In this chapter, we lay out the basic frame for studying innovation management. To do so, we are going to try to understand why innovation is important for society, for companies, and for individuals, and to do that we take our point of departure in the “urtext” of innovation research, namely Schumpeter’s work on Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy and especially the notion of Creative Destruction. To follow that up, we are going to untangle how innovation management fits within a broader context of capitalism as an economic system, within a particular ideology, and within the operations of the modern corporation.

The final chapter concludes with broader implications. After recapping how the previous chapters fit together to form a larger window on social control beyond coercion, it scrutinizes the limits of political atomization with a focus on perverse outcomes that result from the accumulated effects of individualization. Next are implications for China for inequality, the economy, migrant welfare and citizenship, and the authoritarian state’s social control toolbox. China is not alone in using political atomization, and a comparative perspective can spur future research on how the phenomenon already exists in not only other developing and authoritarian countries but also in democracies and developed countries. It ends with an examination of inequality and the state, noting that individual-level schemes are no match for systemic deflection and demobilization to address the entrenchment of inequality in social policy.

The Introduction explains what East Asia is and how it is defined here: which is culturally, primarily in terms of shared use of the Chinese writing system, shared institutional models, Confucianism, and common forms of Buddhism. It argues that East Asia has changed greatly over time and is internally diverse, but that there are also important commonalities and continuities. The relatively recent origins of some traditions are also discussed. East Asias global importance and continued relevance are emphasized.

The private sector is virtually nonexistent in Indian country. Consequently, reservations experience chronically high rates of unemployment and poverty. Tribes have implemented numerous laws to foster development; however, the private sector is yet to thrive. Legal uncertainty is a major reason why. Although tribes have the ability to make their own laws, the Supreme Court limits tribes’ ability to exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians. In 1981, the Supreme Court held tribes can exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians who enter a consensual relationship with the tribe or its citizens, and tribes can also assert jurisdiction over non-Indians engaged in behavior that imperils tribal welfare. These categories have been construed extremely narrowly. Furthermore, determining whether a transaction is subject to tribal jurisdiction often requires years of costly litigation. Another impediment to tribal economic development is state taxation because the Supreme Court permits states to tax Indian country commerce. This means tribes cannot collect taxes because this would result in dual taxation. Without tax revenue, tribes struggle to fund the infrastructure businesses need. Additionally, it is often unclear whether the state can regulate an activity in Indian country. As a result of these factors, businesses avoid Indian country.

In a rights-based legal system, a government may justly condemn property on two main distinct grounds. The eminent domain power authorizes governments to take private property upon payment of just compensation, if the taken property is going to be used by the government or by the public at large. Governments may also condemn and redistribute private property under the police power, primarily when doing so seems clearly likely to secure an average reciprocity of advantage to all the affected owners. If a government action does not satisfy either set of standards, however, it constitutes a violation of property rights. This chapter applies the justifications it studies to familiar disputes about irrigation systems, the creation of dams and mills, the acquisition of land for mining rights of way, urban renewal programs, the redistribution of land in Hawaii to deal with oligopoly, and the redistribution of land to facilitate economic development in Kelo v. New London (2005). This chapter also considers the skeptical view holding that it is impossible to distinguish between police regulation and eminent domain or between public and private uses.

Politicians in all democracies have goods to distribute, and they employ different modes of distribution to deliver them. They can offer voters goods in the hope those goods turn into votes. Alternatively, they can try to make the distribution of a good conditional on how someone votes. The latter mode is clientelism. I point out that the literature on clientelism has been preoccupied with the idea that politicians form clientelistic relationships with individuals. This has led to an intense scholarly focus on how politicians can consummate such vote buying deals to their satisfaction, given that the secret ballot prevents them from observing how people vote. I argue that under a certain configuration of political institutions, it makes sense for politicians to form clientelistic relationships with groups of voters. To do so, a politician’s electoral district must be divisible into groups of voters, at which electoral support is observable and to which resources are targetable. I take four longstanding questions of interest in the clientelism literature, concerning brokers, economic development, democratic integrity, and club goods and explain how the theory of group-based clientelism opens up new lines of inquiry in each.

This chapter offers an introduction to Making India Work. It presents a snapshot of India’s welfare regime today and outlines its distinctive features in comparative perspective. The chapter establishes that the development of social policies has been a significant component of the building of India’s national economy and polity. Historical decisions have had longer-term implications for the shape and size of the country’s social provision, yet social policy has been curiously marginalised within classic scholarship on India’s political economy. The introductory chapter defines the term ‘welfare regime’ as distinct from a ‘welfare state’ and introduces the analytical tools necessary to identify the components of a welfare regime in a context of high economic informality. It provides an overview of methods and historical sources and summarises the book’s main arguments before providing an outline of the book structure.

While national rules regarding the scope, availability and issuance of utility models vary from country to country, most utility model regimes offer protection for tangible products, with many, but not all, jurisdictions excluding processes, biological materials and computer software from the scope of protection. The duration of utility model protection ranges from five to fifteen years, with most countries offering ten years of protection. In most countries, utility model applications are not formally examined and must simply disclose the product in question. Given the lack of examination, obtaining utility models is generally viewed as faster and cheaper than obtaining patents. This combination of speed and cost, in theory, makes utility models potentially attractive to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) that cannot afford to obtain full patent protection. Similar considerations have also been raised as advantageous to innovators in low-income countries.

This chapter provides an overview of the origins, expansion and reform of India’s welfare regime since the early twentieth century. It outlines the contributions of the book to wider literatures on the histories and politics of social policy in developing countries. The chapter demonstrates interventions in three bodies of literature: firstly, to histories of labour and of the mid twentieth-century democratic and developmental Indian state at the interstices of the colonial and postcolonial eras; secondly, to the literature on the political economy of democracy and development in postcolonial India; thirdly, to the comparative politics literature on welfare regimes beyond Europe and North America. The chapter highlights three factors for their role in shaping the nature of India’s welfare regime over the past century: firstly, the changing shape of India’s model of capitalism; secondly, the gradual deepening of democratic participation; and thirdly, the multi-level territorial articulation of both capitalism and electoral politics.

The global landscape for existing utility model rights is a helpful starting point to the discussion on utility model innovation policy at the country-level as well as firm strategy. WIPO data indicates that approximately 3.0 million utility model applications were filed globally in 2022, a growth rate of 2.9% from the previous year and close to the global total of 3.5 million applications for standard patents. Only about one-half of the world’s countries provide for utility model systems, yet companies from around the world acquire these rights. Utility models are important players in the IP environment, and the unique qualities of the system and differential representation require specific analysis. In this chapter, we review existing empirical data and present additional data regarding UM filings and litigation worldwide. Our purpose is to provide background and context for the more detailed discussion in the remaining chapters in this book.

The UN General Assembly, a body including representatives of all UN member governments, serves as the primary forum for defining a better world order through peaceful change. It has endorsed programs of peaceful change at all levels of ambition at different times and on different issues. Much of its activity has focused on the minimalist goal of averting or ending particular wars. On other issues, most notably decolonization, national economic development, and adding environmental concerns to the intergovernmental agenda, it has contributed to incremental change in the states system. Yet the limits on what governments would endorse became clear on issues such as human rights where changes would affect domestic political orders. The end of the Cold War and related domestic-level political changes provided the context for higher ambition, which peaked in 2005 when the General Assembly endorsed the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The SDGs offered a vision of deep peace in which universal respect for human rights, human development, and human security prevail within ecologically sustainable societies. Yet the subsequent spread of authoritarian rule within states and increased geopolitical tensions between major states have reinforced governments’ traditional approaches to states system, reducing the ambition of programs for peaceful change.

Chapter Two focuses on the long-term effects of foreign direct investment at the subnational level in less developed peripheral regions. It identifies the different types and mechanisms of foreign direct investment in more developed (core) regions and less developed (peripheral) regions. It argues that positive long-term development effects of foreign direct investment in host regions depend on linkages between foreign-owned and domestic firms and spillovers from foreign-owned to domestic firms. It argues that in the long run, foreign direct investment tends to benefit core regions more than peripheral regions. Chapter Two also critically evaluates the most important conceptual approaches to foreign direct investment in peripheral regions developed in economic geography since the 1970s, namely the branch plant economy and truncation, new regionalism, new international division of labor and spatial divisions of labor, and the global production networks perspective.

Chapter One reviews the history of foreign direct investment in less developed world regions and less developed countries and considers the empirical evidence about its effects on economic development. It critically evaluates main theoretical and conceptual perspectives on the effects of foreign direct investment in less developed countries. I argue two main points. First, the empirical evidence points strongly towards very uneven and limited positive long-term development effects of foreign direct investment in less developed countries. Second, mainstream and heterodox approaches to foreign direct investment came to contrasting conclusions about its potential long-term development effects in less developed countries.

This chapter shows that child labor is common in most countries with sweatshops but that most children don’t work in manufacturing – most work in agriculture or the service sector. Thus, calls to ban imported sweatshop goods made using child labor ends up shifting even more children into agriculture and services where pay is often lower and work less safe. The chapter argues that the process of economic development that raises average incomes has been the main cure for child labor. Anti–child labor laws typically codify improvements that market competition already achieved.