This chapter resolves the problem posed in the previous chapter, namely, the Scotist objection to the instrument doctrine. It argues that of five different strategies, only one solves the problem of coherence, and it is a solution found not only in some of Aquinas’s mature statements on instrumental causality but also in the theology of Matthias Joseph Scheeben (1835-1888), who knew the intricate debates about the doctrine after Aquinas’s time and had developed a unique response to the Scotist objection. The chapter defends Scheeben’s view, known as ’extrinsic elevation’, as the way to preserve the coherence of the two claims that God alone is the cause of grace and that Christ’s humanity is an instrumental efficient cause of grace.

This chapter poses the most difficult objection for the instrument doctrine, in particular as Aquinas conceives of it. For Aquinas, a created cause, Christ’s humanity, produces divine effects as an instrumental cause. But the tradition has affirmed that God alone is the cause of grace in the soul, and no created cause can produce grace. John Duns Scotus puts this objection to Aquinas’s account of instrumental causality, and this chapter argues that the criticism appears to succeed. If a created cause participates in the production of grace, as Aquinas argues, then Scotus argues that Aquinas fails to maintain the distinction of natures and powers in Christ basic to Chalcedonian Christology. For Christ’s humanity is taken up into God’s power and brings about the deification of the human person immediately, something only divine power can do. The ground is prepared for a response to this objection in the following chapter.

This chapter is the heart of the book’s analysis of St. Thomas Aquinas’s teaching on Christ’s humanity as the instrument of the divinity. It explores the various details of Aquinas’s account, outlining it in five synthetic propositions. These propositions, taken together, form the instrument doctrine as St. Thomas conceives of it. Various ambiguities in Aquinas’s account are presented for consideration, and the chapter makes some judgments about how best to understand Aquinas in his mature works. The chapter concludes with a section on the relationship of language to reality in Christology and why reduplicative propositions, used in a standard mode of theological analysis in the thirteenth century, can clarify how to understand the instrument doctrine.

The book’s conclusion assesses the extent of legalism in Korea and Japan, including other issue areas. It underscores the importance of studying the role of activists and lawyers in catalyzing sociolegal and institutional change. Legalism may take diverse forms, as demonstrated in the comparisons of Korea and Japan. The tobacco liability cases show that legalism is not emerging everywhere. The cases suggest legalistic governance is more likely when support structures for advocacy and legal mobilization exist, opposition is diffuse or weak, and activists sustain all five mechanisms. The conclusion considers what the expanding role of law and courts means for democracy in both countries. It ends on a cautiously optimistic note: the potential for rights realization and participatory channels has grown, especially in Korea. Although challenges in legal mobilization persist, and reform implementation faces human, resource, and attitudinal barriers, activists and lawyers are creatively engaging with legal frameworks in ways that strengthen legalistic regulatory styles.

Chapter 2 outlines the book’s conceptual and theoretical frameworks. It bridges studies of regulatory styles with scholarship on legal and political opportunity structures to detail indicators of legalistic governance, which serve as a guide for the subsequent paired case studies. It also theorizes five causal mechanisms that elucidate how activism contributes to more legalistic governance. Finally, it discusses, in probabilistic terms, the conditions under which activism is more likely to contribute to legalistic modes of governance.

Worldwide, more than 125 countries have enacted legal provisions against disability-based discrimination; such legislation was also a core demand of Japanese and Korean disability rights activism. Despite the rapid diffusion of non discrimination norms, we know less about why their forms vary and how they have affected rights-claiming options. Through a paired comparison of activism surrounding statutes enacted in Korea and Japan in 2007 and 2013, respectively, Chapter 5 shows how advocacy for such legislation and related litigation transformed governance and created legal opportunities. To a greater extent in Korea than in Japan, people with disabilities gained non discrimination rights, mechanisms for redressing discrimination, support from NGOs and state agencies, and the legal tools with which to solidify and expand anti discrimination protections in court and through statutory revisions.

International law is a system of rules, institutions and practices that govern the relations of States with one another. It is designed to distribute resources and solve problems that States identify as relevant for creating order in the world. In a world without a centralised government States use international law and its institutions to generate solutions for emerging and complex issues and problems, such as climate change and terrorism. The effectiveness of international law is often called into question when it fails to stop certain kinds of activities that appear abhorrent to most people from around the world. However, it also manages to resolve and address issues and challenges that would otherwise get ignored without international cooperation. A lot of international law is designed to meaningfully contribute to establishing order. States also use it to legitimise disruptions to global relations.

The third bridge is explored in chapter five and focuses on the connection between constitutional values and private law. The analysis concentrates on the values of autonomy and human dignity and their interplay with the principle of freedom of contract in English contract law. The discussion also reflects on the link between the UNCRPD, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998, and English contract law, and suggests that rather than looking for a seamless bridge that links the UNCRPD directly with English contract law, we should look for steppingstones connecting the UNCRPD, the ECHR, the HRA and domestic private law. This chapter also discusses the values of participation and inclusion, with a focus on the idea of influence vulnerability explored in the previous chapter, and reflects on the need to enhance the influence of persons with disabilities and DDPOs in shaping legislative developments in English law, including consumer contract law.

This chapter explores how international law and its legitimacy could be improved and made more aligned with the demands of justice. It focuses on two types of requirements. First, there are the principles and accompanying procedures on the basis of which actors ask their agency (and their rights) to be recognized by international law and its culture of legitimacy. These principles are consent, justification, accountability, consistency, representation and participation, and non-abuse of power. Second, there are the topics around which this quest for the recognition of agency (and rights) takes place. They are better universality of international law, human rights as a benchmark of the legitimacy of sovereignty, compliance/enforcement/accountability, and human rights supported by public goods. These two kinds of requirements have been at the center of the efforts to make international law more inclusive as well as more legitimate, and they need to be taken more seriously in the future.

This chapter argues that while great strides have been made to humanise the law of diplomatic protection, its practice in the courtroom is not in alignment with this as the protected individual does not participate in proceedings. It first dismantles the famous Mavrommatis fiction and argues that other conditions for diplomatic protection (such as nationality and the exhaustion of local remedies) and its features (such as state discretion and state responsibility) have been increasingly humanised to place emphasis on the individual. Second, it analyses the case law to show how the individual does not participate in proceedings at the Peace Palace. Finally, it provides suggestions to advocate for stronger procedural participation for the injured individual in cases of diplomatic protection at the ICJ.

This chapter argues that advisory proceedings have the procedural flexibility to enable individuals’ participation, despite the Court’s reluctance to bring such participation to fruition. It first dispels the myth that witnesses are limited to the confines of contentious proceedings. It then discusses the Court’s sparse engagement with amici curiae. Finally, it explores the potential of the analogous extension of Article 66(2) of the Court’s Statute, authorising the furnishing of information by entities beyond states and international organisations.

Chapter 2 presents the book’s main argument about how party rules shape membership. Previous literature is split in its portrayal of party members – some scholars describe members as extremist ideologues, whereas others depict them as partisan loyalists. To reconcile these competing views, Chapter 2 develops a spatial model of membership in which members receive utility from government policy and party proximity, as well as features of party membership unrelated to ideology. The model demonstrates that party rules play a pivotal role in shaping a party’s overall membership level and distribution. The model predicts that decentralized parties attract more members than centralized parties, all else equal. However, decentralized parties’ members should be more ideologically extreme than their counterparts in centralized parties.

The political idea of self-government has a natural elaboration, which is that a society is self-governing when it is ruled by the will of the people of that society. A variety of attempts to vindicate popular will conceptions of self-government exist but I argue that they are fatally flawed. In its place, we need a conception of self-government that is deflationary (that is does not rely on the existence of a popular will) but nevertheless quite demanding. I discuss some deflationary accounts of self-government and I argue for an account that emphasizes an egalitarian collective decision-making process but that also recognizes the importance of outcomes. I argue that attention to the conditions necessary to the achievement of self-government of an egalitarian sort is essential to how we are to think of the proper aims of constitutional institutions. We need to attend to how information is disseminated to citizens and how citizens can have the sophistication necessary to understand information. An egalitarian conception of self-government can show how the constitution of a society should be structured so as to achieve equality in these two dimensions of the information system.