315
    Chisholm, Roderick 1969 On the observability of the selfPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 30 7
    Chisholm, Roderick M. 1976 Person and Object: A Metaphysical StudyLa Salle, ILOpen Court Publishing Company
    Chisholm, Roderick M. 1981 The First PersonMinneapolis, MNUniversity of Minnesota Press
    Churchland, Paul M. 1985 Reduction, qualia, and the direct introspection of brain statesJournal of Philosophy 82 8
    Churchland, Paul M. 1988 Matter and ConsciousnessCambridge, MAMIT Press
    Cole, Jonathan 1995 Pride and A Daily MarathonCambridge, MAMIT Press
    Confucius [5th century ] 2003 AnalectsSlingerland, EdwardIndianapolis, INHackett Publishing
    Critchley, Hugo D.Wiens, StefanRotshtein, PiaOhman, ArneDolan, Ray J. 2004 Neural systems supporting interoceptive awarenessNature Neuroscience 7 189
    Damasio, Antonio 1994 Descartes’s Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human BrainNew YorkG. P. Putnam’s Sons
    Damasio, Antonio 1999 The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of ConsciousnessNew YorkHarcourt
    Dancy, Jonathan 2000 Practical RealityOxford University Press
    Darwin, Charles 1872 The Expression of the Emotions in Man and AnimalsEkman, PaulOxford University Press
    Davidson, Donald 1984 First person authorityDialectica 38 101
    Davidson, Donald 1991 Three varieties of knowledgeGriffiths, A. PhillipsA. J. Ayer Memorial EssaysCambridge University Press
    Davidson, Donald 2001 Inquiries into Truth and InterpretationOxfordClarendon Press
    Davies, Martin 1998 Externalism, architecturalism, and epistemic warrantWright, CrispinSmith, Barry C.MacDonald, CynthiaKnowing Our Own MindsOxford University Press321
    Dennett, Daniel C. 1992 Consciousness ExplainedBoston, MALittle, Brown and Company, Back Bay Books
    Dennett, Daniel C. 2002 How could I be wrong? How wrong could I beJournal of Consciousness Studies 9 13
    De Ridder, DirkVan Laere, KoenDupont, PatrickMenovsky, ThomasVan de Heyning, Paul 2007 Visualizing out-of-body experience in the brainNew England Journal of Medicine 357 1829
    Descartes, René 1984 The Philosophical Writings of DescartesCottingham, JohnStoothoff, RobertMurdoch, DugaldCambridge University Press
    Descartes, René 1984
    Dretske, Fred I. 1981 Knowledge and the Flow of InformationCambridge, MAMIT Press
    Dretske, Fred I. 1988 Explaining BehaviorCambridge, MAMIT Press
    Dretske, Fred I. 1995 Naturalizing the MindCambridge, MAMIT Press
    Dretske, Fred I. 2003 How do you know you are not a zombieGertler, BriePrivileged Access and First-Person AuthorityBurlington, VTAshgate Publishing Company1
    DSM-IV 1994 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Psychiatric DisordersWashington, DCAmerican Psychiatric Association
    du Boisgueheneuc, FoucaudLevy, RichardVolle, EmanuelleSeassau, MagaliDuffau, HughesKinkingnehun, SergeSamson, YvesZhang, SandyDubois, Bruno 2006 Functions of the left superior frontal gyrus in humans: A lesion studyBrain 129 3315
    Einstein, GillianFlanagan, Owen 2003 Sexual identities and narratives of selfFireman, GaryMcVay, TedFlanagan, OwenNarrative and ConsciousnessOxford University Press209
    Ekman, Paul 2003 Emotions Revealed: Recognizing Faces and Feelings to Improve Communication and Emotional LifeNew York and LondonTimes Books (US), Weidenfeld & Nicolson
    Eliot, George 1985 Mill on the FlossHarmondsworthPenguin Classics
    Evans, Gareth 1982 142
    Evans, Gareth 1982 184
    Evans, Gareth 1982 The Varieties of ReferenceMcDowell, JohnOxford University Press
    Farrer, ChlöeFranck, NicolasGeorgieff, NicolasFrith, Chris D.Decety, JeanJeannerod, Marc 2003 Modulating the experience of agencyNeuroimage 18 324
    Feit, Neil 2008 Belief About the SelfOxford University Press
    Fernández, Jordi 2005 Self-knowledge, rationality and Moore’s paradoxPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 533
    Fernández, Jordi 2007 Desire and self-knowledgeAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 85 517
    Fiala, Brian
    Fiala, BrianExplaining the explanatory gapUniversity of Arizona
    Finkelstein, David H. 2003 Expression and the InnerCambridge, MAHarvard University Press
    Fitzgerald, Scott F. 2000 This Side of ParadiseHarmondsworthPenguin Classics
    Flanagan, Owen J. 1990 Identity and strong and weak evaluationFlanagan, OwenRorty, Amélie OksenbergIdentity, Character, and MoralityCambridge, MAMIT Press37
    Flanagan, Owen J. 1991 Varieties of Moral Personality: Ethics and Psychological RealismCambridge, MAHarvard University Press
    Flanagan, Owen J. 1992 Consciousness ReconsideredCambridge, MAMIT Press
    Flanagan, Owen J. 1995 Deconstructing dreams: The spandrels of sleepJournal of Philosophy 92 5
    Flanagan, Owen J. 1996 Self Expressions: Mind, Morals, and the Meaning of LifeOxford University Press
    Flanagan, Owen J. 2000 Dreaming Souls: Sleep, Dreams, and the Evolution of the Conscious MindOxford University Press
    Flanagan, Owen J. 2002 The Problem of the Soul: Two Visions of Mind and How to Reconcile ThemNew YorkBasic Books
    Flanagan, Owen J. 2003 Emotional expressionsHodge, Jonathan S.Radick, GregoryThe Cambridge Companion to DarwinCambridge University Press413
    Flanagan, Owen J. 2007 The Really Hard Problem: Meaning in a Material WorldCambridge, MAMIT Press
    Flavell, John H. 2003 Development of Children’s Knowledge About the Mind: The Heinz Werner LecturesWorcester, MAClark University Press
    Flavell, John H.Miller, PatriciaMiller, Scott 1993 Cognitive DevelopmentEnglewood Cliffs, NJPrentice Hall
    Fodor, Jerry A. 1990 A Theory of Content and Other EssaysCambridge MAMIT Press
    Ford, Jason 2008 Attention and the new skepticsJournal of Consciousness Studies 15 59
    Frith, Chris D. 2007 Making up the Mind: How the Brain Creates Our Mental WorldMalden, MABlackwell Publishing
    Frith, Chris D.Blakemore, Sarah-J.Wolpert, Daniel M. 2000 Abnormalities in the awareness and control of actionPhilosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B355 1771
    Furnham, Adrian 2001 Self-estimates of intelligence: Culture and gender differences in self and other estimates of both general (g) and multiple intelligencesPersonality and Individual Differences 31 1381
    Gallois, André 1996 The World Without, the Mind Within: An Essay on First-Person AuthorityCambridge University Press
    Gallup, Gordon 1970 Chimpanzees: self-recognitionScience 167 86
    Gallup, Gordon 1979 Self-Recognition in Chimpanzees and Man: A Developmental and Comparative PerspectiveNew YorkPlenum Press
    Gazzaniga, Michael 1985 The Social BrainNew YorkBasic Books
    Geach, Peter T. 1957 On beliefs about oneselfAnalysis 18 23
    Gennaro, Rocco J. 2004 Higher-order thoughts, animal consciousness, and misrepresentation: A reply to Carruthers and LevineGennaro, Rocco J.Higher-Order Theories of ConsciousnessAmsterdam and PhiladelphiaJohn Benjamins45
    Gennaro, Rocco J. 2006 Between pure self-referentialism and the (extrinsic) HOT theory of consciousnessKriegel, UriahWilliford, KennethSelf-Representational Approaches to ConsciousnessCambridge, MAMIT Press/A Bradford Book221
    Gertler, Brie 2011 Self-knowledge and the transparency of beliefHatzimoysis, A.Self-KnowledgeOxford University Press
    Giberman, Dan. 2010
    Goldberg, Ilan I.Harel, MichalMalach, Rafael 2006 When the brain loses itself: Prefrontal inactivation during sensorimotor processingNeuron 50 329
    Goldman, Alvin I. 1993 The psychology of folk psychologyBehavioral and Brain Sciences 16 15
    Goldman, Alvin I. 2000 Folk psychology and mental conceptsProtosociology 14 4
    Goldman, Alvin I. 2006 Simulating MindsOxford University Press
    Gopnik, Alison 1993 How we know our minds: The illusion of first person knowledge of intentionalityBehavioral and Brain Sciences 16 1
    Gordon, Robert M. 1995 Simulation without introspection or inference from me to youDavies, MartinStone, TonyMental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications – Readings in Mind and LanguageOxfordBlackwell Publishing52
    Gordon, Robert M. 1996 ‘Radical’ simulationismCarruthers, PeterSmith, Peter K.Theories of Theories of MindCambridge University Press11
    Gordon, Robert M. 2007 Ascent routines for propositional attitudesSynthese 159 151
    Gosling, Samuel D.John, Oliver P.Craik, Kenneth H.Robins, Richard W. 1998 Do people know how they behave? Self-reported act frequencies compared with on-line codings by observersJournal of Personality and Social Psychology 74 1337
    Hall, LarsJohansson, PetterTärning, BettySikström, SverkerDeutgen, Thérèse 2010 Magic at the marketplace: Choice blindness for the taste of jam and the smell of teaCognition 117 54
    Haslanger, Sally 2008 Changing the ideology and culture of philosophy: Not by reason (alone)Hypatia 28 210
    Hatfield, ElaineCacioppo, John T.Rapson, Richard L. 1993 Emotional contagionCurrent Directions in Psychological Science 2 96
    Haybron, Daniel 2008 The Pursuit of UnhappinessOxford University Press
    Heil, John 1988 Privileged accessMind 97 238
    Hohwy, Jakob 2007 The sense of self in the phenomenology of agency and perceptionPsyche 1 1
    Horgan, TerenceTienson, John 2002 The intentionality of phenomenology and the phenomenology of intentionalityChalmers, David J.Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary ReadingsOxford University Press520
    Hume, David 1739 A Treatise of Human NatureNorton, David FateNorton, Mary J.Oxford University PressSelby-Bigge, L. A.Nidditch, P. H.
    Hurlburt, Russell T.Heavey, Christopher L. 2006 Exploring Inner ExperienceAmsterdamJohn Benjamins
    Hurlburt, Russell T.Schwitzgebel, Eric 2007 Describing Inner Experience? Proponent Meets SkepticCambridge, MAMIT Press
    Hurlburt, Russell T.Schwitzgebel, Eric 2011
    Israel, David J.Perry, John 1990 What is information?Hansonx, Philip P.Information, Language and CognitionVancouver, CanadaUniversity of British Columbia Press1
    James, William 1890 The Principles of PsychologyNew YorkCosimo
    James, William 1892 The stream of consciousnessJames, WilliamPsychology: Briefer CourseCambridge, MAHarvard University Press151
    Johansson, PetterHall, LarsSikström, SverkerOlsson, Andreas 2005 Failure to detect mismatches between intention and outcome in a simple decision taskScience 310 116
    John, Oliver P.Robins, Richard W. 1993 Determinants of inter-judge agreement on personality traits: The Big Five domains, observability, evaluativeness, and the unique perspective of the selfJournal of Personality 61 521
    Kane, Michael J. 2011
    Kant, Immanuel 1787 Critique of Pure ReasonGuyer, PaulWood, Allen WCambridge University Press
    Kaplan, David 1989 DemonstrativesAlmog, JosephPerry, JohnWettstein, HowardThemes From KaplanOxford University Press481
    Karnath, Hans-OttoBaier, BauNägele, Thomas 2005 Awareness of the functioning of one’s own limbs mediated by the insular cortex?Journal of Neuroscience 25 7134
    Keysers, ChristianWicker, BrunoGazzola, ValeriaAnton, Jean-LucFogassi, LeonardoGallese, Vittorio 2004 A touching sight: SII/PV activation during the observation and experience of touchNeuron 42 335
    Klein, Stanley B. 2010 The self: As a construct in psychology and neuropsychological evidence for its multiplicityWIREs Cognitive Science 1 172
    Koch, Christof 2004 The Quest for ConsciousnessNew YorkRoutledge
    Korta, KepaPerry, JohnCritical PragmaticsCambridge University Press.
    Koyama, TetsuoMcHaffie, John G.Laurienti, Paul J.Coghill, Robert C. 2005 The subjective experience of pain: Where expectations become realityPNAS 102 12950
    Kriegel, Uriah 2003 Consciousness as intransitive self-consciousness: Two views and an argumentCanadian Journal of Philosophy 33 103
    Kriegel, Uriah 2004 Consciousness and self-consciousnessThe Monist 87 182
    Kriegel, Uriah 2005 Naturalizing subjective characterPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 23
    Kriegel, Uriah 2009 Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational TheoryOxford University Press
    Kripke, Saul 1980 Naming and NecessityCambridge, MAHarvard University Press
    Kruger, JustinDunning, David 1999 Unskilled and unaware of it: The difficulties in recognizing one’s own incompetence lead to inflated self-assessmentsJournal of Personality and Social Psychology 77 1121
    Kusch, Martin 1999 Psychological KnowledgeLondonRoutledge
    Kwan, Virginia S. Y.John, Oliver P.Robins, Richard W.Kuang, Lu L. 2008 Conceptualizing and assessing self-enhancement bias: A componential approachJournal of Personality and Social Psychology 94 1062
    Levine, Joseph 1983 Materialism and qualia: The explanatory gapPacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 354
    Levine, Joseph 1993 On leaving out what it’s likeDavies, M.Humphreys, G.Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical EssaysOxfordBlackwell Publishing121
    Levine, Joseph 2001 Purple Haze: The Puzzle of ConsciousnessOxford University Press
    Levine, Joseph 2006 Conscious awareness and (self-)representationKriegel, UriahWilliford, KennethSelf-Representational Approaches to ConsciousnessCambridge MAMIT Press173
    Lewis, David 1972 Psychophysical and theoretical identificationsAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 50 249
    Lewis, David 1979 Attitudes and Philosophical Review 88 513
    Lewis, Michael 1993 Self-conscious emotions: Embarrassment, pride, shame and guiltLewis, MichaelHaviland-Jones, Jeannette M.Handbook of EmotionsNew YorkGuildford Press563
    Lewis, Michael 1995 Embarrassment: The emotion of self-exposure and evaluationTangney, June PriceFischer, Kurt W.Self-conscious Emotions: The Psychology of Shame, Guilt, Embarrassment and PrideNew YorkGuildford Press192
    Lewis, MichaelBrooks-Gunn, Jeanne 1979 Social Cognition and the Acquisition of SelfNew YorkPlenum Press
    Libet, Benjamin 2004 Mind Time: The Temporal Factor in ConsciousnessCambridge, MAHarvard University Press
    Libet, BenjaminWright, Elwood W.Feinstein, BertramPearl, Dennis K. 1979 Subjective referral of the timing for a conscious sensory experience: A functional role for the somatosensory specific projection system in manBrain 102 193
    Lichtenberg, Georg C. 1765 Hollingdale, Reginald. J.New York Review of Books
    Loar, Brian 1987 Subjective intentionalityPhilosophical Topics 15 89
    Loar, Brian 2003 Phenomenal intentionality as the basis for mental contentHahn, MartinRamberg, BjørnReflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler BurgeCambridge, MAMIT Press229
    Locke, John 1689 An Essay Concerning Human UnderstandingNidditch, Peter H.OxfordClarendon Press
    Lycan, William G. 1987 ConsciousnessCambridge, MAMIT Press
    Lycan, William G. 1996 Consciousness and ExperienceCambridge, MAMIT Press/Bradford Books
    Lycan, William G. 2004 The superiority of HOP to HOTGennaro, Rocco J.Higher-Order Theories of ConsciousnessAmsterdam and PhiladelphiaJohn Benjamins
    Marcel, Anthony J. 1983 Conscious and unconscious perception: An approach to the relations between phenomenal experience and perceptual processesCognitive Psychology 15 238
    Marcel, Anthony J. 1983 Conscious and unconscious perception: Experiments on visual masking and word recognitionCognitive Psychology 15 197
    McAllister, Margaret M. 2000 Dissociative identity disorder: A literature reviewJournal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing 7 25
    McFetridge, Ian 1990 Explicating ‘x knows that p’Haldane, JohnScruton, RogerLogical Necessity and Other EssaysLondonAristotelian Society213
    McGinn, Colin 1975 and knowledgeProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 195
    McKay, Ryan T.Dennett, Daniel C. 2009 The evolution of misbeliefBehavioral and Brain Sciences 32 493
    McKinsey, Michael 1991 Anti-individualism and privileged accessAnalysis 51 9
    Millikan, Ruth G. 1984 Language, Thought, and Other Biological CategoriesCambridge, MAMIT Press
    Milliken, Ruth G. 1990 The myth of the essential indexicalNoûs 24 723
    Moore, Don A.Healy, Paul J. 2008 The trouble with overconfidencePsychological Review 115 502
    Moran, Richard 2001 Authority and EstrangementPrinceton University Press
    Moro, ValentinaZampini, MassimilianoAglioti, Salvatore M. 2004 Changes in spatial position of hands modify tactile extinction but not disownership of contralesional hand in two right brain-damaged patientsNeurocase 10 437
    Nagel, Thomas 1965 PhysicalismPhilosophical Review 3 339
    Nagel, Thomas 1970 The Possibility of AltruismOxford University Press
    Nagel, Thomas 1979 What is it like to be a bat?Philosophical Review 4 435
    Nagel, Thomas 1983 The objective selfGinet, CarlShoemaker, SydneyKnowledge and MindOxford University Press211
    Ney, Alyssa 2008 Physicalism as an attitudePhilosophical Studies 138 1
    Nichols, ShaunStich, Stephen 2003 Mindreading: An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-Awareness, and Understanding Other MindsOxford University Press
    Nietzsche, Friedrich 1886 Beyond Good and EvilJohnson, IanArlington, VARicher Resources Publicationshttp://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/n/nietzsche/friedrich/n67b/complete.html
    Nietzsche, Friedrich 1901 The Will to PowerKaufmann, WalterHollingdale, Reginald J.Kaufmann, WalterNew YorkVintage Books
    Nietzsche, Friedrich 1997 Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of MoralityHollingdale, Reginald J.Clark, MaudemarieLeiter, BrianCambridge University Press
    Nisbett, Richard E.Wilson, Timothy DeCamp 1977 Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processesPsychological Review 84 3 231
    Olson, Eric 1999 The Human Animal: Personal Identity without PsychologyOxford University Press
    Ornstein, Robert 1986 Multiminds: A New Way to Look at Human BehaviorBostonHoughton Mifflin
    Parfit, Derek 1971 Personal identityPhilosophical Review 88 3
    Paulus, Delroy L.Lysy, Daria C.Yik, Michelle S. M. 1998 Self-report measures of intelligence: Are they useful as proxy IQ tests?Journal of Personality 66 525
    Peacocke, Christopher 1983 Sense and ContentOxford University Press
    Peirce, Charles S. 1898 Collected PapersHartshorne, CharlesWeiss, PaulCambridge, MAHarvard University Press
    Perry, John 1979 The problem of the essential indexicalNoûs 13 3
    Perry, John 1986 Thought without representationSupplementary Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 60
    Perry, John 1998 Myself and IStamm, MarceloPhilosophie in Synthetischer AbsichtStuttgartKlett-Cotta83
    Perry, John 2000 The Problem of the Essential Indexical and other EssaysOxford University Press
    Perry, John 2001 Knowledge, Possibility, and ConsciousnessCambridge, MAMIT Press
    Perry, John 2001 Reference and ReflexivityStanford:CSLI Publications
    Perry, John 2002 Identity, Personal Identity and the SelfIndianapolis, INHackett Publishing
    Perry, John 2011
    Pollock, John L.Cruz, Joseph 1999 Contemporary Theories of KnowledgeOxfordRowman & Littlefield
    Prinz, Jesse J. 2004 Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of EmotionOxford University Press
    Prior, Arthur N. 1967 On spurious egocentricityPhilosophy 42 326
    Putnam, Hilary 1975 The meaning of ‘meaningPutnam, HilaryMind, Language and Reality, Philosophical PapersCambridge University Press215
    Rosenthal, David M. 1990 729
    Rosenthal, David M. 2002 Explaining consciousnessChalmers, David J.Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary and Classical ReadingsOxford University Press406
    Rosenthal, David M. 2004 Being conscious of ourselvesThe Monist 87 159
    Rosenthal, David M. 2004 Varieties of higher-order theoryGennaro, Rocco J.Higher-Order Theories of ConsciousnessAmsterdam and PhiladelphiaJohn Benjamins17
    Rosenthal, David M. 2005 Consciousness and MindOxfordClarendon Press
    Rosenthal, David M. 2011 How to think about mental qualitiesPhilosophical Issues 20
    Ross, Colin A. 1997 Multiple Personality Disorder: Diagnosis, Clinical Features, and TreatmentNew YorkJohn Wiley and Sons
    Rovane, Carol 1990 Branching self-consciousnessPhilosophical Review 99 355
    Ruby, PerrineDecety, Jean 2001 Effect of the subjective perspective taking during simulation of action: A PET investigation of agencyNature Neuroscience 4 546
    Rust, JoshuaSchwitzgebel, Eric
    Ryle, Gilbert 1949 The Concept of MindLondonHutchinson
    Sartre, Jean Paul 1939 NauseaAlexander, LloydNew York
    Sartre, Jean Paul 1969 Being and NothingnessBarnes, Hazel E.OxfordRoutledge
    Saul, JenniferUnconscious influences and women in philosophyJenkins, F.Hutchison, K.Women in PhilosophyNewcastle upon TyneCambridge Scholars Publishing
    Saxe, RebeccaPowell, Lindsey J. 2006 It is the thought that counts: Specific brain regions for one component of theory of mindPsychological Science 17 692
    Scanlon, Thomas 1998 What We Owe to Each OtherCambridge, MAHarvard University Press
    Schnider, Armin 2008 The Confabulating Mind: How the Brain Creates RealityOxford University Press
    Schueler, George F. 1995 Desire: Its Role in Practical Reason and the Explanation of ActionCambridge, MAMIT Press
    Schwitzgebel, Eric 2002 How well do we know our own conscious experience? The case of visual imageryJournal of Consciousness Studies 9 35
    Schwitzgebel, Eric 2002 A phenomenal, dispositional account of beliefNoûs 36 249
    Schwitzgebel, Eric 2008 The unreliability of naive introspectionPhilosophical Review 117 245
    Schwitzgebel, Eric 2010 Acting contrary to our professed beliefs, or the gulf between occurrent judgment and dispositional beliefPacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 531
    Schwitzgebel, Eric 2011 Perplexities of ConsciousnessCambridge, MAMIT Press
    Schwitzgebel, EricIntrospection, what?Smithies, DeclanStoljar, DanielIntrospection and ConsciousnessOxford University Press
    Schwitzgebel, EricGordon, Michael S. 2000 How well do we know our own experience? The case of human echolocationPhilosophical Topics 28 235
    Schwitzgebel, EricRust, Joshua
    Shoemaker, Sydney 1963 Self-knowledge and Self-identityIthaca, NYCornell University Press
    Shoemaker, Sydney 1968 Self-reference and self-awarenessJournal of Philosophy 65 555
    Shoemaker, Sydney 1970 Persons and their pastsAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 7 269
    Shoemaker, Sydney 1976 Embodiment and behaviorRorty, Amélie OksenbergThe Identities of PersonsBerkeley and Los AngelesUniversity of California Press109
    Shoemaker, Sydney 1986 Introspection and the selfFrench, Peter A.Vehling, Theodore E.Wettstein, Howard K.Studies in the Philosophy of Mind. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 101
    Shoemaker, Sydney 1988 On knowing one’s own mindPhilosophical Perspectives 2 183
    Shoemaker, Sydney 1994 Self-knowledge and ‘inner sense’Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 249
    Shoemaker, Sydney 1995 Moore’s paradox and self-knowledgePhilosophical Studies 77 211
    Shoemaker, Sydney 1996 The First-Person Perspective and Other EssaysCambridge University Press
    Shoemaker, Sydney 2003 Consciousness and co-consciousnessCleeremans, AxelThe Unity of Consciousness: Binding, Integration, and DissociationOxfordClarendon Press59
    Shoemaker, Sydney 2009 Careers and quareers: A reply to BurgePhilosophical Review 118 87
    Shynkaruk, Jody M.Thompson, Valerie A. 2006 Confidence and accuracy in deductive reasoningMemory and Cognition 34 619
    Sidelle, Alan 2002 Some episodes in the sameness of consciousnessPhilosophical Topics 30 269
    Smith, Michael 1994 The Moral ProblemOxfordBlackwell
    Spener, MajaBayne, Timothy 2010 Introspective humilitySosa, ErnestVillanueva, EnriquePhilosophical Issues 20 1
    Spinoza, Benedictus de 1677 EthicsCurley, EdwinPrinceton University Press
    Steinmayr, RicardaSpinath, Birgit 2009 What explains boys’ stronger confidence in their intelligenceSex Roles 61 736
    Strawson, Galen 1999 Self and body: Self, body, and experienceProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 73 307
    Strawson, Galen 2004 Against narrativityRatio 17 428
    Strawson, Galen 2009 Selves: An Essay in Revisionary MetaphysicsOxfordClarendon Press
    Strawson, Peter F. 1959 Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive MetaphysicsLondonMethuen & Co. Ltd
    Strawson, Peter F. 1966 The Bounds of SenseLondonMethuen & Co. Ltd
    Strawson, Peter F. 1994 210
    Taylor, Shelley E.Brown, Jonathon D. 1988 Illusion and well-being: A social psychological perspective on mental healthPsychological Bulletin 103 193
    Thomson, Judith Jarvis 2008 NormativityChicagoOpen Court
    Tsakiris, Manos 2010 My body in the brain: A neurocognitive model of body-ownershipNeuropsychologia 48 703
    Tsakiris, ManosHesse, MaikeBoy, ChristianHaggard, PatrickFink, Gereon R. 2007 Neural correlates of body-ownership: A sensory network for bodily self-consciousnessCerebral Cortex 17 2235
    Tunik, EugeneLo, On-YeeAdamovich, Sergei V. 2008 Transcranial magnetic stimulation to the frontal operculum and supramarginal gyrus disrupts planning of outcome-based hand-object interactionsJournal of Neuroscience 28 14422
    Vazire, Simine 2010 Who knows what about a person? The Self–Other Knowledge Asymmetry (SOKA) modelJournal of Personality and Social Psychology 98 281
    Vendler, Zeno 1972 Res Cogitans: An Essay in Rational PsychologyIthaca, NYCornell University Press
    Visser, Beth A.Ashton, Michael C.Vernon, Philip A. 2008 What makes you think you’re so smart? Measured abilities, personality, and sex differences in relation to self-estimates of multiple intelligencesJournal of Individual Differences 29 35
    Vosgerau, GottfriedNewen, Albert 2007 Thoughts, motor actions, and the selfMind & Language 22 22
    Wegner, Daniel M. 2002 The Illusion of Conscious WillCambridge, MAMIT Press
    Wegner, Daniel M.Wheatley, Thalia P. 1999 Apparent mental causation: Sources of the experience of willAmerican Psychologist 54 480
    Weisberg, Josh 2008 Same old, same old: The same-order representation theory of consciousness and the division of phenomenal laborSynthese 160 161
    Wiggins, David 1967 Identity and Spatio-Temporal ContinuityOxfordBasil Blackwell
    Williams, Bernard 1957 Personal identity and individuationProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57 229
    Williamson, Timothy 1995 Is knowing a state of mind?Mind 104 533
    Williamson, Timothy 2004 Armchair philosophy, metaphysical modality and counterfactual thinkingProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 1
    Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1958 The Blue and Brown BooksOxfordBasil Blackwell
    Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1974 Tractatus Logico-PhilosophicusPears, David F.McGuinness, Brian F.London and New YorkRoutledge
    Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1984 Notebooks: 1914–1916University of Chicago Press
    Wolpert, Daniel M.Ghahramani, ZoubinJordan, Michael I. 1995 An internal model for sensorimotor integrationScience 269 1880
    Xunzi, 2005 Cultivating oneselfHutton, EricIvanhoe, Philip J.Van Norden, Bryan W.Readings in Classical Chinese PhilosophyIndianapolisHackett261
    Yun, RichardKrystal, John H.Mathalon, Daniel H. 2010 Working memory overload: Fronto-limbic interactions and effects on subsequent working memory functionBrain Imaging and Behavior 4 96
    Zahavi, DanParnas, Josef 1998 Phenomenal consciousness and self-awareness: A phenomenological critique of representational theoryJournal of Consciousness Studies 5 687

    Metrics

    Altmetric attention score

    Full text views

    Total number of HTML views: 0
    Total number of PDF views: 0 *
    Loading metrics...

    Book summary page views

    Total views: 0 *
    Loading metrics...

    * Views captured on Cambridge Core between #date#. This data will be updated every 24 hours.

    Usage data cannot currently be displayed.

    Accessibility standard: Unknown

    Why this information is here

    This section outlines the accessibility features of this content - including support for screen readers, full keyboard navigation and high-contrast display options. This may not be relevant for you.

    Accessibility Information

    Accessibility compliance for the PDF of this book is currently unknown and may be updated in the future.