The study of international relations since 1945 has focused on the question, how can states make their commitments to go to war more credible? Scholars have proposed that states often make their commitments more credible by tying their hands, by making it impossible or highly costly not to follow through on a commitment. However, tying hands necessarily makes it impossible or more difficult to stay out of war. If war is fought under undesirable political or military conditions, it becomes the “wrong war” and risks extraordinary or even catastrophic costs for the leader, society, and state. The grave risks and costs of the wrong war cause states, leaders, and societies to prefer to avoid tying hands, to give themselves the flexibility to avoid the wrong war. They prefer not to engage in brinkmanship, sign binding alliance treaties, give mad leaders or computers the ability to start wars, or deploy tripwire forces to drag the nation into war. When they rarely tie their hands to make a commitment more credible, they tie their hands as minimally as possible, to provide as much ability as they can afford to avoid getting dragged into the wrong war.