To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
In the wake of the boycott, the British govenment strengthened the warrant chief system, gathered intelligence on these communities to reorganize them into discrete, governable units. Reorganization was carried out in the context of interwar colonial development policy, which sought to increase the efficiency and productivity of the colonies. The British government coerced Africans across their colonies to engage in waged labor, in order to pay taxes and contribute to local development initiatives. In the Niger Delta, ethnic competition was used as a mechanism by which colonial development was distributed. Paramount chieftaincy increased a community’s ability to access colonial resources, contributing to a proliferation of new chieftaincy titles in competition for these resources. The case of the Olu title among the Itsekiri people is exemplary of these developments.
The communities of the western Niger Delta, in the midst of economic turmoil, confronted the British colonial government’s effort to integrate them into the wider colonial economy with a boycott on palm oil exports in 1927. Taxation was the primary instrument of incorporation for the British government, and Niger Delta community’s primary form of leverage against taxation was a systemic boycott. Beyond taxation, these communities resented the imposition of warrant chiefs, who were tasked with enforcing taxation and carrying out local administration of the courts (another vital source of income for the colonial government). The 1927 boycott succeeded in slowing down the palm oil trade. It was also part of a broader pattern of resistance in the palm-producing region across southern Nigeria. This widespread resistance indicated the lack of knowledge and control the colonial state had regarding these communities, and the need to impose stronger mechanisms of contol, through the warrant chiefs, increased surveilance and policing, and by exploiting ethnic differences.
Chapter 4 explores how fiscal policy and questions of national security play on stage. Fiscal concerns pervade Shakespeare’s history plays. All of his sovereigns wrestle with the need to fund security in the face of ongoing domestic and international threats, and all of them have to confront ongoing fiscal discontent. This chapter shows how security dilemmas are at the heart of controversies that drive English history as Shakespeare understands it. Rulers’ ongoing efforts to cover the expenses associated with implementing security coupled with subjects’ resentment at having to pay for their sovereign’s decisions opens up the terms of security and collective wellbeing for collective scrutiny. By depicting a multiplicity of voices and perspectives on collective existence, Shakespeare foregrounds fiscal controversies and the alternative visions of security and collective life such controversies prompt. These plays immerse theatergoers in an underdetermined world defined by antagonism, conflict, geopolitical struggle, and political inventiveness.
Chapter 3 demonstrates the centrality of fiscal infrastructures to the action of Marlowe’s plays. His Tamburlaine plays, The Jew of Malta, and A Massacre at Paris all hinge on the agencies created by – and the violence associated with –wealth organized into treasuries. The protagonists of these plays – Tamburlaine, Barabas, and the Duke of Guise – draw attention to their own and others’ treasuries, and their stories underscore both the security and the volatility associated with treasuries in action. In each play, treasuries drive the action by creating security for some through extreme violence to others. For Marlowe, treasuries are central to his depiction of geopolitical existence. Fiscal realities, in turn, represent a primary formal mechanism impacting how Marlowe’s characters – and audiences – experience the antagonistic spaces of geopolitical existence. Marlowe’s awareness of the challenges of implementing sovereignty are thus central to his ongoing project of creating theatrical states of emergency.
Taxation was a central challenge for England's rulers during the Renaissance, and consequently became a major theme for some of the period's greatest writers. Through close readings of works by Thomas More, Christopher Marlowe, William Shakespeare, George Herbert, and John Milton, David Glimp reveals how these writers and others grappled with the period's expanding systems of taxation and changing understandings of collective security. Such debates involved questions of political obligation, what it meant to be safe, and the nature of political community itself. Challenging dominant understandings of Renaissance sovereignty, Glimp explores in greater detail than ever before how early modern authors thought about and engaged the fiscal realities of government. From Utopia to Paradise Lost, his groundbreaking analysis illuminates how Renaissance literature addressed concerns about fiscal policy, state power, and collective wellbeing and will appeal to scholars of Renaissance literature, political theory, and economic history alike.
This study considers why public abattoirs of the Republican era failed to function effectively and were unpopular with contemporaneous Chinese people. In the early twentieth century, Chinese officials began to rely on biomedical parameters to define safe food, a critical step in the modernization of social control strategies. Tianjin was among the first Chinese cities to launch government-run slaughterhouses that combined safety inspection with monopolized animal slaughtering. However, how such slaughterhouses operated has received little academic attention. The municipal authorities introduced a series of laws covering slaughterhouses’ construction and operations to ensure meat safety. However, Tianjin’s public slaughterhouses failed to uphold their new duties toward public health and even became menaces to urban sanitation. City officials lacked the ethics of modern public servants, and the slaughterhouses provided them new opportunities for rent-seeking practices. The collection of slaughter tax superseded meat safety inspection as the municipality’s primary concern, which undermined the effectiveness of food hygiene regulation. Therefore, city residents regarded the public slaughterhouses as predatory tax collectors. Taking Tianjin as an example, this article demonstrates the gap between the modernization of governmental agencies modeled on Western countries and the persistence of traditional, exploitive governing practices in Republican China.
The semiotic construction of corporate persons in law is key to the contemporary organization of global capitalism. The economic capacities enjoyed by corporations stem significantly from how the semiotics of corporate personhood work within domestic and international legal orders fundamentally designed for human persons. Signs (especially in documents—laws, incorporation papers, tax filings, etc.) construct corporations as legal persons—entities modeled on human persons yet differently bound to human embodiment. Corporations multiply themselves through the creation of legally independent corporate persons (“subsidiaries”), while unifying themselves through their control over these persons. Unlike human offspring, corporations’ corporate offspring are easily created, may take up residence in almost any jurisdiction, and always obey their parents. The paper will discuss the implications of these features of corporations with respect to tort liability, international trade, property, taxation, and private militaries.
Chapter 1 examines the fourteenth-century emergence of problems that drove fifteenth-century developments. When necessary, this chapter places those fourteenth-century problems in their twelfth- and thirteenth-century contexts. The problems were three. Firstly, there was the diminution of the town’s population caused by bubonic plague. Secondly, there was swelling municipal debt; its existence and the measures taken to reduce it exacerbated social antagonisms that fuelled the third problem, distrust. Between the 1340s and the 1390s, suspicion and hostility between burghers and merchants, on the one hand, and tradespeople, on the other, deepened and became dangerously acute.
For over half a century, discussion of the relationship between military finance, organisation, and state development has been dominated by the contested concept of a ‘military revolution’; the belief that there were one or a few periods of fundamental change that transformed both war and wider European history. More recently, this has been supplemented by the idea of smaller, but more frequent ‘revolutions in military affairs’ (RMAs) as individual military organisations respond to, or anticipate, changes made by their likely opponents. Technology is generally considered to drive both forms of ‘revolution’, as innovative weaponry and institutional practice transform war, rendering older models ineffective and obsolete. Change flows through a series of chain reactions, as states adapt to new conditions, modifying their structures to sustain and direct altered armed forces, and revising their forms of interaction with society both to extract the necessary resources and to legitimate their use in war-making.
Tax collection is difficult in low-income countries, and bureaucracies exist alongside non-state actors that extract revenue and provide services informally. Might weak states leverage these actors’ strengths to collect taxes, or should they invest in building fiscal capacity on their own? We conducted a field experiment in Lagos, Nigeria that randomly assigned market vendors to tax appeals delivered by state or non-state agents. Contrary to expectations, non-state actors were not effective messengers. Tax appeals delivered by representatives of marketplace associations, an important social intermediary in this context, were ineffective even at higher levels of trust and message credibility. Messages delivered by state agents, however, were sometimes effective in spurring registration and tax payments, especially among ethnic minorities. This study underlines the importance of social intermediaries in shaping the social contract, and it draws attention to the uneven effects of these kinds of institutions within populations.
This chapter surveys Qiu’s ideas about financial administration, drawing on Section 4, “Administering State Finances” (Chapters 20–35) of the Supplement. The chapter discusses Qiu’s recommendations for regular and light taxation centred on the land tax and how to control government expenditure, before turning to his view of the state’s relationship with the market and merchants. The state must only involve itself in the market in a limited way, with the exception of moderating the supply of grain, since it is a basic necessity for life and the fundamental source of wealth. A brief overview of policies illustrates Qiu’s support for commerce. Throughout, the chapter also considers how Qiu’s ideas might have reflected or influenced actual practice. While there is some indication that his proposals may have been implemented, by the late Ming and especially from the later Wanli era onwards, the prudent financial administration that Qiu advocated did not exist.
This paper sets up a small open economy two-agent model and addresses the size of output multiplier of government spending associated with taxation either on constrained households or on unconstrained households. The paper shows that the tax financing rule matters to real resource allocations in the small open economy with flexible prices and equal tax burden at the steady state, contrasting to the finding of Monacelli and Perotti (2011) in closed economies. The output multiplier in open economies is larger than the multiplier in closed economies when taxes are levied on constrained households, while the reverse holds under taxations on unconstrained households.
New fiscal histories of the United States are in a state of efflorescence. Revisionist work infused with economic heterodoxy and social histories of capitalism have rescued fiscal topics from staid institutionalists, producing work that should enrich the study of inequalities of all stripes. By assembling a collection of recent works on money, public debt, and taxation—subjects treated in isolation within the literature, but which form a totality in practice—this review attempts a composite portrait of the United States’ fiscal state formation in the long run. Present in the foreground and at each stage is real estate: the iconic plot of farmland or single-family home.
In affluent democracies, a broad rise in wealth concentration since the 1980s has not been accompanied by a broad rise in wealth taxation. As a large literature points out, conditions such as growing financialization, tax competition and tax avoidance have all curtailed the ability of left governments to tax wealth. This article argues that, despite the global constraint on taxing wealth, as left governments continue to influence wealth concentration and more advanced economies enter an era of slowing population growth, financial wealth of the rich tends to gain at the expense of (more equal) housing wealth. In response, left governments increase taxes on financial assets relative to housing wealth. By contrast, when population growth is still high, left subtly by adjusting the relative difference by which different types of wealth are taxed. In particular, as governments tax housing wealth more heavily instead. These predictions are tested using data from 15 to 16 advanced economies (1970–2015).
What gives the benefit principle its moral appeal as an idea of tax justice? And what can count as a benefit for that purpose? My claim is that we can trace the moral force of various versions of the principle to five ideas: individual justification, causal feedback, reciprocity, opposable valuation and non-objectionable baseline. I develop those ideas into an account of the moral permissibility of benefit-based taxation, and explain how that account addresses problems about the quantification and valuation of benefits and the relationship between benefit and the justice of the background distribution.
The private sector is virtually nonexistent in Indian country. Consequently, reservations experience chronically high rates of unemployment and poverty. Tribes have implemented numerous laws to foster development; however, the private sector is yet to thrive. Legal uncertainty is a major reason why. Although tribes have the ability to make their own laws, the Supreme Court limits tribes’ ability to exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians. In 1981, the Supreme Court held tribes can exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians who enter a consensual relationship with the tribe or its citizens, and tribes can also assert jurisdiction over non-Indians engaged in behavior that imperils tribal welfare. These categories have been construed extremely narrowly. Furthermore, determining whether a transaction is subject to tribal jurisdiction often requires years of costly litigation. Another impediment to tribal economic development is state taxation because the Supreme Court permits states to tax Indian country commerce. This means tribes cannot collect taxes because this would result in dual taxation. Without tax revenue, tribes struggle to fund the infrastructure businesses need. Additionally, it is often unclear whether the state can regulate an activity in Indian country. As a result of these factors, businesses avoid Indian country.
Shelley’s engagement with economics is central to his work. From Queen Mab (1813) to ‘A Philosophical View of Reform’ (composed 1819–20), his discussion of economic events and ideas helped him to critique the social world and propose how it could be improved. His work responds to the productive activities of the labouring poor in the factories and the fields, and to the financial phenomena reshaping Britain’s economy, from public debt to fiat currency. Crucial to Shelley’s economics was the perception that orthodox ideas, such as the labour theory of value and the quantity theory of money, could be used to promote radical ends. The chapter outlines the role of such ideas in Shelley’s work and his response to key economic writers, including Thomas Robert Malthus and William Cobbett. It also outlines how, for Shelley, the production of credible economic knowledge was vital to attaining economic change to benefit the many.
When tribes are allowed to operate as governments, states will push back because states fear tribal competition. In particular, states are concerned tribes will offer lower tax rates and other legal incentives to attract businesses to their land. This is a misguided concern. States already craft numerous exceptions to their laws, often designed specifically for their favorite corporations; plus, the source of state power over tribes is lacking. Apart from this, tribal development benefits states. New jobs in Indian country often employ non-Indians who purchase goods and pay taxes off reservation. Thus, tribal sovereignty also serves as a shield against state protectionism and promotes economic opportunities that benefit everyone.