

ABSTRACTS FROM *INQUIRY*

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THE DESIRE FOR PRIVATE GAIN: CAPITALISM AND THE THEORY OF MOTIVES

RICHARD SCHMITT

Recent writers on economics have conceded that capitalism suffers from serious shortcomings. But they argue, that in spite of that, preference should be given to capitalism over alternative systems, because it alone gives free rein to the universal, human desire for private gain and is therefore best adapted to human nature. I argue against this psychological defense of capitalism that the desire for private gain is not a universal trait of human beings. On the contrary, it is a defining trait of capitalist society that in it persons are first and foremost motivated by that desire. My argument rests on reflections about the way in which we identify motives. We identify motives not by introspection but by reference to lists of actions that persons, who act from a given motive, may be expected to perform in suitable circumstances. To function in a capitalist society I must perform the sorts of actions by reference to which we identify the desire for private gain as a motive.

THE CONCEPT OF ATTITUDE

J. R. MAZE

Current conceptions of attitude do not adequately distinguish between attitudes and factual beliefs on the one hand, or between attitudes and preferences on the other. To hold an attitude is to ascribe an objective moral property to the attitude-object; however, the conception of such properties rests on an incoherent theory of relations as constitutive of their terms, and the belief in them has only pseudo-cognitive content. Moralism, or the maintaining of attitudes, is a special technique for disguising and promoting interests. Attitudes serve as rationalizations for concealed or unconscious impulses and are themselves defended by further rationalizations. These considerations call into question some common techniques of attitude-assessment. Some apparent exceptions, namely "aesthetic attitudes" and "authentic values," reveal themselves to be either (a) factual beliefs about aesthetic properties or about human motivation respectively, (b) preferences, or (c) moral attitudes as defined. Moralism is not essential to socialization and is inimical to the "social feelings."

MEDICINE'S SYMBOLIC REALITY: ON A CENTRAL PROBLEM IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MEDICINE

ARTHUR M. KLEINMAN

Modern socio-cultural studies of medicine demonstrate the symbolic character of much of medical reality. This symbolic reality can be appreciated as mediating the traditional division of medicine into biophysical and human sciences. Comparative studies of medical systems offer a general model for medicine as a human science. These studies document that medicine, from an historical and cross-cultural perspective, is constituted as a cultural system in which symbolic meanings take an active part in disease formation, the classification and cognitive management of illness, and in therapy. Medicine's symbolic reality also forms a bridge between cultural and psychophysiological phenomena; the basis for psychosomatic and sociosomatic pathology and therapy. This in turn becomes a central problem for medical theory and for a philosophical reinvestigation of medicine.

**DISCUSSION:
SCEPTICISM AND DOGMATISM**

JØRGEN DØØR

In "A Note on 'Scepticism and Absurdity'" (*Inquiry*, Vol. 10 [1967], No. 3), Zinkernagel has restated his attack on scepticism, maintaining that his approach, where we need only refer to a simple and inspectable fact of language, offers a decisive argument against scepticism. It is suggested that Zinkernagel's optimism is unwarranted because on close inspection his general theory reveals some serious complexities, and it is shown that in his own terms Zinkernagel's second rule is not a condition for description.

REVIEW DISCUSSIONS:

I. THE THEORY OF OBJECTS:

**A REVIEW DISCUSSION OF J. N. FINDLAY'S
*MEINONG'S THEORY OF OBJECTS AND VALUES***

KAREL LAMBERT

II. GEORGES GURVITCH AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

G. Gurvitch, *The Social Frameworks of Knowledge*, translated by M. A. and K. A. Thompson, R. MARTIN GOODRIDGE.

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THE EXPERIENCE OF VALUES

FRITHJOF BERGMANN

The first part of this paper argues that the various contending positions in the contemporary Theory of Value share one tacit presupposition, namely that the world of facts is value-neutral. Some of the sources of this premise are identified and a critique attempts to show that it cannot be defended. The second part delineates the general implications that the abandonment of this premise would have for the Theory of Value and outlines an alternative position.

SYSTEMS OF MODAL LOGIC FOR IMPOSSIBLE WORLDS

CHARLES G. MORGAN

The intuitive notion behind the usual semantics of most systems of modal logic is that of "possible worlds." Loosely speaking, an expression is necessary if and only if it holds in all possible worlds; it is possible if and only if it holds in some possible world. Of course, contradictory expressions turn out to hold in no possible worlds, and logically true expressions turn out to hold in every possible world. A method is presented for transforming standard modal systems into systems of modal logic for impossible worlds. To each possible world there corresponds an impossible world such that an expression holds in the impossible world if and only if it does not hold in the possible world. One can then talk about such worlds quite consistently, and there seems to be no logical reason for excluding them from consideration.

THINKING ABOUT NONBEING

CHARLES CRITTENDEN

There are genuine references to nonexistent objects, as can be seen through elucidating reference in common language and applying the criteria enumerated to expressions used in writing and speaking about fiction. The concept of a fictitious entity is simply accepted in the adoption of the "language-game" of fiction and has no undesirable ontological consequences. To think

otherwise is to fail to attend to the conceptual status of such talk. Accounts of fictional discourse by Russell, Ryle, and Chisholm are found objectionable. The concept of existence is touched on, and consequences concerning reference to abstract and other objects and also concerning method in ontology mentioned.

DISCUSSION:

IDEAL CHRONICLES AND FUTURE KNOWLEDGE

PER STRØMHOLM

In his *Analytical Philosophy of History* A. C. Danto suggests that the main difference between an Ideal Chronicle (i.e. an account of events that is contemporaneous and exhaustive) and a History is that the Chronicle cannot by its nature treat adequately the *significance* of the events it describes. For, Danto claims, events derive significance from their relations with other events, including those that are future to themselves, and this latter type of significance cannot be described in a Chronicle since it would involve knowledge of the future. In the following discussion it is suggested that the difference between Ideal Chronicles and Histories, if it exists, cannot be the one suggested by Danto. It is claimed that all significance-giving relations are fully described in a Chronicle and that it is only by the *order* of its material that it differs from a History.

REVIEW DISCUSSIONS:

I. HISTORY, MAN, AND REASON

Maurice Mandelbaum, *History, Man, and Reason. A Study in Nineteenth-Century Thought*, LEON POMPA.

II. HUMANISM AND IDEOLOGY

James R. Flynn, *Humanism and Ideology: An Aristotelian View*, H. J. N. Horsburgh.

III. ONWARD TO YESTERDAY

René Dubos, *A God Within*, JOSEPH W. MEEKER.

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ON WHAT IT IS LIKE TO BE A MAN

VIRGIL C. ALDRICH

The human body is "transmogrified" (caricatured) under physicalistic descriptions of it. These imply that it is a contingent fact that rational beings such as human persons have the sort of bodies they do have. (Or, that, say, baboons are not rational creatures.) The human body is "transfigured" under a description that makes it necessary to the performance of rational functions, including speaking a language. Any view of the matter that excludes this notion, either by reduction to the physicalist treatment or simple denial, is inadequate.

LAO TZU'S CONCEPTION OF TAO

CHARLES WEI-HSUN FU

This article attempts a new interpretation of Lao Tzu's metaphysics of Tao by employing a combined method of linguistic and philosophical analyses. This new methodological approach involves the following basic assumptions: (1) Lao Tzu's metaphysics of Tao can be characterized as a kind of nondualistic and nonconceptual metaphysics *sub specie aeternitatis*; (2) Tao is not an entity, substance, God, *Idée*, or anything hypostatized or conceptualized, but is rather a metaphysical symbol unifying various dimensions of Nature as the totality of things-as-they-

are; (3) there is, generally speaking, no confusion or inconsistency of thought involved in the *Lao-Tzu*; (4) there are two kinds of speech used by Lao Tzu, viz. philosophical (real) speech and figurative (metaphorical) speech; and (5) figurative expressions, which predominate, can be reduced to philosophical expressions for the sake of the clarification of Lao Tzu's thought. In the light of these basic assumptions, a philosophical explication of Lao Tzu's conception of Tao is undertaken by exploring its six dimensions. They are: (i) Tao as Reality, (ii) Tao as Origin, (iii) Tao as Principle, (iv) Tao as Function, (v) Tao as Virtue, and (vi) Tao as Technique; and (ii)–(iv) can be subsumed under Tao as Manifestation (to us). These six dimensions are not “categories” or “attributes” in the Western (conceptual) sense, but are the inseparable aspects or perspectives of Tao reconstructed from the *Lao-Tzu* in order to show the best possible way of understanding Lao Tzu's metaphysical thinking. In the Epilogue, a brief comparison of Lao Tzu and Spinoza is made in order to emphasize the nonconceptual and nonpropositional nature of Lao Tzu's metaphysical language.

RATIONALITY AND THE *TU QUOQUE* ARGUMENT

JOSEPH AGASSI

The *tu quoque* argument is the argument that since in the end rationalism rests on an irrational choice of and commitment to rationality, rationalism is as irrational as any other commitment. Popper's and Polanyi's philosophies of science both accept the argument, and have on that account many similarities; yet Popper manages to remain a rationalist whereas Polanyi decided for an irrationalist version of rationalism. This is more marked in works of their respective followers, W. W. Bartley III and Thomas S. Kuhn. Bartley declares the rationalist's very openness to criticism open to criticism, in the hope of rendering Popper's critical rationalism quite comprehensive. Kuhn makes rationality depend on the existence of an accepted model for scientific research (paradigm), thus rendering Polanyi's view of the authority of scientific leadership a *sine qua non* for scientific progress. The question raised here is, in what sense is a rationalist committed to his rationality, or an irrationalist to his specific axiom? The tradition views only the life-long commitment as real. Viewing rationality as experimental open-mindedness, we may consider a rationalist unable to retreat into any life-long commitment—even commitment to science. In this way the logic of the *tu quoque* argument is made irrelevant: anyone able to face the choice between rationality and commitment is already beyond such a choice; it is one thing to be still naïve and another—and paradoxical—thing to return to one's naïveté.

KNOWLEDGE VERSUS SURVIVAL

HERMAN TENNESSEN

Our biological survival is often taken as an argument in favor of the validity of our present conceptual scheme and cognitive frame of reference. A twofold counterargument is offered: (1) Given any notion of “knowledge,” “insight,” etc. within our present scheme, it is possible, even plausible, that such “knowledge” and “insight” be extended and perfected beyond what is beneficial to the survival of mankind; (2) The alleged link between survival and veridicality is not logical but contingent and tenuously tangential. Since the prevailing scheme may prove to serve ends not just other than, but opposed to survival, e.g. the end of unmasking the world and man's lot therein, survivalism may require a radical reconsideration of that scheme, including its prejudice in favor of survival. From the point of view of all current schemes or frames of reference, such a project appears inherently paradoxical.

DISCUSSIONS:

I. COMMENTS ON “KNOWLEDGE VERSUS SURVIVAL”

ARNE NÆSS

II. REJOINDER TO NÆSS

HERMAN TENNESSEN

III. CODY'S CATEGORIES

DAVID RAYFIELD

This paper is a reply to criticism made by A. B. Cody ("Is 'Human Action' a Category?" *Inquiry*, Vol. 14 [1971], No. 4) of earlier papers by the author ("On Describing Actions," *Inquiry*, Vol. 13 [1970], Nos. 1-2, and "Action," *Noûs*, Vol. 2 [1968], No. 2). For brevity, familiarity is presupposed not only with the three papers just mentioned, but also with Cody, "Can a Single Action Have Many Different Descriptions?" *Inquiry*, Vol. 10 (1967), No. 2; R. E. Dowling, "Can an Action Have Many Descriptions?" *Inquiry*, Vol. 10 (1967), No. 4; and Cody, "A Reply to Mr. Dowling," *ibid.*

IV. REPLY TO MR. DØØR

PETER ZINKERNAGEL

REVIEW DISCUSSIONS:

I. WITTGENSTEIN REINVESTIGATED

James Bogen, *Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Language: Some Aspects of its Development*, and P. M. S. Hacker, *Insight and Illusion: Wittgenstein on Philosophy and the Metaphysics of Experience*, JOHN E. LLEWELYN.

II. UNDERSTANDING HERMENEUTICS

Richard E. Palmer, *Hermeneutics. Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer*, GUTTORM FLØISTAD.

RECENT BOOKS

- JOSEPH MARGOLIS. *Knowledge and existence*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1973.
 EDGAR MORSCHER. *Das logische an-sich bei Bernard Bolzano*. Salzburg: Universitäts-verlag Anton Pustet, 1973.
 JAMES CHRISTIAN. *Philosophy: an introduction to the art of wandering*. California: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1974.
 ARCHIE BAHM. *Ethics as a behavioral science*. Springfield: Charles C. Thomas Press, 1974.
 MAX JAMMER. *The philosophy of quantum mechanics*. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1974.