Why do democracy supporters abandon their pursuit of a democratic system? Existing scholarship highlights how materialist incentive strategies employed by elites contribute to regime resilience; however, the cultural norms that motivate popular response to incentives remain unclear. We argue that East Asian individuals influenced by Confucianism interpret democracy through instrumental rationality, resulting in pragmatic democratic support. Ordinary citizens recognise the abstract ideals of democracy but hesitate to prioritise the democratic system over material well-being in trade-offs. To identify genuine supporters of democracy, this paper develops two conceptual tools: ‘minimum support for democracy (MSFD)’, which acknowledges the fundamental value of democracy, and ‘priority support for democracy (PSFD)’, which prioritises democratic principles and institutions over competing values. Using data from the latest fifth Asian Barometer Survey (2018–2022), our results suggest that Confucian values are compatible with the MSFD but simultaneously undermine the PSFD. Through mediation analysis, we further find that the instrumental understanding of democracy embedded within Confucianism drives people to abandon the PSFD. These findings shed light on the cultural roots of pragmatic democratic support, offering major implications for the prospects of democratisation in East Asia.

Despite ongoing affective polarization in the United States, support for Taiwan has somehow remained unscathed; Democrats and Republicans unanimously endorse US-Taiwan foreign policy. This is reflected both in public opinion surveys of American voters and support for Taiwan from elected officials. Theories of foreign policy and public opinion suggest that whether voters take top-down or bottom-up cues on foreign policy, we should expect some level of polarization on a salient issue like Taiwan. Utilizing two preregistered survey experiments in the United States, this study tests how robust bipartisan support for Taiwan persists when Taiwan is framed as either a Republican or Democratic issue. When presented as a partisan issue, do American voters still support Taiwan? Contrary to theoretical expectations, Taiwan presents a complex reality. Some foreign policy issues related to Taiwan can become partisan when framed along party lines while others remain bipartisan. Specifically, support for diplomatic and military policy may be affected by partisan framing, but support for economic policy remains bipartisan. This study contributes to theories of public opinion and foreign policy, particularly for scholars focused on US-Taiwan and US-China relations.

Diplomatic events are frequently cited as key determinants of public opinion on foreign countries. However, the process of political socialisation also plays a critical role in shaping such views over time. In this study, we examine trends in Japanese perceptions of China, Russia, and, as a comparative background, the U.S., focusing on the influences of age, period, and cohort effects. Utilising data from the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitude & Trends Survey (2007–2022), we apply the hierarchical age–period–cohort model to disentangle these three effects. Our findings indicate that while the older tend to hold more negative views of these three countries, the influence of age appears weaker than initially hypothesised. While major international crises tend to worsen perceptions across the board, regional disputes exert additional fluctuations (period effect). In comparison to the age and the period effects, cohort effects reveal a generational divide: First, contrasting with the U.S. case, different cohorts exhibit different perceptions toward China and Russia. Second, those born before or after the Cold War generally have more positive attitudes towards the two countries than those born during it. Notably, regional events appear to have little impact on these cohort-based attitudes. We also find that the age effect is more pronounced in the case of Russia, while period and cohort effects are more significant in the case of China. Our conclusions remain robust when controlling for other demographic factors. This study provides a temporal dynamics of Japanese foreign perceptions, utilising sociological methods to explore issues within international relations.

Unlike many other industrial societies, the partisan fights on the vaccination against COVID-19 in Taiwan centred on its brand choice rather than acceptance. Did the incumbent DPP supporters adhere to their party line of Medigen to vaccinate against COVID-19 during the pandemic? We argue that individual COVID-19 vaccine brand choices as gradually updated judgements during the pandemic were not solely determined by the party line, but jointly shaped by the strength of party affiliation and the level of government trust to facilitate decision-making in the highly uncertain information environment at the early stage of the pandemic. More specifically, when choosing COVID-19 vaccine brand, the incumbent DPP supporters, particularly weak ones, were more likely to adhere to their party line of Medigen as they trusted government more; however, this was only for the highly uncertain first shot, due to the absence of reliable information for making informed judgements about COVID vaccine brand choice at the early stage of the pandemic, not for the informationally rich booster shot. We report empirical findings consistent with our argument from statistical analyses of original data from a survey of 1642 Taiwanese adult respondents conducted in the fall of 2022.

Since the initiation of its Belt and Road Initiative, China’s economic statecraft has drawn considerable attention in academic circles. Yet less attention has been given to why the Chinese leadership first chose to pursue its national interests through economic means in the post-Mao period. This underexplored part of China’s economic statecraft can serve as a useful starting point to understand China’s foreign economic policies on their own terms. Employing a neoclassical realist framework and surveying statements made by Chinese leaders throughout the reform era, this study argues that the country’s leaders have gradually modified the strategic importance of the country’s economic statecraft in response to changes in their perceptions of the world order. Meanwhile, China’s form of economic statecraft has largely been determined by reform of its state-owned enterprises in the domestic realm.

Recent studies suggest that young individuals living in consolidated democracies are growing increasingly disillusioned with liberal democratic institutions and becoming more receptive to alternative forms of governance. This study investigates the democratic orientations of young individuals by examining support for different forms of leadership in South Korea. It argues that some young Koreans are following the global trend and are increasingly showing less faith in democracy. Specifically, they are showing more support for strongman leaders due to the way in which these leaders appeal to these voters. An original survey with an embedded experiment suggests that, while the general Korean public tends to support democratic leaders, young Koreans increasingly express a greater preference for strongman leaders due to their growing public anxieties and societal grievances along with the leaders’ painted image to resolve problems. These findings empirically challenge the long-held belief that young people inherently and undoubtedly prefer democracy and suggest that more needs to be done to overcome their diminishing faith in democratic leadership. The study thus prompts a reconsideration of how generational value changes may influence democracies in the future.

This paper examines the effect of the 2022 FIFA World Cup group matches on outgroup bias among South Koreans. Using a list experiment conducted in four rounds before and during the tournament, we investigate whether these matches promote social learning, enabling individuals to update their perceptions of outgroups directly involved in the match, or if they merely trigger emotional responses to match results, with defeats leading to increased outgroup bias regardless of match contact. Our findings suggest insufficient evidence to conclude that South Korean respondents generally modify their outgroup bias levels in response to these events. However, certain subgroups, particularly males, demonstrate strong reactions to losses, exhibiting heightened outgroup bias towards all outgroups. These results indicate that in the context of negative contact valence, high-stakes intergroup sports competitions can lead to an overgeneralized outgroup bias against various groups among highly engaged individuals. This study contributes to understanding the relationship between sports events and intergroup attitudes, highlighting the potential for negative outcomes to exacerbate biases among certain subpopulations.

A growing number of studies focus on how governments can manage audience costs when they want to back down from international crises. In line with previous studies, especially Kohama et al. (2024), this paper argues that the Japanese government can use a variety of reasons to justify its decisions to de-escalate while minimizing domestic audience costs. I found that governments can reduce audience costs using several rhetorical devices, reinforcing the current understanding of audience costs. However, my design, which presented a fait accompli scenario by China against Japan, yielded significantly different results regarding audience costs compared to previous studies on the subject. Specifically, the results of this study indicate that the public might not value economic development following a fait accompli as highly as in less severe scenarios. The results also suggest that leaders might have a harder time backing down after a loss of territory compared to other forms of provocation.

Why do some autocrats establish a ruling party, whereas others do not? The existing literature argues that weak leaders facing a commitment problem have an incentive to create highly institutionalised parties in order to stabilise their ruling coalition. However, empirical research points out that stronger leaders also create ruling parties, which tend to lack institutional strength and be short-lived.

Through a simple formal model and a case study, this paper explains strong leaders’ motivation to create less-institutionalised, short-lived parties. My model introduces two variables to classical leader-elite bargaining model. (1) indivisible benefit from incumbency, which the leaders can exclusively consume and cannot share with ruling elites. This makes the bargaining more difficult while it also increases the leaders’ merit to maintain his post. Thus, the leaders found ruling parties to temporarily deter the elites’ defection, even if the leaders are sure that their ruling coalition will inevitably collapse in the near future. (2) loser’s share, which the elites consume even after the failed rebellion. Many existing models assume that losers in rebellions lose everything, but some leaders lack the willingness or capability to punish defectors. The low loser’s share decreases the elites’ future share, which encourages weak elites to rebel before their bargaining power furthermore goes down. Thus, even strong leaders can face the commitment problem. Through the case study of Georgia, this paper also shows that even less-institutionalised ruling parties can prevent elites from rebelling by empowering potential defectors.

Allied states often seek to discourage other members from engaging in unnecessary conflicts, frequently working to mitigate and de-escalate tensions during crises involving their partners. This study investigates the de-escalatory influence of alliances − referred to as the restraint effect − on state behaviour during international crises. The central question addressed is: under what conditions does the restraint effect of alliances become more pronounced? The study hypothesizes that relatively weak states allied with major powers are more likely to experience a stronger restraint effect compared to others. This hypothesis is empirically tested using multiple regression models. The findings provide evidence of an additional restraint effect associated with the presence of a major ally within defence pacts. Furthermore, the temporal analysis reveals that this effect is particularly evident during the Cold War era.

This study investigates whether corruption among public officials undermines fundamental rights, analysing data from 142 countries using the Rule of Law Index, a widely recognised and respected tool for assessing the rule of law worldwide. The results show that corruption among judges and bureaucrats consistently erodes fundamental rights, including labour rights and freedom of association. In advanced democracies, police and military corruption significantly reduces freedom of association, while lawmakers’ corruption undermines labour rights. However, in the broader context, corruption among lawmakers, police, and military officers does not significantly affect these rights. This study emphasises the significant role of bureaucracy in protecting rights and the devastating consequences of bureaucratic corruption. The trend of executive power abuse further complicates this issue. To combat corruption and safeguard fundamental rights, this article recommends robust mechanisms to ensure accountability and transparency, emphasising the importance of democratic oversight.

The Universal Periodic Review (UPR) is a human rights mechanism under which all UN members are subject to human rights reviews by other states. Given that North Korea is among the worst human rights violators globally, human rights practitioners and academic research have paid much attention to North Korea as a State under Review (SUR). What is much less known and researched is that North Korea actively engages as a ‘reviewer’, regularly making human rights recommendations to other UN members. Using UPR data from 2008 to 2020, this study explores the political dynamics of North Korean human rights recommendations by identifying to whom North Korea makes recommendations and why. We theorize that North Korea utilizes the UPR as a political arena wherein it pats on the back of politically close states and tries to shame politically antagonistic states. Empirical analysis shows that political closeness with North Korea is the main driver influencing its back-patting and shaming efforts in the UPR. Specifically, politically distant states from North Korea, measured by the UN General Assembly voting affinity and presence of unilateral economic sanctions, receive more condemnations and fewer back-patting recommendations. We also demonstrate that North Korea has become much more active over time in their shaming efforts. These findings suggest that even an isolated country like North Korea can learn how to operate in an international institution and can utilize it strategically.

How do different regime types execute a security response during a pandemic? We interrogate the politics of monopolistic securitization which we argue to have significantly directed and influenced the COVID-19 policy strategies adopted in the ‘democratic’ United Kingdom (UK) and ‘authoritarian’ Thailand. Despite their stark political differences, we contend that the British and Thai states’ parallel resort to monopolistic securitization as an overarching pandemic approach effectively made them ‘functionally similar’ by producing security responses that differed only in magnitude and scale but not in kind. Integrating securitization and democratic standards violations frameworks, we find out that the British and Thai authorities’ monopolistic securitization of COVID-19 initially constrained the intersubjective process required to socially construct the pandemic as a primary existential threat endangering both countries. This significantly diminished their public audiences’ individual/agential and collective/institutional capacity to deliberate the immediate emergency measures they unilaterally deployed, particularly during the pandemic’s early stages. Consequently, whether it was in the UK with a supposedly robust democracy or in Thailand with at best a hybrid regime if not outright authoritarian, the security responses that emerged constituted varying types and degrees of violations within the illiberal-authoritarian spectrum. Nevertheless, as the pandemic progressed, the fundamental deliberative-iterative mechanism underpinning securitization enabled the British and Thai public audiences to gradually reclaim their role and space, allowing them to challenge the appropriateness and legitimacy of the existing emergency measures, thereby weakening the states’ monopolistic control over the process.

The home rule movements in Taiwan and Korea were two major events that took place at a time when the Taisho Emperor was embracing a more liberal atmosphere. While Taiwan asked for equal standing within the Japanese empire, Korea wanted political independence from colonial rule. The different framing strategies adopted by the social activists lead to the following empirical puzzles: How did the public intellectuals and social activists define their colonial grievances in Taiwan and Korea and seize the window of opportunity in the post-WWI era? And what framing strategies did they apply in promoting their ideas of self-determination?

This article proposes a comparative analysis of Taiwan’s and Korea’s mobilization of international norms, and it investigates how their framing strategies were used in their respective home rule movements during the colonial era. Their rhetoric and mobilization finally led to Japan’s shift to a more conciliatory policy in these two colonies. The finding contributes to the theoretical development of norm contestation and discourse analysis in international relations.

The organizational structure of this article is presented as follows. First, it engages the current literature on social movements, norm diffusion, and East Asian politics, and it explores the framing strategies of the resistance to Japan’s rule by comparing Taiwanese and Korean social movements in the early 1900s. Second, this study offers a framework of norm contestation in capturing how activists in Taiwan and Korea promoted the principle of self-determination. Third, it addresses alternative explanations on the structural factors and agency in these two movements.

Many democracies have questioned the policy effectiveness of parliamentary petitions because the legislative approval of petitions does not legally bind follow-up measures that lead to petition realization. This study examines the connection between a legislature's adoption of petitions and ex-post policy implementation, using data from an original mail survey of previous petitioners at the prefectural level in Japan. Regression analysis and empirical insights from case studies suggest that the disclosure and transparency of the petition process, especially the issuance of progress reports, enhance officials' commitment to petitions' broad goals, leading to greater accountability, which, in turn, facilitates increased petition realization. These findings imply that citizens in Japan can expect democratic responsiveness to function, partly through the parliamentary petition system after an election.

Candidates from established political families are more likely to win than their non-dynastic counterparts because their political inheritance often includes significant advantages in resources and reputation. Yet dynastic candidates also bring their own set of experiences and qualities to the game. Is it the case that their individual characteristics can explain their electoral success, or is their success due to their family legacy? Theoretically, how and when are political resources transferred to the new generation? We examine these questions by looking at non-incumbent candidates in city and county council elections in Taiwan from 2009 to 2014, drawing on unique data on politicians' backgrounds. The profile of dynastic candidates differs from that of non-dynastic candidates: they are younger, have less electoral experience and list experience in different sorts of organizations and jobs. However, these differences are not what drives their electoral success; indeed, they tend to win despite these qualities rather than because of them. Even after controlling for candidate quality, dynastic status remains a powerful predictor, conveying roughly a 20 percentage point increase in the probability of winning. This suggests that while dynastic candidates accrue some of their advantage long before they run for office, a large part of the inheritance is transferred during the campaign.

While vaccine hesitancy has become a salient issue, few studies have examined the influence of international collaboration and vaccine developments on people's attitudes towards vaccines. The international collaboration especially with China has been an integral part of the field of influenza. In recent years, attitudes towards vaccines and China are both heavily politicized in the USA with a deepening partisan divide. Republicans are more likely than Democrats to be vaccine hesitant, and they are also more likely to view China negatively. At the same time, the USA has economic, security, and medical collaboration with Japan and most Americans display a very positive view of the country. Thus, does a more international collaboration or more country-specific vaccine development have an influence on US vaccine hesitancy? This study conducts a survey-embedded question-wording experiment to assess the roles of US–China and US–Japan collaboration and partisanship in people's willingness to get the flu vaccine. Despite the previously successful and effective US–China collaboration, this study finds that respondents especially Republicans are much less likely to receive a US–China flu vaccine than a US–Japan or USA alone. Interestingly, both Democrats and Republicans are as willing to receive a US–Japan vaccine as USA alone. These results point to critical roles of partisanship and international relations.

This study examines the political dynamics that shape legislators' policy positions on importing US meat into Taiwan during the past decade, focusing on the cases of US beef in 2012 and US pork in 2021. The trade policy surrounding this issue has become politically contentious, involving conflicting national interests and constituency preferences. Legislators face a dilemma, torn between prioritizing the interests of their constituents and aligning with their party's interests. The central argument posits that legislators affiliated with the ruling party are more inclined to advocate for or adjust their stances to support the removal of import bans on American meat, while those associated with the opposition party tend to exhibit a greater reluctance to endorse such a stance. Factors such as the legislators' constituent's interests, district vs party-list affiliations, the urban–rural divide, or education level do not consistently explain legislators' positions on the US meat trade policy. To examine these arguments, this study employs a mixed-method approach, incorporating quantitative analysis and two case studies of individual legislators. The findings of this study offer empirical support for the central proposition.

This article examines the implications of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) centrality in East Asian regionalism. It seeks to address the question of how ASEAN created and maintained its central position in East Asian regionalism by managing regional cooperation in general and institution-building in particular. This article addresses the question by relying on the theoretical concept of productive power and tangible attributes associated with the concept. This article makes three arguments. First, ASEAN maintained its central position in East Asian regionalism by exerting productive power that works in generalized and diffuse social processes and through constitutive social relations. Second, the Association developed and employed specific meanings and norms that constituted the foundation for regional cooperation. Third, ASEAN maintained its central position in the complicated Sino–Japanese rivalry by embedding them in constitutive social relations and avoiding exclusive links with each of the two states.

In the wake of the intensifying Sino–Japanese rivalry in Asia, a new third-party market cooperation (TPMC) framework emerged in late 2018. The new mechanism was inaugurated around the time of former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's visit to Beijing, displaying new attempts at Sino–Japanese economic diplomacy. Nonetheless, this article highlights the absence of major cooperative outcomes and suggests a pessimistic vision of TPMC's future, as three pairs of politico-economic gaps have led to asymmetries in the approaches adopted by China and Japan. First, a government-to-government policy asymmetry occurred between China's initiatives and Japan's responsiveness, as the latter merely utilized the TPMC as a temporary diplomatic tool to restore bilateral relations in late 2018 and appeared to have lost its policy momentum in the following years. Second, asymmetries in business modes and investment management between the two countries' enterprises have led to technical barriers in materializing the two governments' agreements into specific TPMC business collaboration. This study illustrated a project of Sino–Japanese collaboration in building a high-speed railway in Thailand, and saw this failed case as a warning for existing gaps of commercial modes. Third, both countries are now confronted with domestic underdeveloped public–private partnerships between state and private sectors. This article also aims to provide some policy-oriented implications for steadily implementing the Sino–Japanese TPMC in the future.