This chapter compares the short-lived norm recognition in the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq war with the persistent norm recognition in the 1267 sanctions regime. Delegation to agents – weapons inspectors (Iraq) and the Ombudsperson (1267 sanctions regime) – played a significant role due to its consensual and potentially ongoing nature. The chapter thus focuses on how delegation affects the relative stability of norm recognition. The different problem structures both agents faced made the Ombudsperson more effective in managing norm contestation than the United Nations (UN) weapons inspectors: Certainty over the output legitimacy of its work and compliance constituencies that exert social pressure on the UN Security Council (UNSC) to continue delegating have made it easier to build a reputation as credible and effective. While norm recognition persists, the indirect costs of delegation for the UNSC have led to tensions in the delegation relationship, rendering resolution of the claim disagreement between the UNSC and European Court of Justice (ECJ) unlikely. Moreover, the chapter shows that contestation over the 2003 Iraq war reduced the clarity, and thus the social strength, of chapter VII norms, but contestation increased the social strength of due process rights in targeted sanctions. The effect on relative norm strength is more difficult to determine due to the claim disagreement.