This chapter focuses on Cicero’s treatment of the emotions in Books 3 and 4, and more specifically on his account of the dispute between the Stoics and the Peripatetics. At first sight, the dispute seems uncomplicated: the Stoics advocate the complete absence of emotions whereas the Peripatetics hold that emotions should rather be moderated or controlled. But Cicero’s stress on the idea that emotions are beliefs seems to come at the expense of other central parts of the theory of emotions, most prominently the theory of action.  I argue that these features of his presentation serve him in securing a thesis that he is keen to defend in Book 5: that virtue guarantees happiness and that this happiness is invulnerable to the accidents of fortune.

This chapter considers more platform-specific forms, exploiting possibilities such as the ready integration of emoji on X/Twitter or the integration with audio and video on TikTok. We focus on the expression of emotional meanings and stance, and also pay attention to the co-construction of memetic discourse by multiple discourse participants in online exchanges. Overall, we suggest that the easy transfer across platforms and modes reveals a kind of memetic mindset in which discourse takes shape online, even where this does not necessarily involve fully formed or identifiable memes in a strict sense.

Values permeate every aspect of our lives, shaping individual actions and giving meaning, direction and scope to our work environments and organisational cultures. Defining positive behaviours and identifying unprofessional, disrespectful or negative behaviours shape and define every aspect of our work and personal lives. Values also have an emotional component: when we act in accordance with our values, we experience positive emotions; conversely, when we act against our values or are placed in situations that compromise our values, we experience emotional dissonance. It is this emotional component that drives us to seek values alignment in our personal and professional lives.

To be compassionate is to care about others specifically in opposition to their suffering or deficiency. While the distress of compassion is paradigmatic of the virtue, a wide range of emotion types – gratitude, anger, fear, joy, and so forth – can express it. Aristotle offers an analysis of the emotion of compassion as entailing propositions (1) that the other is suffering, (2) that the other doesn’t deserve the suffering, and (3) that oneself is vulnerable to the kind of suffering one sees in the other. In dialogue with Martha Nussbaum’s exposition and adaptation of Aristotle’s analysis of the emotion of compassion, this chapter compares Aristotelian compassion with the compassion that is commended in the New Testament. Differences between the two turn on differences in the concept of suffering, in the presence of a concept of forgiveness, and in the locus of commonality.

How are virtues constituted psychologically? The virtues of caring or substantive virtues are dispositional concerns for the good in its various aspects: the well-being of people and other animals, the avoidance or relief of their suffering, the reconciliation of enemies, knowledge and truth, justice, proper formation of sensual desire and pleasure, and one’s duties. Generosity, compassion, forgivingness, justice, and the sense of duty are examples of virtues constituted by such caring. Because the caring is virtuous only if directed to real goods, the concerns need to be shaped by correct thought (understanding). The virtues of caring divide into direct (for example, generosity) and indirect (for example, justice). Another class of virtues – the enkratic – are powers, abilities, or skills of self-management. These, too, require understanding – of self and how to manage it in the various situations and influences of life. Examples are self-control, courage, patience, and perseverance.

Chapter 2 explores the developmental psychology of metaphor and its significance for illness experience. While semiotics of medicine implies a simple link between physiological processes and symptom reports, illness experience is articulated through metaphors that are grounded in bodily experience, social interaction, discourse, and cultural practices. Bodily grounding of metaphor is based on sensorimotor equivalences, as seen early in development in synesthesia and cross-modal analogies. Social grounding resides in the pragmatics of language in which context and goals depend on social roles, norms, and cultural meaning. Despite this, metaphors allow for creative play by requiring only piecemeal correspondences to the world through ostension. The meaning of metaphors is then found not in representation but in presentation. Clinical examples illustrate a patient on dialysis refusing a blood transfusion and a woman with medically unexplained floating sensations, showing how a semantics of metaphor can clarify the tensions between the essential irrationality of illness experience and the biomedical presumption of rationality in normative accounts of illness cognition and behavior.

Chapter 5 explores the effects of identity strategies. In this chapter, an intersectional approach illuminates the parameters of identity and affect that define the universal citizen. The chapter argues that when activists embody identity strategies in public events, activists politicize the terms of personhood and citizenship, giving rights a specific, embodied form. The chapter first examines Free Gender’s deployment of their strategy of commensurability during their participation in memorial services for deceased lesbians. It shows how memorial services are a moment when members of the organization can provide support to the deceased’s family, the local community, and each other. By embodying the confluence of the identities of lesbian, African, and community member during this community activity, the organization challenges dominant notions of who is entitled to the right to live free of violence. The chapter then examines La Fulana’s participation in the annual Pride march in Buenos Aires. The deployment of lesbian visibility challenges the gendered and heteronormative parameters of the ideal citizen through lesbians’ embodied enjoyment and pleasure in public activity. The chapter concludes by considering the importance of embodiment and emotional context to the successful deployment of identity strategies.

The same developmental principles account for both normal and disturbed development. Disturbed behavior too is coherent and meaningful. Psychopathology is an outcome of development. This applies to common problems such as idealization or over-control; childhood disturbances such as ADHD; and to extreme symptoms, such as the stereotypes of autistic children and the dissociation and thought disturbances of adults. All of these become more understandable when looked at through the lens of meaning.

Coalescing developments in brain, mind, and body bring about qualitative changes in all aspects of the teenager’s life, with both great advantages and challenges. Being able to imagine how things could be, and seeing multiple possibilities, can lead to idealism or cynicism. Teens are aware of the complexity of thought and feeling and know that neither they nor others are always aware of motives. Along with a profound sense of uniqueness, they have the capacity to connect with others in a deeper, more intimate way and to be involved in a complex network of relationships. At the same time, they can feel alone in dealing with emotions at a new level of complexity. To thrive during this period they must be able to tolerate a level of vulnerability never before experienced, because they know others may be thinking about them and seeing beneath the surface of their behavior, just as they can.

The power of meaning is revealed in diverse arenas from health and wellbeing, to economics, to the way children engage their worlds, to the organized worldviews of adults. The goal of this book is to go beyond past work on meaning and social relationships by considering comprehensive developmental data at each phase of life that was not previously available.