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The institutional design of NJMs varies considerably in the manner they enable, empower or constrain worker and community struggles. Whereas the UNGPs effectiveness criteria, along with other key contributions to the NJM design literature, emphasise the importance of procedural fairness, across the cases we studied purely procedural efforts were insufficient to address the deep imbalances of power between business actors and aggrieved communities. However, in some cases, these imbalances were ameliorated by aspects of institutional design that the UNGPs effectiveness criteria leave implicit: the financial and human resources the NJM can mobilise, the authority it can command and the extent to which its design enhances its capacity to exercise leverage in support of human rights redress. Even where the NJM’s design provides leverage, NJM staff frequently hesitate to flex institutional muscle for fear of jeopardising crucial resources and relationships. As such, the usefulness of transnational NJMs’ interventions often depends crucially also on factors beyond institutional design, namely the extent to which aggrieved communities are able to draw on and effectively deploy other forms of leverage and influence.
When NJMs fail to deliver remedy, criticism is often first levelled against their institutional design: the policies, processes and powers that characterise their operations. Chapter 2 interrogates literatures that conceptualise and critique effective design, primarily theories of non-judicial governance and regulation within the business and human rights scholarship focused on NJMs and approaches captured under the term ‘new governance’. Four elements of institutional design receive particular emphasis in these literatures: efforts to establish accessible and fair non-judicial procedures, processes that support socialisation and learning, strong institutional capacity and resourcing and provisions to help motivate businesses to engage with non-judicial redress processes. This scholarship, though, often overlooks important areas of ambiguity, firstly, whether and how design can encompass and respond to the divergent purposes and aims that animate grievance claims and, secondly, implications for institutional design that arise from recognising the embedding of regulatory and redress processes in broader, and highly unequal, social relations.
What can economists and lawyers contribute to the stock of useful knowledge for designing institutions? How do their contributions differ? I argue that law and economics generate two complementary but distinct types of knowledge. At its core, legal knowledge is participatory and internal to law’s practice, while economic knowledge is observational and external. Drawing on Michael Polanyi’s concept of ‘intellectual orders’, I propose that economics as a social science and law as a primarily practical profession each rely on complex institutions to generate their respective types of knowledge. The comparative analysis clarifies the potential and limits of using economics for institutional design, the role of law as a knowledge-generating profession, and principles for intellectual collaboration.
Some propose that states tie hands by signing alliance treaties. The presence of an alliance treaty increases the audience costs of violating a commitment to defend another state, having the effect of tying hands. This chapter argues that states prefer to keep their hands untied to make it easier to avoid getting drawn into the wrong wars. Accordingly, when states design alliance treaties, they routinely include flexibility language in the treaties that enable them to stay out of conflicts involving embattled allies without violating the treaty, thereby reducing or avoiding the audience costs of abandoning an ally. The chapter demonstrates that all alliances since 1945 include such flexibility language, including alliances signed by the US and Soviet Union/Russia. Further, the chapter demonstrates that in every single post-1945 case when a state allegedly abandoned an embattled ally, the flexibility language of the treaty means that the decision to stay out of the conflict did not technically violate the treaty. On the rare occasions when states want to tie hands more tightly to bolster deterrence, they make verbal statements that de facto reduce the flexibility of the alliance treaty, though such verbal statements are crafted to tie hands minimally.
As the UNCITRAL Working Group III is deliberating on an appellate mechanism for investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), this article analyzes the debate surrounding the necessity and feasibility of such an appellate mechanism. It highlights the political and practical issues in establishing such an appellate mechanism, drawing on its comparison with the WTO Appellate Body. Emphasizing the need to balance the interests of developed and developing countries, this article argues that the absence of a structured method in the existing proposals to evaluate equal representation and fairness in the institutional design for the appellate mechanism poses significant challenges. The article makes specific proposals to address such challenges as the financial burden on developing countries, the risk of procedural delays, and the requirement for impartial and diverse tribunal composition. These considerations underscore the critical need to balance party autonomy with centralized oversight and ensure that procedural reforms do not unintentionally disadvantage developing nations.
This chapter considers questions of immigration institutional design in light of lessons learned from how Caribbean home-care aides currently work and travel. The growth in paid home care has been largely staffed by migrant labor – with some care workers operating outside of the scope of their visas. While these workers may technically be noncompliant, the author argues that most of these workers are in fact “good types,” who would have been favorably screened ex-ante for elder-care visas. The chapter proposes that we urgently devise a system that permits temporary entry of elder-care workers. If migrant care workers are permitted long-term temporary visas in which they can work in the US for a few months per year over several years, they have every incentive to comply.
Guarantor institutions (such as electoral commissions and anti-corruption watchdogs, which supposedly comprise the so-called ‘fourth’ or ‘integrity’ branch of the state) are increasingly of interest to constitutional scholars. In a given political context, a guarantor institution is a tailor-made constitutional institution, vested with material as well as expressive capacities, whose function is to provide a credible and enduring guarantee to a specific non-self-enforcing constitutional norm (or any aspect thereof). Arguing that guarantor institutions are more trustee-like than agent-like in character, this chapter defends the claim that the design of any guarantor institutions should seek to ensure that it has: (i) sufficient expertise and capacity to perform its functions effectively; (ii) sufficient independence from political, economic, or social actors with an interest in frustrating the relevant norm it is meant to guarantee; and (iii) sufficient accountability to bodies with an interest in upholding the relevant norm.
This chapter identifies three shortcomings in our preparedness for the governance of future worlds of consumers and AI. If our governance is to be smart, there must first be a systematic gathering of regulatory intelligence (to understand what does and does not work). AI givernance will require new institutions that are geared for the kind of conversations that humans will need to have in the future to adjust to a radically different approach to governance
Carbon neutrality cannot be achieved without different economic sectors, individuals and households, and the government making serious efforts. Green finance in different forms including environmental, social and governance investment and carbon emissions trading are used to measure the reduction in carbon emissions and place a monetary value on them. However, because of inconsistencies or even manipulation in the monitoring/measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) of air quality and carbon emissions data, the effectiveness of green finance has been largely compromised. Environmental MRV is a technology-based engineering task, which is also heavily impacted by institutional design and professionalism. This commentary will draw upon principal–agent theory and the practical arrangements of environmental MRV to discuss why professionalism is badly needed and how to bridge the missing link for achieving carbon neutrality and sustainability transitions.
Examining oral argument in the Australian High Court and comparing to the U.S. Supreme Court, this article shows that institutional design drives judicial interruptive behavior. Many of the same individual- and case-level factors predict oral argument behavior. Notably, despite orthodoxy of the High Court as “apolitical,” ideology strongly predicts interruptions, just as in the United States. Yet, important divergent institutional design features between the two apex courts translate into meaningful behavioral differences, with the greater power of the Chief Justice resulting in differences in interruptions. Finally, gender effects are lower and only identifiable with new methodological techniques we develop and apply.
Competition policy is one important aspect of trade liberalization. However, when examining preferential trade agreements (PTAs), a major type of policy tools to liberalize trade, competition provisions are revealed not to be uniformly distributed across these treaties. What explains the variation in the design of competition clauses in PTAs? Borrowing insights from the rational design of international institutions and combining them with those from treaty ratification and policy diffusion literatures, I identify five major causal mechanisms through which competition provisions are incorporated into PTAs. In evaluating them, I employ a range of operationalization techniques to capture the proposed mechanisms. A treaty-level analysis of 319 PTAs over the period 1960–2015 lends strong and robust support to most of the hypothesized relationships. By integrating theoretical frameworks across international political economy literatures with that from law and economics scholarship, this study demonstrates the utility of political science thinking to the real-world international law-making.
Chapter 7 assesses the overall findings of the book and provides outlooks and perspectives. The responses of international institutions to transformative novel technologies are mostly deficient in that they do not meaningfully contribute either to the realization of associated technological promises or to the avoidance of perils. Exceptions do exist, however, particularly where transformative novel technologies have a strong normative fit with pre-existing regulatory frameworks and can thus be assimilated by them with relative ease. The chapter also offers broader reflections on how to improve institutional responses to transformative novel technologies and then goes on to elaborate on some conceptual issues that have emerged in the previous discussion: from technology and path dependence to the role of the precautionary principle to the potential problem of ‘slippery slope’ effects in research and development. The chapter then tentatively discusses how the theoretical framework of this book would apply beyond the environmental domain. I conclude with some final considerations on the notion of ‘techno-fixes’ in the global politics of environmental sustainability.
Economic accounts of repugnance concern two broad questions: the rationalisation of sentiments of repugnance (do emotional and visceral reactions of repugnance track valid reasons for not engaging in or condemning certain (trans)actions?) and institutional design (how to institute, regulate, or restrict markets in response to reasonable objections). If repugnance expresses valid practical reasons for regulating or limiting markets, our institutions should acknowledge and express these. If attitudes of repugnance are not rationalisable in the sense of instrumental or moral values, we should disregard or eventually counteract or reduce them. Focusing on a special case of repugnance, when commodification, i.e., the sale of goods or services for money meets societal disapproval, this paper identifies three characteristic ways to combine conceptual, empirical, and normative arguments and map repugnance into a disciplinary ‘epistemic frame’ of economics: repugnance as taste; repugnance as proxy for market failures or moral reasons; repugnance as hypocrisy or contingent cultural fact. Correspondingly, economists advise to (1) work around; (2) make sense of; and (3) explain away people's sentiments of repugnance.
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) uses a chamber system to more efficiently decide cases. To what extent, and under what conditions, does the CJEU’s chamber system undermine the consistency of the Court’s application of EU law? This paper contributes to the literature on the internal organization of collegial courts by presenting a computational formal model that predicts (a) that hearing cases in smaller chambers undermines the consistency of the Court’s application of EU law and (b) that the magnitude of this effect is larger when judges’ preferences are more heterogeneous and smaller when plaintiffs strategically bring cases. Based on these findings, I use machine learning and empirical data on CJEU judgments in infringement cases to estimate the degree to which we should expect the chamber system to undermine the consistency of the CJEU’s application of EU law in practice.
Chapter 7 concludes Making International Institutions Work. It opens with a brief review of the main findings and the role of each stage of the empirical investigation in establishing them. I then discuss the book’s contributions to international relations, international political economy, and political science as well as other fields of social science. The third section draws out lessons for policy and practice. I identify a variety of stakeholder-specific strategies for safeguarding policy autonomy and promoting accountability reforms, contributing to a lively ongoing debate among academics and practitioners over how to achieve an effective and accountable global institutional architecture. Finally, I reflect on the book’s implications for some notable emerging issues in global governance – including responding to international crises and challenges to the modern liberal order – outlining promising avenues for further research.
This chapter elaborates the book’s theoretical framework. It proceeds in three stages. First, based on a microfoundational analysis of the incentives facing states and international bureaucrats, I make the case that the former are more liable than the latter to engage in opportunistic behavior that imperils institutional performance. Second, I flesh out the concept of policy autonomy, explaining how its different components provide the basis for gains in performance and why it cannot be reliably established and maintained through institutional design. Third, I explore the true origins of policy autonomy, elaborating the causal mechanisms by which (certain types of) operational alliances and governance tasks insulate bureaucrats against state capture. The chapter concludes by summarizing the framework’s observable implications at the macro and micro levels.
Why do some international institutions succeed and others fail? This opening chapter introduces the subject of Making International Institutions Work. It begins by describing the motivation behind the book, presenting striking examples of differences in the performance of international institutions, explaining why such variation is puzzling for conventional theories of international cooperation, and highlighting its growing substantive importance. I then define the book’s two central concepts – international institutions and institutional performance – clarifying the precise scope of my analysis. This is followed by a brief review and critique of relevant literature. The last three sections provide an overview of the book’s argument, research design, and structure.
International institutions are essential for tackling many of the most urgent challenges facing the world, from pandemics to humanitarian crises, yet we know little about when they succeed, when they fail, and why. This book proposes a new theory of institutional performance and tests it using a diverse array of sources, including the most comprehensive dataset on the topic. Challenging popular characterizations of international institutions as 'runaway bureaucracies,' Ranjit Lall argues that the most serious threat to performance comes from the pursuit of narrow political interests by states – paradoxically, the same actors who create and give purpose to institutions. The discreet operational processes through which international bureaucrats cultivate and sustain autonomy vis-à-vis governments, he contends, are critical to making institutions 'work.' The findings enhance our understanding of international cooperation, public goods, and organizational behavior while offering practical lessons to policymakers, NGOs, businesses, and citizens interested in improving institutional effectiveness.
In Chapter 11, John Patty draws on recent developments in behavioral economics to consider how political overseers, such as congressional oversight committees or agency heads, can deal with the extraordinary complexity of their job. Modern political organizations are composed of a hoard of individuals making innumerable choices, so how can overseers make sense of it? Patty introduces the concept of bracketing – how principals and agents group choices to compare among them when contemplating actions. Bracketing can affect how principals such as congressional members evaluate the consequences of bureaucratic behavior, the flow of evaluative information available to such principals, and the incentives for government officials to allocate or misallocate their efforts. Patty discusses how bracketing may influence features of institutional design, centralization of authority, and specialization. Additionally, bracketing has implications for policy evaluation and planning.
Schelling (1969, 1971a,b, 1978) observed that macro-level patterns do not necessarily reflect micro-level intentions, desires or goals. In his classic model on neighborhood segregation which initiated a large and influential literature, individuals with no desire to be segregated from those who belong to other social groups nevertheless wind up clustering with their own type. Most extensions of Schelling’s model have replicated this result. There is an important mismatch, however, between theory and observation, which has received relatively little attention. Whereas Schelling-inspired models typically predict large degrees of segregation starting from virtually any initial condition, the empirical literature documents considerable heterogeneity in measured levels of segregation. This paper introduces a mechanism that can produce significantly higher levels of integration and, therefore, brings predicted distributions of segregation more in line with real-world observation. As in the classic Schelling model, agents in a simulated world want to stay or move to a new location depending on the proportion of neighbors they judge to be acceptable. In contrast to the classic model, agents’ classifications of their neighbors as acceptable or not depend lexicographically on recognition first and group type (e.g., ethnic stereotyping) second. The FACE-recognition model nests classic Schelling: When agents have no recognition memory, judgments about the acceptability of a prospective neighbor rely solely on his or her group type (as in the Schelling model). A very small amount of recognition memory, however, eventually leads to different classifications that, in turn, produce dramatic macro-level effects resulting in significantly higher levels of integration. A novel implication of the FACE-recognition model concerns the large potential impact of policy interventions that generate modest numbers of face-to-face encounters with members of other social groups.