

DIFFERENTIAL MIGRATION
OF CUBAN SOCIAL RACES:
A Review and Interpretation of the Problem*

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In the aftermath of the 1959 revolutionary triumph there began a massive impelled migration to the United States, paralleled in Cuban history only by the great exodus during the nineteenth-century wars of independence. Close to 500,000 Cubans had migrated to the United States by 1972.¹

The migration has shifted in size and has occurred intermittently since 1959, a consequence of the turbulent relations between the United States and Cuban governments. From January 1959 to October 1962, regular commercial flights existed between the United States and Cuba. During much of this period, American visas could be obtained in the United States embassy in Havana and in the Santiago de Cuba consulate. However, after diplomatic relations were severed (3 January 1961), the United States government generally waived the visa requirements for Cubans desiring to migrate. During this period, 153,534 Cubans registered with the Miami Cuban Refugee Center and close to 200,000² had arrived in the United States by the time of the 1962 October missile crisis.

By the end of 1965, the migration had decreased enormously—between 23 October 1962 and 30 November 1965, only 29,962 Cubans registered with the refugee center. During this period, Cubans wanting to come to the United States had to obtain visas through third countries, mainly Mexico and Spain, or they utilized illegal means to migrate—small boats, rafts, hijacking. At the close of this period (September–October 1965) Fidel Castro allowed Cubans to leave the island from the port city of Camarioca. Manned by Cuban exiles, hundreds of private boats crossed the Gulf and thousands of Cubans were reunited with their relatives in the United States. Air travel between Cuba and the United States was reestablished on 8 December 1965. It was ended in April 1973. During this period, close to 270,000 Cubans registered with the refugee center.

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In what follows, an attempt is made to identify some historical processes that have shaped the racial characteristics of this migrant population. It is not an exhaustive treatment of the problem but, rather, a selection of the critical variables affecting the migration rates of the different social races.³

It is well established that Cubans in the United States are primarily white, which are overrepresented in the migration flow if compared to their proportion in the Cuban population in 1953. Moreover, the racial homogeneity of the émigré population in the United States increased during the 1960s. In conjunction with this increasing homogeneity, the occupational distribution of the exiled population has shifted towards that estimated in the 1953 Cuban census. Although no statistical information exists on the occupational characteristics of the migratory population at time of entry by race,⁴ table 2 gives an estimate of how the preexile occupational composition of the émigré population has shifted throughout the years. The occupational characteristics of the exiles progressively moved from a highly trained and professional population with a small semiskilled and unskilled stratum in 1962 to a yearly influx which, in 1971, was quite representative of the Cuban population during the late 1950s, with the exception of those in agriculture and fishery.

As early as 1964, Fagen et al., had pointed out that even though certain occupational groups, like professionals, were overrepresented in the émigré population, there was a clear shift in the socioeconomic status of the emigrants. "By 1962," these writers tell us, "a considerable proportion of the refugees were neither rich, well-educated, occupationally advantaged, nor in any sense members of the pre-Castro establishment."⁵

TABLE 1. *Percentage Distribution by Racial Extraction, Cuban Population in 1953 and Cubans in the United States, 1960 and 1970*

	<i>Cuba, 1953 Census</i>	<i>Cubans in the United States</i>	
		1960	1970
White	72.8	93.5	96.4
Black	26.9 ^a		2.6 ^a
Asian	.3	6.5	1.0

Source: 1970 Census of Population. Detailed Characteristics: U.S. Summary, Table 5. Persons of Spanish Origins by Race, Sex, Relationship to Head of Household and Nativity: 1970. See also, U.S. Census, 1960 and 1970, U.S. Summary Tables on Country of Origin of the Foreign Stock by Nativity and Race.

^aBoth Negro and mulatto

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TABLE 2. *Percentage Distribution of Occupations at the Time of Entry, Cuban Refugees Arriving in the United States in Specified Years, Compared to the Occupational Distribution Estimated from the 1953 Cuban Census.*

	1959– 1962 ^a	1966 ^a	1967 ^a	1969 ^b	1970 ^b	1971 ^b	1953 ^a Cuban Census
Professional, Semi-professional and Managerial	31.0	21.0	18.0	16.4	12.4	13.1	9.2
Clerical and Sales	33.0	31.5	35.5	30.6	30.2	27.0	13.7
Skilled	17.0	22.0	26.0	28.1	25.2	23.2	27.2
Semiskilled and Unskilled	8.0	11.5	8.0	10.6	16.0	18.6	—
Service	7.0	9.0	8.5	8.7	9.0	8.9	8.3
Agriculture and Fishing	4.0	5.0	4.0	5.7	7.2	9.2	41.6
Total	100.0 (27,419)	100.0 (17,124)	100.0 (14,867)	100.0 (15,187)	100.0 (14,755)	100.0 (12,350)	100.0 (1,938,228)

^aRichard R. Fagen, et al., *Cubans in Exile: Disaffection and the Revolution* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), p. 115, table 7.1.

^bCuban Refugee Program, "Consolidated Report on Overall Operation," for the periods 12/28/68 to 1/2/70; 1/3/70 to 12/31/70; and 1/1/71 to 12/30/71.

The shift in the socioeconomic status of the émigré population has continued in the direction foreseen by Fagen and his associates. Since 1967 (the most recent date they researched), the overrepresentation of professionals, semiprofessionals, and managerial occupations has been greatly reduced. By 1971, semiskilled, unskilled, and skilled occupations were overrepresented in the émigré population of that year, compared to their representation in the occupational estimates of the 1953 Cuban Census.⁶

The fact that every new yearly influx during the 1960s was more representative of Cuba's occupational distribution, while the racial homogeneity of the exiled population increased, merits careful attention. The later émigrés have been increasingly white while representing every social stratum of the postrevolutionary social structure. Paradoxically, as migration became a common experience throughout Cuban society, Cuban Negroes participated less in it.

The tendency of Cuban Afro-Americans to stay in Cuba does not appear to be a result of a pre-1959 castelike system of occupational dis-

crimination and segregation that had isolated them from widespread participation in the national occupational structure. On the contrary, as noted by Wagley, the basic characteristic of the cultural interpretation of race common to the Caribbean is that no one is excluded from higher statuses solely on the basis of color. Whiteness, although highly valued socially, is only one of the dimensions of status by which the overall evaluation of a man's social position was reached in pre-Castro Cuba.

Wagley's ideas get support from Cuban census data, which document the movement of gainfully employed Negroes from unskilled occupations in 1919⁷ to more skilled occupations by the 1940s and 1950s.⁸ Constituting 25.9 percent of Cuba's population in 1943,⁹ Negroes accounted for more than 30 percent of the musicians, artists, bricklayers, dressmakers, carpenters, decorators, tinsmiths, cigarmakers, shoemakers, stevedores, painters, bakers, and cooks.¹⁰ Of all Cuban primary school teachers in 1943, 18 percent were Afro-Americans. They had achieved parity in such skilled occupational categories as boilermakers, jewelers, bookkeepers, typists, stenographers, radio mechanics, watch repairmen, and mechanics.¹¹ According to Lowry Nelson, "In none of the broad groups do the colored fall markedly low, a fact which must be accepted as evidence that there is no rigid color line so far as the major occupations are concerned."¹²

The increased participation of Negroes in Cuban life can be observed also in the intergenerational change in literacy. The percentage of the nonwhite population twenty years old and above able to read rose to 69.1 percent in 1943, faster than improvement in the literacy rate of native whites. The literacy rate of all younger cohorts, however, fell during the 1931–43 period, and the decline seemed to have been worse in the colored population.¹³

In general terms, the same pattern emerges from a comparison of the incomes of Cuban Negroes and whites.¹⁴ By 1943, "46% of black workers got under \$30 a month compared to 37% of white, while 43% of white got between \$30 and \$60 compared to 41.4% of black, and 6% of white workers got over \$100 and only 2½% of black."¹⁵ Though distributed in appreciable numbers through all of the income categories, Negroes were concentrated at the lower levels. In agriculture, however, the influence of color on income was nil.¹⁶

This information shows how the institutionalized patterns of racial discrimination operated in Cuba. Negroes were, in general, underrepresented in the political system, in the civil services,¹⁷ in the professions, and in banking and finance. More than whites, they suffered the chronic unemployment and underemployment characteristic of the Cuban economy after World War II. They earned less than whites even in the same

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TABLE 3. *Distribution of Cuban Labor Force by Occupational Group and Race and Nativity: 1919, 1943*

Occupation	1919						1943			
	Native Whites		Foreign White		Colored ^c		White		Colored ^c	
	Percent ^a	Index ^b								
Agriculture, Livestock, Fishing	55.9	89	14.7	156	29.3	106	81.0	109	19.0	73
Agriculture	55.6	88	14.6	155	29.7	107	81.0	109	19.0	73
Livestock	72.0	114	17.6	187	10.3	37	86.6	117	13.4	52
Fishing	74.0	118	15.8	168	10.2	37	86.0	116	14.0	54
Mining	23.7	38	63.5	676	12.7	46	67.3	91	32.7	126
Construction	32.6	52	21.4	227	46.0	166	56.4	76	43.6	168
Manufacturing and Mechanized Industries	44.0	70	18.9	201	38.0	137	65.5	88	34.5	133
Food & Similar Products	43.9	70	21.2	226	34.8	126	69.2	93	30.8	119
Other Food Industries							61.2	83	38.8	150
Textiles	46.7	74	23.5	250	29.8	108	78.6	106	21.4	83
Clothing & Similar	33.4	53	11.9	126	54.7	197	57.7	78	42.3	163
Lumberyards	43.0	68	23.6	251	33.3	120	80.3	108	19.7	76
Furniture & Similar Products	70.9	113	10.5	112	18.6	67	62.9	85	37.1	143
Other Wood Products	52.5	83	18.5	197	29.0	105	56.7	76	43.3	167
Paper Products	.0	0	.0	0	.0	0	93.0	126	7.0	27
Printing & Similar	49.7	79	35.0	372	15.3	55	75.0	101	25.0	96
Chemical Products & Fertilizers	.0	0	.0	0	.0	0	90.3	122	9.7	37
Pharmaceutical Products	.0	0	.0	0	.0	0	92.6	125	7.4	28
Leather & its Products							57.9	78	42.1	162
Leather Processing	41.9	67	17.9	190	40.2	145	86.9	117	13.1	50
Other Leather Articles							55.0	74	45.0	174
Shoes	34.7	55	19.5	207	61.0	220	57.1	77	42.9	166
Ceramics & Products	43.7	69	28.5	303	27.7	100	72.9	98	27.1	105
Metals & Products	38.3	61	20.3	216	41.4	149	61.1	82	38.9	150
Machinery	48.0	76	25.2	268	26.7	96	72.6	98	27.4	106

Table 3 Continued.

Occupation	1919						1943			
	Native Whites		Foreign White		Colored ^c		White		Colored ^c	
	Percent ^a	Index ^b								
Transportation										
Equipment	42.3	67	20.8	221	36.8	133	81.6	110	18.4	71
Sugar Industries	85.4	136	9.4	100	5.2	18	73.6	99	26.4	102
Tobacco & Cigarettes	52.8	84	7.0	74	40.2	145	66.0	89	34.0	131
Other Manufacturing Industries	37.7	60	43.9	467	18.4	66	81.8	110	18.2	70
Transportation & Communications	57.0	91	27.6	294	15.3	55	77.7	105	22.3	86
Air Transport	.0	0	.0	0	.0	0	88.0	119	12.0	46
Railroads	67.8	108	15.8	168	16.5	60	75.9	102	24.1	93
Trolleys	.0	0	.0	0	.0	0	87.1	118	12.9	50
Bus System	.0	0	.0	0	.0	0	89.3	120	10.7	41
Trucking	.0	0	.0	0	.0	0	82.0	111	18.0	69
Taxicabs	.0	0	.0	0	.0	0	81.0	109	19.0	73
Maritime Transports	51.0	81	37.3	397	11.7	42	64.4	87	35.6	137
Other Transports	51.4	82	30.8	328	17.8	64	78.3	106	21.7	84
Telephones	84.7	135	7.5	80	7.8	28	97.1	131	2.9	11
Telegraphs							81.5	110	18.5	71
Radio	.0	0	.0	0	.0	0	85.2	115	14.8	57
Other Public Services	39.8	63	26.1	278	34.0	123	82.0	111	18.0	69
Commerce							89.1	120	10.9	42
Wholesale	38.4	61	50.0	532	11.6	42	83.6	113	16.4	63
Retail							89.6	121	10.4	40
Banks & Financial Institutions	66.7	106	27.2	289	6.1	22	91.8	124	8.2	32
Personal & Domestic Services	30.6	49	23.7	252	45.6	165	58.2	78	41.8	161
Domestic Services	30.7	49	25.6	272	43.8	158	52.7	71	47.3	183
Hotels & Guest Houses	39.7	63	45.3	482	14.9	54	91.6	124	8.4	32
Laundry & Cleaners	18.5	29	10.0	106	71.4	258	73.8	100	26.2	101
Barbers & Beauticians	47.1	75	10.7	114	39.2	142	56.4	76	43.6	168
Miscellaneous	.0	0	.0	0	.0	0	64.2	87	35.8	138

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Table 3 Continued.

Occupation	1919						1943			
	Native Whites		Foreign White		Colored ^c		White		Colored ^c	
	Percent ^a	Index ^b								
Recreational Services & Similar	36.8	58	32.4	345	30.7	110	61.5	83	38.5	149
Theaters & Movies	39.3	62	53.1	565	7.5	27	80.5	109	19.5	75
Miscellaneous	.0	0	.0	0	.0	0	46.1	62	53.9	208
Professional Services	74.0	118	17.4	185	8.6	31	86.8	117	13.2	51
Education	74.2	118	14.4	153	11.3	40	82.0	111	18.0	69
Medicine	78.1	124	14.8	157	7.1	26	84.1	113	15.9	61
Lawyers	89.7	143	7.8	83	2.4	8	88.0	119	12.0	46
Engineering	67.0	106	28.5	303	4.5	16	89.5	121	10.5	40
Religion & Charity Institutions	22.6	36	73.0	776	4.4	16	87.5	118	12.5	48
Government	74.0	118	6.6	70	19.4	70	80.8	109	19.2	74
Defense	67.5	107	7.2	76	25.2	90	80.4	108	19.6	76
State, Provinces, Municipios	83.9	133	5.6	60	10.5	38	81.1	109	18.9	73
Diverse Services (Renting, Repairs)	49.9	79	24.5	261	25.7	93	73.6	99	26.4	102
Repairing, Renting of Auto	51.5	82	22.1	235	26.4	95	70.5	95	29.5	114
Other Services	30.8	49	55.0	585	14.2	51	72.7	98	27.3	105
Not Classified	47.8	76	25.7	273	26.5	96	75.6	102	24.4	94

Source: Cuba, Dirección General del Censo, *Census of the Republic of Cuba, 1919* (Havana: Masa, Arroyo Y Caso, Printers), pp. 666–67; Informe General del Censo de 1943 (Havana: P. Fernandez y Cia, 1945), p. 1042, as presented by Marianne Masferrer and Carmelo Mesa-Lago, “The Gradual Integration of the Black in Cuba,” in *Slavery and Race Relations in Latin America*, ed. Robert B. Toplin (Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1974), pp. 368–70.

^aIntra-occupational Percentage Distribution—it may not add to 100 due to rounding error.

^bPercent Index Number—Percent in Population = 100. 1919: Native whites, 62.9 percent; foreign whites, 9.4 percent; colored, 27.7 percent. 1943: White, 74.1 percent; colored, 25.9 percent. In 1919, 26 percent of the native white population, 72 percent of the foreign born, and 35 percent of the colored were in the labor force. See Masferrer and Mesa-Lago, “The Gradual Integration,” and Carmelo Mesa-Lago, *The Labor Force, Employment, Unemployment and Underemployment in Cuba* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publication, 1972).

^cIncludes black, mulatto, and Asian.

^dThe 1919 figures represent my own categorization of 95 selected occupations on which data were available, rather than the whole national occupational structure, as is the case for 1943. The results are, however, quite close to the 1919 census’ own estimates of the whole occupational structure—see table 23, p. 632, and my own note 7.

TABLE 4. Percentage of Cuban Population Able to Read, by Age Category and Color, 1931 and 1943

Age Category	Native White		Colored	
	1931	1943	1931	1943
10–13	69.7		67.4	
10		51.7		46.1
11		59.0		53.6
12		63.0		58.2
13		68.1		62.8
14–19	75.4	74.1	73.7	69.5
20 and over	71.3	74.5	61.7	69.1

Source: Lowry Nelson, *Rural Cuba* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1951), p. 243.

industries¹⁸ and had higher illiteracy rates. While all of this is well documented, the existing information supports the generalization that Afro-Americans had improved their economic condition and increasingly were becoming full participants in every element of the economy and society. It is inaccurate to characterize pre-1959 Cuban society as a divided camp in which Afro-Americans were mercilessly exploited, an assertion that even scholarly works reflect. For instance, according to Blustein et al., “Before the 1959 Revolution [blacks] were usually found in the lower socioeconomic positions and performed, for the most part, unskilled jobs.”¹⁹ Life was at times difficult, but difficult for most of the population, regardless of race.

A number of observers of the Cuban revolution state that its programs have benefited the poor and consequently the Negro population. Joseph A. Kahl writes: “For the first time Cuba’s Negroes—about one-third of the population—share equally in the goods and services and the civic respect of their society. They have been fully integrated in the schools and on the job.”²⁰ Indeed, there are good indications²¹ that, at least during the first years of its regime, the revolutionary programs benefited the lower social strata, thus eliciting their support. As the revolutionary experience matured, however, the evidence of support and acceptance of these programs by the lower social strata became more tenuous. To my knowledge, the Cuban authorities neither publish information relevant to such questions²² nor allow independent investigation of the problem.²³ Qualitative accounts of visiting journalists, however, indicate that the lower social strata and the Afro-American population

participate extensively in the life of the nation and in important programs such as the Block Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR). Only occasionally does specific information on racial groups become available.²⁴ On the whole, however, the degree of *free* participation of different social races and social strata in revolutionary efforts of various kinds is largely unknown, nor do we know the shifts in the pattern over time. Although it is reasonable to suppose that the revolutionary government has encouraged all Cubans to participate in the so-called tasks of national development, how much freedom this participation connotes is still unexplored.

If, as we have argued, the tendency of Cuban Afro-Americans to remain in Cuba cannot be explained solely by their social class, then it becomes fruitful to analyze the social processes that in fact have helped determine who migrates from Cuba. One of these is the historical origin of the impelled migration itself; another is the ideological climate of present-day Cuban society.

In Cuba, extended-family networks²⁵ were quite important units of the social structure. That nuclear families relate to each other through various degrees of superordination and subordination is a useful base for the analysis of contemporary Latin American society in general and Cuban society in particular. In Cuba, the nuclear family has been the model family unit since the 1930s, at the latest, and increasingly so after that date. Romantic choice of spouses was practiced universally by the 1950s. The typical family comprised the parents and a small number of children and, in general, excluded other relatives from the household. Separate households were maintained as a rule. The predominance of the nuclear family was reflected also in the growing rationalization of Cuban family law, under which women and illegitimate children increasingly obtained equal legal protection. The rate of divorce rose and common-law marriages became less prevalent.²⁶ However, what Talcott Parsons identifies as the essential characteristic of the nuclear family, i.e., its *economic independence* from extended kin networks, had not been fully achieved by 1959, probably because of the stagnant economy that did not provide enough avenues for social mobility. There was a general lack of effective transfer payments via the impersonal mechanisms of a fully developed economy—social security, long-term unemployment compensation and medical coverage, comprehensive retirement programs, and the like. Cuba's nuclear families, especially those dependent on unemployed and underemployed heads, relied much more than those in the United States on lateral and intergenerational kinship ties. The extended family as a corporate entity and the family name as a social passport

furnishing the individual with particularistic social evaluations was, and probably still is, a feature of Cuban society.

The migration of nuclear families was facilitated to the extent that they were embedded in an extended kin network, with "contacts" and other mobilizable resources in Havana and in the United States. During its first months in power, the revolutionary government attacked primarily the Cuban upper classes (from which Negroes had been most excluded); thus, from the very onset of the flow, the white Cubans set up a chain migration through extended family networks. The poorer and less-educated nuclear families participated in the migration later. Interestingly, in his study of Cuban-exiled white families in the United States, Gibboney²⁷ found evidence that partially supports this hypothesis. When he asked resettled Cubans which groups or persons had helped them the most in the United States, 45.3 percent of the respondents declared that they had received the greatest assistance from Cuban relatives and friends.²⁸ Rogg concludes, from her study of Cubans in West New York, that while they had received a great deal of assistance from relatives, "most family help did not come from the most immediate family members but from the extended families."²⁹

Of course, the migration policy of the United States and Cuban governments contributed to the exclusion of Cuban Negroes from the migration flow. Indeed, after the 1965 Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Cuba, priority in the migration was given to relatives of Cubans residing in the United States. Prospective immigrants needed close relatives to claim them, otherwise they could not leave. Whether intended or not, this policy automatically excluded categories of persons in the Cuban population that had migrated least during the first years of the exodus; the Negro was thus systematically excluded.

The second major social process operating in this case is the whole climate of the Cuban revolution. Two interrelated themes are stressed in Cuban revolutionary ideology: Cuban society is socialist, where racism has been totally eradicated and egalitarianism and achievement are fully institutionalized; and the United States is a racist and decadent capitalist society that exploits and brutalizes Afro-Americans and all other minorities, as well as the poor and the workers.³⁰

According to official dogma, racial discrimination, as well as other kinds of prejudicial distinctions, disappeared in Cuba with the demise of private property.³¹ In the words of Fidel Castro: "Discrimination disappeared when class privileges disappeared, and it has not cost the revolution much effort to resolve that problem. . . . In Cuba, the exploitation of man by man has disappeared, and racial discrimination has disappeared too."³² In revolutionary doctrine, the status of the Afro-Americans

is drastically redefined, with an emphasis on their importance in Cuban history and in the formation of the Cuban nation. Similar to the Mexican and Brazilian experience of the recent past, present-day revolutionary education on the history of ethnic and racial relations emphasizes the process of racial miscegenation in Cuba and identifies the mulatto as the most numerous and typical social racial category in the population.³³ The new revolutionary history emphasizes the heroic and belligerent posture of Afro-Americans throughout the colonial period. Blas Roca, a well-known Communist intellectual, states that close to 85 percent of all Cuban rebels in the wars of independence were Negro.³⁴

Revolutionary thought on race relations, by presenting the Cuban revolution as the champion of racial egalitarianism, can claim descent from that fountainhead of patriotism, Jose Martí, celebrated as the most exalted public figure in the history of the Cuban people and the most romantic symbol of the nation.³⁵ By integrating socialist thought with aspects of Cuban history, the revolutionary ideology presents a strong claim to the loyalties of Cuban Negroes. Supposedly, the social criticism³⁶ of the Cuban black intellectuals has been fully answered. In fact, of course, since according to Communist dogma any racial conflict is epiphenomenal to the basic class struggle, the pre-1959 arguments of Cuban Negro intellectuals were attacked.³⁷ Communist ideologues condemned their efforts to create a "black doctrine"³⁸ and a black separatist movement as distracting the masses from the "real" social struggle and thus helping national and international capitalist forces. But Cuban Negro leaders who espoused racial integration were also attacked, since according to the Communist interpretation they underestimated the structural origins of racial discrimination. They were not willing to fight against discrimination!

In contrast to the idyllic portrayal of race relations in revolutionary Cuba, the United States is depicted as a racist and inhuman society, unfit for free, authentic men. Capitalism, in the words of Fidel Castro, encourages a type of human egoism closely related to racist feelings. "Why hasn't the United States been able to eradicate discrimination? It is because racial discrimination and the exploitation of man by man are two things intimately joined."³⁹

United States race relations are portrayed in terms common to the international revolutionary eschatology, appealing to the nationalist, third-world sentiments of the moment. According to Cuban revolutionary ideology, the American blacks are a *colonized subnation*, living in segregated quarters, forming colonies of misery in the heart of American affluence. In the view of Desnoes, writing from Havana, the black movement in the United States will inevitably develop into a black revolu-

tionary armed action against the American "capitalist dogs"; Malcolm X emerges as the heroic prophet of liberation of the people of the third world, responding to Guevara's call for revolutionary vengeance.⁴⁰

As in every aspect of this complicated problem, the revolutionary ideology comprises selected aspects of social history to make up a consistent social map to the Cubans. Moreover, the Cuban population in exile acts as if the official claims on the loyalty of the Negro population have every basis of fact and thus help corroborate them. Cuban white exiles charge that Castro "created" the race problem in Cuba. However, he was simply willing to abandon the traditional racial etiquette (so astutely analyzed by Fernandes in his Brazilian study) studied in Cuba by Fernando Ortiz.⁴¹

According to this ideology, Afro-Americans are to fulfill revolutionary tasks by rejecting the very principles of group relations in pre-1959 Cuban society. The dark past of discrimination and oppression of the Afro-Americans is contrasted with a future of unequaled *humanismo*. The resentment this causes among Cuban exiles is aggravated by the widespread feeling among émigrés that Cuban Afro-Americans welcomed the Castro regime. Nicholas and Prohias, in their study of rent differentials among racial and ethnic groups in Miami, found that the discrimination against black Cubans was strongest in the city's Cuban areas, as compared with white, black, and mixed tracts.⁴² Miami's Little Havana, in the city's central district, was almost totally free of black residents, with only 0.8 percent of the population of Afro-American extraction in 1970!

Asked who had benefited the most from the revolution, a sample of Miami Cubans rejected a social-class explanation and couched their answers primarily in moral terms: Apart from the obvious choices of "no one" or "communists," those who benefited from the revolution are those of low moral worth.⁴³ Negroes are, in my opinion, so judged by most émigrés. Historically, in Cuba, there has been a strong tendency to associate moral worth with social and economic status. Thus, lower-class persons were seen as morally deficient (e.g., witness the treatment of the Negro in prerevolutionary literature). This view of the Negro, and of the poor in general, is maintained by the exiles. Less than 44 percent of Rogg's Cuban sample in West New York⁴⁴ thought that American Negroes had a right to complain about the injustices that they had received in this country, while 69.2 percent of the 545 respondents thought that the Negro had done fairly well here. The majority (85.2 percent) of the respondents, in fact, agreed with the statement that "if Negroes worked hard they would attain all the gains of advancement that others have," and 64.4 percent accepted the statement that "if Negroes aren't kept in their place they will ruin this country." What is noteworthy about this information is

the willingness of the exiles to place the responsibility for social betterment squarely on the shoulders of the Negroes themselves and their insistence that social advancement is to be achieved through hard work and not by political mobilization.

Perhaps the moral isolation of the Cuban Negroes from the exile community explains their atypical geographical distribution if compared to that of the Cuban foreign-born population residing in this country. Whereas Cuban nonwhites tended to live in the Northeast (58.5 percent), by 1970, a majority of Cuban whites were concentrated in the southern states (52.3 percent), although there had been a shift out of the Northeast for all social races during the 1960–70 period.⁴⁵ Apparently, the ethnic identity of the Cuban Negro cannot neutralize the greater discrimination that all blacks experience in the South, so that the majority avoid the region. They lack a sense of community that shelters the ethnic individual from the effects of the larger society and culture.⁴⁶ This hypothesized lack of a feeling of ethnic identification is again corroborated by the Cuban Negroes' inordinately high rate of naturalization.

In a very real sense, for the Afro-American, migration means a loss of his national identity. He can have no illusion of belonging to a nation in exile, temporarily marking time in a foreign setting while awaiting the wished-for return. In his fieldwork among Cubans in Chicago, Fox⁴⁷ found that Negro workers had inordinately positive evaluations of the revolution and its leaders. This datum makes sense if we assume that, once in this country, the Afro-American is isolated from the larger Cuban community and thus is not socialized to its dogmas. Presumably this isolation is known in Cuba and is a factor in Negroes' decisions concerning migration.

In sum, a revolutionary ideology that institutes a set of sanctioned expectations prescribing what is morally appropriate in the social and political conduct of Cuban Negroes essentially identifies them as both a major bulwark of the revolution and one of its main beneficiaries. A

TABLE 5. *Rate of Naturalization of Cuban Foreign Born by Race, 1970.*

	<i>Whites</i>	<i>Negroes</i>	<i>Other Races</i>	<i>All Races</i>
Naturalized	23.8% (102,687)	40.1% (4,340)	32.1% (1,274)	24.3% (108,301)

Source: 1970 Census of Population. Detailed Characteristics: U.S. Summary, Table 195. Citizenship of the Foreign Born by Race and Country of Birth: 1970.

declaration by a black of his intention to migrate to the United States is not only, as in the case of poor whites, a political affront to those who are revolutionary committed but *cannot be accepted by them as a reasonable, logical, and moral decision*. Since it challenges the very core of the revolution's ideological foundation, it places very high liabilities on the individual Afro-Americans.⁴⁸

NOTES

1. Rafael J. Prohias and Lourdes Casal, *The Cuban Minority in the United States Preliminary Report on Need Identification and Program Evaluation, Final Report on Fiscal Year 1973* (Boca Raton: Florida Atlantic University, 31 August 1973), p. 12.
2. The refugee center commenced operations in December 1960. Since January 1959, however, thousands of Cubans arrived in the United States who never needed public assistance and never registered at the center. These were primarily government officials of the Batista regime and wealthy industrialists and professionals. See John F. Thomas and Earl E. Huych, "Resettlement of Cuban Refugees in the United States" (Paper prepared for presentation at the Meeting of the American Sociological Association, Session 71, 31 August 1967).
3. The most exhaustive study on the Cuban exiles in the United States is that of Prohias and Casal. According to Charles Wagley, the term *social race* refers to categories that are socially defined, "although the terms by which they are labeled may have originally referred to biological characteristics . . . such terms as 'Negro,' 'white,' 'Indian,' or 'mulatto' do not have genetic meanings in most of our American societies . . . [moreover] the criteria for defining social races differs from region to region in the Americas. In one region *ancestry* is stressed, in another region sociocultural criteria are emphasized, and in still another, *physical appearance* is the primary basis for classifying people according to social race." See his *The Latin American Tradition: Essays on the Unity and the Diversity of Latin American Culture* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), especially chap. 5, "The Concept of Social Race in the Americas," pp. 155–74.
4. Personal correspondence, 29 April 1974, with Mr. William T. Clifford, assistant director, Cuban Refugee Center, Miami, Florida.

The survey data presented in this paper is not the best we could hope for. In the case of occupations (table 2), the Cuban refugee center uses an occupational codebook ("most commonly used occupational codes extracted from the Official Dictionary, for use by interviewers in this center") abstracted from the *Dictionary of Occupational Titles, Definitions of Titles*, vol. 1, 2nd ed. (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949). The codebook classified occupations differently from the way that Richard Fagen and his associates grouped 1953 Cuban census occupations (Richard R. Fagen and R. A. Brody, "Cubans in Exile: A Demographic Analysis," *Social Problems* [Spring 1964]; Richard R. Fagen et al., *Cubans in Exile: Disaffection and the Revolution* [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968], p. 115). The two classificatory systems are not fully comparable. This may partially explain the very low percentages of Cuban refugees in agriculture and fishing. Of course it may also be affected by a tendency among Cuban refugees to report to the Cuban refugee center (on which they initially depended for jobs) preexile, urban-industrial occupations so as to facilitate their entry into an economy that, in contrast to Cuba's, offered very few opportunities in agriculture and fishing. The occupation data in table 3 for 1919 are my own estimates on the basis of partial information available in the 1919 census, pp. 666–67.

It is even more difficult to ascertain the accuracy of the data presented in table 1. As in a number of other instances, differential self-assignment of race probably produced the strongest distortion in the census estimates. Unfortunately, the U.S. census

has not calculated this error and corrected the extant information. Moreover, differential return-to-Cuba rates and differential death and birth rates of the social races may be distorting the assumed correspondence of the racial characteristics of the migrant and resident Cuban populations in this country.

The educational data presented in table 4 also has its limitations. "It is very difficult to assess the extent of any gap in the literacy rates of whites and blacks during the Republican period. The categories in the censuses of 1907, 1919, and 1943 are based on different criteria of age and race; and neither the 1931 census nor the 1953 census includes data on this matter" (Marianne Masferrer and Carmelo Mesa-Lago, "The Gradual Integration of the Black in Cuba: Under the Colony, the Republic, and the Revolution," in *Slavery and Race Relations in Latin America*, ed. Robert B. Toplin [Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1974], p. 365). In all of these cases, the quality of the information available is less than desired. I hope to resolve the problem of dissimilar occupational categories in a future paper.

5. Fagen and Brody, "Cubans in Exile: A Demographic Analysis," p. 400. See also, Fagen et al., *Cubans in Exile: Disaffection and the Revolution*, for the best demographic analysis to date of the Cuban exile community.
6. David Williamson in his dissertation ("Cognitive Complexity and Adaptation to Sociocultural Change: The Case of the Cuban Refugees in New Orleans," Tulane University, 1973) found generally low-educated and poorly trained exiles in his sample of adult Cubans arriving in New Orleans between January 1968 and July 1970. Eighteen persons of ninety-nine head-of-household respondents were grade school graduates and seventy-six had only had some grade school. Three respondents were high school graduates and two had some high school education in Cuba. Their occupational characteristics were as follows: Three were owners of small independent businesses in Cuba; forty were clerical, sales workers, or technicians; thirty were skilled workers; twelve were semiskilled; and eight were unskilled workers. Six of the respondents refused to answer the questions.
7. *Distribution of Cuban Labor Force by Major Occupational Group and Race and Nativity, 1919*

Occupational Group	Native White		Foreign White		Colored ^a	
	Percent	Index ^b	Percent	Index ^b	Percent	Index ^b
Agriculture, Fisheries and Mining	56	89	15	160	29	105
Professional Service	73	116	15	160	12	48
Domestic and Personal Service	39	62	23	245	38	137
Trade and Transportation	46	73	41	436	13	47
Manufacturing and Mechanical Industries	40	64	20	213	40	144
Percentage of Cuban Population, by Group	62.9		9.4		27.7	
Percentage in the Labor force, by Group	26		72		35	

Source: Cuba. Dirección General del Censo, *Census of the Republic of Cuba, 1919*, table 23, p. 632.

^aIncludes black, mulatto, and Asian.

^bPercent Index Number—Percent in Population = 100.

8. See Masferrer and Mesa-Lago, "The Gradual Integration of the Black."
9. The 1953 Cuban census did not give the occupational characteristics of the Cuban social races. Thus we are forced to use 1943 census estimates. These are reasonably useful since, prior to 1959, no drastic change in race relations took place which would negate the tendencies toward full occupational representation of Negroes to be deduced from the 1943 estimates (see Masferrer and Mesa-Lago, "The Gradual Integration of the Black"). Prior to the 1953 census, racial identification was by the persons themselves. In 1953, this evaluation was given to the census field workers and occasioned, in the opinion of many, drastic underrepresentation of the nonwhite population, which was placed at 27.2 percent of the total population (see Hugh Thomas, *Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom* [New York: Harper and Row, 1971] pp. 1117–26). According to Thomas, Fernando Ortiz thought that probably 40 percent would have been a more accurate estimate of the Afro-American population in 1953. The actual directive to the census takers stated that they were "not to question the race characteristics of the persons interviewed, but to use their own judgment based on physical appearance, in determining the race to which the person interviewed belonged" (Cuban Economic Research Project, *A Study on Cuba* [Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1965], p. 425).
10. Lowry Nelson, *Rural Cuba* (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1951), pp. 151–73.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 155.
12. *Ibid.*
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 242–43. Masferrer and Mesa-Lago ("The Gradual Integration of the Black," p. 365) conclude "it is clear that the rate of literacy among blacks was gradually increasing [during the Republican period] and the gap between whites and blacks was decreasing slowly."

Literate Population by Race in Cuba: 1907, 1919, 1943

Year	Literate Whites (Percent)	Literate Blacks (Percent)
1907	44.3	32.9
1919	45.5	38.4
1943	72.2	67.4

Source: Masferrer and Mesa-Lago, "The Gradual Integration of the Black," p. 366.

14. Nelson, *Rural Cuba*, p. 156.
15. Thomas, *Cuba*, p. 1119.
16. Nelson, *Rural Cuba*, p. 170.
17. W. MacGaffey and C. R. Barnett, *Cuba: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture* (New Haven: HARF Press, 1962), p. 32.
18. Maurice Zeitlin presents empirical verification of this generalization in his *Revolutionary Politics and the Cuban Working Class* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 66–88. On the problem of the pre-1959 Cuban economy, see Julián Alienes y Urosa, *Características fundamentales de la economía Cubana* (La Habana: Banco Nacional de Cuba, Biblioteca de Economía Cubana, 1959); see also, Cuban Economic Research Project, *A Study on Cuba*; U. S. Bureau of Foreign Commerce, *Investment in Cuba* (Washington, D.C., 1946); and Ramiro Guerra y Sánchez, *Filosofía de la producción Cubana* (La Habana: Cultural S.A., 1944).
19. Howard I. Blustein, L. C. Anderson, E. C. Betters, Deborah Lane, J. A. Leonard, and C. Townsend, *Foreign Area Studies Area Handbook for Cuba* (Washington, D.C.: The American University, 1971), p. 72.
20. Joseph A. Kahl, "The Moral Economy of a Revolutionary Society," in *Cuban Communism*, ed. I. L. Horowitz (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1970).
21. David Barkin, *The Redistribution of Consumption in Cuba* (Warner Modular Reprint 263), pp. 1–11.

22. Carmelo Mesa-Lago, "Availability and Reliability of Statistics in Socialist Cuba," *LARR* 4, no. 1 (Spring 1969): 53–91.
23. For instance, see the experience of Juana y Verena Martínez Alier, *Cuba: Economía y Sociedad* (Paris: Biblioteca de Cultura Socialista, Ruedo Ibérico, 1972), p. 5. Her research was abruptly terminated by the Cuban authorities for reasons unknown to her. Maurice Zeitlin is, to my knowledge, the researcher most successful in gaining the trust of the Cuban government. This very success, however, makes the validity of his data questionable. During his dissertation fieldwork in Cuba, he went throughout the island with an official written permission of Ernesto Guevara, then minister of industries, which allowed him to visit almost all industrial installations at will. He was very warmly received everywhere by the party cadres. One wonders how truthfully the workers answered his rather sensitive political questions, knowing that he was an official visitor of the Cuban government and that he was respectfully treated by the local party authorities. For a discussion of the political climate during the early years of the revolution and the problems that this presented to the researcher, see Lloyd A. Free, *Attitudes of the Cuban People toward The Castro Regime in the Late Spring of 1960* (Princeton: The Institute for International Social Research, 1960), especially his foreword.
24. For instance, we know the racial composition of the *brigadista* teaching force in the 1961 national literacy campaign, which showed Afro-Americans fully participating in that important revolutionary effort (see Richard Jolly, "The Literary Campaign and Adult Education," in Dudley Seers, ed., *Cuba: The Economic and Social Revolution* [Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964], pp. 190–219, especially p. 200). He gives the following estimates, in thousands, of the brigadista force: Total—84,200 persons; White—51.1; Negro—16.2; Mestizo—15.3; Chinese—0.1; Unreported—1.5.
25. On the definition and theoretical significance of this concept, see Eugene Litwak, "The Use of Extended Family Groups in the Achievement of Social Goals: Some Policy Implications," *Social Problems* 7:177–86. See also his "Occupational Mobility and Extended Family Cohesion," *American Sociological Review* 25 (February 1960): 9–21; and "Geographical Mobility and Extended Family Cohesion," *American Sociological Review* 25 (June 1960): 385–94.
26. Nelson, *Rural Cuba*, pp. 174–200. See also the Cuban censuses of 1931 and 1943 for the shift in the illegitimacy rates: Cuba, Dirección General del Censo, *Censo de 1931* (La Habana: Carasa y Cia., 1932); and Cuba, Dirección General del Censo, *Censo de 1943* (La Habana: P. Fernández y Cia., 1945).
27. J. D. Gibboney, "Stability and Change in Components of Parental Role Among Cuban Refugees" (Ph.D. diss., Catholic University of America, 1961), p. 101. Manuel Caraballo, in his study of Cuban exiles in New Orleans ("A Socio-Psychological Study of Acculturation/Assimilation: Cubans in New Orleans" [Ph.D. diss., Tulane University, 1970, p. 141]) reports that 73.4 percent of his sample participated in the migration accompanied by their immediate family. One percent made the move with friends, while 25.5 percent of the sample came to the United States by themselves. Caraballo adds that the percentage of refugees living in New Orleans who were married at time of entry remained fairly constant at around 50 percent during the first years of the decade of the 1960s, while during the latter years the percentage who were married increased to over 65 percent. The smaller participation of single persons in the migration may be partly due to the effect of the military service that the government requires of young Cubans. Rogg found in her study of 545 Cubans in West New York that 74.5 percent of them were married; 20.7 percent were single; and separated, widowed, and divorced made up the remaining 4.8 percent (E. M. Rogg, *The Assimilation of Cuban Exiles: The Role of Community and Class* [New York: Aberdeen Press, 1974], p. 154).
28. The other responses were as follows: American friends—13.3 percent; agencies of church groups—18.0 percent; none of the above—18.6 percent; two or more of the above—3.3 percent; no answer—1.2 percent.
29. Rogg, *The Assimilation of Cuban Exiles*, especially chap. 8, p. 132.
30. A pamphlet that is a good example of the revolutionary message on race relations and

- offers excerpts from the speeches and pronouncements of revolutionary leaders on the racial matter is Dirección de Información, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, *Cuba: Country Free of Segregation* (La Habana, Cuba, circa 1965–66).
31. In this context see the comments by Charles Howard, "The Afro-Cubans," *Freedomways*, no. 3 (1964): 375–82, especially p. 377. See also an equally biased and inaccurate report by Joseph North, "Negro and White in Cuba," *Political Affairs*, July 1963, pp. 34–45. Also see Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy, *Socialism in Cuba* (New York: Modern Readers Paperback, 1969), especially chap. 8.
 32. In a conversation with Lee Lockwood. See Lockwood's *Castro's Cuba, Cuba's Fidel* (New York: Random House, 1969), pp. 114 and 216.
 33. Seers, *Cuba: The Economic and Social Revolution*, p. 365.
 34. Blas Roca, *Los fundamentos del socialismo en Cuba* (La Habana: Ediciones Populares, 1960).
 35. Jose Martí had promised justice to the Afro-Americans and tried to calm the fears of the whites of a black revolution. He stated: "El hombre no tiene ningun derecho especial porque pertenezca a una raza u otra: Dígase hombre y ya se dicen todos los derechos. . . . Hombre es más que blanco, más que mulato, más que negro. Cubano es más que blanco, más que mulato, más que negro." See Ramon E. Ruiz, *Cuba: The Making of a Revolution* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1968), especially chap. 4, "Jose Martí," pp. 58–75.
 36. As example of this tradition see: Alberto Arrendondo, *El negro en Cuba* (La Habana: Editorial Alfa, 1939); Emilia Bernel, *La raza negra en Cuba* (Santiago: Prensas de la Universidad de Chile, 1937); G. E. Mustelier, *La extinción del negro* (La Habana: Rambla, Bónsa y Cia; 1912); see also Pascual B. Marcos Vegueri, *El negro en Cuba*, 7 December 1955; Juan René Betancourt, *El negro, ciudadano del futuro* (La Habana: Cárdenas y Cia., circa 1955–61.)
 37. José Felipe Carneado, "La discriminación racial en Cuba no volverá jamás," *Cuba Socialista*, January 1962, pp. 54–67.
 38. Juan René Betancourt, *Doctrina negra: La única teoría certera contra la discriminación racial en Cuba* (La Habana: P. Fernández y Cia., 1955).
 39. Lockwood, *Castro's Cuba*, p. 216. The portrayal of the United States as a racist society is carefully orchestrated in the Cuban news media. Lockwood, one of the most recent and successful interlocutors of Fidel Castro, took him to task on this very issue and asked him why the Cuban press ignored the advances the civil rights movement made in the United States and concentrated, instead, on the urban race riots, the KKK activities, etc. Castro denied the truth of these allegations. For early examples of this emphasis in the Cuban press see the following articles in *Revolución*: "Disuelven protesta negra en Washington," 3 March 1960; "Reprime la policia una protesta negra en Montgomery, Alabama," 8 March 1960, p. 8; "Delito: Ser negro en E.E.U.U.," 9 March 1960, p. 8.
 40. Edmundo Desnoes, ed., *El movimiento negro en Estados Unidos* (La Habana: Instituto del Libro, 1967). This is a collection of speeches and articles by Malcolm X, Stokeley Carmichael, Leroi Jones, and others. For the ideological context of Guevara's thought see Ernesto Guevara, *El socialismo y el hombre in Cuba* (La Habana: Ediciones R., 1965); Joseph Hansen, ed., *Che Guevara Speaks* (New York: Merit Publishers, 1967); R. E. Bonachea and N. P. Valdes, eds., *Che, Selected Works of Ernesto Guevara* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1969).
 41. F. Fernandes, *The Negro in Brazilian Society* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969); Gustavo J. Godoy, "Fernando Ortíz, Las Razas y Los Negros," *Journal of Inter-American Affairs* 8, no. 2, pp. 236–44.

James M. Stevenson, in his doctoral dissertation ("Cuban Americans: New Urban Class," Wayne State University, 1973), asked fifty Cuban businessmen in Miami: "What was the situation (prior to Castro) between the blacks and the whites in Cuba?" He obtained the following answers: No problems—10; good—10; no differences or distinctions—6; no discrimination—5; normal—5; no racism—5; like brothers—4; equals—1; magnificent—1; no social class resentment—1; better than

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here—1; don't know—1. Most of these answers, if taken at face value, would indicate an almost idyllic environment of race relations in the island prior to 1959. Of course, this was not the case, but it is still indicative of the type of social myth so prevalent in Caribbean societies and in parts of Latin America which have had such an enormous effect on the works of such American scholars of comparative race relations as F. Frazier.

42. J. D. Nicholas and R. J. Prohias, *Rent Differentials Among Racial and Ethnic Groups in Miami, A Report to the Florida Atlantic University* (Florida International University Joint Center for Environmental and Urban Problems, July 1973). For another look at race relations in the Miami Cuban community see John Egerton, *Cubans in Miami: A Third Dimension in Racial and Cultural Relations* (Nashville: Race Relations Information Center, November 1969).
43. *Cubans Who Have Benefited Most from the Revolution*

Group or Sector	Percentage of Refugees Responding (N = 197)
No one	30*
The Communists	32
The frustrated, the envious, opportunists, those of low moral character	32
Revolutionary leaders (excluding Castro)	8
Foreign Communists	7
Fidel Castro	7
Miscellaneous (pejorative)	2
The lower class	2

Source: Fagen, et al., *Cubans in Exile*, p. 31.

*These figures total more than 100 percent because of multiple responses.

44. Rogg, *Assimilation of Cuban Exiles*, pp. 83–89.
45. U.S. Census of Population. Characteristics of the Population: U.S. Summary, Table 236. Country of Origin of the Foreign Stock, by Nativity, Color, and Sex for Regions: 1960; Detailed Characteristics: U.S. Summary, 1970 Census of Population, Table 272. Country of Origin of the Foreign Stock by Nativity and Race, for Regions: 1970. The unequal geographical distribution of the Cuban social races in this country, moreover, is quite stable. Indexes of dissimilarity were calculated from the previous tables for 1960 and 1970. They yielded, respectively, 31.13 and 29.65.
46. For an analysis of the Cuban community in West New York see Eleanor Rogg, "The Influence of a Strong Refugee Community on the Economic Adjustment of Its Member," *International Migration Review* 5, no. 4, (Winter 1972): 474–81; see also Michael Cohn, ed., *The Cuban Community of Washington Heights in New York City* (The Brooklyn Children's Museum and the National Science Foundation, Occasional Papers in Cultural History, no. 12, Summer 1967). Rogg, in her West New York study, interviewed nine Cuban Negroes. Although on the average Negroes had lived longer in the community than whites, they had a greater desire to move out of it. A majority of the Negroes were certain that they would return to Cuba if the situation were satisfactory.
47. Geoffrey Fox, "Cuban Workers in Exile," *Society* 8, no. 11 (September 1971).
48. During the course of conversation with a Cuban exiled Afro-American, he stated that when declaring his intention to leave the island, an armed militiaman on duty in the government office where he was presenting the necessary documents, threatened him with the butt of his rifle. He was asked by the insulted guard why was he, a black, going to the United States. He was asked if he did not know of the many programs the revolutionary government had instituted for the benefit of the poor and if he was

aware of United States racist policies. It was only after the informant claimed that *extraordinary family circumstances* necessitated his leaving the island that the guard and others in the government office left him alone. I do not know how prevalent this type of social pressure is, and there is a clear need for further research in this area. The experience of the informant may be indicative of the type of social control that emerged from the ideological milieu and that, therefore, discourages Cuban Afro-Americans from migrating. In this context, Juan M. Clark found 10.2 percent nonwhites (includes Negroes, mulattoes, and Asians) in his sample of Cuban escapees who left the island in boats, floats, and other illegal means (personal communication, 3 June 1974). See his "Selected Types of Cuban Exiles Used as a Sample of the Cuban Population" (Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Rural Sociological Society, Washington, D.C., August 1970). See also his "The Cuban Escapees," *Latin Americanist* 6, no. 1 (1 November 1970).

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