The notion of agreement in nature plays a pivotal function in Spinoza’s mature philosophy. In the Ethics (e.g., E4p32d), Spinoza consistently uses the Latin convenire and convenientia to express “agreement in nature” (see also cohaerentia and consentio in Letter 32). Its opposite is natura discrepare or disagreement in nature (e.g., E4p33). In general, there are three main contexts in which this notion occurs: (i) in the domain of epistemology, as Spinoza discusses the nature of “common notions” (E2p37–39); (ii) in the mixed domain (including ontology, psychology, and moral philosophy) of causal interactions between individuals and how their affects shape these interactions (e.g., E4p32–35); and (iii) in the political domain in which Spinoza discusses how agreement or harmony can be reached, supported, and defended within political bodies, societies, and institutions (e.g., E4p40; TP2.13–15).