

RESEARCH REPORTS AND NOTES

THE STUDY OF ARGENTINE POLITICS THROUGH SURVEY RESEARCH*

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What causes a country that has experienced exceptionally high growth rates and living standards to stagnate with only poor and uneven economic advance, especially after it has achieved one of the lowest rates of population growth among the American republics? What forces lead to the intensification of civil violence and conflict among social and occupational groups, encouraging a pattern of military intervention in politics? What impact do patriotism, popular perceptions of leaders' decisions, and a sense of political legitimacy have upon these processes of economic growth and group conflict, and what kinds of leadership can best utilize appeals to constructive nationalism and self-sacrifice in order to promote growth and reduce conflict? Do long periods of frustrated expectations and economic stagnation tend to give citizens patterns of attitudes and behavior that make conflict more likely and growth more difficult?

These questions are now of more than academic interest in a number of nations, including the United States,¹ but they can be analyzed to particular advantage in the context of Argentine politics. Argentina had achieved, by the 1920s, one of the world's highest living standards, yet today even Argentine beef is rationed in the domestic market through the

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imposition of meatless days. Argentina's annual rate of population increase is far below that of Brazil or Mexico, yet before the return of Peronists to power in 1973, these countries far outdistanced Argentina in aggregate, per capita economic growth. The work of José Luis de Imaz, Gino Germani, and Robert Potash, among others, has painstakingly analyzed Argentina as a society of elites, of immigrants and new awareness by the masses, and of military intervention,² but these interpretations—important as they are—leave considerable gaps in our understanding of the underlying determinants of Argentine political processes.

In attempting to fill some of these gaps, a study is underway that has involved, in part, some 890 interviews with selected members of the Argentine elite and rank and file, beginning in August 1973, the start of Juan Domingo Perón's final campaign for the presidency. Designed to test a complex set of hypotheses involving the relationships among perceptions of leadership, legitimacy, and nationalism, the work has both theoretical and country-specific implications. It is set in the general context of recent writing on the theoretical variables and on Argentine history; the survey findings must also be viewed in relation to the surprisingly rich and varied results of other interview data, much of it not yet mined by social scientists, gathered by Argentine survey firms. Set out below are the initial assumptions, operationalization, initial conclusions, and related sources for the study (see Appendix for the Spanish version of the questionnaire).

AN APPROACH TO ARGENTINE POLITICS

Comparative data on Argentina establish the theoretical context in which this study is framed. In comparison to the other major nations of the world, Argentina has been peculiarly plagued in the recent past by inadequate economic growth and political violence. The country suffered an average annual decrease of 0.4 percent in per capita gross national product during the 1950s, placing her sixty-fifth for this economic indicator out of some sixty-eight nations. With an estimated rate of 217 deaths from domestic group violence per one million population between 1950 and 1962, Argentina was eighth out of some seventy-four nations in this indicator of violence.³ Between 1948 and 1967, Argentina ranked third out of 136 countries in the number of governmental sanctions taken to suppress threats to state security.⁴ In the index of achievement motivation that David McClelland based upon content analysis of children's schoolbooks, Argentina placed second out of forty-one nations.⁵ The combination of high motivation to achieve and dramatically inadequate growth

points to an apparent cause for frustration and domestic violence. It also establishes a presumption that intergroup competition and antipathies will be high, as my hypotheses suppose and for which my study is designed to probe.

Other discussions have tentatively ascribed the Argentine pattern of military intervention and inadequate development to a loss of governmental legitimacy and the Argentines' failure to achieve a cohesive, constructive brand of nationalism.⁶ But how much do concepts of legitimacy and nationalism actually explain in a country where most political power rests with a series of elites, where elections are repeatedly overturned by military *golpes*, and where most people seem resigned to the persistence of military interventions, if not to the high rates of inflation and the inadequate level of growth? My study tries to answer such questions through an intensive investigation of the roles of recent Argentine political leaders, the dimensions of Argentine nationalism, and the popular perceptions that Argentines hold in regard to the legitimacy of their political system and the acts of competing groups within it. Analysis of these variables will not provide simple answers to the problems of economic stagnation, group conflict, and military intervention, but it should help to clarify some of the vital links and interrelationships among them.

The theory to be tested investigates the effects on citizens' attitudes of a high level of economic expectations, prolonged experience of low economic growth, inadequacies of leadership, and nationalistic appeals that set groups in antagonistic relationships to one another. The theory suggests that, as these frustrations of expectations, economic rewards, leadership, and "antinationalism" have recurred time after time under different regimes during the last quarter century, they have deeply influenced the perceptions and the behavior of Argentine citizens. As recurring factors in the long-term process of political socialization, the frustrations have discouraged individuals from making sacrifices in the national interest, while increasing hostility among major groups, the level of civil violence, and the rate at which governments are overthrown through violence or the threat of violence. Therefore, the factors have undermined the personal sacrifice and the more unified efforts that would have been necessary to achieve more rapid economic growth. In turn, the low rate of aggregate growth frustrates the personal desires of individual citizens to get ahead economically, and, in this way, the low experience of growth becomes part of a self-reinforcing cycle.

This middle-level theory deals with the ways in which certain conditioning factors shape the perceptions of members of the elite and the

rank and file. The theory is not one of short-run causation, but of the long-run effects of frustration on political attitudes. It does not explain why a particular coup occurred; it examines a climate of disappointed expectations and relative deprivation where coups are more likely to occur. It does not deal with business cycles or the problems encountered in Argentina's foreign trade. Instead, it investigates ways in which the economic experience of individual citizens and competing elites influence their attitudes and their behavior toward government and toward other groups. It is not, however, simply a theory of frustrated development in the Argentine case. If the relationships hold among the variables that it measures, it would suggest reasons why Mexico and several other countries have been far more successful in recent decades in restraining civil violence and promoting economic growth.

The theory's central variables of leadership, legitimacy, and nationalism are closely interrelated in the Argentine case, as they also appear to be in other countries. Gale Stokes seems quite right in commenting that differences in the social function of nationalism arise from the ways in which leaders legitimize their authority and mobilize support through nationalistic appeals.⁷ Although these variables deal directly with only certain aspects of the more general situation that has disappointed Argentine expectations, they touch upon the other major aspects as well. They have important links to economic dimensions of the Argentine problem. Structural deficiencies in the Argentine economy now seriously hamper the options that are open to national leaders, but these deficiencies arose in considerable part through leadership decisions, and they continue to be exacerbated by the country's legitimacy crisis and by the politics of what K. H. Silvert calls "antinationalist" factionalism.

Juan Perón, for instance, squandered the foreign currency reserves built up during World War II on such showy and allegedly patriotic objectives as the nationalization of British-owned railroads; but the serious expense, deterioration, and inefficiency of Argentine railroads under his and later administrations undercut the strength of the national economy. Perón tried to win favor with labor and the army by promoting industrialization, high wages, and domestically produced equipment for the military; but in doing so, he forcefully opposed the *estancieros*, whose export of beef and wheat accounted for a large part of the nation's traditional wealth. By publicly opposing and later welcoming foreign investment in such areas as petroleum production, he vacillated back and forth, as have subsequent regimes, winning "nationalist" support initially with a hard line toward foreign companies, but then dissipating that support through a reversal of policies on the basis of economic expedi-

ency. The welcoming of foreign investment under President Juan Carlos Onganía and Minister of Economy and Labor Adalberto Krieger Vasena in 1967 and 1968 was abruptly curtailed with the *cordobazo* confrontation of May 1969, revealing the political constraints on a strategy of economic growth similar to that taken by Mexico and Brazil.⁸ Such reversals by national leaders have not only made foreign enterprises hesitant to invest in Argentina, but, even more importantly, they have also led Argentine citizens fundamentally to question the sincerity and consistency of their leaders, the legitimacy of democratic institutions, and the possibility that concepts of Argentine nationalism can be anything more than the empty rhetoric of self-seeking politicians.

Besides being of particular importance in Argentina, these issues of leadership, legitimacy, and nationalism have also assumed central significance in the discipline of political science. The relationship between leadership and legitimacy is an area of considerable controversy in the literature on political development. Popular accounts of Argentine politics point to a crisis of legitimacy, relating military coups to a loss of legitimacy on the part of incumbent governments and to the growth of widespread civilian opposition to them.⁹ A tentative reading of the Argentine situation seems to confirm the suggestion of Lucian Pye that, in contrast to the Weberian interpretation, a legitimacy crisis occurs, not simply when one form of authority replaces another, but also when shifts take place in both institutional legitimacy and the personal legitimacy of national leaders.¹⁰ Weak confidence in the presidency has lessened the personal prerogatives of such recent presidents as Arturo Illia, Roberto Levingston, and Alejandro Lanusse; but it arose through inadequacies of preceding presidents, such as Perón's inability to maintain the economic largess of the late 1940s, Pedro Aramburu's acquiescence to the election of Arturo Frondizi despite his better judgment, and Frondizi's callous reversal of the programs promised in his electoral campaign.

Nationalism appears to play a central role here, and one that challenges assumptions often made about it. Development theorists usually assume that a high level of national identification within a population leads to feelings of political legitimacy, which in turn allow the nation's leaders to activate the citizenry in support of political and economic development. As Sidney Verba sums up this point of view: "It is the sense of identity with the nation that legitimizes the activities of national elites and makes it possible for them to mobilize the commitment and support of their followers."¹¹ In the Argentine case, however, the social efficacy of nationalism came to be debased through Peronist attempts to mobilize the lower classes with appeals to a type of nationalism

that alienated them from other Argentine groups.¹² It is now difficult to convince Argentines that they need to make sacrifices in the national interest because, as in the early promises of Perón and Frondizi, nationalist rhetoric has so often been coupled with the unrealistic promise that the rise of prosperity and affluence will not require sacrifice. Taking the presidential sash once again on 12 October 1973, Perón stressed hard work and mutual economic sacrifice among groups rather than distributionist politics before he died on 1 July 1974; but the “grand national accord” among labor, management, and the military has come under increasing, irresistible pressure since his death.

Pursuing a closely related theme, this study will also investigate the relationship between the values of consensus and legitimacy that has been reinterpreted recently by Michael Mann and others. On the basis of survey data from Britain and the United States, Mann claims that “it is the absence of consensus among lower classes which keeps them compliant,” and that “whatever ‘legitimacy’ liberal democracy possesses is not conferred upon it by value consensus, for this does not exist.”¹³ What Perón provided among Argentine workers and the lower classes was a heightened level of consensus, which made them reject the compliant roles of the past and see themselves as an oppressed group deserving far more income. Whereas Mann argues that the educational system in liberal democracies neglects “the populist deviant tradition” and renders the working class incapable of abstract thinking, Peronist education stressed his populist message and made the working class accepting of his slogans but unable to think out the more complex and deleterious results of his early economic policies. Whereas Mann suggests that our understanding of the lack of consensus among British and American workers requires reliance upon Marxist theories of pragmatic role acceptance and manipulative socialization, the Argentine experience suggests the dangers—in terms of dissensus, economic stagnation, and military intervention—of working-class rejection of “pragmatism” in favor of a populist ideology that is propagated under a new form of manipulative socialization. To pursue this argument further requires detailed analysis of the extent and the elements of consensus among Argentine workers and other groups, but the significance of the argument and the Argentine case should be apparent.

The issues with which this project deals have particular salience in regard to development in Latin America; political scientists recognize that leadership studies in this part of the world deserve special attention. Robert Packenham suggests that “there is a woeful lack of theoretical knowledge about political leadership in developing countries,”¹⁴ while

William Welsh contends that "it is staggering that there has been so little systematic research of *any kind* done on political leadership in Latin America."¹⁵ Economists find that a crucial problem in the underdevelopment of the region has been that leaders have failed to generate an appropriate ethic of self-sacrifice. Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, for example, declares that the ultimate cause for Latin America's disappointing rate of increase in per capita income between 1950 and the middle 1960s was "the lack of drive, mystique, and elan which alone could overcome the normal inertia and resistance to change. . . . To create a heroic spirit of mission, an enthusiasm for a peaceful revolution is the main task confronting Latin American leadership. It is a difficult task, but it is not impossible."¹⁶ That Mexico fared so much better than did Argentina in economic growth during this period may indeed reflect, in part, the comparative effectiveness of the Mexican mystique.¹⁷

Respected students of Latin American politics assert that the failures of national integration allow the persistence of personalistic patterns of political and social relationships. For Latin America as a whole, Jacques Lambert thus finds that "incomplete" national integration has encouraged the maintenance of interpersonal bonds that are familial, clanish, and even "feudal" in nature.¹⁸ More specifically in the case of Argentina, Daniel Goldrich points out that, although personalistic patterns of politics are usually assumed to decrease as socioeconomic development occurs, personalistic norms remain strong in contemporary Argentina, while adherence to legal norms seems weak. He asks: "Is it possible that the impersonalistic mode did increase with economic development in nineteenth-century Argentina, but that the failure to integrate the nation politically and socially has since led to the rise of personalistic modes?"¹⁹

In exploring answers to such basic questions in Argentine politics, the hypotheses and variables of this study challenge interpretations of the past. To take but one example, it is worth asking how much credence we should give to the thesis that Argentine factionalism and authoritarianism have grown out of Perón's prohibition of democratic trade unionism. For mass movements in general, and for Peronism in particular, William Kornhauser suggests that, when suppression of free labor unions occurs along with urbanization and industrialization, it "atomizes" the working class, leads workers to join a mass movement, and prevents their integration into the competitive framework of liberal democracy.²⁰ In and of itself, however, this interpretation cannot account for the alienation of Argentine workers from other groups or for any relationship that this alienation may have to Argentine personalism and low economic growth.

In Brazil, where Getúlio Vargas and his successors exploited and co-opted trade unions, urban workers have come, since the military revolution of 1964, to be supportive if hardly independent members of Brazil's political system with its rapid economic advance. In the United States, where trade unions remain comparatively free and where their members have become well paid and politically powerful, their very power has helped to fuel inflation and, as wage gains exceeded increases in productivity, to lessen the international competitiveness of the American economy. Mass movements like Peronism have not developed in the Brazilian context of low union autonomy or in the United States context of high union autonomy. Although economic growth may be retarded in the Argentine pattern, where Perón alienated labor from other groups by raising its expectations and pushing it into a mass movement, so growth may also be restricted in the North American pattern of autonomy, power, high wages, and high expectations. For liberal democrats, free trade unionism remains a valuable objective, but its absence does not assure the rise of mass movements any more than its presence assures the egalitarian distribution of wealth or the maintenance of a healthy climate of economic growth.


To more adequately investigate such challenges to past assumptions, it has been necessary to gather survey data on the interrelationships among the attitudes of the Argentine elite and the rank and file. Figure 1 identifies the variables, anticipated relationships, and hypotheses to be tested through this data. Solid lines indicate the relationships to be tested; the number of the hypothesis relating each variable to another appears beside the line connecting the variables. Broken lines represent relationships that are not formally tested in the study, but which are logical and commonly accepted, with ample justifications in the literature. Operational definitions of the tested hypotheses are all in terms of responses to questions in the survey, a copy of which appears as an appendix below.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Patriotism: Degree of feeling among respondents of positive or negative loyalty toward the nation-state, its symbols, and its traditional heroes.

Popular expectations: Retrospective expression of the degree to which respondents expected—in the early years of the Perón regime, after the electoral campaign of Arturo Frondizi, and/or at the beginning of the presidency of Juan Carlos Onganía—that the national economy would grow much more rapidly than it has actually done, and/or that they would personally benefit from a redistribution of national income.

FIGURE 1



Experience of growth: Degree of feeling among individual respondents that their personal economic situation is either better or worse than it was ten years ago.

DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Perception of leadership: Degree to which respondents feel that, during the last twenty-five years, most of the major decisions of the chief executive leaders of their country have been appropriate and that the quality of leadership has been good.

Legitimacy: Degree to which respondents feel that decisions of the government ought to be obeyed.

Sacrifice: Degree of willingness of respondents to make personal sacrifices in the national interest.

Attitude toward wage demands: Degree to which respondents say that they would accept large wage or salary increases even if they knew that such increases would sharply raise the price of the things that all other citizens need to buy.

Group antagonisms: Degree of hostility expressed toward occupational and interest groups whose interests the respondents define as opposing those of the groups to which they belong.

Attitude toward civil violence: Degree to which respondents feel that violence must be used to achieve political goals.

Violent overthrow: Degree to which respondents believe that those regimes in their country that they oppose should be overthrown by violence if other means of deposing the regimes prove unsuccessful.

VARIABLES NOT DIRECTLY TESTED IN THE SURVEY

Growth: The annual percentage of increase in the gross national product of the country being studied.

Economic factors: The economic factors of production available in the country, such as domestic and foreign capital, natural resources, and the size and quality of the labor force.

Leaders' decisions: The decisions made by national political leaders as to which policies should be followed in regard to economic growth, income distribution, and the mobilization of political support.

Promises by leaders: The promises made by prominent national political leaders during the past twenty-five years in regard to future economic growth and income distribution.

Inflation: The annual percentage of increase in the general price level of the country being studied.

These definitions allow testing of relationships described in the general political science literature. Dankwart Rustow, for example, suggests both that "a leader's charisma is in the mind of the followers," and that "empirically the followers' attitude is influenced by the magnitude and improbability of the results achieved."²¹ These are the variables which have been given the operational definitions of "perception of leadership" and "experience of growth." The survey allows these variables to be contrasted in their effect upon "legitimacy." Are citizens' feelings that the government ought to be obeyed affected more by their positive support for leaders or by personal economic experience under the governments directed by the leaders in question? How strong is the connection between the variables of "perception of leadership" and "experience of growth" themselves? Is the "experience of growth" more influential than patriotic attitudes in affecting the willingness of citizens to make personal sacrifices in the national interest? The data from Argentina on these variables should provide information of some significance to those social scientists engaged in the study of political leaders and the quality of leadership.

HYPOTHESES

H-1: A high level of patriotism increases citizens' willingness to make personal sacrifices in the national interest.

H-2: Citizens whose expectations of national growth and prosperity were especially high will be particularly critical of national leaders if prosperity does not ensue.

H-3: Citizens whose economic interests suffered under the regimes of recent leaders will be especially critical of those leaders.

H-4: Citizens whose economic interests suffered under the regimes of recent leaders will ascribe lower legitimacy to their political system than will other citizens.

H-5: Citizens whose economic interests suffered under the regimes of recent leaders will be less willing than other citizens to make personal sacrifices in the national interest.

H-6: Citizens whose economic interests suffered under the regimes of recent leaders will be more willing than other citizens to make exaggerated wage demands.

H-7: Citizens whose economic interests suffered under the regimes of recent leaders will show more hostility than will other citizens toward groups whose interests they define as opposing those of the groups to which they belong.

H-8: Citizens who are highly critical of recent political leaders will

ascribe lower legitimacy to the political system than will citizens who believe that the leaders' decisions were appropriate and that the quality of leadership was good.

H-9: Citizens who ascribe lower legitimacy to their political system will show low willingness to sacrifice in the national interest.

H-10: Citizens who show low willingness to sacrifice in the national interest will be more willing than other citizens to make exaggerated wage demands.

H-11: Citizens who show low willingness to sacrifice in the national interest will show strong hostility toward groups whose interests they define as opposing those of the groups to which they belong.

H-12: Citizens who show strong hostility toward groups whose interests they define as opposing those of the group to which they belong will be more supportive of civil violence than will other citizens.

H-13: Military leaders who ascribe low legitimacy to a particular regime will believe that that regime should be overthrown by force to a greater degree than they believe that other regimes should be overthrown by force.

H-14: Citizens who ascribe low legitimacy to their national government will be more tolerant of civil violence than will citizens who ascribe high legitimacy to their government.

H-15: Citizens who are more supportive of civil violence will also be more supportive than other citizens of overthrowing by force those regimes that they oppose.

Given these hypotheses, the research project does not expound a full and detailed explanation of the causes for inadequate economic growth and political instability in Argentina. At most, interconnections among the variables of leadership, legitimacy, and nationalism account for only one part of the economic failure. Other causes for the failure include changes in the markets and prices for Argentine exports and the disorienting inflations that Argentina has undergone. This work focuses not so much on the actual economic decisions that leaders have made as it does on the attitudes of key groups toward those decisions and their apparent consequences. Popular expectations were made unrealistically high by the promises of Perón and Frondizi, but these expectations are only one element in inflation and in the dissatisfaction that has led to a high level of instability and civil violence.

The study does, however, seek to operationalize variables of considerable importance in the social sciences, such as the key concept of legitimacy, which involves perceptions of considerable importance for the evolving patterns of politics in the United States, Britain, and other

countries far removed from Latin America. The common assumption has been that legitimacy—support for government—results from prosperity and the ability of government to fulfill citizens' expectations. As Seymour Martin Lipset says for the early political system in the United States, democratic values "gained legitimacy as they proved effective—that is, as the nation prospered." As the United States seemed to achieve "the fulfillment of its original political objectives,"²² its citizens believed that its leaders had made correct decisions, that its government should be obeyed, and that, if necessary, they should make personal sacrifices in the interests of such a nation. This variable has considerable importance in the contemporary United States, where surveys have shown rapid, consistent declines in respect for basic institutions²³ and where, as Howard Wiarda recently commented, we may be seeing "the Latin Americanization of United States politics."²⁴ Furthermore, even setting aside questions of domestic legitimacy within the United States, the variables of governmental performance and legitimacy are vital within each Latin American nation-state, affecting what United States policy should be toward those countries.²⁵

Estimations of the relationship between legitimacy and prosperity can be made for one or more nations in historical retrospect. Such investigations could have significant implications for Britain and the United States, especially if their recent problems with economic growth should bear out the pessimists and produce a "steady-state," no-growth or low-growth situation where gains for one group inevitably reduce the income and lifestyle of another. As Peter Smith demonstrates the feasibility of historical approaches to legitimacy in his contention that authoritarianism has been a "legitimate" part of the Latin American tradition,²⁶ so indeed the rules of the game that citizens in such traditional democracies as Britain or the United States accept as "legitimate" may in time come to be more authoritarian, confounding those who have conceptualized political development as unilinear and progressive, a secular equivalent of the Unitarian credo, "onward and upward forever."

Legitimacy may also be studied through survey research, either through similar questions asked in different countries, through the same questions asked in the same nation over time, or through a single survey that relates legitimacy variables to other theoretical correlates. As David Apter reminds us, while the sum of individual decisions in regard to legitimacy deeply affects the structure of the political system, legitimacy remains a normative issue for each citizen,²⁷ so that it can be evaluated through interviews with individual respondents.²⁸ In my Argentine survey, perceptions of prosperity remain a central variable, hypothetically

affecting the way that citizens think about leaders, government, and their own situations. Operationalizing this interpretation, the assumption is that citizens who feel their personal economic interests suffered under recent leaders will be critical of those leaders, will manifest lower legitimacy, and will be less inclined to make personal sacrifices.

Before any replication of parts of this survey design in other countries, the initial test in a single country runs into the level-of-analysis problem, an issue that must be carefully considered. The strategy calls for making inferences about system-level variables, such as nationalism, group antagonisms, and even economic growth, on the basis of data collected primarily at the individual level through survey research. This difficulty is partially dealt with through the use of aggregate and comparative data, outlined below. The approach combines system-level and individual-level analysis, attempting to use survey research better to understand relationships that aggregate data suggest but about whose underlying causes the aggregate data leave us with serious, unanswered questions.

As Phillips Shively has contended that we can gain information on individual-level variables through aggregate data, so survey data gathered at the individual level can help us to understand the forces affecting such aggregate phenomena as per capita growth or levels of civil violence and political instability. An important distinction does indeed lie in what Shively calls "our intent in using the variable."²⁹ Aggregate data documents the disappointing economic growth and the successive redistributions of income that have taken place in Argentina since 1945,³⁰ but only survey data can tell us whether those social groups and those individuals who have suffered most from economic privations have also become the most critical of Argentine leaders, the most vehemently antagonistic to other groups, or the most unwilling to make economic sacrifices in the national interest. If measures of nationalism correlate with a lower desire to press wage demands that the respondent defines as harmful to the national economy, then we may reject the null hypothesis that national loyalty and wage demands are unrelated. Economists find that income demands in both the urban and agricultural sectors have been crucial factors in spurring Argentina's inflation and in retarding its growth,³¹ so that if survey research helps us to determine the motivations that lie behind these demands, then we should gain insight into Argentina's stagnation.

Survey research can also provide vital data on the expectations and frustrations that underlie Argentina's exceptionally high level of civil violence and the popular tolerance for military coups that has encouraged

continuing instability in the executive branch. The concept of relative deprivation, which initially grew out of the survey research of World War II and was reported in *The American Soldier*, has proved to be a central variable in such recent approaches to violence as that of Ted Gurr.³² In judging the sense of relative deprivation in Argentina for both domestic and foreign reference groups, the survey was structured to measure the expectations, the aspirational frustrations, and the mutual perspectives of members of key groups in the Argentine system.

This strategy is most appropriate because the ultimate referent for statements on nationalism and intergroup hostilities must be the individual citizen and group member. System-wide generalizations can remain so vague as to be relatively meaningless. If "nationalism" is merely described as a uniform, unifying force in society, such an approach neglects the very different kinds of understanding, commitment, and nationalist goals that different citizens maintain. Arthur Whitaker and David Jordan are profoundly correct in calling Argentina "a battleground of competing nationalisms," a country where "most Argentines are nationalists of one kind or another, but the kinds range over the whole spectrum of nationalism, from right to left, from traditional to revolutionary, from benign to terroristic."³³ The best way more precisely to define these varieties of nationalism and to investigate their attitudinal correlates is through survey research. As Leonard Doob has suggested, "new subjective indices of patriotism and nationalism clearly need to be devised" and tested through survey research.³⁴ There is not and there never can be a simple connection between such indices and an index of economic growth at the national level, but, when contrasted with other variables that are also subject to being tested in surveys, responses on the dimensions of nationalism can provide information that is necessary for a fuller understanding of economic and political development.

Another apparent problem with this approach is that of trying to deal with development, which cannot vary within a single system except over time, on the basis of data from that system at a single point in time. Saying something about economic growth requires comparisons of the same nation at different periods and of the nation in question with other countries. Survey data collected at one time in a single nation cannot explain causes or effects of economic development in several nations over time.

There are various ways of coping with this problem. First, the objective is not so pretentious as to "explain" economic growth or political development, but rather to investigate possible connections among attitudes toward leadership, legitimacy, and nationalism that have remained

poorly understood and that may be one important element in alternative patterns of growth. No single theory has been capable of explaining the multiple causes for different rates of economic growth, and, because of this, middle-level theories appear to be the most efficacious. The broad, classical theories of Marx, with their assumptions of proletarianization and their de-emphasis on patriotism, are not particularly helpful as we approach the process of development in the United States or Argentina. More limited in scope are such middle-level approaches as Joseph Schumpeter's concern with the innovational entrepreneur³⁵ or Everett Hagen's interpretation of creativity among strategic groups,³⁶ but—together with other interpretations—these theories significantly increase our understanding of growth in many situations. The present study investigates another set of middle-level variables and hypothesized relationships on the assumption that this theory may be useful alongside others. Although the theory has numerous implications that can be studied in later projects, its variables need to be tested initially in one nation, such as Argentina.

The use of aggregate data is a prerequisite of this test, and one of the advantages of the Argentine case is the high level of reliability of this data for Argentina. Aggregate data relates directly to the groups under study in the survey. In terms of the six countries in Table 1, for instance, the three states with the best rates of economic growth during the 1950s also spent a consistently lower part of their GNP on defense. Japan, Brazil, and Mexico spent smaller percentages of their GNP on the military and also enjoyed far more rapid increases in GNP than did Argentina, the United Kingdom, or the United States. This relationship does not, of course, mean that decreased military spending is the key to growth; both Taiwan and Russia spent even higher percentages of their GNP on defense than did the United States, while their GNP also increased far more rapidly than did the American. But, in countries where military spending is especially high, resentment can be expected to build up against it. Such expenditure policies can slow growth, not only by causing economic dislocations and diverting resources to the military, but also by heightening popular antipathy toward the military, thus calling into question the legitimacy of governmental budgets and the payments made to the military guardians of the nation's territory. As Table 1 shows, the weight of military expenditures has been far greater in the United States and Britain than in Argentina, and British and American soldiers—in contrast to those of Argentina—have been asked repeatedly to fight in wars and police actions abroad. As a result, popular pressure has cut back the relative weight of military spending in Britain and the United States.

When survey data is to be obtained on and about the Argentine military, it can be best interpreted in the light of such aggregate data and the comparisons that they imply.

TABLE 1 *GNP Increases and Military Expenditures*

	Average Yearly % Increase in GNP, 1950–1960 ^a	Expenditure on Defense as a % of GNP, 1959 ^b
Japan	8.0	1.6
Brazil	6.6	2.5
Mexico	6.3	0.7
Argentina	3.4	2.6
United States	2.9	9.6
United Kingdom	2.7	6.7

a. Source: *Statistical Yearbook, 1970* (New York: United Nations, 1971), pp. 590–94. All of the data is for the 1950–60 period, except that on Japan, which covers only 1952 to 1960. The Mexican figure represents the average annual rate of growth in real gross domestic product at factor cost.

b. Source: Bruce M. Russett et al., *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1964), pp. 79–80.

In the survey component of the project, the conclusions may be less time-bound than they would at first appear to be, partially because of the nature of the survey and partially because its responses can be compared to those of other survey work. *The American Voter*, among other studies, was largely based upon a single survey, yet its conclusions reveal underlying perceptions and relationships that are not time-bound. Current attitudes of respondents are shaped by their past experience, socialization, and behavior. Carefully designed survey questions can get at this experience of the past, particularly through open-ended questions that, in allowing respondents to talk freely, also allow researchers to see which recollections are still meaningful to the respondents. For this reason, the survey has included a significant amount of open-ended material.

Whether or not Lucian Pye is correct in saying that the major pitfall

of past attempts to use survey research in the analysis of political systems has been “trying to relate data to excessively high orders of abstraction,”³⁷ the present study should be able to sidestep this particular danger. The analysis tries to shed new light on the issues of instability and military intervention that lie at the center of the Argentine system; but instead of dealing with a wide range of abstractions, the approach focuses upon the three, closely interrelated issues of sacrifice, legitimacy, and perceptions of leadership. Such an approach does not pretend that these issues are the only ones touching instability and militarism, but it does posit that we can learn more about the apparent failures of Argentine development—and perhaps also gain fresh perspective on the three foci themselves and on alternative strategies of economic growth, political modernization, and consensus-building—through systematic investigation. While seeking areas of consistency among the attitudes of the elite and nonelite, the project is built upon the rich foundation of past theorizing, historical inquiry, and survey work.

SURVEY RESEARCH IN ARGENTINA

The context of prior surveys in Argentina helped to establish the parameters of this one. The work of Gino Germani, of course, has influenced a large number of theories and interpretations.³⁸ Fairly well known in the United States have been the studies done before Project Camelot for the United States Information Agency, which demonstrate anti-Americanism to be far less pervasive than one would expect on the basis of politicians’ fist-shaking and reports in the press;³⁹ the important 1965 survey of Jeane Kirkpatrick, which showed Peronist sympathies to be especially strong among the more authoritarian members of the lower class;⁴⁰ and David Nasatir’s work on university students, concluding guardedly that “contact with the university appears to provide some basis for developing support for a democratic system” by counteracting the notion that political power is very tightly concentrated.⁴¹ Before going to Argentina in 1972, I knew that many other surveys, not at that time readily available in the United States, had been conducted by Argentine firms and scholars, yet found myself unprepared for the full richness of what actually existed. The institutions that had conducted the most, and the most useful, surveys of a social science character proved to be Instituto IPSA, Analistas de Empresa & Consultores de Dirección (A & C), and the Centro de Investigaciones Motivacionales y Sociales.

The importance of survey findings reflects in the fact that, as President Juan Perón said, “The only successor of Perón will be the

Argentine people, who in the final analysis, must make the decision."⁴² Popular opinion has oriented the major decisions of the recent past, such as the need to allow an opening to the Peronists in the political system once again, and we can best understand the likely future drifts of that opinion through detailed knowledge of what past opinion has been. Before considering the implications of past survey research for this study of Argentine politics, some of the most significant work of these firms will be outlined below. Copies of the materials were purchased for two data banks in the United States. The majority of the studies can be obtained on IBM cards at the present time from the Roper Public Opinion Research Center in Williamstown, Massachusetts. They will be fully listed, with others in a total of about 350 Latin American data sets, in a forthcoming volume on the Latin American holdings of the Roper Center that has been made possible through a grant from the Tinker Foundation. Those studies listed below that are not at the Roper Center will be available on magnetic tape, after the data has been cleaned and processed, from the Social Science Data Center at the University of Connecticut.

IPSA, which has been very ably directed by Miguel Gorfinkiel and Carmen Zayuelas, has carried out research of high quality on political issues in addition to many market surveys. The issues studied have included the images of business and other institutions; habits in regard to periodical reading and television viewing; the attitudes of young people in the violence-plagued cities of Buenos Aires, Rosario and Córdoba; pre-election studies; and a variety of general surveys in regard to current political issues. Since the IPSA staff has been large and highly proficient from a technical standpoint, its surveys provide a fairly reliable basis for the judgment of attitudes in Argentina.

Some of the most interesting research at IPSA has been a project called *Opiniómetro*, a four-part set of surveys on related issues with waves of the project covering the period from February 1971 to November 1972. Each wave provides, in effect, a national sample, with detailed analysis of opinion in Greater Buenos Aires (which contains a third of the national population), the cities of Córdoba and Rosario, and small interior towns whose impact is then weighted up in order to provide the proportions of a national sample. The questions have included an evaluation of the respondent's optimism or pessimism in regard to the political and economic situation of the country, his own economic situation, nationalism, foreign investment, private versus public ownership of basic industries, the leaders most deserving of respect, and the impact and motivation of guerrilla groups.

The climate of opinion tested in *Opiniómetro* clearly encouraged

the government of Alejandro Lanusse to allow comparatively free elections and the return of Juan Perón. Confidence in the economic condition of the country steadily declined, in all four major regions of the survey, up to the last wave of November 1972—some four months before the election of Héctor J. Cámpora. In regard to inflation, criticism was particularly acute. Less than one *porteño* in ten said that he was even fairly satisfied with his standard of living, reflecting the dissatisfactions that have served as an underlying cause for so many changes in the personnel of Argentine government. In regard to the armed forces themselves, less than 10 percent of the respondents regularly opted for one of the two favorable responses (“without the armed forces the country would have fallen into chaos” and “the armed forces are the ones in a condition to hold power”), while over 70 percent opposed further military rule (either with the more positive response category, “the armed forces have fulfilled their duty in past years, but now it is time to give their place to the politicians,” or the more negative category, “the military ought to go back to their barracks, which they never should have left”).

Like a double-edged sword, the attitudes toward terrorism and subversion further encouraged giving the Peronists new access to politics. On one side, with the increase in kidnappings, *Opiniómetro* reveals that people felt they had lost their assurance of personal security. This suggested the need for a government that could provide law and order, yet even after seventeen years such a government was impossible as long as the Peronists were excluded from electoral politics, as long as the exclusion encouraged Marxist and traditional Peronist guerrillas to fight together to bring down the anti-Peronist system. On the other edge of the sword, when asked what motivated the guerrillas, nearly a third of those surveyed chose a sympathetic response category: “It is the only way to express their protest.” As one would expect, this sympathy for the guerrilla was consistently highest in Córdoba and lowest in Buenos Aires; it declined over the time period of *Opiniómetro* because the government became more amenable to the demands. Quite literally, the objective situation changed so as to encourage dissenters to express their opinions through dialogue and an electoral campaign rather than through violence. Sadly, internecine hostilities are so great that ideologically antagonistic groups of the extreme right and left, each trying to assume the mantle of “genuine Peronism,” have increased rather than decreased the level of assassination since the Peronist victory of 1973,⁴³ but the hope that violence would abate rather than increase was nevertheless a strong force for those watching the pulse of public opinion in 1971 and 1972.

Another highly knowledgeable pulse-taker has been Dr. José En-

rique Miguens, the former head of the Sociology Department at the Catholic University of Argentina, who more recently has directed surveys for the Centro de Investigaciones Motivacionales y Sociales. While not undertaking market research, this firm has concentrated upon surveys of political utility and theoretical significance in the social sciences. Some of these, such as work on the foreign policy orientations of the Argentine people, remain classified and not open to foreign scrutiny, because of the sensitivity of the material. Other studies include important work on terrorism, business, foreign capital, individual willingness to sacrifice, the petroleum issue, the role of priests, and even women's liberation and the efficiency of the national railways. The studies are fairly short and, unfortunately, contain almost no open questions; but they deal with vital issues, cover them adequately, and in some cases summarize the attitudes of powerful sectors of the elite. Although not yet available in the United States, three 1973 election studies will in time come from the Centro to the Social Science Data Center at the University of Connecticut.

In contrast to the IPSA and the Miguens practice of keeping the cards and questionnaires from all past studies, the firm of A & C destroyed these materials several months after the analysis phase of each project. It is impossible, therefore, to manipulate the data in ways that would go beyond the A & C summaries and publications, or even to check on the accuracy of the original findings themselves. Carlos Kaplan, the president of the firm, kindly allowed me to copy his personal file of the survey reports dealing with social and political matters, and some of these findings, both published and unpublished, are quite significant.

A & C surveys reveal, for example, how ephemeral was the support for the government of General Juan Carlos Onganía. An initial survey, taken a week after the coup in the Argentine winter of 1966, showed 66 percent of the respondents happy with the change in government, 27 percent neither happy nor unhappy, and only 6 percent ready to declare themselves unhappy over it. A short two years later, however, some 70 percent of all respondents said that the Onganía government was equal to or worse than the one preceding it, with a whopping 86 percent of the working class expressing their resentment to the economic situation of the country and the government's strategy concerning it. On one level, this shows that survey research can operate quite effectively even under military dictatorships of the recent Argentine variety. Workers clearly felt that they could criticize the government in an anonymous interview situation, just as Maurice Zeitlin had found some workers outspokenly critical of Fidel Castro during the early period of his government.⁴⁴ Such critical findings undergird confidence in survey results obtained in the

climate of an authoritarian regime. The precipitate decline in Onganía's popularity also underscores the appeal of revolutionary promises and, especially in Argentina, the difficulty of trying to implement them through demands for sacrifice and austerity.

A number of other issues gain considerable elucidation in the A & C materials. The depth of anti-Semitism in Argentina comes out, for example, in a survey of the Middle East situation conducted in 1967.⁴⁵ As regards the causation of the struggle, 24 percent of the 243 porteños questioned said that it was an episode in the struggle between Russia and the United States, 23 percent attributed it to the "imperialistic Israeli monopolists," 20 percent found it to be for the legitimate rights of the Arabs, and—despite the heavy Jewish population of Buenos Aires—only 16 percent related it to the legitimate rights of the Jewish people. In a Buenos Aires survey of 250 men in February 1968, the results were, as Table 2 indicates, highly skewed according to social class, with the upper class far more likely to favor the United States and to see it defending positive values such as democracy and world peace. Class analysis is a fascinating dimension of these surveys, and, although the operational definitions of class leave much to be desired and need to be handled carefully, this remains one of the most important variables to study in the comparative perspective of the Argentine materials. Other significant

TABLE 2 *Perceptions of What the United States Was Defending in the Vietnam War, in Percent*

Responses	Social Classes		
	Upper	Middle	Lower
Capitalism; colonialism; imperialism; militarism; world hegemony; political, economic, and strategic interests	19	58	45
Democracy, liberty, defense of the West, world peace, style of life	43	30	18
Prestige as a great world power (perceived in a positive way toward U.S.)	36	10	3
Prestige as a great world power (perceived in a negative way toward U.S.)	—	2	22
Don't know/No answer	2	—	12

A & C materials deal with attitudes toward business, kidnappings and terrorism, candidates and elections, youth, and the return of Perón.

Given the wealth of these past findings, it became particularly appropriate for this survey to gather information on crucial elite and rank-and-file groups rather than obtain, once again, a national sample. At less cost than a national sample, critical segments of the population—businessmen, landowners, military officers, blue-collar workers, rural *peones*, and the middle class—could be investigated with sample sizes large enough to allow generalization about the particular attitudes of each group. By replicating certain questions from national samples taken both earlier and at the same time, my survey allows comparison of elite attitudes with national opinion at various points in time. It gathers information on segments of the elite, such as landowners and the military, for which very little survey data is available, while occupationally matching elite and rank-and-file segments in city and countryside through the landowner-rural worker and the businessman-urban worker comparisons. An early plan to compare the views of all Argentine bishops with those of a random sample of priests was discarded, partly because it turned out that travel expenses to remote bishoprics were prohibitively expensive and partly because I came to feel that the Argentine Church was less significant in politics than originally believed. Instead of this clerical comparison, a middle-class component was substituted on the advice of Argentine survey researchers who, in addition to being extremely proud of their large middle class and seeing it as a feature distinguishing Argentina from other Latin American countries, felt that its shifts in opinion had had considerable importance in affecting governmental decisions.

This strategy required that six different samples be drawn. Some 120 *empresarios* were interviewed on the basis of a random sample of the three top executives (president, production manager, and marketing director) in the 120 largest firms, as measured in the annual list of *Mercado*, a source roughly equivalent to the *Fortune* 500 in the United States. Foreign executives were excluded, as were foreign respondents in all other categories. A random sample of the membership list of the Sociedad Rural, the major interest association of landowners, provided one hundred interviews within the *estanciero* group. A random selection of small communities in the *pampa húmeda* allowed one hundred interviews with rural workers from highly diverse job categories, who appear to be quite representative of rural workers in this central agricultural area. Some 199 urban blue-collar workers and 298 members of the middle class were interviewed through a block sample in the cities of Buenos Aires and its suburbs, Córdoba, Rosario, Laboulaye, 25 de Mayo, Mar del Plata, Olavarría, La

Plata, and Ramallo. For the military, understandable considerations of Argentine national security prevented more statistically acceptable bases of sample selection, so that finally seventy-three retired officers were interviewed on the basis of a "daisy chain," which began with eight officers known to represent different tendencies in the Argentine armed forces and then continued with balanced proportions of other officers suggested by the original interviewees.

Despite the problems of this subsample, and the sensitivity of top business executives in the context of widespread kidnappings of businessmen, the response rates were exceptionally good, allowing significant generalizations to be made about each group on the basis of the study. This was partly a matter of luck, in that August and September of 1973, a period suggested for the interviews in a funding proposal to the National Science Foundation some two years before, turned out quite unexpectedly to be the time of Juan Perón's election campaign, when a number of other surveys were in the field and when citizens seemed naturally disposed to answer questions on candidates and political issues. Also, by working through IPSA, the experience of the organization proved very useful, as did IPSA's prior contact with the executives of some of the firms in obtaining interviews with the vital, but generally hard to reach, industrial elite. The strategy of using a number of open questions, outlined in the questionnaire below, now seems most worthwhile, as the responses to these questions have turned up attitudes that would not have been anticipated or revealed in precoded responses. The richness of these materials has meant that the coding and check-coding is only now drawing to a close, and final results of the survey, with a formal testing of the hypotheses, will not be possible until a lengthy period of data analysis is completed. Nevertheless, a number of preliminary findings are already apparent. Coding of the closed questions was done in Argentina, with a summary of the findings made available to all elite respondents, many of whom—in contrast to the nonelite respondents—had asked to see the survey results. When completed and cleaned, a data set will be deposited at the Di Tella Institute in Buenos Aires, members of whose staff extended warm hospitality and assistance in 1972 and 1973.⁴⁶

A central finding of the study has been that, at the time of his last election to the presidency, Perón drew major support from a variety of social and occupational groups. Far from being the narrow instrument of the working class or the middle class, Peronism also gained significant support among the industrialists and even the landowners of the survey. While this was considerably less pervasive than the backing demonstrated among workers, the richness of the open question materials

suggests that much of this upper-class support depended, not upon intimidation of industrialists, but rather on their contrasting perception of what Peronism stood for. While blue-collar workers regularly said that they admired Perón for his genuine dedication to their welfare, the industrialists consistently revered what they called his *arrastre popular*, his ability to *control* the masses.⁴⁷ Findings on the polyclass nature of Peronism are consistent with other 1973 surveys, such as those of José Miguens, as well as with what Peter Smith has concluded, on the basis of his exhaustive analysis of the first presidential victory of Perón, to be the “socially complex” nature of the early Peronist movement.⁴⁸ Given the elite components of my survey and the substantial amount of open-question material, it becomes possible to characterize somewhat more precisely the disparate appeals that Peronism has had to different sectors and classes.

From these materials emerge patterns of belief quite at variance with the standard interpretations of North American texts. Admiration of President John F. Kennedy was widespread in the survey, and, as few North Americans would do, several Argentine respondents compared him directly to Perón. A thirty-four-year-old worker, naming Perón and Kennedy as the two political figures whom he respected, explained that this was “because of what the United States stood for. He [J.F.K.] was the first Perón; he tried to seek peace in the world.”⁴⁹ A woman machinist in the garment trade described Kennedy as “a man very like Perón in his struggle for the poor and the blacks.”⁵⁰ For Kennedy as for Perón, images, the symbolic dimension of politics, sometimes had far more effect in shaping attitudes than the actual political decisions that had been reached. Kennedy was noted for his Latin American policies as well as for his idealism, youth, and untimely death. For this president, who launched the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba and the recently criticized Alliance for Progress, one *estanciero* thus lionized him on the untenable grounds that “for the first time he made the United States look disinterestedly toward Latin America.”⁵¹

As in the views of Perón and Kennedy, so perceptions of the central variable of legitimacy relate distinctively to the separate orientations of the groups under study. To many military officers, for example, their discipline and command structure and the ability to take decisive actions when other sectors of society seem paralyzed by internal conflict and dissent, provided a rationale for legitimacy, a justification for taking power. As a retired major who had gone into business put it, the armed forces are “the only disciplined and organized institution in the country; the rest of the institutions are degenerate.”⁵² Implicitly, many respon-

dents saw political legitimacy as a question of degrees. That is, they believed that in general the constitutional norms and institutions of Argentina should be respected, but that occasions might arise when extraconstitutional, illegal actions had to be taken in the interests of the majority. A retired lieutenant general thus named the national constitution as “undoubtedly” representing authority, as it importantly de-personalized political power. Nevertheless, since Argentines lived in a “deformed democracy,” it was sometimes necessary to disobey true democratic principles. Such an “exceptional” case was “the second presidency of Perón. He fell into a number of excesses that brought the country to a class war. He incited violence. He armed the popular militias. This threatened a civil war and therefore required that the government be ended. In this case, it was justified.”⁵³

As one reads over the open-question replies from the different groups, comparing them with statistical summaries from the closed questions, the “character” of the groups comes out in unexpected dimensions. Some few agree on the need for sacrifice, like the Capitán de Navío who said, when asked what he would most like to change about his country, “Eliminate the lack of sincerity and the demagogery, the excessive propaganda and the hope that everything will be given to you without your own effort.”⁵⁴ Upward mobility is higher than anticipated, as the great industrialists turn out to be the sons of tailors, gasoline station owners, and metallurgical workers as well as, in other cases, the sons of the great industrialists and estancieros of an earlier era. Mobility through the army to positions of power is considerable, depending in part on the level of personal drive and initiative. In the explanation of a brigadier general whose father’s occupation shows the officer to have come from a respected segment of the lower-middle class, “I was born poor, and I owe everything I have to my own efforts. Need is the great impetus.”⁵⁵ As a group, the estancieros appear thoughtful and cultured, with time for reading, music, and reflection. In breadth, style, and often in grace, the replies of the military officers are strikingly like those of anti-Marxist intellectuals.

As measured in the three extensive, open sections of question 44, the sincerity of replies appears to be very high. Most respondents reported that they liked the survey, and they seemed to answer the questions thoughtfully and honestly. A favorite, yet quite typical, reply came from a realistic, pragmatic woman who had worked hard since her early teens. When asked what she thought of the interview, she said, “It’s good, because if you don’t ask, you can’t know what others think.” She went on to say that the questions were highly interesting, that they

provided a chance for genuine responses on issues that concerned every Argentine, and that it was “a great responsibility and honor, to ask my views on such important matters.”⁵⁶ If respondents feared the possibility of political reprisals for certain answers, such as naming figures who used power for their own special interests in question 4a, they frequently failed to answer the question, commenting, like a retired army doctor, that “I couldn’t say, because it might get me in trouble.”⁵⁷

Critics of survey research claim that questions do not mean the same thing to respondents from different classes and backgrounds, but the survey results reported here demonstrate that, while respondents may come from different intellectual worlds, they can all understand the meaning of clearly phrased, pretested questions. The level of sophistication and complexity with which they formulate responses to those questions differ greatly, but it is the objective of the survey to uncover just these differences. Furthermore, it is striking to see the uniformity of positive response to the survey itself. Retired generals and farm laborers, business executives and housewives, feel gratified to be asked their opinions, glad that their views will be counted in an attempt to clarify national problems. Some even held far higher hopes for the survey’s impact than did the principal investigator, while others took pride in the fact that their country was free enough to allow meaningful answers in this sort of research. A sincere, concerned colonel in the artillery believed, for example, that “If a sound evaluation of these opinions is made, it will be possible to improve, with dignity, all that happens in the country.”⁵⁸ A general in the Gendarmerie, the paramilitary Argentine border patrol, said, when asked what he felt about the survey, “I think that it could only be done in a country like ours; that is, I don’t believe that in Cuba there would be the freedom to do it.”⁵⁹

Worldwide, this freedom should be maintained and extended, always under the proviso that, as in the present study, the data are fully shared with all interested parties in the country where the research is carried out. Already in the Argentine case, the number of past surveys and their general availability means that a great deal can now be done with secondary analysis. Alejandro Portes is quite right in saying, for studies directed by North Americans, that “the unused data kept for future analyses (which seldom take place) constitute—after several decades of empirical research in Latin America—a vast reservoir of untapped opportunities for investigation.”⁶⁰ This is, of course, also true for data collected on other parts of the world, including the United States, and it holds for data collected by scholars and organizations in Latin America. There is far more survey work going on there than we usually

imagine, especially under quasi-official auspices in authoritarian political contexts that we associate with the silencing of dissent, with the muzzling of intellectuals, and therefore, incorrectly, with a rejection of survey research. On a recent, extended research trip to Chile, the chief Latin American correspondent for the *Wall Street Journal* found the junta to be conducting regular surveys on popular reactions to its policies.⁶¹ Even before such studies find their way into data banks, if they ever do, however, a wealth of material already resides there, waiting for theorists with time and energy to invest.

APPENDIX

Buenos Aires, Agosto de 1973

Señor entrevistado:

De nuestra consideración:

Tenemos a nuestro cargo una investigación mediante la cual se trata de estudiar las opiniones de los argentinos sobre el acontecer económico-social en el país.

Su colaboración consistirá en contestar algunas preguntas que nuestra colaboradora le formulará durante la entrevista.

Los resultados de la entrevista, así como las opiniones vertidas serán tratadas con la más absoluta reserva para ser luego procesadas mediante computadoras.

Agradecemos profundamente su gentileza por el tiempo y la atención que nos ha dispensado.

1. Podría Ud. nombrarme alguna/s figura/s a quien/es admire especialmente. (NO IMPORTA CUAL SEA EL CAMPO EN EL QUE SE DESTAQUEN)

1a. Me gustaría que me dijera, si es posible, la razón más importante por la que esa/s persona/s goza/n de su admiración (PROFUNDIZAR PARA CADA UNA DE LAS PERSONAS QUE MENCIONE)

Figuras Razones

Ninguno (VOL.) ()

No sabe ()

No contesta ()

2. Vayamos ahora a un campo más concreto, el de algunas figuras políticas que se han destacado en los últimos años. Respecto a ellos, me gustaría saber su opinión.

Acá tenemos una tarjeta donde hay dibujado un cuerpo geométrico, dividido en 100 porciones. Imagine que el total de la figura significara la totalidad de su simpatía, su adhesión por una persona, u que Ud. pudiera separar así sus sentimientos en porciones para calificar lo que piensa de ella.

Para guiarlo mejor podemos pensar que si Ud. siente poca simpatía por esa persona dirá que tiene desde 0 a 49 porciones de su adhesión por ella, si tiene un sentimiento término medio, dirá que le da la mitad de su adhesión (porción 50) y si tiene una adhesión mayor le dará desde 51 a 100 porciones, de su simpatía. Cuanto más se acerque a 0 significa menos simpatía y cuanto más se acerque a 100 significa más simpatía.

Dentro de este criterio cuántas porciones de su simpatía le merece la figura de . . . (ROTAR TARJETA FIGURAS)

	<i>Porciones</i>	<i>No Sabe</i>	<i>No Contesta</i>
Arturo Frondizi	_____	()	()
Pedro Aramburu	_____	()	()
Eva Duarte de Perón	_____	()	()
Arturo Illia	_____	()	()
Alejandro Lanusse	_____	()	()
Héctor Cámpora	_____	()	()
Juan D. Perón	_____	()	()
Francisco Manrique	_____	()	()
Juan Carlos Onganía	_____	()	()
Ricardo Balbín	_____	()	()
_____	_____	()	()

3. Siempre en el campo de las figuras políticas, le quisiera pedir que me dijera quién o quiénes son los líderes más importantes, mejores conductores que recuerde.

3a. Por qué razón opina Ud. así? (PROFUNDIZAR CADA UNO QUE MENCIONE ESPONTANEAMENTE)

<i>Lider</i>	<i>Razones</i>
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____

- Ninguno (VOL.) ()
- No sabe ()
- No contesta ()

4. Suele decirse muchas veces, que hay alguna personas o grupos de mucha influencia en el gobierno que aprovechan su posición en beneficio propio, olvidando el bienestar del pueblo.

Diría Ud. que esto es cierto o no corresponde a la realidad?

- Es cierto ()
- Cierto en parte (VOL.) () a Preg. 4a
- No es cierto ()
- No sabe () a Preg. 5
- No contesta ()

4a. (A LOS QUE DIJERON "CIERTO" O "CIERTO EN PARTE") Qué personas, o qué grupos, diría Ud. que se encuentran en esa situación?

<i>Personas</i>	<i>Grupos</i>
No sabe	()
No contesta	()

5. Seguramente a Ud. le sucede—como a todo el mundo—que se siente más de acuerdo con unos grupos de gente que con otros, o sea, que siente que unos lo representan más que piensan más como Ud.

Si usamos una vez más nuestra escala de porciones, con el mismo criterio, (0 a 49 porciones para aquellos grupos que piensan menos como Ud., 50 porciones regular, término medio, y de 51 a 100 porciones si piensan en cambio igual que Ud.) cuántas porciones le daría Ud. a . . . (ROTAR TARJETA GRUPOS)

<i>Grupos</i>	<i>Porciones</i>	<i>No Sabe</i>	<i>No Contesta</i>
Estudiantes universitarios	_____	()	()
Políticos	_____	()	()
Campeños	_____	()	()
Empresarios/Grandes			
Industriales	_____	()	()
Estancieros/Terratenientes	_____	()	()
Dirigentes sindicales	_____	()	()
Obreros	_____	()	()
El Clero	_____	()	()
Las Fuerzas Armadas	_____	()	()
Grupos civiles que buscan la solución a través de la lucha armada	_____	()	()

6. Pasando a otro tema, algunas personas dicen que todas las decisiones del gobierno—cualquiera que sea—deben ser respetadas, aun aquellas con las que se está en desacuerdo o perjudiquen, entendiendo así que por el sólo hecho de ser gobierno, por respeto a la Institución lo merece.

Diría Ud. que está de acuerdo o nó con esta idea?

Sí	()
No	()
Depende	
(VOL.)	() . . . De qué? _____
No sabe	()
No contesta	()

7. Siguiendo con esta idea, ahora en cambio pensando en distintos gobiernos que tuvo el país, me gustaría que me dijera para cada uno de ellos—usando nuestra escala de posiciones—en qué proporción merecieron ser respetadas sus decisiones. Recuerde que de 0 a 49 posiciones, sería que merecieron ser poco respe-

tadas, 50 sería el término medio y de 51 a 100 porciones significaría que merecieron ser muy respetadas.

Así por ejemplo las decisiones que asumió . . . (ROTAR TARJETAS PRESIDENTES) en qué proporción le parece que fueron dignas de respeto?

<i>Presidentes</i>	<i>Porciones</i>	<i>No Sabe No Contesta</i>	
Juan D. Perón (1a. presidencia)	_____	()	()
Pedro Aramburu	_____	()	()
Arturo Illia	_____	()	()
Juan D. Perón (2da presidencia)	_____	()	()
Alejandro Lanusse	_____	()	()
Arturo Frondizi	_____	()	()
Juan Carlos Onganía	_____	()	()

7a. (PARA LOS QUE HACEN DIFERENCIAS Y ASIGNAN DISTINTAS PORCIONES ENTRE UN GOBIERNO Y OTRO)

A su juicio, entiendo que las decisiones de determinadas gobiernos merecieron ser más respetadas que las de otros. Podría Ud. decirme cuál es la razón principal de esta diferente evaluación? (PROFUNDIZAR)

8. Diría Ud. que la Argentina ha tenido en los últimos 30 años un tipo de gobierno apropiado a las necesidades del país?

- Sí ()
- No ()
- Depende () . . . De qué? _____
- No sabe ()
- No contesta ()

9. En nuestro país hemos tenido períodos diferentes, algunos de más legalidad constitucional que otros. Como Ud. sabe, según las distintas ideologías o posiciones hay quien dice que lo mejor para el país es la legalidad institucional y otros que piensan que hay otros caminos que son más eficaces.

Con cuál de estas posturas estaría más de acuerdo?

- Legalidad institucional ()
- Otros caminos ()
- Depende (VOL.) () . . . de qué depende? _____
- No sabe ()
- No contesta ()

10. Si Ud. tuviera que personificar lo que para Ud. representa la *autoridad* qué institución, grupo, tradición o norma le resulta de más valor para definirlo?

10a. Por qué razón opina Ud. a favor de ello? (PROFUNDIZAR)

11. Alguna gente dice que en los últimos 30 años el prestigio de la Argentina ha disminuído, y en cambio otros opinan lo contrario.

A su entender, diría Ud. que aumentó o disminuyó en comparación con el de otros países, por ejemplo.

- Aumentó ()
- Igual (VOL.) ()
- Disminuyó ()
- No sabe ()
- No contesta ()

12. Teniendo en cuenta las revoluciones que sufrió el país desde 1930, cuál de las siguientes fechas (MOSTRAR TARJETA) considera Ud. que realmente se justificó? Y cuál nó?

	<i>Sí</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No Sabe</i>	<i>No Contesta</i>
1930 (Caída de Irigoyen)	()	()	()	()
1943 (Llegada de Perón al poder)	()	()	()	()
1955 (Caída de Perón)	()	()	()	()
1962 (Caída de Frondizi)	()	()	()	()
1966 (Caída de Illia)	()	()	()	()
1970 (Caída de Onganía)	()	()	()	()

13. Si piensa Ud. en el grueso de la gente, diría Ud. que los argentinos son muy patriotas o poco patriotas?

- Muy patriotas () Nada patriotas (VOL.) ()
- Regularmente patriotas No sabe ()
- (VOL.) () No contesta ()
- Poco patriotas ()

13a. Y Ud. personalmente se considera igual (más o menos patriota que el grueso de la gente)?

- Igual () No sabe ()
- Más patriota () No contesta ()
- Menos patriota ()

13b. Hay gente que se siente totalmente orgullosa de su país y aunque sabe que hay problemas trata de encontrar justificación para los mismos; en tanto que otras personas no consiguen ver nada bueno. Tomando la regla que hemos venido usando y pensando que cuanto más se acerque a 100 significa que más orgulloso y optimista de su país se encuentra y cuanto más a 0 menos orgulloso, en qué lugar se ubicaría Ud.?

Porción: _____

14. Como Ud. sabe el problema de la soberanía argentina en las Malvinas fue siempre motivo de discusión con Inglaterra. Suponga por un momento que la mayoría de la gente que vive en las Islas Malvinas, en una elección libre votara por no aceptar el dominio Argentino. Cuál de las siguientes acciones (MOSTRAR TARJETA) le parece que la Argentina debería seguir?

- Tratar de convencer a la población isleña, señalándole las ventajas que reciben (educación, servicios médicos) del país ()
 Enviar el Ejército y la Armada a tomar las Islas ()
 Elevar el caso a las Naciones Unidas ()
 No hacer nada ()
 Otros (ESP.) _____ ()
 No sabe ()
 No contesta ()

15. Ud. sabrá que en nuestro país se discute bastante sobre si el nacionalismo es bueno o malo para el progreso del país. Quisieramos que Ud. nos indicara con cuál de las siguientes posiciones está Ud. de acuerdo. (MOSTRAR TARJETA)

- Todo tipo de nacionalismo es bueno para el progreso del país ()
 Hay algunas posiciones nacionalistas buenas para el país y otras malas ()
 El nacionalismo es bueno en teoría pero en la práctica no funciona ()
 Todos los nacionalismos son malos para nuestro país ()
 Otros (ESP.) _____ ()
 No sabe ()
 No contesta ()

15a. Cómo definiría Ud. a una persona nacionalista? (PROFUNDIZAR) Dígame todo lo que se le ocurre que puede hacer, decir o pensar para que Ud. lo considere así.

16. También hay distintas ideas sobre si es más favorable para el país un nacionalismo con buena predisposición hacia lo extranjero por ejemplo a la inversión de capitales o un nacionalismo más cerrado.

Con cuál de estas posturas está Ud. más de acuerdo? (MOSTRAR TARJETA)

- Nacionalismo con buena predisposición hacia lo extranjero ()
 Nacionalismo con tolerancia para lo extranjero en aquello que necesitamos ()
 Nacionalismo con exclusión de todo lo extranjero ()
 No sabe ()
 No contesta ()

17. Hablando ahora de otro tema, si Ud. pudiera cambiar las cosas en nuestro país ¿cuáles serían los cambios que le gustaría hacer? (PROFUNDIZAR)

18. Le parece posible realizar estos cambios en los próximos 10 años? Diría Ud. que le parece . . .

- Muy factible ()
- Bastante factible () a Preg. 18a
- Ni factible ni imposible ()
- Poco posible ()
- Imposible () a Preg. 19
- No sabe ()
- No contesta ()

(SI CREE ALGUN MODO POSIBLE)

18a. Cree Ud. que estos cambios deberían realizarse gradualmente o que deben producirse de golpe, usando aún la fuerza o la violencia de grupos especiales?

- Producirse gradualmente ()
- Usando alguna fuerza necesaria (VOL.) ()
- Sólo por la fuerza, la violencia de grupos especiales ()
- No sabe ()
- No contesta ()

19. Si pudiera evaluar el uso de la violencia que se hizo hasta ahora, aquí en la Argentina, con el fin de producir cambio, qué diría Ud. que se usó . . . (MOSTRAR TARJETA)

- Mucho, siempre ()
- Bastante frecuentemente ()
- A veces ()
- Muy poco frecuentemente ()
- Nada, nunca ()
- No sabe ()
- No contesta ()

19a. Le parece a Ud. que esa cantidad de violencia (lo que dijo en preg. 19) fue la necesaria para llevar al país a las elecciones?

- Sí () No sabe ()
- No () No contesta ()

19b. Y el uso de la violencia que se hizo en el *mundo en general* con el fin de producir cambios, diría Ud. que fue . . . (MOSTRAR TARJETA)

- Mucho, siempre ()
- Bastante frecuentemente ()
- A veces ()
- Muy poco frecuentemente ()
- Nada, nunca ()
- No sabe ()
- No contesta ()

20. Como Ud. sabe, en los últimos tiempos se han producido en el país diversos actos de violencia. A la luz de esos hechos, diría Ud. que con respecto a *su seguridad personal* se siente igual, más o menos protegido que antes, por ejemplo que diez años atrás?

- Más que antes () No sabe ()
 Igual que antes () No contesta ()
 Menos que antes ()

21. Pasando a otro tema, Ud. estará de acuerdo con la idea que lo que es bueno para una persona puede no serlo para otras.

Suponiendo que Ud. *personalmente* tuviera la chance de ganar mucho más dinero pero que este aumento de sus ingresos, incidiera en el precio de artículos de primera necesidad. En qué proporción diría Ud. que estaría dispuesto a ceder el incremento de sus ingresos personales si con ello contribuyera a reducir la inflación y favorecer el desarrollo económico del país (MOSTRAR TARJETA)

- En buena parte () Otros (ESP.)
 Sólo un poco () _____
 Muy poco () No sabe ()
 Casi nada () No contesta ()
 Nada ()

22. Suponga—ahora a nivel personal—que le ofrezcan un trabajo mucho mejor que el que tiene (mejor pago) pero en otro país. Pero que al irse Ud. sabe que deja de ayudar al crecimiento del bienestar de la Argentina. ¿Qué haría Ud.?

- Iría a trabajar en otro país () No sabe ()
 No aceptaría ir () No contesta ()

23. Si este mismo ofrecimiento, con las mismas condiciones y los mismos resultados se lo hubieran ofrecido tiempo atrás, cuando Argentina tenía un gobierno militar, qué hubiera hecho entonces?

- Hubiera ido a trabajar a No sabe ()
 otro país () No contesta ()
 No hubiera aceptado ir ()

24. Ahora suponga en cambio que la Argentina estuviera en guerra, como por ejemplo la de la Triple Alianza con Paraguay, si Ud. tuviera un hijo o un hermano, lo alentaría para que se presentara como voluntario?

- Lo alentaría a que se presentara No sabe ()
 como voluntario () No contesta ()
 No lo haría ()

25. Vayamos ahora a otro tipo de preguntas. En comparación con el modo como otra gente vive en la Argentina, Ud. piensa que tiene lo justo de las cosas buenas de la vida, menos de lo justo o más que lo justo?

25a. A quién o a qué diría Ud. que debe el que tenga Ud. . . . (lo que dijo en preg. 25)

- | | | | |
|--------------------|-----|-------------|-----|
| Más que lo justo | () | No sabe | () |
| Lo justo | () | No contesta | () |
| Menos que lo justo | () | | |

26. Si pensamos ahora en un sentido más general, cómo diría Ud. que está repartida la riqueza en nuestro país? (MOSTRAR TARJETA)

- | | |
|---|-----|
| Muy desigualmente (o injustamente) | () |
| Bastante desigualmente (o injustamente) | () |
| Algo desigualmente (o injustamente) | () |
| Bastante aceptablemente (o justamente) | () |
| Muy aceptablemente (o justamente) | () |
| No sabe | () |
| No contesta | () |

27. En terminos personales sus ingresos actuales diría Ud. que son . . . (MOSTRAR ESCALA) que hace 10 años?

- | | | | |
|---------------|-----|--------------|-----|
| Mucho mejores | () | Mucho peores | () |
| Mejores | () | No sabe | () |
| Casi lo mismo | () | No contesta | () |
| Peores | () | | |

28. Y en relación al futuro, por ejemplo pensando en los próximos 5 años cree que su situación personal mejoraría, seguirá igual o empeorará? (MOSTRAR ESCALA)

- | | | | |
|----------------|-----|-----------------|-----|
| Mejorará mucho | () | Empeorará mucho | () |
| Mejorará algo | () | No sabe | () |
| Seguirá igual | () | No contesta | () |
| Empeorará algo | () | | |

29. Pensemos ahora en los últimos 30 años; si revisamos lo ocurrido en ese período en el país, diría Ud. que hubo algún momento más propicio para que se convirtiera en una nación próspera y fuerte de manera *más rápida* que en lo que en realidad ocurrió?

- | | |
|----------------|----------------|
| Sí | () |
| Depende (VOL.) | () a Preg. 30 |
| No | () |
| No sabe | () a Preg. 31 |
| No contesta | () |

30. (SI DIJO SI O DEPENDE) Podría aclararme cuándo, en qué momento?

31. Para concluir voy a preguntarle ahora algunos datos personales. Cuál es su nacionalidad?

31a. (SI DIJO ARGENTINA) Es Ud. nativo o ciudadano naturalizado?

31b. (SI DIJO NATURALIZADO) En qué país nació Ud?

Argentino () Nativo ()
 Naturalizado () Origen: _____
 Extranjero () de: _____
 No contesta ()

32. Tuvo Ud. alguna vez oportunidad de conocer otro país, en paseo o vivir en él?

Conoce otro país () No recuerda ()
 No conoce () No contesta ()

32a. (SI DIJO SI)Cuál o Cuáles visitó (paseo)

32b. En cuál o cuáles vivió?

_____ Visitó () Vivió ()

33.Cuál es su religión?

Católica () a Preg. 33a
 Protestante () Secta: _____
 Judía ()
 Otras (ESPECIFICAR) _____
 Ninguna ()
 No sabe ()
 No contesta ()

33a. (SI DIJO CATÓLICA) En el año pasado aproximadamente cuántes veces asistió a algún servicio en la Iglesia?

_____ veces () No sabe ()
 Nunca () No contesta ()

34. Quisiera que me dijera ahora qué estudios tiene?

GRADO

Primaria:

1er. () 6to. ()
 2do. () 7mo. ()
 3ero. () Ninguna instruc. ()
 4to. () No sabe ()
 5to. () No contesta ()

AÑO

Secundaria:

1er. () 6to. ()
 2do. () Ninguna ()
 3ero. () No sabe ()
 4to. () No contesta ()
 5to. ()

Comercial () Normal ()
 Industrial () Nacional ()
 Otros (ESP.) _____

A Ñ O

Universitaria:

1ero. () 6to. ()
 2do. () 7mo. ()
 3ero. () Ninguna ()
 4to. () No sabe ()
 5to. () No contesta ()

Carrera de: _____

Título: _____

Otro (ESP.) _____

35. Podría decirme ahora cuál es su ocupación? _____

35a. Y cuál es su tarea específica? _____

35b. En qué lugar trabaja? _____

35c. Realiza Ud. alguna otra tarea que podría calificar de segundo trabajo?Cuál? _____

35d. Además de esto, dicta Ud. alguna clase? De qué? _____

35e. Y estudia Ud. algo actualmente? Qué? _____

36. Y cuál es o fue la ocupación de su padre? _____

36a. Y cuál es o era la tarea específica que desempeñaba? _____

37. Y cuál es o fue la ocupación del jefe de Familia? _____

37a. Y cuál es o fue la tarea específica que desempeñaba? _____

	<i>Entre- vistado</i>	<i>Jefe de Familia</i>
Ama de casa	()	()
Empleados de oficina o vendedores	()	()
Trabajadores manuales especializados	()	()
Agricultor	()	()
Pequeños comerciantes, artesanos y obreros que trabajan por cuenta propia	()	()
Ejecutivos o dueños de empresa	()	()
Profesionales o altos jefes de la Adm. Pública	()	()
Peón o servicio doméstico	()	()
Otras tareas remuneradas (ESPECIFICAR)	()	()
Otras tareas no remuneradas (ESPECIFICAR)	()	()

PARA CUANDO CORRESPONDA: *Nivel de vivienda*

	1()	2()	3()	4()	5()
NIVEL SOCIO-ECONÓMICO:	AB	C1	C2	D	E
	()	()	()	()	()

38. De qué país, de qué origen viene la familia de su padre: _____
 38a. Cuántas generaciones de argentinos hay sin contar a Ud.: _____
 39. Y de qué origen es la familia de su madre? _____
 39a. Cuántas generaciones de argentinos? _____
 40. Cuál es su año de nacimiento? _____
 40a. O sea que actualmente tiene Ud. . . . (años). _____
 41. Sexo: Masculino () Femenino ()

SI ES MILITAR

42. Cuál es su grado, por favor? _____
 42a. En qué año se graduó Ud.? _____
 42b. A qué arma pertenece Ud.?
 Caballería () Otras (ESP)
 Artillería () _____ ()
 Comunicaciones () No contesta ()
 Inteligencia ()

SI ES TERRATENIENTE

43. Tiene Ud. tierras? (SI "SÍ") En qué provincia, dónde?
 Sí ()
 No ()
 No contesta ()

43a. (SI "SÍ") De cuántas Ha. es Ud. dueño? (MOSTRAR TARJETA)

- 1.500 Ha. ()
 1.501-2.000 Ha ()
 2.000 y más ()
 No contesta ()

43b. Como Ud. sabe, en este momento el país esta por concurrir a nuevas elecciones. Aquí voy a mostrale una serie de nombres de personalidades que podrían considerarse como posibles candidatos (MOSTRAR TARJETA ROTADO). Cuál de estos le gustaría a Ud. que saliera electo como Presidente y cuál como Vicepresidente?

43c. Independientemente de su agrado, cuál le parece que efectivamente va a salir elegido?

	<i>Preg. 43b</i>		<i>Preg. 43c</i>	
	<i>Le gustaría . . .</i>		<i>Opina saldra electo</i>	
	<i>Presidente</i>	<i>Vicepres.</i>	<i>Presidente</i>	<i>Vicepres.</i>
Juan D. Perón	()	()	()	()
Ricardo Balbín	()	()	()	()
Héctor J. Cámpora	()	()	()	()
Francisco Manrique	()	()	()	()
Juan C. Coral	()	()	()	()
Américo Ghioldi	()	()	()	()
Oscar Alende	()	()	()	()
Ezequiel Martínez	()	()	()	()

Isabel Perón	()	()	()	()
José López Rega	()	()	()	()
No contesta	()	()	()	()

TODOS

44. Para concluir podría decirme Ud. que piensa de esta encuesta, qué le pareció. Como se sintió al contestarla? (PROFUNDIZAR)

QUE PIENSA DE ESTA ENCUESTA: _____

QUE LE PARECIÓ: _____

QUE SINTIÓ AL CONTESTARLA: _____

45. Fecha entrevista

Día: _____

Mes: _____

Año: _____

NOTES

1. Kalman Silvert had these issues in mind when he wrote recently: "Foreign area studies also point up problem areas crying for more adequate explanation. It is highly significant that these themes in applied social inquiry are almost entirely identical with needs newly identified in American society." Silvert, "Area Studies Look Outward," in Fred W. Riggs, ed., *International Studies: Present Status and Future Prospects* (Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1971), p. 49.
2. See, in particular, José Luis de Imaz, *Los que mandan* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1964); Gino Germani, *Política y sociedad en una época de transición* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Paidós, 1966); Gino Germani, "Hacia una democracia de masas," in Torcuato S. Di Tella et al., *Argentina, sociedad de masas* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1965); and Robert A. Potash, *The Army and Politics in Argentina, 1928-1945* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1969).
3. These data, and the following data on achievement motivation, come from Bruce M. Russett et al., *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1964), pp. 99, 161, 194. See also David C. McClelland, *The Achieving Society* (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1961), especially chapter 3, "Achieving Societies in the Modern World."
4. Charles Lewis Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*, 2d ed. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1972), pp. 116-23. Sanctions summarized in this measure include censorship, martial law decrees, troop mobilization to prevent subversion, banning political party activity, the arrest of demonstrators, and the repression of espionage. For a chronological account of the events behind these statistics, see Manwoo Lee, "Argentine Political Instability Since 1946: A Study of Crises of Authority and Equality" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1969).
5. My analysis of the data on national income, deaths from group violence, and achievement motivation in some thirty-two nations where there is quantitative material available indicates no consistent relationship among them, even though an eminently logical relationship does occur in the case of Argentina. During the 1950s, other nations with apparently high achievement motivation and low or only moderate growth, such as Turkey, Canada, and Ireland, had very low rates of domestic group violence. A fundamental problem here lies in our measures of stability and need achievement. Reporting on deaths from violence in some countries is not accurate, and McClelland's analysis of children's stories provides only an indirect measure of the achievement factor. For the

- group violence statistics, the dates of collection of the data take on great importance when the time span is small, as, for example, where data from the 1950s attributes a very high incidence of violence to Hungary and a low incidence to Pakistan, whereas data from the early 1970s would do just the opposite. As researchers try to gather more accurate aggregate data in order better to measure the relationship among these variables, an alternative strategy of investigation is through survey research in one or more countries.
6. K. H. Silvert, "The Costs of Anti-Nationalism: Argentina," in Silvert, ed., *Expectant Peoples: Nationalism and Development* (New York: Random House, 1963), especially pp. 367–68. The survey data of Silvert and Bonilla on the attitudes of students in three faculties at the University of Buenos Aires tend to support this interpretation of factionalism. Although the students and professionals in the same fields outside the University generally agreed in their acclaim for equality before the law and the need for inexpensive public education, they differed sharply in their attitudes toward social class, mobility, and secularism. See "Argentina: Elites, Professionals, and the University," chapter 5 in Kalman H. Silvert, Frank Bonilla, and Frieda M. Silvert, "Education and the Social Meaning of Development" (unpublished manuscript, 1971).
 7. Gale Stokes, "Cognition and the Function of Nationalism" (unpublished paper, 1972), pp. 20–27.
 8. Underlying the more immediate causes of the Córdoba conflict was the unwillingness of labor and student groups to accept the limitations that the Onganía government attempted to place upon wage increases and student power within the universities. Thoughtful discussions of the cordobazo are George I. Oclander, "Córdoba; May 1969: Modernization, Grass-roots Demands, and Political Instability," in Alberto Ciria et al., *New Perspectives on Modern Argentina* (Bloomington, Ind.: Latin American Studies Program, Indiana University, 1972); and Carlos S. Fayt, *El político armado: Dinámica del proceso político argentino (1960/1971)* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Pannedille, 1971), pp. 174–86.
 9. Peter G. Snow, *Political Forces in Argentina* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1971), pp. 62–64.
 10. Lucian W. Pye, "The Legitimacy Crisis," in Leonard Binder et al., *Crises and Sequences in Political Development* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 148–49.
 11. Sidney Verba, "Comparative Political Culture," in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 529.
 12. For a detailed discussion of the nationalist campaigns of the Perón regime, see Samuel L. Bailey, *Labor, Nationalism and Politics in Argentina* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1967).
 13. Michael Mann, "The Social Cohesion of Liberal Democracy," in David E. Apter and Charles F. Andrain, eds., *Contemporary Analytical Theory* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972), pp. 226–27.
 14. Robert A. Packenham, "Political Development Research," in Michael Haas and Henry S. Kariel, eds., *Approaches to the Study of Political Science* (Scranton, Penn.: Chandler Publishing Company, 1970), p. 182.
 15. William A. Welsh, *Methodological Problems in the Study of Political Leadership in Latin America* (Iowa City, Iowa: Laboratory for Political Research, Department of Political Science, University of Iowa, 1970), p. 4. Welsh's italics.
 16. Paul N. Rosenstein-Rodan, "The Alliance for Progress and Peaceful Revolution," in Irving Louis Horowitz, Josué de Castro, and John Gerassi, eds., *Latin American Radicalism: A Documentary Report on Left and Nationalist Movements* (New York: Random House, 1969), p. 60.
 17. See Frederick C. Turner, *The Dynamic of Mexican Nationalism* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1968), especially chapters 1 and 4.
 18. Jacques Lambert, *Amérique latine: Structures sociales et institutions politiques* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1963), p. 422.
 19. Daniel Goldrich, "Toward the Comparative Study of Politicization in Latin America," in

- Peter G. Snow, ed., *Government and Politics in Latin America: A Reader* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967), p. 260.
20. William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (New York: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 156–58.
 21. Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Study of Leadership," in Rustow, ed., *Philosophers and Kings: Studies in Leadership* (New York: George Braziller, 1970), p. 16.
 22. Seymour Martin Lipset, *The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective* (New York: Basic Books, 1963), pp. 90, 97. For a short statement of this position, see Lipset, "Formulating a National Identity," in S. N. Eisenstadt, ed., *Political Sociology: A Reader* (New York: Basic Books, 1971), pp. 470–74.
 23. See, in particular, the survey findings reported in Arthur H. Miller, "Political Issues and Trust in Government: 1964–1970," *American Political Science Review* 68, no. 3 (September 1974); and Daniel Yankelovich, *The New Morality: A Profile of American Youth in the 70's* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974).
 24. Comment by Wiarda in a private conversation at a meeting of the New England Council of Latin American Studies, Norton, Massachusetts, 26 October 1974.
 25. On the basis of his case study of Bolivia since 1952, Norman H. Keehn concludes: "When evaluating regimes, we should not be guided solely by ideological preferences or moral imperatives. . . . Regimes should be evaluated on the basis of performance. . . . It is performance that counts; performance nourishes legitimacy and promotes a sense of identification with the state. Whether performance takes place under the aegis of capitalism, communism, socialism, corporatism, or Maoism is beside the point." Keehn, "Building Authority: A Return to Fundamentals," *World Politics* 26, no. 3 (April 1974): 351. For a similar prescription that "the United States should grant recognition to all Latin American governments but provide the heaviest aid to those countries that are best able to use it," but that democratic or Christian Democratic respect for political participation and civil liberties should also inform our policy, see Frederick C. Turner, *Catholicism and Political Development in Latin America* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1971), pp. 253–54.
 26. See Peter H. Smith, "Political Legitimacy in Spanish America," in Richard Graham and Peter H. Smith, eds., *New Approaches to Latin American History* (Austin, Tex.: University of Texas Press, 1974). In a detailed study of the Argentine case, Smith points to the crucial relationship of legitimacy and leadership, defining crises of legitimacy as occurring "when sizable portions of the politically relevant population challenge or deny the normative validity of claims to authority made by existing leadership." Smith, *Argentina and the Failure of Democracy: Conflict among Political Elites, 1904–1955* (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974), p. 89.
 27. David E. Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 16.
 28. This approach is congruent with Peter G. Stillman's recent interpretation of legitimacy as "the compatibility of the results of governmental output with the value patterns of the relevant systems," seeing legitimacy as a continuum rather than an on-off proposition and finding the "relevant systems" to include international, societal, group, and individual components. Stillman, "The Concept of Legitimacy," *Polity* 7, no. 1 (Fall 1974): 42–43.
 29. As an example, Shively writes: "The percentage of votes for the Democrats in a county may be an individual-level variable measured at the aggregate level, if we relate it to percentage of manual workers in order to find out how manual workers vote Democratic. But it may also be a community-level variable, if we relate the percentage of the vote Democratic in districts to Congressmen's voting records in the house. The distinction lies in our intent in using the variable." Shively, "'Ecological' Inference: The Use of Aggregate Data to Study Individuals," *American Political Science Review* 63, no. 4 (December 1969): 1184.
 30. The best account of shifts in the distribution of personal income in this period is Economic Commission for Latin America, *Economic Development and Income Distribution*

- in *Argentina* (New York: United Nations, 1969). From 1946 to 1965, the inequality of income distribution declined somewhat, with *rentiers* losing their place at the top of the income structure and with industrial workers gaining at the expense of other groups.
31. See chapter 17, "Inflation and Stagnation: Economic Policy After 1950," in Aldo Ferrer, *The Argentine Economy*, trans. Marjory M. Urquidí (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1967).
 32. Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970), especially chapter 2, "Relative Deprivation and the Impetus to Violence."
 33. Arthur P. Whitaker and David C. Jordan, *Nationalism in Contemporary Latin America* (New York: The Free Press, 1966), pp. 6, 75.
 34. Leonard W. Doob, *Patriotism and Nationalism: Their Psychological Foundations* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1964), p. 15.
 35. J. A. Schumpeter, *The Theory of Economic Development*, trans. R. Opie (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1934).
 36. Everett E. Hagen, *On the Theory of Social Change: How Economic Growth Begins* (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1962).
 37. Lucian W. Pye, "Advances and Frustrations in Comparative Politics," in Riggs, ed., *International Studies*, pp. 101–2.
 38. For a comparative and critical appraisal of Germani's work, the shift in his viewpoint, and its implications for other social science theorizing, see Eldon Kenworthy, "The Function of the Little-Known Case in Theory Formation or What Peronism Wasn't," *Comparative Politics* 6, no. 1 (October 1973), especially pp. 30–32. The Latin American holdings of the major United States data banks are outlined in William G. Tyler, ed., *Data Banks and Archives for Social Science Research on Latin America* (Gainesville, Fla.: Consortium of Latin American Studies Programs, 1975).
 39. The data from these surveys is available through the Roper Public Opinion Research Center. Among the reports published by the Research and Reference Service of the United States Information Agency, see especially *A Note on the Impact of Vice-President Nixon's Trip on Public Opinion in Three Latin American Cities*, Report No. 15 (June 1958); *Recent Trends in Latin American Opinion Toward the United States and the Soviet Union*, Report No. 16 (October 1958); *The Economic and Political Climate of Opinion in Latin America and Attitudes toward the Alliance for Progress: Results of a Public Opinion Survey in Seven Countries*, R-110-63 (R) (June 1963); and *Latin American Attitudes toward the Alliance for Progress and the Role of Private Investment*, R-206-65 (December 1965). On the impact of Project Camelot, see Irving Louis Horowitz, ed., *The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot: Studies in the Relationship between Social Science and Practical Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1967).
 40. Jeane Kirkpatrick, *Leader and Vanguard in Mass Society: A Study of Peronist Argentina* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1971), pp. 221–22.
 41. David Nasatir, "Higher Education and the Perception of Power: The Case of Argentina," *Social Science Quarterly* 49, no. 2 (September 1968): 329–30.
 42. Quoted in Jonathan Kandell, "Perón's 2d Presidency Just Didn't Work Out: It May Be That Argentine Conflict Runs Too Deep for Consensus," *New York Times*, 7 July 1974.
 43. See David C. Jordan, "Authoritarianism and Anarchy in Argentina," *Current History* 68, no. 401 (January 1975); and the sources and commentary in Charles A. Russell, James F. Schenkel, and James A. Miller, "Urban Guerrillas in Argentina: A Select Bibliography," *LARR* 9, no. 3 (Fall 1974). On a continuing basis, the factional struggles have been well dealt with in *Latin America* (London). For a comprehensive, balanced summary of the shifts in Peronism, see Alberto Ciria, "Peronism Yesterday and Today," *Latin American Perspectives* 1, no. 3 (Fall 1974). To appreciate the underlying ideological conflict within Peronism, contrast, on the right, Carlos A. Fernández Pardo and Alfredo López Rita, *Socialismo nacional: La marcha del poder peronista* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Relevo, 1973), with, on the left, the writings of John William Cooke, such as *La lucha por la liberación nacional* (Buenos Aires: Granica, 1971), and *Apuntes para la militancia: Peronismo crítico* (Buenos Aires: Schapire, 1972).

44. On the basis of five questions, Zeitlin rated 142 workers as favorable to the revolution, 24 as "indecisive" toward it, and 36 as hostile. In 1962, some workers forthrightly told him that Castro had betrayed the revolution to the Communists, that Russians ran the country, or that they personally wanted to get out of Cuba. Maurice Zeitlin, *Revolutionary Politics and the Cuban Working Class* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967). pp. 31, 34, 44.
45. Anti-Semitism has long been strong in the country, rising with Nazi influence in the 1930s and being especially pronounced at certain times, such as the Onganía coup of 1966. While the Battle of Britain was continuing in 1941, Rabbi J. X. Cohen reported on the dramatic growth of anti-Semitism in Argentina, including (a) an attempt to keep all Jewish students out of medical school, (b) a violent battle to prevent this, and (c) the near sterilization under an X-ray machine of a Jewish intern who refused to be intimidated. Despite Argentina's need for skilled immigrants, a public official told Cohen, "We do not desire persons in our country who would come because the international situation sends them to Argentina for accidental reasons," a highly slanted remark in the context of the times. See J. X. Cohen, *Jewish Life in South America: A Survey Study for the American Jewish Congress* (New York: Bloch Publishing Company, 1941), especially pp. 51-53, 108.
46. In this connection, I am particularly grateful to Roberto Cortés Conde and Guillermo O'Donnell.
47. An estanciero said of Perón, "He remains a good leader because he is very astute; he touches those points on which he knows he is going to be supported. He uses democracy in a demagogic manner." Respondent 3053, question 3a.
48. Peter H. Smith, "The Social Base of Peronism," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 52, no. 1 (February 1972): 58. Also, see Eldon G. Kenworthy, "The Formation of the Peronist Coalition" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1970), especially pp. 230-32.
49. Respondent 2077, question 3a. Similarly, a 1968 study of middle-school students in Tokyo named John F. Kennedy as the most respected political leader. Japanese democracy, instituted under the American occupation following World War II, gained legitimacy without relying upon a heroic Japanese figure, so that, as Joseph A. Massey writes, "For the great majority of Japanese youngsters, political heroes either do not exist or are foreign leaders." Massey, "The Missing Leader: Japanese Youths' View of Political Authority," *American Political Science Review* 69, no. 1 (March 1975): 48.
50. Respondent 2097, question 1a.
51. Respondent 3092, question 1a.
52. Respondent 6041, question 10a.
53. Respondent 6034, questions 6, 10a.
54. Respondent 6071, question 17.
55. Respondent 6044, question 25a.
56. Respondent 5281, question 44.
57. Respondent 6059, question 4a.
58. Respondent 6058, question 44.
59. Respondent 6064, question 44.
60. Alejandro Portes, "Sociology and the Use of Secondary Data," in Robert S. Byars and Joseph L. Love, eds., *Quantitative Social Science Research on Latin America* (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1973), p. 213.
61. Luncheon conversation with Everett Martin, New York City, 14 January 1975.