The chapter explains the process of building Meaning Networks and Systemic Networks, as described in chapter 6, for four semantic fields inspired by the concept of material process and a further two semantic fields inspired by the concept of relational process. The fields are: Change, Creation, Location_change, Possession_transfer, Equivalence, Logical_relation. For each semantic field, the constructions are described as they relate to one another. Their significant features are identified and expressed in Systemic Networks. The distinctions or choices between the constructions are modelled in taxonomies or Meaning Networks.

This chapter introduces the world of change management. Firstly, it sets out the case for change – why change management matters – then looks at the theories concerning individual and organisational change. Finally, the role of the professional change manager is discussed.

Chapter 9 draws on the evidence outlined earlier in the book to evaluate a range of possible legal interventions. Structured according to the five potential equality objectives outlined earlier, the measures include steps to increase the visibility of people with disfigurements in daily life, methods of motivating employers to become appearance-inclusive and changes to influential institutions outside the employment context. They also include a range of legislative reforms to replace the severe disfigurement provision with a better remedial mechanism, such as the creation of a new protected characteristic of disfigurement or the reformulation of the definition of disability.

While the preceding three chapters are critical, Chapter 7 can be described as hopeful. It asks the question of ‘what now’, having identified numerous sources of anxieties around a potential renewed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), as helped or fully created by the global project of transitional justice. As this chapter is interested in changes for ‘Never Again’, it explores how activists and practitioners in BiH resist and challenge the practices seen as harmful for non-recurrence, pushing different political communities towards a place of enhanced ontological security with, despite, and perhaps even against transitional justice. In this chapter, there are numerous illustrations of what people can do to challenge and change the post-conflict status quo across different aspects of action at the intersection of truth recovery, memorialisation, and education. The chapter conceptualises and imagines non-recurrence beyond governance as not only resistance but also co-existence, binding, and healing; as a form of work.

This chapter defines the theoretical terms – networks, nodes, and nuclei – explains the choice of dates between two revolutions in communication (print and the internet), and gives some concrete historical examples of the tangible benefits of looking at the history of Christianity through transnational flows and networks. This approach allows us to cross national and denominational boundaries and borders and to think more deeply about the underlying social and cultural conditions promoting or resisting adaptation and change. It also enables us to explore the crossroads or junction boxes where religious personnel and ideas encountered different traditions and from which something new and dynamic emerged.

This chapter focuses on the fact that a major difference between a change in an international order and a change of international order is that the scope and depth of the former are not as great as those of the latter—in other words, change unfolding in an international system is somewhat circumscribed. To reflect on a change in the international order and what this means for its legitimacy, this chapter focuses on three points. First, it examines some of the characteristics that facilitate change in an international system and what this implies for the sense of legitimacy. Second, it mentions the reforms that an international order and its legitimacy can adopt to respond to evolving pressures, alluding to the stress faced by the current international system in the last few years. Third, this chapter ends with an overview of the systemic risk to which the present international system is exposed.

The chapter discusses the issue of the evaluation of the validity of international legitimacy. This issue is important because it concerns how true international legitimacy can be distinguished from false international legitimacy, especially in the midst of change. This chapter concentrates on this matter, with its philosophical resonance, by looking into when international legitimacy, established or changing (change of/in an international system and its legitimacy), can really be considered valid or legitimate. Specifically, the following questions are addressed: First, does it make sense to examine the issue of the evaluation of international legitimacy (established or changing)? Second, if indeed it makes sense, what are the criteria that can be used to evaluate the validity of a claim or belief of international legitimacy? Third, what are the relevance and the modalities of application of this normative approach to international legitimacy (established or changing) across various periods and cultures?

This chapter focuses on change of an international order and its sense of legitimacy—in other words, change of the system of an international order and of its legitimacy. Concentrating on the change of an international order and of its legitimacy consists of exploring a type of change that is so transformative that it brings about a change in both how an international order is organized and institutionalized and functions, and how this is justified by the culture of legitimacy that is part of it. As a way to analyze this issue, this chapter addresses three questions: What can be the reasons triggering a change of international order/system and the sense of legitimacy that comes with it? What are the modalities and processes indicating that an international system and its legitimacy are changing? What has shifted—that is, changed—when a new international order and its culture of legitimacy have emerged?

Irish has a number of features such as VSO word order and initial mutations that make study of the acquisition of Irish morphosyntax particularly interesting to theories of child language development and, more recently, to language change. The chapter opens with a brief overview of Irish morphosyntax. We then outline and critically review studies of Irish morphosyntactic development over four main periods: (1) historical informal research on Irish acquisition; (2) studies of monolingual or strongly Irish-dominant acquisition; (3) a transition phase; and (4) more recent studies of acquisition in what have now become mainly simultaneous bilingual contexts. The findings of these studies are discussed in the light of the international literature and their contribution to our understanding of child language acquisition in general and Celtic languages in particular. The implications of these studies for language support and education are discussed, and future areas for research are considered.

One of life’s most fundamental revelations is change. Presenting the fascinating view that pattern is the manifestation of change, this unique book explores the science, mathematics, and philosophy of change and the ways in which they have come to inform our understanding of the world. Through discussions on chance and determinism, symmetry and invariance, information and entropy, quantum theory and paradox, the authors trace the history of science and bridge the gaps between mathematical, physical, and philosophical perspectives. Change as a foundational concept is deeply rooted in ancient Chinese thought, and this perspective is integrated into the narrative throughout, providing philosophical counterpoints to customary Western thought. Ultimately, this is a book about ideas. Intended for a wide audience, not so much as a book of answers, but rather an introduction to new ways of viewing the world.

One of life’s most fundamental revelations is change. Presenting the fascinating view that pattern is the manifestation of change, this unique book explores the science, mathematics, and philosophy of change and the ways in which they have come to inform our understanding of the world. Through discussions on chance and determinism, symmetry and invariance, information and entropy, quantum theory and paradox, the authors trace the history of science and bridge the gaps between mathematical, physical, and philosophical perspectives. Change as a foundational concept is deeply rooted in ancient Chinese thought, and this perspective is integrated into the narrative throughout, providing philosophical counterpoints to customary Western thought. Ultimately, this is a book about ideas. Intended for a wide audience, not so much as a book of answers, but rather an introduction to new ways of viewing the world.

Chapter 4 examines the First Way, the argument for God from motion or change. Some introductory remarks on the Five Ways are followed by a translation and stating the premises of the First Way. The chapter then turns to the controversial premise that “whatever is in motion is moved by another,” that every change in a thing requires a separate cause of the change. Objections to the premise include ones stemming from Newtonian laws. The chapter then examines the per se ordered causal series the argument has in mind. There is a look at why Aquinas thinks that such a series cannot be infinite, but must have a first uncaused cause of change. The chapter notes a few characteristics of this first mover. A final section looks at why Aquinas thinks that this being would be understood to be God. It is explained how each Way concludes to a description that is a nominal definition of God, which Aquinas thinks successfully designates the divine nature for those able to recognize it.

The chapter develops the question (raised in Chapter 4) about the precise way in which soul is supposed to play the role of the primary explanans of perception. It does so by bringing out the key difficulty that Aristotle faces and by analysing the three possible answers to this difficulty. The problem is that Aristotle seems to commit himself to three jointly inconsistent tenets: (i) the perceptive soul is the primary cause of perception; (ii) perception is passive; and (iii) the perceptive soul is impassive. These claims are inconsistent if it is true that (iv) there is no way for the soul of being the primary cause of φ-ing other than being the proper subject of whatever φ-ing consists in. Two dominant ways of resolving this problem, since antiquity, consist in denying Aristotle’s commitment to either (ii) or (iii). I argue that difficulties, both exegetical and philosophical, faced by each of these strategies are insurmountable. The third possible strategy starts from denying (iv). I trace such a strategy to the medieval idea of a sensus agens and argue that although the existing medieval (and later) versions cannot stand as such, the third strategy is nevertheless the most promising one.

The chapter explores how Aristotle wants to account for perception’s essentially receptive nature. It focuses on Aristotle’s commitment to the passivity of perception, namely, the idea that perception is a certain kind of being affected (paskhein) by perceptual objects. It provides a classification and preliminary critical analysis of existing interpretations of the passivity of perception. I argue that Aristotle’s first general account of perception in An. 2.5 is systematically pre-causal in the sense that makes it impossible to directly infer from it anything specific about the respective roles of the body and the soul (against both Material and Psychic Interpretation). Furthermore, I contend that Aristotle develops a robust conception of passivity here that successfully encapsulates, on the most general level, what perception is (against Deflationary and Aporetic Interpretation). More specifically, I argue that An. 2.5 is centrally aimed at reconciling perception’s passivity and completeness (the perceiver has both seen and is seeing the same object) and that this task is motivated by the need for capturing the difference between genuine (‘continued’) perceiving and mere appearance within an assimilation model of perception.

The chapter provides a novel detailed analysis of one of the most discussed chapters in the Aristotelian corpus, namely An. 2.5. The central claim is that in An. 2.5 Aristotle lays down his programmatic definition of perception as a complete passive activity. He does so by classing the perceptive capacity with capacities that are already fulfilments (entelekheiai) of their subjects and by showing how this classification is compatible with perception being passive (i.e. a kind of being affected). By working out the concept of complete passive activity Aristotle fills in a conceptual gap left open elsewhere in the corpus (most strikingly in Metaphysics Θ.6), where both completeness and passivity are taken for granted but without showing how the two features can cohere. In An. 2.5, Aristotle, thus, succeeds in capturing how perception differs not only from manifestations of non-passive complete capacities (such as the art of house-building), but also from passive processes (as exhibited in the inexhaustibility of the perceptive capacity and the object-directedness of perception). His definition is programmatic in the sense that it analyses the explananda without, however, yet providing any explanantia.