In this chapter Soviet strategy in practice is viewed through the lens of Soviet interventions within the Soviet bloc: East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. The Kremlin’s struggle for justifying interventions within the socialist bloc provides an interesting analysis of the decision making, objectives, priorities and means of Soviet intervention, while also allowing an examination of the extent to which the Soviet leadership learnt from previous mistakes. The interventions illustrate an interesting kind of progression from unilateral decision making in 1953 to consultation of Soviet allies within the Warsaw Pact, and beyond in 1956 to a so-called ‘coalition of the willing’ of five Warsaw Pact countries, which collectively intervened in Czechoslovakia in August 1968. Concerns for the security and integrity of the Soviet bloc as well as fears for a domino-effect of unrest spilling over into neighbouring Warsaw Pact countries informed Soviet decision making. This chapter accordingly also argues that the Kremlin was increasingly reluctant to intervene, as shown in the Solidarnosc trade union crisis in Poland in 1980–1981. The chapter concludes with a brief comparison with the motives and methods of Russian president Vladimir Putin to invade Ukraine in 24 February 2022.