This chapter demonstrates that a correct understanding of Kant’s argument for the bindingness of the moral law in Groundwork III succeeds. Through his critique of the conditions of the possibility of the act of willing, Kant demonstrates that any act of the will involves our activity as intelligences. This includes action in accordance with hypothetical imperatives, which involves the capacity to understand what is required in order for us to influence the world and so act in it; it requires the capacity to act in accordance with laws. Kant characterizes his argument in Groundwork III as a deduction answering the question: With what right we are bound by the categorical imperative? It proceeds in three essential steps: an analysis of (1) negative freedom and the logical conditions of judgment in all practical principles; (2) moral valuation and the problem of the circle, and (3) positive freedom as implied in the act of reflection as the self understands itself as acting in accordance with the idea of laws. When we so act, we transfer ourselves into the world of intelligences and must assume the conditions of membership in such a world. These include being bound by the moral law.