from Part IV - Experimental Comparisons of Auction Designs
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 October 2017
Introduction
During the discussion and evaluation of proposals for the design of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) mechanism to sell the spectrum, over 130 auctions were run under controlled conditions at Caltech for the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), the FCC, and others. While these data were used in those debates, we do not intend to relive that process here. Instead, in this paper, we reexamine these data and try to extract some useful information for those who may, in the future, be involved in the difficult task of creating mechanisms to auction multiple items.
The two major design questions we can say something about are (1) should the items be auctioned off sequentially or simultaneously? and (2) should package bidding be allowed? Ourmain conclusion is that, over a very wide range of environments, package bidding mechanisms (weakly) dominate simultaneous mechanisms, which in turn (weakly) dominate sequential mechanisms. This conclusion is based on three observations derived from a close look at the data.
First, in environments with multiple items to be allocated, if those items are homogeneous and substitutes, then little coordination between buyers is needed and the only role of the mechanism is to sort bidders with high values from bidders with low values. Both the sequential and simultaneous mechanisms seem to work very well at finding efficient allocations in these “easy” environments.
Second, in environments with multiple items to be allocated, if those items are heterogeneous, then some coordination among bidders is necessary to achieve high-value allocations even if there are only low synergy values. Simultaneous auctions provide a first step at this coordination that sequential auctions might have difficulty in providing.
Third, in environments with heterogeneous goods exhibiting complementarities, significant coordination is required for an auction or allocation mechanism to perform well with respect to efficiency or revenue. Sequential auctions perform poorly. Simultaneity is clearly necessary but not sufficient to attain high efficiencies.
To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.
To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.
To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.