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Social psychiatry focuses on the interpersonal and cultural contexts of mental disorder and mental wellbeing. Research in this area examines the relationship between psychiatric disorders and the social environment. This includes the consequences of positive or negative life events at the individual level, as well as broader themes – such as discrimination and inequality - at the societal level. This chapter aims to illustrate how research in social psychiatry has advanced our understanding of the role of social factors in the aetiology and management of mental disorders. We provide breakdowns of six high-impact research studies including summaries of background, methods, results, conclusions, strengths, and limitations. In addition, we provide some information about common pitfalls and methodological considerations that are specifically relevant to social psychiatry for novice researchers in this area, and our thoughts regarding future challenges and opportunities in this field.
Many traditional subsistence groups have been described as ‘egalitarian societies’. Definitions of ‘egalitarianism’, especially beyond anthropology, have often emphasised equality in resource access, prestige or rank, alongside generalised preferences for fairness and equality. However, there are no human societies where equality is genuinely realised in all areas of life. Here we demonstrate, empirically, that nominally egalitarian societies are often unequal across seven important interconnected domains: embodied capital, social capital, leadership, gender, age/knowledge, material capital/land tenure, and reproduction. We also highlight evidence that individuals in nominally egalitarian societies do not unfailingly adhere to strong equality preferences. We propose a new operational framework for understanding egalitarianism in traditional subsistence groups, focussing on individual motivations, rather than equality. We redefine “egalitarianism” societies as those where socio-ecological circumstances enable most individuals to successfully secure their own resource access, status, and autonomy. We show how this emphasis on self-interest — particularly status concerns, resource access and autonomy — dispels naive enlightenment notions of the ‘noble savage’, and clarifies the plural processes (demand-sharing, risk-pooling, status-levelling, prosocial reputation-building, consensus-based collective decision-making, and residential mobility) by which relative equality is maintained. We finish with suggestions for better operationalizing egalitarianism in future research.
Political and economic elites often warn that taxes on the rich impair economic growth. Although such warnings have a long tradition in elite discourse, what the public believes about the effects of progressive taxation remains surprisingly understudied. This omission limits our understanding of a basic democratic mechanism, the congruence of elite and public opinion. To close this gap, we employ a conjoint experiment during the 2021 German national election on a representative quota sample. Participants compare policy packages that entail changes in income, inheritance, and corporate taxes and evaluate their impact on equality and growth. We find no evidence that the public believes that progressive taxes promote equality at the expense of growth. Instead, participants believe that progressive taxes are doubly beneficial, promoting both outcomes. Furthermore, such beliefs do not vary by ideology or economic status. Our findings suggest a more consensual view of progressive taxation that emphasizes positive synergies between economic growth and greater equality.
Scholars argue that while left partisan governments traditionally support stronger market regulation, this partisanship effect has started to vanish as left governments converge with the right in supporting deregulation, resulting in higher inequality. This paper argues that, instead of vanishing, the partisanship effect has intensified, but in a novel direction: left governments have become stronger defenders of market competition than other partisan governments. Furthermore, this new association between left partisanship and market competition has delivered new distributive gains for labor. I highlight the depressed interest rates across the rich world today in driving this outcome: low rates spark a rise in market concentration, which puts downward pressure on the labor share of income. By boosting market competition, left governments can counter this force and defend the labor share of income, thus revitalizing redistribution for a more difficult economic era. These claims are tested using data from 10 to 17 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries (1995–2017).
Breaking new ground in the intellectual history of economic and social human rights, Christian Olaf Christiansen traces their justification from the outset of World War II until the present day. Featuring a series of fascinating thinkers, from political scientists to Popes, this is the first book to comprehensively map the key arguments made in defense of human rights and how they connect to ideas of social and redistributive justice. Christiansen traces this intellectual history from a first phase devoted to internationalizing these rights, a second phase of their unprecedented legitimacy deployed to criticize global inequality, to a third phase of a continued quest to secure their legitimacy once and for all. Engaging with the newest scholarship and building a bridge to political philosophy as well as global inequality studies, it facilitates a much-needed novel and nuanced history of rights-rights we should still consider defending today.
Sludge is one of the most important yet underappreciated problems in modern society. Examples of sludge include unnecessarily complex paperwork requirements, hard-to-navigate documents and websites, long waiting time, and unfriendly or confusing staff interactions. However, little is known about whether some people are more vulnerable to and less accepting of some types of sludge than others. Drawing on data from a nationally representative survey with 1,591 participants from Ireland, we show that people report being particularly vulnerable to outdated websites with broken links, unfriendly staff interactions, complex documents laden with jargon, and hard-to-navigate websites. These are also the types of sludge that are least acceptable. Less vulnerability is reported to long waiting times and requirements about having to provide private information. We find only minor differences in sludge perceptions depending on whether the sludge emerges in the public or the private sector. Moreover, people with poor mental health report being more vulnerable to and less accepting of sludge. Self-reported administrative literacy is related to less reported vulnerability, and the tendency to procrastinate and a lack of time and mental energy predict more reported vulnerability to sludge. Administrative literacy and a lack of mental energy also predict acceptability of sludge.
'Self-Made' success is now an American badge of honor that rewards individualist ambitions while it hammers against community obligations. Yet, four centuries ago, our foundational stories actually disparaged ambitious upstarts as dangerous and selfish threats to a healthy society. In Pamela Walker Laird's fascinating history of why and how storytellers forged this American myth, she reveals how the goals for self-improvement evolved from serving the community to supporting individualist dreams of wealth and esteem. Simplistic stories of self-made success and failure emerged that disregarded people's advantages and disadvantages and fostered inequality. Fortunately, Self-Made also recovers long-standing, alternative traditions of self-improvement to serve the common good. These challenges to the myth have offered inspiration, often coming, surprisingly, from Americans associated with self-made success, such as Benjamin Franklin, Frederick Douglass, and Horatio Alger. Here are real stories that show that no one lives – no one succeeds or fails – in a vacuum.
Oliver Cromwell was a stern, Puritan dictator from the seventeenth century, and Kylie Jenner is a twenty-first-century pop culture princess and lipstick mogul. They could not be more different, yet they have in common that they’ve been tagged with the provocative and powerful label “self-made.” Their stories bookend the history of how what was once a sin became an accolade. For Cromwell, a claim of self-making would have endangered his social and political standing, as well as his soul. Jenner, in contrast, proudly accepted this label as a badge of esteem, a reward for being a “selfie-made success.” Over the centuries between them, the concept of self-making evolved, always serving storytellers as a tool for judgment. It became socially and politically destructive along the way because storytelling based on its false assumptions and judgments has fostered policies and cultural attitudes that advance inequality and absolve the affluent of community obligations. Although much of its modern persuasiveness comes from claims that it belongs among core American values, the myth’s history reveals that there is nothing intuitive, stable, or tied to the real world about the idea of self-made success.
Democracy is one of India’s great achievements. However, it is undeniable that Indian democracy has been under considerable strain in recent years. Chapter 1 analyzes these trends linked to Indian democracy and their underlying determinants. In particular, the chapter emphasizes the link between growing economic inequality and India’s recent democratic decline through two mechanisms – the decline of the Congress and the rise of the BJP under Modi.
The term “self-made” was fully embedded in 1920s popular culture, intertwined with individualism. Master of positive thinking Dale Carnegie dominated armies of cultural entrepreneurs selling tales of success. The Crash of 1929 and the Great Depression turned many Americans against businessmen’s leadership, but business advocates militantly circulated the myth of self-made success to justify why the privileged still deserved esteem and power. They rejected efforts at systemic change. They used the myth of self-making to explain success and failure as individual matters, and explicitly upheld inequality as a valid outcome of merit alone. To resist the progressive state, conservatives invested enormous resources to attack reformers for threatening freedom and opportunities. Among their rhetorical tools were fantasies of self-made success that they often imagined came from Horatio Alger, distorting his legacy into an individualistic and often harsh “bootstraps” mythology. Into the 1950s, positive thinker Norman Vincent Peale and others magnified the faith that people could “make” their own lives regardless of what the world handed them.
This chapter provides an introduction to the book. It sets the stage by highlighting contrasts in India’s economy, democracy, and society. It then discusses the main topics covered in the book – democracy and governance, growth and distribution, caste, labor, gender, civil society, regional diversity, and foreign policy. The chapter also outlines the three themes that comprise the main arguments of the book. First, India’s democracy has been under considerable strain over the last decade. Second, growing economic inequalities that accompanied India’s high-growth phase over the last three and a half decades are associated with the country’s democratic decline. Third, society has reacted to changes from below but there are limits to societal activism in contemporary India.
After 1960, well-funded campaigns advanced individualism and reduced support for community-based progressive programs, including Great Society programs. The term “meritocracy” spread quickly, adopted by progressives and conservatives alike. Conservatives asserted that unions, poverty, and public institutions manifested unwillingness to “work hard.” They argued that democracy depended on “free enterprise,” which they imagined could solve all problems. Economic and cultural turbulence energized organizations such as the US Chamber of Commerce and the Horatio Alger Association of Distinguished Americans. Ronald Reagan, George Gilder, Milton Friedman, and others flourished selling individualism. Their accusations of self-made failure shamed anyone who struggled against social or cultural circumstances, racial or gender inequalities, the results of globalization, or inadequate access to education and other opportunities. Presidents Reagan and Clinton both rejected the welfare state and demanded “personal responsibility,” an updated term for self-making. A constant refrain that taxes punish success also drew on the myth and painted the recipients of progressive programs as freeloaders.
Chapter 2 discusses how India’s rulers have used state power to promote economic development, both growth and its distribution. While India’s growth record is relatively impressive, it is also the case that this growth has not been accompanied by the creation of well-paying jobs, and economic inequality in India has increased sharply.
The myth of self-made success triumphed in the new millennium, incentivizing claims that are impervious to reality. Prominent examples include George W. Bush, Donald Trump, and Kylie Jenner, who began their lives in great financial and social wealth, yet they all believe they were self-made. Bush and Trump endorsed policies that lowered taxes for elites but cut programs that served everyone else, arguing that taxes punish success and social support programs foster irresponsibility. The myth eased reducing constraints on financial exploits, making possible both great fortunes and economic crises, such as the Great Recession that began in 2007 and led to taxpayers’ bailouts of private institutions. The megahit reality TV show Shark Tank displayed the myth on steroids, starring “self-made” entrepreneurs. In contrast, the despair of struggling people accused of self-made failure and willful irresponsibility has been deadly. Such accusations can be profitable, as J.D. Vance’s career has shown. This myth-made culture ignores the communities and institutions that make wealth generation possible. It frees tycoons to acquire and donate large fortunes, garnering acclaim as philanthropists.
Using novel nighttime lights and high-resolution atmospheric reanalysis, this paper exploits exogenous fluctuations in temperature and precipitation to identify the causal effects of weather disturbances on local economic growth in the Philippines – the world’s most disaster-prone country. Our findings reveal that heightened temperature variability significantly dampens growth, but only in poor municipalities. This effect persists for at least 2 years after the initial shock. Furthermore, the relationship between weather shocks and growth is nonlinear. We also demonstrate that adverse weather events impede growth by disrupting agricultural productivity and essential service sectors, including wholesale and retail trade, health and education. Overall, our results highlight the importance of understanding the distributional impact of climate change within countries, its underlying mechanisms, and how economic development policies can help shield poor municipalities from the vagaries of the weather.
In this chapter we explore concepts and practices related to diversity. This is a complex terrain to navigate as we are all ‘diverse.’ However, diversity (or our differences) have personal, social and political effects; many of which involve power and engender various forms of inequality, privilege and oppression. Critical social workers have been considering the ‘dilemma of difference’ for decades. In 1985, for example, Martha Minow observed that, rather than avoiding this dilemma, we should ‘immerse ourselves in it’, not necessarily to seek a final resolution, but to engage in a ‘more productive struggle’ for equitable processes and outcomes’. Challenging privilege and oppression is at the heart of critical social work and our journey is both personal and professional as we grapple with how to respectfully listen, learn and engage in mutual consciousness-raising across difference, while advocating for social and systemic change to address inequality.
Many conceptions of Just Transition focus narrowly on how to create employment opportunities for those in the so called ‘dirty’ industries who are likely to lose their jobs in the transition to sustainability. However, there is an emerging concept of ‘Transformative Just Transition’ (TJT) which emphasises the need to entirely transform our societies in order to achieve justice in this transition. What a TJT should include is still being debated. In this article, I propose that the fundamental element needs to be a redistribution of income and wealth – globally, nationally and locally. This would mean the wealthier would inevitably have to reduce their ecological footprint while those on low incomes could afford to meet their social and environmental needs (healthy food, water and housing; adequate energy and transport; etc). This paper discusses the why and how (e.g. climate reparations, progressive environmental taxation) of redistributing income and wealth in order to achieve a TJT. It particularly focuses on the role of labour unions in achieving the necessary redistribution.
Contemporary interest among American progressives in using antitrust law to address wealth inequality lacks a firm intellectual foundation. Indeed, both the original American progressives of a century ago and Thomas Piketty, whose work sparked contemporary interest in inequality, agree that inequality’s source is scarcity, rather than monopoly, and so inequality will persist even in perfectly competitive markets. The only real solution is taxation, not a potentially destructive campaign of breakup. Why, then, is antimonopolism so popular among American progressives today? There are two reasons. The first is American anti-statism, which has closed off tax policy as a viable political solution to inequality, forcing progressive scholars and activists to seek a second- or third-best workaround in antitrust policy. The second is the American press, which is actively promoting antimonopolism as a way of fighting back against Google and Facebook, two companies that have badly outcompeted the press for advertising dollars in recent years.
Since the Reagan era, American economic policy has amounted to self-colonization. Democratic majorities have consistently supported legal regimes that have enabled corporations to extract the lion’s share of the gains from trade from the public. For example, they have supported a corporate law regime that denies the public democratic control over the behavior of corporations and instead gives dictatorial powers to shareholders and managers. The Internet has made it even easier for firms to extract surpluses from consumers through surveillance and algorithmic pricing. One small contribution toward a project of decolonizing the public would be for consumers to obtain a property right in their personal information. This would allow them to claw back some of the surpluses that technology has taken from them.
This paper investigates the effect of taxation of polluting products and redistribution on pollution, income and welfare inequalities. We consider a two-sector Ramsey model with a green and a polluting good, two types of households and a subsistence level of consumption for the polluting good. The environmental tax is always effective in reducing pollution regardless of the level of subsistence consumption. However, this level, together with the redistribution rate, matters at the individual level as it shapes the impact of the environmental policy on individual consumption and welfare. Looking at the stability properties of the economy, a high subsistence level of polluting consumption leads to instability or indeterminacy of the steady state, while the environmental externality reduces the scope for indeterminacy. Increasing the tax rate and redistributing more to the worker affect the occurrence of indeterminacy and instability. Considering the subsistence level of consumption and the level of redistribution among households are of importance as it determines the effects of environmental tax policy in the long term and the stability of the economy in the short term.