

Corrigendum

Preventing and Responding to Dissent: The Observational Challenges of Explaining Strategic Repression – CORRIGENDUM

EMILY HENCKEN RITTER
COURTENAY R. MONROE

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The authors regret the inclusion of two statistical errors in the above article. As described on page 92 of the article, we used data from the Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD) to operationalize, our dependent variable, MOBILIZED DISSENT, as a count of the total number of the following events occurring in a given African province-day: organized and spontaneous demonstrations, organized and spontaneous violent riots, general and limited strikes, and other antigovernment violence. In creating this measure, we erroneously failed to include in the count instances of organized dissent, which are denoted in the Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD) as *etypel*. The

results reported in Table 1 on page 94 of the above article, as well as the associated replication files originally posted on Dataverse, were estimated using the erroneous operationalization of MOBILIZED DISSENT.¹ After correcting the operationalization of MOBILIZED DISSENT, the revision to Table 1 is provided below. The correction does not significantly change our estimates or affect our substantive conclusions. Files to replicate these revised results are available at the APSR Dataverse (see Ritter and Monroe 2024).

In addition, we found a coding error in the generation of our data on conflict and rainfall in the United States, as described on page 93 of the published article. More

TABLE 1. The Effect of Mobilized Dissent on State Repression in African Province-Days (Revised Results)

	1	2	3(a)	3(b)	4(a)	4(b)
	OLS	IV Regression	IV Regression		Matched IV Regression	
	(No instrument)	(Basic Model)	Non-Democracies	Democracies	Non-Democracies	Democracies
Second Stage: The Effect of Dissent on Repression						
Mobilized Dissent	0.233* (0.003)	-0.088 (0.092)	0.002 (0.055)	0.271* (0.067)	-0.034 (0.054)	0.254* (0.068)
Urbanization	-0.007* (0.000)	-0.009* (0.001)	-0.009* (0.001)	-0.006* (0.000)	-0.008* (0.001)	-0.006* (0.001)
Constant	0.002* (0.000)	0.003* (0.000)	0.003* (0.000)	0.002* (0.000)	0.003* (0.000)	0.002* (0.000)
First Stage: Instrumenting Mobilized Dissent						
Rainfall (ln)	—	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)
Annual Rainfall	—	0.030* (0.004)	0.041* (0.005)	-0.025* (0.007)	0.040* (0.005)	-0.021* (0.009)
Urbanization	—	-0.007* (0.000)	-0.001* (0.000)	-0.005* (0.001)	-0.007* (0.001)	-0.004* (0.001)
Constant	—	0.004* (0.000)	0.004* (0.000)	0.003* (0.000)	0.004* (0.000)	0.003* (0.000)

(Continued)

¹ We are appreciative to Avi Attar for bringing this error to our attention.

TABLE 1 (Continued)

	1	2	3(a)	3(b)	4(a)	4(b)
	OLS	IV Regression	IV Regression		Matched IV Regression	
	(No instrument)	(Basic Model)	Non-Democracies	Democracies	Non-Democracies	Democracies
Model Statistics						
<i>N</i>	6,189,005	6,083,070	4,824,337	1,258,733	4,928,534	1,322,906
F-Test of Excluded Instruments	—	29.07 (0.000)	67.58 (0.000)	73.56 (0.000)	85.44 (0.000)	69.59 (0.000)
Cragg-Donald Wald F-Statistic	—	32.27	81.20	58.75	85.44	69.59
Sargan-Hansen J-Statistic (χ^2 <i>p</i> -value)	—	3.523 (0.061)	0.703 (0.408)	0.198 (0.656)	0.685 (0.408)	0.474 (0.491)

Notes: * $p < 0.05$ in two-tailed tests with robust standard errors reported beneath coefficients in parentheses. Parentheses on instrument statistics report their respective *p*-values. All analyses were estimated using Stata 13.1.

specifically, we erroneously generated a measure of ANNUAL RAINFALL, a variable in the first stage of our instrumental variable (IV) analysis, using Stata 13.1 code, gen, rather than Stata 13.1 code egen. The results reported in Table 2 on page 95 of the above article, as well as the associated replication files originally posted on Dataverse, were estimated using the erroneous

operationalization of ANNUAL RAINFALL. After correcting the operationalization of ANNUAL RAINFALL, the revision to Table 2 is provided below. The correction does not significantly change our estimates or affect our substantive conclusions. Files to replicate these revised results are available at the APSR Dataverse.

TABLE 2. The Effect of Mobilized Dissent on State Repression in US State-Days (Revised Results)

	1	2	3
	OLS (No instrument)	IV Regression (Basic Model)	IV Regression (Matched Model)
Second Stage: The Effect of Dissent on Repression			
Mobilized Dissent	0.251* (0.010)	0.297* (0.070)	0.358* (0.089)
Urbanization	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Constant	0.002* (0.001)	0.005 (0.004)	0.009 (0.006)
First Stage: Instrumenting Mobilized Dissent			
Rainfall (ln)	—	0.002* (0.000)	0.001* (0.000)
Annual Rainfall	—	-0.005* (0.001)	-0.004* (0.000)
Urbanization	—	0.001* (0.000)	0.001* (0.000)
Constant	—	-0.065* (0.001)	-0.068* (0.001)
Model Statistics			
<i>N</i>	385,440	385,440	385,440
F-Test of Excluded Instruments	—	32.91 (0.000)	19.44 (0.000)
Cragg-Donald Wald F-Statistic	—	36.75	19.44
Sargan-Hansen J-Statistic (χ^2 <i>p</i> -value)	—	1.154 (0.283)	0.062 (0.803)

Notes: * $p < 0.05$ in two-tailed tests with robust standard errors reported beneath coefficients in parentheses. Parentheses on instrument statistics report their respective *p*-values.

REFERENCES

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