Offsetting Misrecognition at Culpability Evaluation
from Part II - Paradigm and Principle
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 July 2025
Chapter 4 further justifies the Universal Partial Defence (UPD) on a paradigmatic plane by exploring the second (political) deficit to which the Real Person Approach (RPA) responds. It deploys the principle of parsimony to explain how the weight afforded to the dominant rational agency account contributes to a form of conceptual punitiveness at culpability evaluation, which is reinforced by a broader culture of responsibilisation. Applying the RPA, the chapter conceptualises punitive excess at culpability evaluation as a form of pathogenic vulnerability, unearthing a discrete version of misrecognition at this site. In response, the recognitive justice feature of the RPA is engaged to consider how we might ameliorate this particular variant of social injustice. Drawing on recent scholarship promoting a more modest approach to criminal responsibility attribution, the principle of parsimony is reauthenticated as a core tenet of the criminal law, supporting the call for a UPD at the doctrinal level.
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