Introduction
Almost 50 years have passed since Sartori (Reference Sartori1976) introduced to the world one of the most famous innovations in the history of political science: a new party systems typology. Despite many criticisms (Bogdanor, Reference Bogdanor1987; Donovan and Broughton, Reference Donovan, Broughton, Broughton and Donovan1999) and refinements (Beyme, Reference Beyme1985; Ware, Reference Ware1996; Golosov, Reference Golosov2010; Nwokora and Pelizzo, Reference Nwokora and Pelizzo2014) since then, Sartori’s typology “still constitutes the most important point of departure when examining party system change” (Enyedi (Reference Enyedi, Casal Bértoa, Carter, Keith, Sindre and Vasilopoulou2023), Casal Bértoa, (Reference Casal Bértoa2013): 36; see also Mair, Reference Mair, Mair and Smith1990).
In the current research note, taking into consideration that previous typologies designed as either an alternative (Siaroff, Reference Siaroff2019) or an improvement (Nwokora and Pelizzo, Reference Nwokora and Pelizzo2018) to Sartori’s typologies have not been that successful,Footnote 1 we propose a new classification of party systems in Asia, a continent almost completely ignored by Sartori in his seminal work.Footnote 2 Moreover, using an original dataset that includes the most important characteristics of party systems in the region (e.g. fragmentation, polarization, closure), and building on Sartori’s conceptualization (Mair, Reference Mair, Katz and Crotty2006), we examine to what extent party systems in Asian democracies, both contemporary and historical, have changed.
The research note will be structured into six sections, a part of which will be further discussed in the online appendix.Footnote 3 Firstly, we briefly explain Sartori’s seminal typology. Secondly, we summarize the main critiques posed by scholars of this typology, and its principal implications for the analysis of party systems. The third section presents the data and how the different indicators are operationalized. In section four, we apply Sartori’s typology to Asia for the first time, highlighting its problems. In section five, we classify Asian party systems on the basis of Casal Bértoa and Enyedi’s (Reference Casal Bértoa and Enyedi2021) new typology, signaling to what extent the latter advances the literature by improving Sartori’s original typology. The conclusion summarizes the findings.
Sartori’s typology
The main innovation of Sartori’s (Reference Sartori1976) typology was to combine a traditional focus on the format (i.e. number of parties) with a more competition-centred approach that took into consideration the ideological distance between the polar opposites of the party system (Enyedi and Casal Bértoa, Reference Enyedi and Casal Bértoa2020). Such a combination (see Figure 1) allowed him to distinguish seven different party system types, the most prominent being “predominant,” “two-party,” “moderate” and “polarized” pluralist systems (Sartori, Reference Sartori1976: chapter VI). A full discussion of Sartori’s typology is provided in the online appendix section A.
Figure 1. Sartori’s “simplified model”. Source: Sartori (Reference Sartori1976: 292).
Sartori and his critics
Notwithstanding its application in multiple settings (e.g. Mair, Reference Mair1987; Heidar, Reference Heidar, Mair and Smith1990; Pappalardo, Reference Pappalardo1996; Casal Bértoa, (Reference Casal Bértoa2013): Quinn, Reference Quinn2013; Ignazi, Reference Ignazi2017; Lee and Casal Bértoa, Reference Lee, Casal Bértoa, Kasuya and Tan2025), Sartori’s typology has been the object of heavy criticism. Perhaps the most drastic was Pennings (Reference Pennings, Pennings and Lane1998), which even merited Evans’ (Evans, Reference Evans2002) ad hominem defence. While there have been certainly many others (Daalder, Reference Daalder, Daalder and Mair1983; Loenen, Reference Loenen1990; Wolinetz, Reference Wolinetz, Katz and Crotty2006), we confine ourselves here to the most important: the hollowing out of the polarized pluralist category, caused by “the demise of the traditional anti-system [e.g. Communist, Fascist] party” (Mair, Reference Mair, Katz and Crotty2006: 65). The implications of this are mainly four.
First, the main consequence of the abovementioned hollowing is, clearly, the overcrowding of the moderate pluralist type. Secondly, while “[t]he Sartori model assumes a close link between fragmentation and polarization: the higher the number of parties, the higher the ideological distance in the system” (Enyedi and Casal Bértoa, Reference Enyedi, Casal Bértoa, Carter, Keith, Sindre and Vasilopoulou2023: 35), this does not, in fact, seem to be the case.Footnote 4 Thirdly, such conflation of party systems mostly into one single type makes the typology less appropriate to the task of identifying dynamics and making distinctions within the current world. In this context, and already implicit in Sartori’s work, it is clear that not all systems included in the “moderate pluralist” category behave the same: namely, their mechanics – to use Sartori’s expression – are very different. Finally, and most importantly from the empirical point of view, such an accumulation makes party system change, understood as change “from one class or type […] into another” (Mair, Reference Mair1997: 51; see also Casal Bértoa, Reference Casal Bértoa2013), almost impossible or extremely rare (for a full discussion of critiques, see Section B in the online appendix).
Democratic party systems in Asia: new dataset, classic operationalization
In order to test how well Sartori’s and other alternative typologies work outside Europe, we make use of a new dataset that includes 24 different party systems in 17 Asian democracies between the conclusion of the Second World War and the end of 2020 (Casal Bértoa and Lee, Reference Casal Bértoa and Lee2021). In Appendix Section C, we provide the details of our new dataset and include a comprehensive explanation of how we objectively operationalize all the variables used in our analysis.
Sartori goes to Asia: challenges and pitfalls
Figure 2 shows the relationship between (parliamentary) fragmentation and (political) polarization in all 24 democratic party systems in Asia. Using Sartori’s typology one can distinguish between (1) predominant party systems like Bangladesh I and Myanmar II; (2) two-party systems like Mongolia and Bhutan; (3) moderate pluralist party systems like East Timor, Japan, Pakistan I, II and III, Sri Lanka I and Taiwan; and (4) polarized party systems like Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia II, Nepal II and Thailand.Footnote 5
Figure 2. (Parliamentary) fragmentation and (political) polarization in 24 Asian democracies. Source: Casal Bértoa and Lee (Reference Casal Bértoa and Lee2021)
One third of the Asian party systems, however, do not seem to fit easily into Sartori’s typology. Thus, one can find very polarized party systems like Myanmar I and Nepal II, non-polarized extreme party systems (e.g. Philippines), and, especially, a rather high number of limited but polarized party systems (e.g. Bangladesh II, India, Malaysia I, South Korea and Sri Lanka II).
Even if we were to (1) use Sartori’s subjective rules of counting, allowing us to classify Japan, Malaysia I and Myanmar I as predominant party systems,Footnote 6 and (2) regard the Indian and South Korean party systems as non-polarizedFootnote 7; a quick glance at Figure 2 shows the lack of statistical correlation between fragmentation and polarization in Asia (.186).
Secondly, Figure 2 also shows the clear accumulation of Asian party systems around the moderate pluralist type, which includes half of them: namely, the seven signalled above (East Timor, Japan, Sri Lanka I, Taiwan, and three in Pakistan), plus all those that, having an ENPP between 2.5 and 3.9, are highly polarized (e.g. Bangladesh II, Malaysia I, Sri Lanka II) or moderately so (e.g. India, South Korea).
Thirdly, when looking at the countries classified as polarized pluralist, we find that there is only one example of what Sartori would call “anti-systemic parties,” namely, the Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS). In Nepal, there are traditionally Communist parties like the Unified Marxist-Leninist (CPN/UML) or the Maoist Centre (CMP/MC), but they are at the centre of the party system, making it to every single coalition since re-democratization in the late 2000s. As a result, like in Europe (Mair, Reference Mair, Katz and Crotty2006), none of the party systems classified above as “polarized pluralist” really fits the mechanics, even if they fit the format, of “centrifugal” politics, at least not in the Sartorian way of having two or more irresponsible opposition parties located at the extremes of the political spectrum that oblige the centre to rule perpetually.
Fourthly, already implicit in Sartori’s work, it is important to note that not all moderate pluralist party systems behave the same. Thus, some, like Pakistan III, have more the logic of a (German-style) “two-and-a-half” party system, others, like Indonesia and Nepal II, behave more like the Dutch or Finnish party systems where three different party families (socialist, liberal and conservative) alternate in government, still others are characterized, as in Denmark and Hungary, by the opposition of two ideologically inimical blocs of parties.
Finally, there is the everlasting problem of party system change. Considering, like Sartori (Reference Sartori1976) and Mair (Reference Mair, Katz and Crotty2006), that party system change takes place when there is a change in type, we can say that with the exception of Bangladesh I, Bhutan, Nepal I, Pakistan I, Myanmar II (all too short-lived to experience any systemic change), Kyrgyzstan, Indonesia, Malaysia II, Pakistan II and Sri Lanka II, all other Asian party systems experienced at least one change. However, as we will see later, this is problematic for two reasons.
On the one hand, it clearly underestimates systemic change. For example, any observer of Indonesian politics will signal an important change in the party system after the 2014 presidential/legislative elections caused by the institutionalization of political parties and the reform of the electoral system five years earlier (Trihartono and Patriadi, Reference Trihartono and Patriadi2016; Okthariza, Reference Okthariza, Teehankee and Echle2023).
On the other hand, it overestimates party system change. Four examples will suffice to illustrate this point. While the Taiwanese party system has remained a two-party system, pitting DPP on the left against KMT on the right, since the very beginning (Lee, Reference Lee2024), an application of the indicators mentioned above would suggest a change from two-partyism towards moderate pluralism in 1995, with a return to two-partyism in 2012 after a period of KMT’s dominance between 2008 and 2012. Similarly, the Philippine party system, characterized by extremely high fragmentation among unstable parties (Teekankee, Reference Teekankee2020), would be considered according to Sartorian rules to alternate some periods under the moderate pluralist type in 1992–2000, 2004–2006 and 2010–2018. Similarly, Bangladesh II, where two blocs of parties around AL and BNP alternate in power continuously between 1991 and 2006 (Rahman, Reference Rahman2019), would have changed from a moderate pluralist type to a two-party system in 2001. But perhaps the clearest example is East Timor. Having been characterized between independence in 2001 and 2017 by the opposition between the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Freitlin) and the rest of the parties (Shoesmith, Reference Shoesmith2020), it would be considered to have left two-partyism to adopt a polarized pluralist type in 2007, before changing to a moderate pluralist type in 2012.
A new typology of Asian party systems
Recently, Casal Bértoa and Enyedi (Reference Casal Bértoa and Enyedi2021) have proposed a new typology where they distinguish eight types of party systems, considering the party configuration and likely extent of polarization, as well as the number of poles. These eight types can be categorized into five: unipolar, bipolar, tripolar, multipolar and centre-based. A full discussion of these different types can be found in the online appendix (Section D).
Figure 3 shows a typology of Asian party systems according to their level of institutionalization, measured using Casal Bértoa and Enyedi’s (Reference Casal Bértoa and Enyedi2021) index of closure.Footnote 8 While Table A2 in the Appendix contains a summary of the different structures of inter-party competition and party system types observed in each of the countries analysed per period, Figure 3 classifies each party system according to the type that dominated.
Figure 3. Party system type according to the level of institutionalization (i.e. closure). Source: Casal Bértoa And Lee (Reference Casal Bértoa and Lee2021)
As follows from the figure above, the only party system type to be absent in the region – in contrast to Europe – is the centre-based one, which would be equivalent to Sartori’s (Reference Sartori1976) extreme polarized multi-party system. Among the rest, bipolar types have been the most popular (see Table A2): two-bloc (14 times, including twice in Pakistan III, Sri Lanka I/II, as well as Thailand),Footnote 9 two-party (6), and two-plus-one (5).Footnote 10
In clear contrast to Europe, where no dominant party system has ever existed (see Casal Bértoa and Enyedi, Reference Casal Bértoa and Enyedi2021: 122), eight party systems in Asia experienced a dominant pattern of inter-party competition. Most of them were formed immediately after independence (e.g. Bangladesh I, India, Malaysia I/II, Myanmar I). Others were formed after the merger of two main parties in the mid-1950s (e.g. the Liberal and the Democratic parties in Japan), the complete collapse of the once powerful democratic opposition party (e.g. the Democratic Party in Mongolia), or the country’s transition to democracy (Myanmar II in 2016). The majority ended with the collapse of democracy, usually after a military coup (e.g. Bangladesh I, Myanmar I),Footnote 11 a Communist insurgency (e.g. Malaysia I), or simply due to the electoral decline of the dominant party (e.g. the Indian National Congress in 1989,Footnote 12 UNMO in 2018). In Japan, it was the 1994 reform that introduced a new – more proportional – electoral system (i.e. SNTV was replaced by MMP).
Both the Kyrgyz and Philippine party systems have been characterized by multipolarity, a pattern that was also visible in Thailand between 1992 and the beginning of the 21st century. A tripolar structure of competition appears only three times: in Indonesia between 2004 and 2013, in Nepal II after 2008, and, more recently, in Pakistan III after 2018. Grand coalitions are rare, although Mongolia has tried this formula a couple of times (2004–2005, 2008–2011), with newly democratized Indonesia being the only other country to have briefly (1999–2003) experienced such a “broad” pattern.
Party system change, understood as taking place when adopting a new party system type (Casal Bértoa, (Reference Casal Bértoa2023)), took place in more than half of the party systems here studied (for more details, See section E in the online appendix). This clearly contrasts with Europe, where only 24 party systems did not experience systemic change (see Casal Bértoa and Enyedi, Reference Casal Bértoa and Enyedi2021: 123; Casal Bértoa, Reference Casal Bértoa2024). Some, like Bangladesh II, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar I, Nepal II, Pakistan II, the Philippines, Sri Lanka I/II, and Taiwan experienced no change in their structure of inter-party competition whatsoever.Footnote 13 Not surprisingly, the same can be said of those short-lived party systems where free party competition did not manage to last even a decade, either because democracy collapsed rather quickly (e.g. Bangladesh I, Myanmar II, Nepal I, and Pakistan I) or because its democratic transition only happened very recently (e.g. Bhutan).
Focusing only on the type of party system that has been predominant in each country, we can distinguish five different clusters: dominant Bangladesh I, India, Japan, Malaysia I and II as well as Myanmar I and II; two-party Bhutan, Nepal I, Pakistan I, South Korea and Taiwan, two-bloc Bangladesh II, East Timor, Mongolia, Pakistan II, Sri Lanka I and II; two-plus-one Pakistan III; tripolar Indonesia and Nepal II; and multipolar Kyrgyzstan, Philippines and Thailand. In addition, in Appendix Table A3, we present the comparison between Asian and European party system types.
Conclusion
Building on Sartori’s classic typology, we examined in this research note the format and the mechanics of 24 democratic party systems. In doing so, we leveraged an original dataset of Asian party systems that includes both contemporary and historical cases.
Our findings suggest that, while it is still meaningful to apply Sartori’s typology to Asia for the first time, such an attempt reveals a number of problems already portrayed in the literature and detailed above. For this reason, building on Casal Bértoa and Enyedi’s (Reference Casal Bértoa and Enyedi2021) European work, we further classify Asian party systems according to their new typology, presenting to what extent this recent framework correlates with the degree of party system institutionalization (closure). With it, and despite some limitations (e.g. regional scope, non-cross-temporal data, correlational analysis), we aim to move forward the literature regarding our understanding of party system change in general, and the development of party systems over time in Asia in particular, while at the same time solving some of the issues present in Sartori’s classic typology. In this context, our typology not only embeds the notion of polarization into the typology by allowing it to configure the number of poles and structure, even condition, the type of party competition; but also allows us to populate the “polarized pluralist” type beyond Sartori’s “centre-based” (Italian) model. By distinguishing three different types in Sartori’s original “moderate pluralist” category, it allows for a more nuanced (and disaggregated) understanding of party system competition in Asia. Finally, due to its high correlation with the level of party system closure, the new typology will help scholars to better capture the moment systemic change actually takes place, being able to predict at the same time the extent to which party system dynamics in a country will remain stable over time.
What are the implications of our findings for Asian democracies? As shown in Table A3, in comparison with European party systems, a majority of Asian party systems have majoritarian characteristics (i.e. either a dominant or a two-party type). This could be because many new democracies in Asia tend to adopt plurality electoral rules during the early periods of democracy. However, as argued by Lijphart (Reference Lijphart2012), power-concentrating political institutions, such as dominant or two-party types, may induce the nature of a zero-sum game, leading to tensions between social groups. Thus, as in the case of European democracies that have a variety of party system types, as democracies become more mature, power-dispersing political institutions, such as tripolar or multipolar types, may be regarded as more appropriate for democratic consolidation (Reynolds and Reilly, Reference Reynolds and Reilly1999).
Where do we go from here? While, due to limited space, we were only able to focus on three party system characteristics (i.e. fragmentation, polarization, closure), future research could extend our study in a few new directions. One of these could include the use of other systemic variables such as electoral volatility, seat ratio/bias or the level of competitiveness (Siaroff, Reference Siaroff2019). Future studies should also compare our typology to other more recent classifications (e.g. Nwokora and Pelizzo, Reference Nwokora and Pelizzo2018; Siaroff, Reference Siaroff2019). We recommend that researchers conduct a more sophisticated comparative analysis, in terms of both the regions studied and the unit of analysis, not to mention the use of a more sophisticated methodology. Future scholars should be able to use a multivariate regression analysis to show that the evidence we provided here is more systematic. We would like to illuminate our contribution in relation to this direction of future research: paving the way for doing so by constructing a comprehensive original dataset of Asian party systems that spans over seven decades from 1947 to 2020. None of this would be possible, however, without the seminal work of one of the greatest “masters of political science” (Campus and Pasquino, Reference Campus and Pasquino2009: Chapter VIII): Sartori is dead, long live Sartori!
Supplementary material
The supplementary material for this article can be found at https://doi.org/10.1017/ipo.2025.10063
Data availability statement
The replication dataset is available at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/ipsr-risp.
Funding
This article was supported by SKKU Academic Research Support Program (Samsung Research Fund), Sungkyunkwan University, 2024.
Competing interests
The authors declare none.
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