

beneficial for its development from western influences. Thus firmly established in self-respect and its own history and culture, and free from the European disease of lust for power and unrestrained ambition, India will be in a position to acquire material prosperity — without damaging the prospects of its own spiritual fulfilment. And ideally, what would these prospects be? Embracing the Catholic faith which could, if Upadhyay's model were implemented, be achieved without the need for self-alienating transformations. In this way, true to its best heritage of 'Aryan one-centredness,' India will 'progress into the future.'

(pp.245-6)

Even in his name Upadhyay reflected the complex nature of the identity he wished to maintain. Having converted to Christianity he took up a Sanskrit version of Theophilus, Brahmabandhab, both meaning friend of God. By name, in his life and thought Upadhyay expressed his desire to be a Hindu-Catholic.

This is a superb book, written about an inspiring figure. It is of great interest to those who are willing to consider Upadhyay not merely as a member of a particular society and time, but as a model, to be accepted or rejected, of how different religions and cultures might fruitfully embrace each other, though at the same time serving as a warning of how difficult this is, both in its achievement by any individual and in its acceptance by others.

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UNDERSTANDING HUMAN GOODS: A THEORY OF ETHICS by T. D. J. Chappell *Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1998. Pp. 218; £14.95 pbk, £40.00 hbk.*

A great virtue of Tim Chappell's book is to introduce important themes from contemporary natural law thinking to our rather insular 'mainstream' ethics. For this we should be truly grateful. Naturally, his project requires subtlety and some cunning: the secular academy is very resistant to argument historically connected to Christian ethics unless well disguised. The question is: does this sort of Christian realism emerge strengthened by engagement with the world of analytic ethics, or does the mask blur the truth?

Chappell's arguments could be called 'Aristotelian' in that they blend questions of values acquisition with values analysis (normative ethics with metaethics). He argues from the structure of our choices to a pluralism of human goods; he then argues for some particular goods and for an indeterminate number of ways in which these may constitute a good human life. There is no such thing as the way in which to promote or respect human goods; however, there are various types of act which are always violations of the good, thus there are some absolute moral prohibitions. It is rational for us to seek goods from within the developing narratives of our lives: we should seek to sustain a personal identity. However, personal identity is not only our own chosen project. Our identity

is also a given: we are living human substances, not tomatoes or rabbits. This helps explain why the human goods are as they are and why there are deontological limits upon our choices. Chappell concludes with accounts of practical reasoning and freedom of the will.

All of this contains some terrific argument. Teachers and students alike will benefit from Chappell's clear cases against monism, hedonism and egotism, his discussion of Parfit (happily avoiding the output of the 'Parfit industry'), his summary of the traditional account of substance and person, his rather unexpected 'moral mathematics' (Ch. 5), his discussion of freedom etc.

I have two points to make. The first is stylistic. Chappell favours capitalised titles and initials for the various positions he discusses (The Working Hypothesis, The Threefold Schema, TPR, LCG etc.). This is an uncomfortable apparatus for those not used to the world of scholarly journals, and not particularly elegant; by chapter 6 I found it impossible to hold in mind which position is which. The second point concerns Chappell's presentation of material which has been worked over by natural law philosophers such as Grisez, Finnis, George etc.—though I do not mean to imply that Chappell is himself presenting a natural law theory. It is good to have this material circulating in extra-Catholic circles, but how much of it survives this particular mode of engagement?

Contemporary natural law borrows from the best of Aristotelianism and Kantianism to provide new tools for understanding human goods: they are irreducible, incommensurable, intelligible, perfective, sufficient explanations of choice etc. It's not clear how much of this theory Chappell accepts, but given what seem to be his allegiances, his inclusion of items such as pleasure with human goods is unconvincing. What makes ducking to avoid a ball, taking aspirins etc. intelligible is surely concern for oneself, one's health, not fear of the sensation of pain or of threats to future enjoyment. His example of walking into a shop just for the smell of coffee strikes me, if it is a human act at all, as done not for purely sensory stimulation, but for the intelligible good of experiencing beauty (not all beauty is visual!) or nostalgically remembering past times and events or sharpening one's appetite etc. How could having enjoyable feelings be attractive *per se* to a rational being? Surely, unlike some of the other goods Chappell mentions (friendship, contemplation of God, life, truth etc.), delightful sensory experiences are not irreducible goods but enjoyable experiences of health, friendship etc. There is a strong natural law literature arguing the place of pleasure as (a) not a good but part of what motivates and (b) something achieved incidentally but not insignificantly; indeed, this view is a priority of the natural law attack on utilitarianism, subjectivism etc. It would be good to see Chappell tackle this material if he truly wishes to include enjoyment in human well-being. But he gives only brief consideration to it here, e.g. Grisez *et al.* do not say everything that 'motivates in its own right' (p. 63) is a basic good, but that basic goods are factors which make choices intelligible and are self-perfective, irreducible dimensions of well-being.

Chappell also includes ecology in his list. This raises a more general difficulty: if not all goods for humans are human goods—if we platonise the goods—then we might as well re-examine every good. Why not make numbers part of the good for man? Why hold his goods are tied up with his nature at all? Chappell would like (p. 61) to be an Aristotelian about the good but his views draw him too to Platonism, and not even St Thomas brought off a Platonic-Aristotelian account of the human good. The irony then is that though he complains of dualism in the new natural lawyers (p. 63), it is Chappell himself who risks a Platonic theory of the good in which 'our' goods may be ontologically separate from us.

He also argues that the list of basic goods is incompletable—art, for example, had to be discovered—so new possibilities of human good and the good human life may lie ahead. Some clarification would help here. Does it mean we may be experiencing some human goods we don't recognise as such, or that there are human goods we could create by choice but which we presently either reject or are ignorant of? This raises deep questions concerning our self-evident knowledge of basic goods and the possibility of genuine happiness for us if not all the goods are 'in'. In any case, isn't the truth that in discovering art we simply discovered a new mode of participating in an old good — beauty?

It is good that Chappell does not simply repeat natural law orthodoxy on such topics as pursuing the good by immoral acts, commitments, consequentialism, moral absolutes etc.: it is right to discuss these in ways philosophers from other schools will heed. On the other hand, the contribution of Finnis, George and others in these areas is so enormous that I missed more discussion of their work. To take one example, Chappell argues we may kill would-be murderers if our intention is to stop a murder (p. 89). Others argue one may never directly kill, though sometimes one can justly do something which will cause a death. Some discussion of the admittedly bamboozling literature on this topic might be appropriate here.

This book is engagingly written (horrid labels apart!), builds bridges between different moral traditions and provides valuable series of arguments for scholars and students alike. I'm aware of not doing justice to the huge range of topics covered. Let me say it is rare in moral philosophy to resist the temptation of talking your subject into the ground and instead moving *andante*, as Chappell does and does so successfully, from one vital topic to another.

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LE THOMISME ET LES THOMISTES by Romanus Cessario, translated by Simone Wyn Griffith-Mester *Les Editions du Cerf Paris*, 1999. Pp. 125; 120 F.

With such books as *The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics* (Notre Dame University Press, 1991) and *Christian Faith and the Theological Life* (Catholic University of America Press, 1996), not to mention substantial