The “Consequence Argument” has spawned an enormous literature in response. The most notable of these responses is David Lewis’ which is based on his account of counterfactuals. My reason for adding to this literature is that I show that while Lewis’ diagnosis of the argument is on the right track, the account of counterfactuals he relies on to rebut the argument is defective and, consequently, he rejects the wrong premise of the argument. I will develop a response that is in some ways similar to Lewis’ but relies on a different and better account of counterfactuals based on statistical mechanics. My account of counterfactuals is based on an approach that goes back to Boltzmann and has more recently been developed by David Albert in his book, Time and Chance. This account, which is called “the Mentaculus,” provides a framework for explaining and connecting the various so-called arrows of time, including those of thermodynamics, causation, knowledge, and influence. It is the last of these arrows that is key to my response to the Consequence Argument. If my response is effective, then it will turn out that physics (together with some philosophy), rather than conflicting with freedom, is able to rescue it, at least, from the Consequence Argument. Digging more deeply I will argue that metaphysical views about the nature of time and laws underlie the arguments for the incompatibility of free will and determinism and more generally for the difficulty in seeing how there can be free will in a world in which the motions of material bodies conform to fundamental laws of physics. I will conclude by showing why this is so and how the Mentaculus response to the consequence argument involves relacing these metaphysical views with an alternative account of laws and time more in tune with Humean metaphysics.