The 1970s oil shocks sparked high and persistent inflation in advanced economies, also tied to the collapse of the Bretton Woods international monetary system in 1971 that left monetary policy without a stable institutional reference framework. Only in the following decades did a new monetary regime emerge, centered on inflation targeting schemes adopted by independent central banks. Beyond this, other factors affected inflation persistence, namely wage-price spirals rooted in automatic wage adjustment mechanisms, and fiscal policies financed thanks to the regulatory requirement for the central bank to purchase unsold public debt. This article gives a concise analysis of the rationale and provides descriptive evidence of the role these institutional aspects played in the 1970s, suggesting how their evolution has reduced the likelihood of 1970s-style inflationary episodes today. A structural VAR-based counterfactual exercise confirms that absent wage and fiscal pressures inflation persistence would have been significantly lower.

The Great Depression era provides a natural experiment to study the effects of employee stock ownership on productivity due to the unexpected nature of the stock market crash in 1929 and the predetermined expiration of employee stock offerings staggered throughout the 1930s. I collect information on employee stock ownership from reports by the National Industrial Conference Board, annual company reports and other primary sources, and then merge them with the US Census of Manufactures to form the main establishment-level dataset. The results indicate that companies with active programs had significantly lower establishment-level output growth and fewer hours worked per employee than firms with inactive ESOPs post-crash. These negative effects, however, can be mitigated in smaller firms where employees feel their effort level has non-negligible effects. To my knowledge, this is the first study to empirically investigate these early ESOPs as well as address how continuing an employee stock ownership program during a financial crisis affects productivity.

The objective of this study is to analyze the debate surrounding the transformation of the Bank of Brazil into a central bank in 1923. The article seeks to answer the question: What was the role of a central bank for Brazilian policymakers at that time? Unlike other Latin American countries that established their central banks during this period, Brazil’s institution was not the result of any foreign mission. While central banks in other countries were primarily concerned with maintaining the gold standard, in Brazil, the main impetus for establishing a central bank was the need to address cash shortages and expand credit, rather than focusing on monetary discipline. Advocates for the creation of a central bank in Brazil were inspired by the model of Germany’s Reichsbank, and part of their theoretical influence came from the German Historical School. Other references cited in the debates included the works of Keynes and Cassel, and the participants of the debate made parallels with other sciences, such as comparing the central bank to elements of mechanical physics. Beyond controlling the money supply, the central bank was seen as an element for the economic development of the country, and there was an emphasis on the bank’s private management.

This article analyzes the influence of hurricane strikes on the returns of sovereign bonds issued by Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Haiti between 1905 and 1930. The study uses a fixed effects regression model to isolate the impact of hurricane-induced destruction on bond returns, providing a deeper understanding of market reactions following natural disasters. The article shows that hurricanes during this period, which have the potential to cause significant damage, increase bond returns by an average of 0.9 percent in the same month. This suggests that investors demand a risk premium on sovereign bonds from hurricane-prone regions due to the direct impact and broader economic consequences of these disasters.

This article examines the financial strategies employed by Genoese businessmen in Atlantic Castile during the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, focusing on the relative value of private enterprises. It reveals how the interplay between Castilian market characteristics and the unique financial culture of Genoese merchants predominantly supported short-term and transient economic ventures. These methods significantly reduced the need for centralised corporate structures and redundant accounting procedures, supported by a robust notarial system. Consequently, trading in securities and credit extensions became prominent features of this financial market. The research demonstrates that the widespread use of account money, credit and bills of exchange allowed Ligurians to engage in trade and access markets with flexibility and agility through quantitative and functional economic analyses. It also highlights the importance of various credit arrangements, such as loans, bills of trade, or IOUs, which extend beyond merely deferring payments.