At several points in the Summa Logicae, Ockham appeals to or relies on grammatical doctrines and terminology. One prominent example of this is his use of modes of signifying (modi significandi), which played a central role in a specific brand of speculative grammar whose proponents were known as “modists” (“modistae”). A central tenet of modism is that there is a correspondence between language and the world, mediated by thought, so that for every mode of signifying there is a corresponding mode of being. Ockham appeals to modes of signifying explicitly in at least three parts of his logic – fallacies, connotation, and synonymy – but his proclivity for ontological parsimony suggests that he would have had no fondness for the metaphysical commitments of modism. I argue that Ockham might be considered a “moderate modist” who denies the ontological excesses of modism but nonetheless utilizes much of its theoretical apparatus in his logic.