

The Ecclesiastical Policy of King James I

Kenneth Fincham and Peter Lake

I

In a sermon preached at Hampton Court on September 30, 1606, John King proclaimed that “our Solomon or *Pacificus* liveth.” James I had “turned swords into sithes and spears into mattocks, and set peace within the borders of his own kingdoms and of nations about us.” His care for the “Church and maintenance to it” was celebrated. All that remained was for his subjects to lay aside contentious matters and join “with his religious majesty in propagation of the gospel and faith of Christ.”¹ The sermon was the last in a series of four preached—and later printed—at the king’s behest before an unwilling audience of Scottish Presbyterians. The quartet outlined James’s standing as a ruler by divine right and laid down the conceptual foundations of the Jacobean church. A godly prince, exercising his divinely ordained powers as head of church and state, advised by godly bishops, themselves occupying offices of apostolic origin and purity, would preside over a new golden age of Christian peace and unity. A genuinely catholic Christian doctrine would be promulgated and maintained; peace and order would prevail. James I was *rex pacificus*, a new Constantine, a truly godly prince.² As he himself observed in 1609, “my care for the

KENNETH FINCHAM is junior research fellow at St. John’s College, Oxford University. PETER LAKE is lecturer in history at the University of London. The authors are most grateful to Andrew Foster, Conrad Russell, Nicholas Tyacke, and Jenny Wormald for their comments on an earlier draft of this article.

¹ John King, *The Fourth Sermon Preached at Hampton Court on Tuesday the last of Sept. 1606* (Oxford, 1607), pp. 46–49.

² Lancelot Andrewes, *A Sermon Preached before the Kings Maiestie at Hampton Court* (London, 1606) (hereafter, unless otherwise noted, city of publication is London); William Barlow, *One of the Foure Sermons Preached before the Kings Maiestie, at Hampton Court in September last* (1606); John Buckeridge, *A Sermon Preached at Hampton Court before the Kings Maiestie* (1606); King.

Journal of British Studies 24 (April 1985): 169–207

© 1985 by The North American Conference on British Studies.

All rights reserved. 0021-9371/85/2402-0001\$01.00

Lord's spiritual kingdom is so well known, both at home and abroad, as well as by my daily actions as by my printed books."³

This new epoch of Protestant virtue and Christian unity was threatened by two disaffected and aggressive minorities, the papists and the Puritans. Although the sermons of 1606 were directed primarily against the threat of Puritanism, or rather Presbyterianism, the stability of church and state was no less threatened by the papists, as the preachers themselves acknowledged in a number of asides.⁴ The king himself never tired of pointing out the equivalence of these two menaces, a view that may be traced in royal correspondence at the start of the reign through to the king's speeches in his final parliament of 1624.⁵ On that occasion, the episcopate was warned to suppress papists with one hand and "sheep out" the Puritans with the other. James's ecclesiastical policy was often conceived and presented as a *via media* between these two extremes. Thus the Book of Sports of 1618 was directed as much against popish recusants who used Sunday recreations to entice his subjects away from divine service as it was against the judaizing extremism of Puritan Sabbatarianism.⁶ At the end of his reign the king refused to sign a proclamation against the proliferation of popish books until a balancing clause against Puritan tracts had been added.⁷ Demands for lenience or toleration from one group were often judged in terms of their effect on the other. Puritan pleas for special treatment, James observed, constituted "an excellent argument for the papist."⁸

The notion that James I disliked both Puritans and papists and pursued a middle way between these extremes is not in itself novel.

³ "King James and the English Puritans: An Unpublished Document," *Blackwoods Magazine* 188 (1910): 404. This analyzes James's marginalia in a copy of *An humble supplication for toleration & libertie to enjoy & observe the ordinances of Christ Iesus in th' administration of his churches in lieu of humane constitutions* (1609), which is preserved in the Lambeth Palace Library.

⁴ Andrewes, pp. 39, 45; Buckeridge, pp. 31–34; King, p. 23.

⁵ Public Record Office (PRO), State Papers (SP) 14/12/87; British Library (BL), Harleian (Harl.) MS 159, fol. 136r.

⁶ J. R. Tanner, ed., *Constitutional Documents of the Reign of James I* (Cambridge, 1952), pp. 54–56. See also W. Notestein, F. H. Relf, and H. Simpson, eds., *Commons Debates, 1621*, 7 vols. (New Haven, Conn., 1935), 4:7, 5:472; and the remarks of the translators of the Authorized Version: "On the one side we shall be traduced by popish persons at home or abroad . . . on the other side, we shall be maligned by selfconceited brethren, who run their own ways and giving liking unto nothing, but what is framed by themselves and hammered on their anvil" (*The Holy Bible, conteyning the Old Testament and the New* [1611], sig. A2v).

⁷ PRO, SP 14/170/35; J. F. Larkin and P. L. Hughes, eds., *Stuart Royal Proclamations* (Oxford, 1973), 1:599–600.

⁸ "King James and the English Puritans," p. 409.

The king held that Puritans and papists posed equivalent threats because both infringed his authority as supreme governor by seeking to subject him to the spiritual jurisdiction of an independent church. As he declared in Parliament in 1624, "I think it all one to lay down my crown to the pope as to a popular party of puritans."⁹ The argument advanced below is that James I not merely identified and opposed the threats of popery and Puritanism but also endeavored to emasculate the political dangers that both contained. The tactic he adopted was to distinguish between moderates and radicals among papists and Puritans and to incorporate the moderates within his refurbished national church, thereby isolating and excluding the radicals. To be sure, these categories of moderate and radical were mutable, for they were contingent on political circumstances. Equally apparent is that, although the potent images of popery and Puritanism were often used by the king for his own ends, they could be manipulated by others who skillfully played on James's own real fears of the subversive dangers presented by these two groups.

II

The first major decision of James I as supreme governor of the Church of England was to summon a conference of divines and politicians to Hampton Court in January 1604, prompted, it seems, by the request in the Millenary Petition for such a meeting to effect "a godly and thorough reformation."¹⁰ Although historians have charted the course and consequences of the meeting and have assessed the king's own independent stance, the purpose of the conference remains unclear.¹¹ Shriver has suggested that it was intended to be a demonstration of the royal supremacy, while in Collinson's view the aim was to correct ecclesiastical abuses and bring the Puritans to heel.¹² While each of these interpretations is valid, the Hampton Court conference was primarily a premeditated attempt to settle the issue of Puritanism

⁹ BL, Harl. MS 159, fol. 136r-v.

¹⁰ J. P. Kenyon, *The Stuart Constitution, 1603-1688* (Cambridge, 1966), pp. 132-34.

¹¹ The recent literature on the conference is fairly extensive. See M. H. Curtis, "Hampton Court Conference and Its Aftermath," *History* 46 (1961): 1-16; S. B. Babbage, *Puritanism and Richard Bancroft* (1962), pp. 43-73; P. Collinson, *The Elizabethan Puritan Movement* (1967), pp. 448-67, and "The Jacobean Religious Settlement: The Hampton Court Conference," in *Before the English Civil War*, ed. H. Tomlinson (1983), pp. 27-51; P. McGrath, *Papists and Puritans under Elizabeth I* (1967), pp. 339-63; F. Shriver, "Hampton Court Re-visited: James I and the Puritans," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 33 (1982): 48-71.

¹² Shriver, p. 56; Collinson, "The Jacobean Religious Settlement," pp. 45-47.

once and for all by driving a wedge between the moderate and radical wings of Puritan opinion. The moderates were to be fully and finally integrated into the national church, while the extremists were to be expelled or repressed.

James I had set out the assumptions underlying such a policy in the revised preface to the 1603 edition of *Basilikon Doron*, printed in England within days of his accession to the throne. There the king had stated his unflinching opposition to Puritans, among whom he counted Anabaptists, Sectaries, and those within the church who disturbed its peace by their challenges to the magistracy, men “that thinke it their honoure to contend with kings and perturbe whole kingdomes,” men who subscribed to the “imagined democracy” of Presbyterianism. Yet James had emphasized that these strictures applied “only to this kind of men”: “I protest upon mine honour, I mean it not generally of all preachers or others, that like better of the single form of policy in our church [of Scotland], than of the many ceremonies in the church of England; that are persuaded that their bishops smell of a papal supremacy, that the surplice, the cornered cap and such like are the outward badges of popish errors. No, I am so far from being contentious in these things (which for my own part I ever esteemed as indifferent) as I do equally love and honour the learned and grave men of either of these opinions.”¹³ This clear distinction between radical and moderate Puritans runs through many of James I’s speeches and actions after 1603. The defining characteristic of the extremists appeared to be a doctrinaire commitment to Presbyterianism and its subversive creed of ministerial parity. Such men were assimilated to the Separatists and thus excluded from the magic circle of Protestant respectability. But for moderate men who were prepared to express their case for further reformation in the language of expediency, while accepting that the issues involved were in themselves indifferent, James I seemed to offer an olive branch and to imply that a program of reform presented in such moderate terms might meet with a sympathetic hearing.

It was no accident, therefore, that the king’s offer to the Puritans should have elicited a response in the Millenary Petition, phrased in precisely such moderate terms. Certainly, the petition studiously avoided any hint of Presbyterianism, and its authors pointedly denied

¹³ C. H. McIlwain, ed., *The Political Works of James I* (1918), pp. 6–8, 23–24. Once he arrived in England, James’s public attitude did change in one important respect, for he became a staunch upholder of the *jure divino* theory of episcopacy (ibid., p. 126). He continued to argue that radical Puritans inside the church were fathers to the Brownists (see *A meditation upon the Lords prayer written by the King’s Maiestie* [1619], pp. 7–17).

that they were either “schismatics” or “factious men.” Yet accompanying the conventional condemnation of ceremonies, subscription, and pluralism was the cryptic request “that the discipline and excommunication may be administered according to Christ’s own institution.” It was a petition behind which moderates and radicals could cheerfully unite. Its implementation would have completely satisfied non-Presbyterian moderates; and for other more radical spirits such changes were highly desirable in themselves and in their propaganda value against the bishops would be a very welcome platform from which to launch a final assault on episcopacy. This was by no means the first occasion on which Puritan opinion had united behind its most moderate aspect in order to maximize the opportunity for lay and royal support.¹⁴ Indeed, the king’s impartial stance seemed to presage the basic reorientation of the English church in a Puritan direction.

The conference, which opened on January 14, 1604, revealed the extent to which James I was prepared to fulfill these hopes. Shriver has observed that there was an element of “rehearsed drama” about the conference, “which makes one suspect that it was a kind of enacted proclamation.”¹⁵ The precise meaning of the “proclamation” is to be found in the performance itself. James could hardly hope to win moderate Puritans to his new Protestant consensus if he had nothing to offer except a simple statement of the status quo ante. Thus throughout the conference he distanced himself from the rigid conformist position, as represented by a series of choleric outbursts from Bishop Bancroft of London. At the outset, Bancroft had interrupted John Rainolds, leader of the Puritan delegation, by appealing to the king that “schismatics are not to be heard against the bishops,” only to be reminded that the views of both sides were to be heard in a formal disputation such as this. Moments later, James responded to a tirade from Bancroft on the antinomian consequences of Puritan preaching on predestination by backing the predestinarian article in question. Finally, after another lengthy speech from Bancroft on the dangers of too much preaching in the church, James reiterated his commitment to furthering a preaching ministry.¹⁶ At the same time, as Curtis has indicated, the king under-

¹⁴ Kenyon, pp. 132–34; Collinson, *The Elizabethan Puritan Movement*, pp. 453–58; McGrath, pp. 342–43; P. G. Lake, “Laurence Chaderton and the Cambridge Moderate Puritan Tradition” (Ph.D. diss., Cambridge University, 1978), pp. 89–110.

¹⁵ F. Shriver, “The Ecclesiastical Policy of James I” (Ph.D. diss., Cambridge University, 1967), pp. 56–57, 65.

¹⁶ E. Cardwell, *A History of Conferences . . . from the year 1558 to the year 1690* (Oxford, 1840), pp. 179–81, 191–92. See also R. G. Usher, *The Reconstruction of the English Church* (1910), 2:344, 347.

took to reform a number of abuses in the church. He promised to limit pluralism, to provide the means for a full preaching ministry, to place greater restrictions on the sale of popish books, to send more preachers to Ireland, to abolish lay baptism, to issue a new catechism, and to amend faulty translations in the prayer book. In addition to these piecemeal concessions, James agreed to alter the sixteenth of the Thirty-nine Articles in a more overtly Calvinist direction and to sponsor a new translation of the Bible.¹⁷ Significant as these changes were, none represented the signal Puritan victory and open-ended commitment to “further reformation” for which even moderate Puritans must have hoped.

The price to pay for these concessions was conformity in an episcopal church. During the conference James stressed his antipathy to certain doctrines. When Rainolds suggested that parochial ministers should play a greater role in the rite of confirmation, James retorted that the idea “tended to make everyone in his cure to be bishop, which he liked not of.”¹⁸ Later the same day, Rainolds proposed that parish clergy should participate in the administration of church discipline, which was not an explicitly Presbyterian scheme and looked back, instead, to many Elizabethan ideas to modify episcopacy by associating the power of the bishop with leading ministers of the diocese. The king, however, deliberately chose to construe it in a Presbyterian sense. Barlow’s explanation was that James assumed that Rainolds was referring to a presbytery on the Scottish lines; perhaps a more plausible argument is that James deliberately seized on this opportunity to underline his complete hostility to any form of Presbyterianism. Twice, therefore, that day did he state the maxim “no bishop, no king.”¹⁹ James also listened to Puritan objections to the discipline and ceremonies of the church and found none to be of any substance.²⁰ Moreover, he rejected arguments that seemed to offer any justification for continued nonconformity once the conference was over. When it was pointed out that the ceremonies offended the weak in faith, James’s response was that ministers were not the sort of men who ought to be deficient in knowledge. John Knewstubb attempted to

¹⁷ Curtis, pp. 10–12. The promised change to the sixteenth article was of great importance to divines like Laurence Chaderton or John Rainolds who had been involved in doctrinal wrangles in the 1580s and 1590s and now seemed to have gained royal support for their views (see P. G. Lake, *Moderate Puritans and the Elizabethan Church* [Cambridge, 1982], pp. 201–42; C. M. Dent, *Protestant Reformers in Elizabethan Oxford* [Oxford, 1983], pp. 103–25).

¹⁸ Usher, 2:348.

¹⁹ Cardwell, pp. 183–84, 201–3; P. Collinson, *Godly People* (1983), pp. 155–89.

²⁰ Cardwell, pp. 193–203.

explain that the clergy in question were not deficient in learning but troubled in their consciences and concerned for the weakness of their flocks, to which the king replied “that if they had knowledge they might in time satisfy their own conscience and inform their people.” James was equally dismissive about the need to avoid popish abuses, claiming that such abuse could not affect the lawfulness of Protestant use and that the inexpediency of change far outweighed the doubtful advantages of reform. In Barlow’s account the question was also raised “how far such an ordinance of the Church was to bind them without impeaching their Christian liberty?” James answered that the idea “smelt very rankly of anabaptism . . . therefore I charge you never to speak more to that point.”²¹

Once he had resolved the theoretical issues, the king was careful to leave the door open for some practical compromises. After Chader-ton had pleaded that the sudden introduction of ceremonies in his native Lancashire would cause many papists to recant, James granted a period of grace to nonconformist clergy there. However, he added the characteristic rider that, if the ministers concerned were “of a turbulent & opposite spirit,” then conformity would be imposed at once. Seizing his chance, John Knewstubb immediately requested that a similar dispensation be made for Suffolk, where “it would make much against their credits in the county to be now forced to the surplice and the cross in baptism.” James replied tartly: “You show your self an uncharitable man; we have here taken pains and in the end have concluded of a unity & uniformity, and you forsooth must prefer the credits of a few private men before the general peace of the Church . . . I will none of that . . . and therefore, either let them conform themselves, & that shortly, or they shall hear of it.” Then, in exchange for his concession to the Lancashire clergy, the king insisted that conformity be fully enforced in Emmanuel College, Cambridge, of which Chaderton was master. James would help to construct and support a common Protestant front against Rome, but he had little patience with purely precisian principles.²²

Hampton Court was the stage on which James I listened to the case for reform, embraced the godly imperative of a preaching ministry in every parish, and offered favor and preferment in return for a formal renunciation of Puritan scruples. As Robert Cecil publicly declared in February 1605, the king loved and respected many Puritans, “and if they would leave their opinions, there were some of them he would

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 196–99.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 210–12; Usher, 2:338.

prefer to the next bishopric that were void.”²³ These “opinions” were primarily objections to the rites and ceremonies of the church. Since James viewed them as matters indifferent and not contrary to Scripture and had rejected proposals to modify them at the conference, it followed that the king interpreted persistent nonconformity as open defiance of his authority as supreme governor of the church.

In order to detach the moderate from the radical Puritans, James initially proceeded to enforce conformity at a gentle pace in the expectation that many wavering or recalcitrant clergy could be won over by discussion and deliberation to his newly settled church. Time would help distinguish between those Cecil called “religious men of moderate spirits,” whose scruples might be tolerated, and “the turbulent humours of some that dream of nothing but a new hierarchy (directly opposite to the state of monarchy).” Accordingly, ministers were given until November 30, 1604, to conform to the rites and ordinances of the Church of England.²⁴ The strategy was not without its weaknesses. Having believed that conformity could be discussed and settled within the confines of a three-day conference, the king was dismayed to see the debate continue in and outside Parliament during the summer of 1604.²⁵ With equal optimism, James had assumed that the moderate lobby greatly outnumbered the radicals and that the decisions reached at Hampton Court might sever the two fairly painlessly. Thus the petitions against conformity that were presented to the king in November and December 1604 forced his hand.²⁶ A large body of “radical” clergy remained opposed to his policy, so that James was forced to acknowledge that the formidable dialectical skills that he had paraded at Hampton Court had not decisively swayed Puritan opinion.²⁷ In alarm, he ordered the immediate deprivation of clergy who obstinately resisted conformity. The vision of a radical Presbyterian plot now rose to haunt him: “Some of them have been content to disperse false rumours of our connivance at papists and the rather to draw & fix our eyes upon that party and to divert our looks from themselves while they were plotting & contriving all things that could be imagined to deprave the state of the church as it is established in our kingdom & to bring in a

²³ W. P. Baildon, ed., *Les Reportes del Cases in Camera Stellata, 1593 to 1609* (1894), p. 191.

²⁴ Larkin and Hughes, eds. (n. 7 above), pp. 87–90.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 74–77, 87–90; Babbage (n. 11 above), pp. 235–45.

²⁶ B. W. Quintrell, “The Royal Hunt and the Puritans, 1604–1605,” *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 31 (1980): 41–58.

²⁷ J. Wormald, “James VI and I: Two Kings or One?” *History* 68 (1983): 188, notes his “acute ability in personal debate.”

form of presbytery to the utter distraction of all monarchy.” Nevertheless, James emerged from the investigation into the Puritan petitioning campaign “with a clearer appreciation . . . of the relative merits of protestant and catholic dissent.” He could now admit that those petitioners were not necessarily Presbyterian subversives but “our good and loving subjects rather blinded herein with some indiscreet zeal than otherwise carried by any disloyal intentions.”²⁸ With that realization, James’s policy returned to its former course, as is clear from a semiofficial tract of 1607 by Thomas Sparke, a veteran of the Puritan agitations of Elizabeth’s reign and a representative on the Puritan side at Hampton Court.²⁹

Sparke followed James’s differentiation between moderate and radical Puritans. Echoing the views of the king, Sparke claimed that ceremonies were not unlawful but matters indifferent, to be determined by the ecclesiastical authorities. That so much time and energy had been expended over these issues had always distressed him, so that he had welcomed the Hampton Court conference as a unique opportunity to establish perpetual unity in the church. Sparke admitted that he had there pressed for an alteration in the ceremonies, in the hope of removing offense “from the weak and tender consciences of many,” but had been unsuccessful. Instead, the reforms promised by James at the conference were to provide the unity and uniformity of Sparke’s title. In his view, all that stood between the English church and such unity was the perversity of the Puritan conscience. In the present situation, offense at the demand for subscription was offense taken rather than given. Since the nature of the points were inherently indifferent, no one should forsake their ministry for them. Indeed, it was only “foolish protestants” who were offended by the ceremonies, thereby identifying themselves as “radicals.” Sparke concluded with an exhortation to unity, which would “bury and extinguish for ever the odious name of Puritans.”³⁰ In short, the book represented precisely the response to the conference that James desired.

The drive for conformity initiated by James resulted in the deprivation of some ninety beneficed clergy, the majority of whom were ousted in the early months of 1605.³¹ Bancroft had taken up the king’s

²⁸ PRO, SP 14/12/87; Quintrell, p. 54.

²⁹ Thomas Sparke, *A Brotherly Perswasion to Unitie, and Uniformitie in Iudgment, and Practise touching the Received and Present Ecclesiasticall Government* (1607). The work was “seen, allowed and commanded by publike authoritie to be printed,” carried the royal coat of arms on the obverse of the title page, and was dedicated to the king.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, sigs. Ar–B3r, pp. 1–15, 82.

³¹ Quintrell, p. 57.

distinction of moderates and radicals in his circular to the bishops of December 22, 1604, when he required them only to remove those ministers who refused both subscription and ceremonial conformity.³² James, indeed, never abandoned his antipathy toward intransigent nonconformists. In May 1611 he ordered the episcopal bench to win round any nonconformist clergy who were disturbing the peace of the church “or else remove them and that with convenient speed.” Six months later the king was “much offended” to learn that Barlow of Lincoln had contravened these instructions by a grant of a preaching license to Arthur Hildersham, who had lost his living in 1605. Hildersham’s license was revoked, and he was subsequently prosecuted for nonconformity by the High Commission.³³ In September 1614, Archbishop Abbot warned Dove of Peterborough that the king had discovered that deprived ministers were permitted to preach in his diocese. Dove was also instructed to enforce “perpetual conformity” on Robert Catelin, minister of All Saints, Northampton, in view of the “refractory disposition” of his congregation.³⁴ James also consistently defended the decisions on church discipline reached at Hampton Court. He spelled out his attitude in a speech to the House of Commons during the session of 1607: “These painful & profitable ministers by disobedience to the King’s authority & ordinances of a settled church in indifferent things do prove themselves to be nothing else indeed but seditious schismatics & therefore my counsel is hereafter you meddle only in such things as are within the reach of your capacity *noli altum sapere*.”³⁵ The position was altogether different for ministers who showed a willingness to compromise. In July 1610, James informed Parliament that, while he would not tamper with the canons of the church, he would listen to individual cases from the clergy ousted since 1605 “in regard of better hope of conformity.”³⁶ John Cotton of Boston was reported to James I in 1621 for a variety of offenses, including his practice of standing and not kneeling to receive the Communion. Although Bishops Montaigne and Davenant failed to persuade him to yield, he did show sufficient compliance to be restored to his living,

³² David Wilkins, *Concilia Magnae Britanniae et Hiberniae . . .* (1737), 4:409–10.

³³ Lincoln Archives Office (AO), Additional Register 1, fols. 225r–26r; PRO, SP 14/67/58; Historical Manuscripts Commission (HMC), *78 Hastings*, 2:54; Samuel Clarke, *The lives of thirty-two English divines* (1677), pp. 116–22.

³⁴ PRO, SP 14/77/90. Another example is the removal of Thomas Hooker from Esher, Surrey, on royal orders, presumably for nonconformity (Hampshire Record Office, B/1/A/29 [unfoliated] [June 6, 1622]; PRO, SP 16/151/12).

³⁵ BL, Cotton MS, Titus 4, fol. 169, partly transcribed in Babbage (n. 11 above), pp. 252–53.

³⁶ *The Journals of the House of Lords (JL)*, 2:658a.

and from there, in January 1625, he wrote to Bishop Williams of Lincoln to inform him that, through conference, study, and prayer, he was beginning to modify his position.³⁷

The tolerance that James extended to some moderate Puritans was imitated by many of his bishops. In 1604 Hutton of York and Rudd of St. Davids had questioned the expediency of imposing full conformity, while Chaderton of Lincoln and Dove of Peterborough had shown little enthusiasm for the task.³⁸ After 1605, Lake of Bath and Wells, Matthew of York, and Morton of Coventry and Lichfield did occasionally connive at an individual minister's scruples over ceremonies or subscription; indeed, in 1618 Morton observed that deprivation was only used in the face of flagrant nonconformity "in flat contradiction of the Church."³⁹ The fragmentary records of the High Commission in London bear out this latter contention. Only two ministers are known to have lost their livings for nonconformity between 1611 and 1625, and both were incorrigible offenders who had ignored a series of demands that they conform.⁴⁰ In effect, moderate Puritans who held misgivings about aspects of the rites and discipline of the church were accommodated within it since they posed no threat to the stability of church or state.

Shriver has traced the fate of the reforms offered at Hampton Court in exchange for conformity. The prayer book underwent minor textual amendment, and the Authorized Version of the Bible eventually appeared in 1611. Curiously, the changes to the Thirty-nine Articles were never implemented, and the issue disappears from view after it was touched on briefly in the parliamentary session of 1604. Alongside the stringent demands for conformity, the canons of 1604 also formally sanctioned prophesying meetings, which had been officially

³⁷ C. Holmes, *Seventeenth-Century Lincolnshire* (Lincoln, 1980), pp. 95–96; BL, Additional (Add.) MS 6394, fol. 29.

³⁸ Babbage, pp. 81–84, 113–14, 182, 220–23; W. J. Sheils, *The Puritans in the Diocese of Peterborough, 1558–1610*, Northampton Record Society 30 (1979), p. 82. Nonconformist pamphleteers noted that some bishops were not unsympathetic to their cause (see *A Survey of the Book of Common Prayer* [1606], p. 6; *A Myld & Iust Defence of Certeyne Arguments . . . in behalfe of the Ministers suspended & deprived* [1606], p. 8).

³⁹ Richard Bernard, *The Faithfull Shepherd* (1621), sig. A3v; Somerset Record Office, D/D/Ca 204 (unfoliated) (September 19, 1617); R. A. Marchant, *The Puritans and the Church Courts in the Diocese of York, 1560–1642* (1960), p. 34; J. E. D. Mayor, ed., *Materials for the Life of Thomas Morton, Bishop of Durham*, Cambridge Antiquarian Society Communications 3 (1864), pp. 12–13; Thomas Morton, *A Defence of the Innocence of the Three Ceremonies of the Church of England* (1618), pp. 43–44.

⁴⁰ Namely, Anthony Laphorne (in 1618) and John Newton (in 1623) (Lambeth Palace Library, MS 691, fols. 24r–25v; Gloucester Record Office, Diocesan Records 27A, pp. 435–37; PRO, SP 14/138/31).

proscribed since the 1570s.⁴¹ In order to remove the twin evils of pluralism and nonresidence, Bancroft endeavored to secure a parliamentary statute to restore impropriated tithes to vicars and curates, but his proposals were wrecked on the rocks of vested economic interests among the laity.⁴² Nevertheless, James I remained firmly and publicly committed to the ideal of an effective preaching ministry reaching into every parish. In April 1605 he told Bancroft that there was “no one thing in the whole world which he more wisheth from his heart than his people should be instructed in the fear of God” and went on to order the archbishop to investigate allegations that many pluralists neglected their livings and did not procure a preaching curate in their place; and similar instructions were sent to the episcopate in 1610 and 1611.⁴³ The criticisms voiced against the number of local ecclesiastical commissions were finally settled by James’s promise in 1610 to restrict the number of such commissions to one for each of the two provinces. He also repeated his willingness to reform the abuses of excommunication, provided some suitable scheme were submitted.⁴⁴ Thus a number of the reforms proposed at Hampton Court were implemented over the following decade, with the active encouragement of both houses of Parliament.⁴⁵ Clearly James’s activities as an ecclesiastical reformer were not confined to a burst of activity at the beginning of his reign, as some historians have suggested.⁴⁶

How successful was the king’s policy of enticing moderate Puritans to stay within his refurbished church? Certainly, under a hundred beneficed clergy chose to exclude themselves from the church through

⁴¹ Canon 72. In 1608, Thomas Rogers, chaplain to Archbishop Bancroft, did publish a semiofficial commentary on the Thirty-nine Articles that gave a Calvinist reading to the articles on predestination (*The faith, doctrine and religion, professed and protected in the realm of England and dominions of the same* [Cambridge, 1607/8], pp. 74–75). We owe both these references to Nicholas Tyacke.

⁴² Shriver, “Hampton Court Re-visited” (n. 11 above), pp. 61–64.

⁴³ Wilkins (n. 32 above), 4:413–14, 440–42; *JL*, 2:658; Lincoln AO, Additional Register 1, fols. 225r–26r.

⁴⁴ Cardwell (n. 16 above), pp. 205–6; *JL*, 2:658. At least four diocesan commissions (Exeter, Gloucester, Salisbury, and Winchester) sat in the southern province between 1603 and 1610, but there is no evidence that they were active after this date (see P. Tyler’s “Additional Bibliography,” in *The Rise and Fall of the High Commission*, by R. G. Usher [Oxford, 1969]; Gloucester Record Office, Diocesan Records 101; M. J. Ingram, “Ecclesiastical Justice in Wiltshire, 1600–1640” [D.Phil. diss., Oxford University, 1976], p. 22, n. 5).

⁴⁵ Babbage, pp. 233–58.

⁴⁶ See, e.g., Curtis (n. 11 above), pp. 1–16. For further evidence of James’s desire to carry out church reform, see R. C. Munden, “James I and ‘the Growth of Mutual Distrust’: King, Commons and Reform, 1603–1604,” in *Faction and Parliament*, ed. K. Sharpe (Oxford, 1978), pp. 57, 66–68.

deprivation after 1604, but those who conformed often did so for reasons quite other than the royal pronouncements made at Hampton Court. The pattern of deprivations in 1605 can be better explained by reference to local circumstances and the scruples of individual clergy rather than to the dry distinction between radicals and moderates that the king had propounded.⁴⁷ Nevertheless, James's policy bore fruit in the long run. By 1611 he had succeeded in silencing Presbyterian pretensions in the ministry and in time won round many reluctant conformists to his refurbished church.⁴⁸ This was the result, in part, of James's own growing reputation as a godly prince, a reputation acclaimed by the translators of the Authorized Version in 1611: "The zeal of your Majesty toward the house of God doth not slack or go backward, but is more & more kindled, manifesting itself abroad in the farthest parts of Christendom, by writing in defence of the truth . . . and every day at home, by religious and learned discourse, by frequenting the house of God, by hearing the word preached, by cherishing the teachers thereof, by caring for the church, as a most tender and loving nursing father."⁴⁹ James also elevated to the episcopate a number of divines, such as Lake of Bath and Wells, King of London, and Matthew of York, who were indefatigable preachers and pastors.⁵⁰ Moreover, Cecil's claim that the king would go "half way" to meet moderate Puritans proved to be prophetic. Royal patronage extended to divines such as the godly John Preston, who became chaplain to Prince Charles and refused the offer of a bishopric in 1624.⁵¹ In the middle years of his reign James presided over a settled church from

⁴⁷ The career of Samuel Hieron illustrates the local dimension. Hieron, one of the framers of the Millenary Petition, escaped deprivation at the hands of Cotton of Exeter through "the mediation of his potent friends" and went on to write a series of anonymous tracts against the ceremonies (Doctor Williams Library [DWL], RNC 38.34, pp. 60–61, 85; A. W. Pollard and G. R. Redgrave, comps., *A Short-Title Catalogue of Books Printed in England, Scotland and Ireland, and of English Books Printed Abroad, 1475–1640* [STC] [1926], 6814, 13395). For the nature of Puritan scruples on conformity, see the response of Laurence Chaderton (Lake, *Moderate Puritans and the Elizabethan Church* [n. 17 above], pp. 243–61).

⁴⁸ The pamphlet warfare had died out by 1611, and no books against Presbyterianism were licensed for the press between 1611 and 1618 (N. R. N. Tyacke, "Puritanism, Arminianism and Counter-revolution," in *The Origins of the English Civil War*, ed. C. Russell [1973], p. 125).

⁴⁹ *The Holy Bible* . . . (n. 6 above), sig. A2v.

⁵⁰ P. Collinson, *The Religion of Protestants* (Oxford, 1982), pp. 48–49, 87–88; Henry King, *A Sermon preached at Pauls Crosse* (1621), p. 62. Another was Smith of Gloucester, remembered for having filled his diocese "with the plentiful preaching of the gospel" (Miles Smith, *Sermons* [1632], sig. Pp3iv).

⁵¹ Thomas Ball, *The Life of the renowned Doctor Preston*, ed. E. W. Harcourt (Oxford, 1885), pp. 68–69, 98.

which the political radicalism of Puritanism had been removed. This concord would be shattered only by the advent of the Thirty Years' War and the projected match with Spain.

III

There is an underlying congruence between James I's attitude to Puritanism and his attitude to Catholicism. In each case the desire for unity was coupled with an appeal to moderate opinion. If the king intended to heal the breaches within the English church, then he also planned to reunite Christendom. In his opening address to Parliament in March 1604, James outlined his vision of "a general Christian union in Religion," grounded on Scripture and the practice of the primitive church and effected through a council of Christian princes, superior in authority to the pope. This scheme was unsuccessfully pursued through diplomatic channels with the papacy in 1603–5, and it periodically resurfaced in subsequent royal writings.⁵²

Although the papal response was predictable, the call for a general council served several distinct functions. On one level, it reflected James's desire to preside like a new Constantine over the affairs of Europe. On another, it represented a useful polemical device in the propaganda war against Rome, through which popish allegations of novelty and schism could be refuted and the English church's claims to catholicity and apostolic purity vindicated. James's distinction between core catholic doctrines to be held *de fide* and other issues on which debate and disagreement were acceptable among Christian brethren allowed the king to argue that the Church of Rome, though vitiated with serious errors of belief and practice, still remained a true church since it professed the crucial doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation.⁵³ On that basis, leniency toward English Catholics became more defensible, as did James's assertion of the essential equivalence of the popish and the Puritan threats. The usual Protestant position was that, while Puritans might err over externals, the papists erred over beliefs central to the faith.⁵⁴ In contrast, James played down

⁵² McIlwain, ed. (n. 13 above), pp. 151, 274–76; W. B. Patterson, "King James I's Call for an Ecumenical Council," in *Councils and Assemblies: Studies in Church History*, vol. 7, ed. G. J. Cuming and D. Baker (Cambridge, 1971), pp. 267–75; Bodleian Library (Bodl.), Tanner MS 73, fol. 236. We owe this latter reference to Nicholas Tyacke. See also J. L. LaRocca, "'Who Can't Pray with Me, Can't Love Me': Toleration and Early Jacobean Recusancy Policy," *Journal of British Studies* 23, no. 2 (1984): 22–36.

⁵³ Patterson, *passim*.

⁵⁴ Both Robert Cecil and Archbishop Hutton of York subscribed to this view (PRO, SP 14/10/64, 66).

doctrinal differences and reserved his criticism for papal pretensions to supremacy and the power to depose secular rulers. It was on this issue, of course, that the menace from popery and Puritanism coincided. When Cardinal du Perron responded to James's irenic rhetoric by arguing that Catholics differed from English Protestants on only four issues—the real presence, the nature of the eucharist, purgatory, and the intercession of saints—Isaac Casaubon, replying on behalf of the king, denied that union could be achieved even if agreement were reached on those four points: “For nowadays there is an eager contention about the empire of the bishop of Rome as for these or any other points of christian religion. This alone is now made the article of faith whereon all the rest do depend.”⁵⁵ To James, the pope's status as Antichrist was based on his claim to depose princes. If the pope dropped this assertion, the king implied that he might not be Antichrist after all. In 1621, James told the Spanish ambassador that he had only “written in his books that the pope was Antichrist” because of his claims “in deposing and setting up kings at his will.”⁵⁶

The consequence of his stance was a decidedly ambiguous attitude to popery. While for many of his Protestant subjects popery was an unequivocal evil, James was able to adopt a more detached and refined view.⁵⁷ At times he might denounce the pope as Antichrist and his church heretical, on other occasions admit that the pope's identity as Antichrist was only probable and the Roman church held the central doctrines of the Christian faith.⁵⁸ In short, these ambiguities gave the king maximum room for maneuver in his relations with papists, at home and abroad. It also meant that his moderate Protestant subjects

⁵⁵ *A Letter written from Paris by the Lord Cardinall of Peron, to Monsr. Casaubon in England* (St. Omer, 1610), pp. 39–45; *The Answer of Master Isaac Casaubon to the Epistle of the most Illustrious and most Reverend Cardinal Peron* (1612), p. 28. We owe both these references to Johann Somerville.

⁵⁶ McIlwain, ed., pp. 149–50; *Spain and the Jacobean Catholics*, vol. 2, 1613–1624, ed. A. J. Loomie, Catholic Record Society, 68 (1978), p. 146 (hereafter cited as 1613–1624). See his comment in ca. 1601–2: “I will never agree that any should die for error in faith against the first table, but I think they should not be permitted to committ works of rebellion against the second table” (J. Bruce, ed., *Correspondence of King James VI of Scotland with Sir Robert Cecil and others in England*, Camden Society, 1st ser., vol. 78 [1861], p. 37). We are grateful to Robert Beddard for alerting us to this correspondence.

⁵⁷ See, e.g., the attitude of Archbishop Abbot, who referred to Catholics in 1608 as “vassals of the Antichrist . . . and . . . adorers of the beast” (George Abbot, “A Preface to the Reader,” in *The Examinations, Arraignment & Conviction of George Sprot*, by Sir William Hart [1608], pp. 5–6).

⁵⁸ Compare his remarks in McIlwain, ed., pp. 124–26, with his statement in November 1613 that Rome was a true church and only the papal powers of deposition separated it from the English church, an opinion that offended, among others, Abbot and Ellesmere (Loomie, ed., pp. 15–16).

could emphasize his irenic intentions and the relative moderation of his attitude toward popery. Their more antipopish Calvinist colleagues could cite James's use of the rhetoric of Antichrist and his sponsorship of antipapal polemics in the Oath of Allegiance controversy to cast him in the role of champion of the Protestant cause.⁵⁹ Whatever short-term political advantages this may have brought, when James refused to predicate his foreign policy on the need for an antipopish crusade against Spain after 1618, many of his subjects were distressed by his apparent failure to live up to his own rhetoric.⁶⁰

These perceptions provided a potent justification for James's habitual distinction between radical and moderate papists. Among the ranks of the radicals he numbered Catholic clergy and lay apostates from Protestantism, those "factious stirrers of sedition and perturbers of the common wealth," who accepted both the papal power of deposition and the assurance that rebellions against the enemies of Rome were meritorious to salvation. Such men posed a direct political challenge to James's authority and therefore had no place in his kingdom. Thus he repeatedly issued proclamations ordering "all jesuits, seminaries and other priests" to leave the country and urged the bishops and assize judges to apply the full sanctions of the law against lay apostates.⁶¹ Other more moderate spirits could expect less harsh treatment. The king might "denounce mortal wars to their errors," yet he promised to be "a friend to their persons if they be good subjects." In a speech in Star Chamber in 1616, he went so far as to profess his love for such men, "honestly bred, never having known any other religion."⁶²

At James's accession there were rumors among Catholics that he might grant a full toleration, just as the Puritans had hoped he would unleash a full reformation.⁶³ As a new king, unsure of his welcome, James may well have found it politic not to scotch such hopes among the English Catholics.⁶⁴ Once safely established on the English throne, however, he lost no time in spelling out his policy: "There can be no unity in the church if there be no order or obedience to superiors but

⁵⁹ George Hakewill, *An Answer to a Treatise written by Dr Carier by way of a letter to his Maiestie* (1616), sigs. a3, a3iv; pp. 20–21.

⁶⁰ See Sec. VI below.

⁶¹ McIlwain, ed., pp. 275, 323, 341; Larkin and Hughes, eds. (n. 7 above), 1:70–73, 142–45, 245–50, 591–93.

⁶² Hakewill, pp. 37–38; McIlwain, ed., p. 341.

⁶³ A. Dures, *English Catholicism, 1558–1642* (1983), pp. 40–42.

⁶⁴ See his remark early in the reign: "Na, na, gud faiyth, we's not need the papists noo" (quoted in Collinson, "The Jacobean Religious Settlement" [n. 11 above], p. 28).

that it be lawful to every man to follow freely his own fancy.’’⁶⁵ To each, James offered not toleration but tolerance. ‘‘As long as the catholics remain quiet and decently hidden they will neither be hunted nor persecuted,’’ the Venetian ambassador was informed.⁶⁶ The earl of Northampton went out of his way to make this point in his speech at the trial of Henry Garnet, superior of the English Jesuits, in March 1606. On the other hand, he stressed that toleration had never been on offer. Twice he cited the admission of the Jesuit Watson, made on the point of death, that, when he had gone to see James in Edinburgh shortly before 1603, he had been given no promise of toleration. Yet at the same time, Northampton emphasized how much more lenient the king had been to Catholics than his predecessor, Elizabeth I, had been. James had knighted Catholics, had given them free access to his person at court, had employed them abroad as ambassadors, had administered the recusancy laws with clemency, had listened to their grievances at the council board, had suppressed informers ‘‘that preyed upon the prostrate fortunes of recusants,’’ and had even included priests and Jesuits in the general pardon issued at the close of Parliament.⁶⁷ The significance of such statements, spoken by the cryptopapist Northampton, snubbed by Elizabeth and favored by James, cannot have been lost on his audience.⁶⁸ His message was clear. For those Catholics prepared to conform, the highest preferments were attainable; and for others prepared to vindicate themselves as ‘‘good subjects,’’ a measure of de facto tolerance was possible. Only the real ‘‘radicals,’’ those devotees of the deposing power of the papacy, were to be hunted down and excluded.

Not even the Gunpowder Plot deflected James I from pursuing this policy toward English Catholics. In its immediate aftermath, he tried to cool the temper of Parliament by reminding M.P.s that not all who professed the ‘‘Romish religion’’ were disloyal subjects.⁶⁹ The Oath of Allegiance that was enacted the following year may be viewed as a formal offer to moderate papists to accommodate themselves to the Jacobean regime by affirming their civil obedience and by repudiating

⁶⁵ ‘‘King James and the English Puritans’’ (n. 3 above), p. 407.

⁶⁶ Patterson (n. 52 above), p. 268.

⁶⁷ T. B. Howell, ed., *A Complete Collection of State Trials* (1816), 2:267–68, 337, 344. An extended version of Northampton’s speech was printed later that year (*STC*, 11618).

⁶⁸ L. L. Peck, *Northampton: Patronage and Policy at the Court of James I* (1982), pp. 6–22.

⁶⁹ McIlwain, ed., p. 285.

the deposing power of the papacy. According to the king, the intention was “to make a separation between so many of my subjects, who although they were otherwise popishly affected, yet retained in their hearts the print of their natural duty to their sovereign; and those who . . . thought diversity of religion a safe pretext for all kind of treasons and rebellions against their sovereign.”⁷⁰ Although the oath was only fitfully enforced in the provinces, it became for James the touchstone of Catholic loyalty and moderation.⁷¹ In 1610, the king defended the oath as “an act of great favour and clemency” toward Catholics who wished to prove their allegiance to him; and in answer to a Commons petition against the spread of popery in 1621, James observed that the recusancy laws should be primarily imposed on those “traitors” who refused to take the oath.⁷²

James’s policy made only a limited impression on the fortunes of English Catholics. The financial penalties for recusancy continued to be exacted on many Catholics who had taken the oath; and political events, such as the assassination of Henri IV of France, precipitated a widespread drive against recusancy, undertaken with explicit royal backing.⁷³ The most tangible evidence of royal policy in operation lay in the presence of many cryptopapists at the Jacobean court, following the example of Northampton, among whom may be numbered Edward Lord Wotton and Sir George Calvert.⁷⁴ Their standing with the king excited the contempt and distrust of many prominent M.P.s and court prelates. In a heated meeting of the Privy Council in July 1610, Archbishop Bancroft denounced the earls of Northampton, Suffolk, and Worcester as Catholics, citing as evidence their persistent absence from the communion table.⁷⁵ Two years later his successor Abbot and the future bishop of Bangor, Lewis Bayley, led separate attacks on Northampton’s influence at court, but with little success.⁷⁶

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 71–72.

⁷¹ Dures, pp. 45–51.

⁷² Larkin and Hughes, eds. (n. 7 above), 1:245–50; Notestein et al., eds. (n. 6 above), 4:74.

⁷³ Dures, pp. 40–54.

⁷⁴ J. C. H. Aveling, *The Handle and the Axe* (1976), pp. 124–25; A. J. Loomie, “A Jacobean Crypto-Catholic: Lord Wotton,” *Catholic Historical Review* 53 (1967): 328–45.

⁷⁵ T. Birch, ed., *The Court & Times of James the First* (1848), 1:45–46; *Spain and the Jacobean Catholics*, vol. 1, 1603–1612, ed. A. J. Loomie, Catholic Record Society, 64 (1973), p. 157.

⁷⁶ Peck, p. 82; N. E. McClure, ed., *The Letters of John Chamberlain* (Philadelphia, 1939), 1:390, 396; PRO, SP 14/90/24. In 1618, Abbot remarked that Northampton’s conformity had been only nominal, for “in truth he was never freed from that his old leaven” (PRO, SP 105/95/43v). We owe our knowledge of this latter correspondence to Simon Adams.

IV

James was a monarch dedicated to the principle of religious unity. Within Christendom, unity could be based on a number of core Catholic doctrines to be guarded by Christian princes in different national churches. Two groups challenged his authority to be such a prince, and toward each he developed a roughly similar policy. In the interests of unity and for the success of this policy, James had to incorporate a wide range of theological opinion and churchmanship into the ecclesiastical establishment. For the policy toward Puritans he needed evangelical Calvinists who were committed to a preaching ministry and to an episcopal church. For his Catholic policy he needed Protestants who were sympathetic to his irenic and ambivalent attitude to Rome. Few divines combined both perspectives. Evangelical Calvinists such as George Abbot opposed any tolerance to moderate Catholics, while churchmen such as Richard Neile, who supported this latter policy, were no friends to godly preachers.⁷⁷

It is no surprise, therefore, that the king employed a broad spectrum of theological opinion in three royal projects. In the pamphlet warfare precipitated by the Oath of Allegiance controversy, differences over the theology of grace were buried as Calvinist and Arminian alike leapt to the defense of the king.⁷⁸ Among the fifty-four translators of the Authorized Version of the Bible were staunch Calvinists, such as Thomas Ravis and Samuel Ward, proto-Arminians, such as John Overall and Richard Thomson, and two Puritan delegates to Hampton Court, Lawrence Chaderton and John Rainolds. A similar range of opinion existed among the seventeen founder fellows of Chelsea College, established by royal charter in 1610 to write against the usurping powers of the papacy.⁷⁹ The king also ensured that a similar plurality of theological views flourished among his bench of bishops.

Traditional accounts of the scramble for episcopal office that center on the timely intervention of powerful patrons such as Cecil or Villiers need revision. They fly in the face of clear evidence of the

⁷⁷ See Sec. IV above; A. W. Foster, "A Biography of Archbishop Richard Neile, 1562–1642" (D.Phil. diss., Oxford University, 1978), pp. 35–36, 74; Collinson, *Godly People* (n. 17 above), pp. 489–90. Foster notes (pp. 131–32) that, when Neile took up James's distinction between moderate and radical Catholics in the parliament of 1621, he was denounced as a friend to the papists.

⁷⁸ Tyacke (n. 48 above), p. 125; J. P. Somerville, "Jacobean Political Thought and the Controversy over the Oath of Allegiance" (Ph.D. diss., Cambridge University, 1981), pp. 53–72.

⁷⁹ Thomas Fuller, *The Church History of Britain, from the birth of Jesus Christ until the year MDCXLVIII*, ed. J. S. Brewer (Oxford, 1845), 5:370–74, 390–91; A. W. Pollard, ed., *Records of the English Bible* (Oxford, 1911), pp. 48, 331.

king's own knowledge of his clergy.⁸⁰ Most Jacobean bishops had served their turns as royal chaplains, and their conduct and preaching aptitudes were not lost on the discerning eye and ear of their monarch.⁸¹ Certain churchmen, such as Lancelot Andrewes and James Mountagu, received bishoprics without the backing of a powerful sponsor.⁸² Indeed, when James attributed his decision to the recommendation of a courtier, there is often good reason to suppose that the selection was his own. In May 1619, George Carleton was promoted to Chichester by James as a reward for his performance at Dort, although Villiers did his best to take the credit for his preferment.⁸³

The elevation of George Abbot to Canterbury in February 1611 illustrates many of these themes. Ostensibly, James chose Abbot on the suggestion of the earl of Dunbar, but other evidence indicates that his decision was as much the result of Abbot's high standing at court.⁸⁴ In 1608, Abbot had traveled to Scotland to defend episcopacy and church ceremonies against the Scottish Presbyterians, a service that won him the sees first of Coventry and Lichfield and then of London. The extent of James's esteem is suggested by the rumors circulating in the summer of 1610 that Abbot was destined to succeed Bancroft, which were endorsed not only by Puritan critics but also by the archbishop himself. Nor was Abbot the passive recipient of these favors. In a memorial sermon preached the Sunday after Bancroft's death, Abbot cast himself as heir presumptive by praising Bancroft's restoration of Cheapside Cross in 1600, which at the time he had bitterly denounced as idolatrous. Abbot's change of heart may be read as a repudiation of a past action tainted with Puritanism and as a public gesture of his respectability aimed at the king across the river from the pulpit of Lambeth church.⁸⁵ James's choice of Abbot, therefore, was entirely con-

⁸⁰ H. R. Trevor-Roper, "James I and His Bishops," in *Historical Essays* (1957), pp. 130–45; A. P. Kautz, "The Selection of Jacobean Bishops," in *Early Stuart Studies*, ed. H. S. Reinmuth (Minneapolis, 1970), pp. 152–79. Kautz does suggest (p. 176) that James chose "most of the men elevated and translated in the period 1611–1619," but he adduces no evidence to support this.

⁸¹ No single source for this assertion can be cited; it will be documented in extenso elsewhere. Laud is one distinguished example (William Laud, *Works*, ed. J. Bliss and W. Scott [Oxford, 1853], 3:133–34).

⁸² Henry Isaacson, *The Life & Death of Lancelot Andrewes* (1829), p. 32; Bodl., Carte MS 74, fol. 361; HMC, 9 *Hatfield House XX*, pp. 86–87.

⁸³ PRO, SP 14/109/60, 144.

⁸⁴ PRO, SP 14/61/107; P. A. Welsby, *George Abbot: The Unwanted Archbishop* (1962), pp. 35–37.

⁸⁵ Welsby, pp. 19–20, 30–33, 39; David Calderwood, *History of the Kirk of Scotland*, ed. T. Thomson (Edinburgh, 1845), 7:152. In 1615 John Howson claimed that Bancroft had regarded Abbot as a Puritan for his opposition to the restoration of the cross (PRO, SP 14/80/113). We owe this reference to Nicholas Tyacke. A similar gesture

sonant with his cherished principles of the polity and discipline of the Jacobean church and was not the wayward decision that some historians have claimed.⁸⁶ Indeed, the continuity of royal policy before and after 1611 was more significant than the personalities of either archbishop of Canterbury. In short, if James possessed a good understanding of the proclivities of his bishops and fashioned a bench in sympathy with his beliefs, it follows that their contribution to the quiescence of the church after 1611, as noted above, was no happy accident.⁸⁷

How did James I justify this range of religious opinion in the heart of his church? The explanation lies in his belief in Christian unity, based on a very limited number of crucial Catholic doctrines. It is apparent that Jacobean divines agreed on what the king took to be the essential pillars of Christian doctrinal truth. Moreover, in the Oath of Allegiance controversy, the foundation of Chelsea College, and the new translation of the Bible, the king can be seen organizing divines of divergent opinions around his position as a Christian prince invested with a divine authority to govern the church, supported by the apostolic order of episcopacy.⁸⁸ These were the essential ecclesiastical issues for James, and disagreements among his churchmen were acceptable because they involved those secondary issues on which true Christians might differ. There is good evidence that, for James, the theology of grace was one such issue. In 1610, he told a Dutch embassy that he had often examined the matter and that his opinion on it had changed. Naturally, he felt that his present position was the right one, but he did not think that his salvation depended on whether it was correct; for predestination was a thorny subject on which disagreement was possible yet over which public dispute should be limited. So long as private doubts did not erupt into unseemly and disorderly altercation, James was prepared to allow a certain variety of opinion. This was the policy he urged on the United Provinces in 1610, and only when such a course proved impossible to sustain and religious divi-

was made by Bishop Morton of Chester, who missed preferment to Lincoln in 1617 because of his leniency with Puritan nonconformists. In order to win back royal favor, Morton published a defense of ceremonial conformity the following year, and as the book went to press, he was promoted to Coventry and Lichfield (Mayor. ed. [n. 39 above], p. 17; Morton [n. 39 above]; McClure, ed., 2:163).

⁸⁶ Peter Heylyn, *Cyprianus Anglicus* (1668), pp. 62–64; Trevor-Roper, pp. 135–36; Welsby, p. 38; Kautz, pp. 178–79.

⁸⁷ See Sec. II above.

⁸⁸ J. P. Somerville, "The Royal Supremacy and Episcopacy *Iure Divino*, 1603–1660," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 34 (1983): 548–58. For evidence that James monitored the writings of his divines on these controversies, see the correspondence between James Mountagu and Isaac Casaubon in BL, Burney MS 365, fols. 229–38.

sions seemed to threaten political unity did James openly support the Calvinist cause at Dort.⁸⁹

It would hardly be plausible to attribute this support solely to political circumstances. On the contrary, ample evidence suggests that James subscribed to a moderate Calvinist position on the theology of grace. From his favorable response to John Rainolds's desire for clarification of article 17 in 1604 to his stance at Dort, the king publicly supported Calvinists against anti-Calvinists. Admittedly, as he said at Hampton Court, the subject needed to be "very tenderly handled and with great discretion."⁹⁰ It was not a subject to be treated in popular sermons, and the royal instructions to the English delegates at Dort tried to avoid too great a scholastic precision in the definition of such inherently difficult and contentious issues. Abroad, James supported the condemnation of Arminius's teachings at Dort; while in England, theological propriety might allow divergences of private opinion, but the demands of political and ecclesiastical order would not allow open dispute, so that the king suppressed public expression of anti-Calvinist theology. The nature of James's policy on this issue can be gleaned from his relations with Lancelot Andrewes. The king knew of Andrewes's liberal opinions on the theology of grace, but he enjoined him to silence.⁹¹ Andrewes acquiesced in this demand, resorting to private correspondence with leading divines of the Dutch remonstrant party and allowing himself only a number of biting asides against Calvinists in his sermons before the king.⁹² Consequently, his standing with James suffered no harm, and he received three bishoprics, a string of court offices, and a place on the Privy Council from a monarch appreciative of his rare gifts of eloquence and erudition.⁹³ Indeed, both before and after Dort, James made his views quite clear. In October 1617, an Arminian sermon by Edward Simpson, a fellow of Trinity College, led James to summon all the heads of Cambridge to Newmarket to warn them "that no such seed grow in the university." Immediately after Dort, James is recorded at supper with Bishop Carle-

⁸⁹ C. Grayson, "James I and the Religious Crisis in the United Provinces, 1613–19," in *Reform and the Reformation: England and the Continent, c. 1500–1750*, ed. D. Baker (Oxford, 1979), pp. 195–219.

⁹⁰ Cardwell (n. 16 above), p. 181.

⁹¹ *Memorials of Affairs of State . . . from the original papers of . . . Sir Ralph Winwood* (1725), 3:459.

⁹² See, e.g., A. Clarke, "Dr Plume's Notebook," *Essex Review* (Colchester) 15 (1906): 20; McClure, ed., 1:295. James also bullied Andrewes into writing a defense of the Oath of Allegiance (McClure, ed., 1:264).

⁹³ PRO, SP 105/95/4r, 28v; Lancelot Andrewes, *Works*, ed. J. Bliss (Oxford, 1841), 3:32, 328.

ton, denouncing the remonstrants as mere Pelagians before an abashed and silent Lancelot Andrewes.⁹⁴ Combined with the evidence marshaled by Nicholas Tyacke for the Calvinist dominance of both the universities and the press in these years, it appears that James had sided with the Calvinists on the theology of grace. This support may not be as significant as some contemporaries and later historians have assumed in view of the status that James gave to predestination as a secondary doctrine.⁹⁵ Certainly, it left the king free to patronize men of different persuasions when policy or friendship dictated. The less than harmonious relations between the bishops engendered by these debates is the subject to which we now turn.

V

The Jacobean church may have incorporated a range of diverse styles of divinity and churchmanship, yet this refurbished establishment was divided by factional and personal rivalries, often colored by conflicting views of the theology of grace. Among the court bishops of James I were a number of Arminian as well as Calvinist prelates. Tyacke has outlined these allegiances. Richard Neile headed an Arminian party that included Lancelot Andrewes, John Buckeridge, and John Overall, with William Laud waiting in the wings, while orthodox Calvinism was guarded by James Mountagu, George Abbot of Canterbury, and his ally John King of London. Many contemporaries were aware of these differences; Hugo Grotius came to England in 1613 to win support for the Dutch Arminians or remonstrants and had little difficulty in making contact with prominent English Arminians, including Lancelot Andrewes, John Overall, and John Richardson, Regius Professor of Divinity at Cambridge. In 1617, when the remonstrants were canvassing for sympathetic English delegates to be sent to Dort, they asked for Neile, Buckeridge, and Overall.⁹⁶

Personal and political alignments were often organized around these theological divisions. In a letter to Dudley Carleton in 1617, Archbishop Abbot outlined the dissemination of Arminian ideas in England. Apart from "one Baro a Frenchman," such opinions were limited, he believed, to Samuel Harsnett of Chichester and John Overall of Coventry and Lichfield, who "did infect as many as he could until by

⁹⁴ PRO, SP 105/95/16r, and SP 14/109/60.

⁹⁵ Tyacke (n. 48 above), p. 120.

⁹⁶ Tyacke, *ibid.*, pp. 126–27, 130–31, and "Arminianism and English Culture," in *Britain and the Netherlands*, 7, ed. A. C. Duke and C. A. Tamse (The Hague, 1981), pp. 95–96, 98.

sharp rebuke and reproofs he was beaten from the public avowing of these fancies. But certainly to this day he doth retain that leaven and . . . underhand doth smother these conceits amongst us.”⁹⁷ Harsnett, for one, heartily reciprocated Abbot’s distrust. Writing to his patron, the earl of Arundel, that same year, he complained that “the power of my Lord’s grace of Canterbury doth grow so transcendant . . . that the petitioner must either be an Oxford man or a sole creature to the Archbishop.” Abbot, it seems, had turned down Harsnett’s chaplain for a post in Sutton’s Hospital only “because he . . . was traduced for a papist.”⁹⁸

Such personal rivalries and factional tensions among the court bishops were not always occasioned by doctrinal disputes, yet even on issues such as the celebrated Essex divorce in 1613, groupings with a basis in religious ideology can often be discerned. Abbot’s contemporary account of the affair relates how he and King of London opposed the divorce, while Neile, Buckeridge, Andrewes, and Bilson of Winchester all readily complied with the king’s wishes for a speedy annulment; it also indicates how Buckeridge, Bilson, and especially Neile exploited Abbot’s scrupulosity to damage his standing with the king and to further their own careers.⁹⁹ Abbot himself compared his position to that of Archbishop Grindal, and his opponents reminded him that Grindal “had been overthrown for not giving consent to the divorce of Dr Julio, as implying the same would be my case.”¹⁰⁰ Although matters did not come to that, the archbishop’s relations with the king were strained by the affair. Immediate ecclesiastical preferment went to Neile, and Abbot’s brother Robert forfeited his elevation to the see of Lincoln. It was also rumored that “the archbishop must have no more to do with naming any to church livings, but some lords in court could dispose of all.”¹⁰¹ Even after the divorce was granted, Neile persisted in making capital out of Abbot’s discomfiture by contriving to make him either give retrospective approval to the divorce or again incur James’s displeasure. Abbot came away from the affair resolving to “be very wary” in trusting Neile again. Neile came away with the bishopric of Lincoln.¹⁰²

⁹⁷ PRO, SP 105/95/9v. See also PRO, SP 14/89/35.

⁹⁸ BL, Add. MS 39948, fol. 184r.

⁹⁹ Howell (n. 67 above), 2:806–50, esp. 815, 817, 823–24, 827, 829, 833–45.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 809, 821.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 829–30; McClure, ed., 1:478.

¹⁰² Howell, 2:834–45. Neile, Buckeridge, and Andrewes were anti-Calvinists who counted on the support of the crypto-Catholic Northampton and “the house of Suffolk,” no friends of Abbot (*ibid.*, p. 839).

When court prelates did divide on doctrinal issues, their animosity found expression in accusations of popery or Puritanism, often directed at the king. Abbot used an accusation similar to that against Harsnett's chaplain to blight the early career of William Laud. According to Peter Heylyn, Abbot persecuted Laud at Oxford in 1606, openly branding him "for a papist or at least very popishly inclined, that it was almost made a heresy (as I have heard from his own mouth) for any to be seen in his company and a misprision of heresy to give him a civil salutation as he walked the streets." In 1611, Abbot tried to scupper Laud's bid to become president of St. John's College by complaining to the chancellor of the university that Laud was "at least a papist in heart." These remarks reached the king, and it was Neile who persuaded James to disregard them. In 1615, Abbot's brother Robert also denounced Laud from the pulpit as a papist in points of free will, justification, and certainty of salvation.¹⁰³ This cycle of suspicion and vilification also touched Lancelot Andrewes. In 1615, it was reported that Abbot's intimate friends had laid "aspersions of popery" on Andrewes and had also circulated rumors that Catholics would have given £10,000 to secure his succession to Canterbury in 1611. Abbot had long known that Andrewes was sympathetic to the Dutch remonstrants' opinions on predestination and had not recanted his views.¹⁰⁴

If allegations of popery and Arminianism were the stock weapons in the Calvinist's polemical armory, their opponents had almost as frequent recourse to accusations of Puritanism. On this matter, even the irenic Andrewes was capable of playing politics. At the time when John Preston was a leading Cambridge Puritan and about to receive court preferment, Andrewes tried to block his path. He informed the king that Preston was a Puritan and that, if he "were not for this expelled the University, Lord Bishops would not long continue." Andrewes then required Preston to preach on the value of set prayers in the church, with the intention of exposing his Puritan sympathies. According to his biographer, it was only Preston's skill in the pulpit that enabled him to satisfy Andrewes and the king and yet preserve his reputation among the godly.¹⁰⁵

How aware was the king of these divisions? There survives a long manuscript account by John Howson, a canon of Christ Church and future bishop of Oxford, of an altercation between him and George

¹⁰³ Heylyn (n. 86 above), pp. 54, 60–61, 66–67; Laud (n. 81 above), 3:133–35.

¹⁰⁴ PRO, SP 14/80/113; *Memorials of Affairs of State* . . . (n. 91 above), 3:459; PRO, SP 105/95/4r, 28v.

¹⁰⁵ Ball (n. 51 above), pp. 45–56.

Abbot in the presence of the king at Greenwich in 1615.¹⁰⁶ In the course of the exchange, the polarized picture of Oxford politics presented by Peter Heylyn is amply confirmed. Disputes going back to the 1590s were recalled between Howson and Bishop Henry Robinson of Carlisle, John Rainolds and the Abbot brothers. The archbishop claimed that Lord Buckhurst, when chancellor of the university, had detested Howson. The latter denied this and accused Abbot of slandering him to Buckhurst.¹⁰⁷ Abbot then suggested that Howson was the most factious preacher in Oxford, but Howson maintained he was the innocent victim of the malice of Abbot and his ally Bishop King of London. Indeed, Howson added, there were many learned men in the university who had to conceal their friendship for him in fear of Abbot and King.

The substance of the exchange between the two men naturally involved accusations of Puritanism and popery. Abbot recounted a long list of charges to prove Howson's popish affections. Howson had troubled the dean and chapter of Christ Church with "papistical disputations," had associated with suspected papists in the university, and had been rebuked by Bancroft "for maintaining popery." All these allegations Howson denied. Abbot then enquired if he had preached against the papists "and wished me to name in what points." Howson answered that he had preached against the papal supremacy, transubstantiation, auricular confession, popish penances, and meritorious works as well as "the wicked practises of the Jesuits and the prophane order in the powder treason." "There was no man but would preach against that" was Abbot's acid comment.

Howson was happy to concede that he preached less against popery than some men did, for he held that, while three hundred divines railed against the work of three or four recusant priests, there were only a handful of men prepared to criticize three hundred preachers suspected of Puritanism. Both these assertions "highly offended" the archbishop. Just as Abbot used charges of popish backsliding against Howson, so Howson implied that Abbot was a Puritan. Hence when Abbot alleged that Bancroft died in the belief that Howson was a papist, Howson countered with the claim that when Bancroft was bishop of London "he held his grace for a puritan & said in my hearing that if he were not a dean already he should never have dignity in the Church of England if he & his friends could possibly hinder him."

¹⁰⁶ PRO, SP 14/80/113. We hope to print this document elsewhere.

¹⁰⁷ For an analysis of John Howson's stormy rule as vice-chancellor of Oxford in 1602–3, see Dent (n. 17 above), pp. 208–18.

Howson admitted that Bancroft's animosity stemmed from Abbot's tract against the restoration of Cheapside Cross and that Bishop Ravis of London brought him into favor again after 1607. It has already been noted that Abbot felt obliged to repudiate his former stand against the idolatry of the cross at Cheapside in his memorial sermon for Bancroft, and he now found it necessary to bluff.¹⁰⁸ "He denied that ever he wrote such a tract," Howson recalled. If Andrewes concealed his Arminian sympathies, so Abbot lied about the Puritanical excesses of his past.¹⁰⁹ The evenhandedness of James's ecclesiastical policy could have no clearer illustration.

The reference to Cheapside Cross was a palpable hit for Howson. There can be no doubt that he exerted a considerable polemical leverage on the king through reference to the issue of Puritanism. When Abbot accused him of defending Sunday sports in time of divine service, he replied that he had merely upbraided an assize judge who was "judaically affected in the observation of the sabbath and troubled the poor people wherever he went." The king intervened to remark that he knew the judge in question to be "a sour puritan."¹¹⁰ When Howson said he had preached against Rainolds's doctrine that foreign tongues should never be quoted in sermons, Abbot denied that anyone was "ever so absurd" to hold that opinion. However, he was contradicted by the king, who maintained that "he knew puritans hold it." James, it seems, still believed in Puritans and had a rather wider definition of what constituted a Puritan opinion than had Abbot. Howson tried to exploit this opening further with innuendos about "puritan bishops" who had only partially abandoned their old opinions. But here James refused to follow him. When Howson mentioned Henry Robinson, James reminded him that Robinson "was a bishop and now no puritan." It appears, therefore, that the king viewed Puritanism as excessive Protestant zeal on other matters than simple conformity and church polity, but he also retained his earlier definition of Puritanism in terms of two issues alone. Once a man became a bishop and aligned himself explicitly on the side of episcopacy, any former Puritan allegiances evaporated. While James stuck to that position and con-

¹⁰⁸ See Sec. IV above.

¹⁰⁹ See Sec. V above.

¹¹⁰ This attitude may account for James's willingness to listen to accusations of Sabbatarianism leveled at Morton of Chester in 1617, which ended with the publication of the Book of Sports (John Barwick, *The fight, victory and triumph of S. Paul, accommodated to the right reverend father in God Thomas late L. Bishop of Duresme* [1660], pp. 80–82).

tinued his policy of defusing Puritanism by raising such men as Abbot to the episcopate, there were severe limits on the value of Puritanism as a polemical weapon.

By the same token, there were real limits on the leverage that Abbot could exert through the issue of popery. Abbot emerges from this altercation—and indeed from his own activities as archbishop—as a man deeply exercised by the threat of popery, in contrast with which Puritanism was of slight significance.¹¹¹ The only defense for the English church lay in the incessant assertion of what he took to be right doctrine; and any backsliding, especially on the theology of grace, was the first move on a road that led inexorably to Rome. These beliefs account for the virulence of Abbot's reaction to Laud and Howson, who were, at best, neuters hovering between Protestantism and popery.¹¹² In contrast, Howson saw Puritanism as infinitely more dangerous to the English church than popery was. Nor did the king entirely endorse Abbot's view on the popish threat, despite accepting the need to maintain a common front against Rome. When Abbot sought to blackguard Howson by association with his popish friends, James answered that no man "should answer for the faults of his acquaintances," and he was prepared to take Howson's protestations of anti-papal orthodoxy at face value. Moreover, he would not accept Abbot's claim that to deny the pope was Antichrist was a point of popery. Yet James went on to chide Howson for not preaching more often against the papacy.

This debate encapsulates the bitter divisions existing at the center of the Jacobean ecclesiastical establishment, played out in the presence of the king. James appeared content enough to allow this situation to persist and did not condone or condemn either set of opinions. His parting shot to Howson was to preach more sermons against the papacy, an instruction that Howson heeded.¹¹³ Four years later he was promoted to the see of Oxford, his opponent Abbot still holding the archbishopric. It may be suggested that these divisions provided James with a freedom for maneuver between rival factions of court prelates as well as the widest range of advice on any religious issue.

¹¹¹ See, e.g., *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic (CSPD), 1611–18*, pp. 148, 178–79, 221, 227, 285, 303, 315, 320–21, 458, 485, 495.

¹¹² Joseph Hall made this point in a famous letter to Laud: "To day you are in the tents of the Romanists, tomorrow in ours . . . our adversaries think you ours, we theirs" (Heylyn, pp. 54–55).

¹¹³ John Howson, *Certaine Sermons made in Oxford, Anno. Dom. 1616. Wherein, is proved, that Saint Peter had no Monarchicall Power over the rest of the Apostles, against Bellarmine, Sanders, Stapleton, & the rest of that Companie. Published by Commandement* (1622).

James also relished his role in these debates as the godly prince who settled disputes between rival parties. In 1624–25, Neile and Laud tried to embarrass Archbishop Abbot by informing the king that Abbot's chaplain, Daniel Featley, had licensed a "schismatic" book. James interviewed the author, William Crompton, before both Featley and his accusers. None of the three groups received James's unqualified support: "Sometimes the King would vary the question and frown upon Mr Crompton, which did not a little gratify and please his adversaries; at other times his Majesty would speak kindly to him, favour him and take his part which did so much amaze and trouble them, being doubtful and afraid of the issue of this affair." The king identified several errors in Crompton's book and upheld the *jure divino* powers of bishops and the propriety of marriage with Catholics. He advised Crompton to study further yet promised to take care of his preferment. Featley was warned to be more vigilant in licensing theological tracts, but he was dismissed favorably, to the evident dismay of Neile. The whole affair, from the king's obvious delight in theological debate to the careful balance of the outcome, was a typically Jacobean performance.¹¹⁴

How inherently unstable was this rivalry? Abbot's arrival at Canterbury may well have deepened the split among the court prelates, for all the evidence cited above dates from his time as archbishop, and there is good reason to think that men who found the archconformist Bancroft congenial enough would have been less than delighted with Abbot's style of churchmanship.¹¹⁵ Laud, for one, found his path at court obstructed by Abbot and relied heavily on the patronage of Richard Neile. If the years after 1611 witnessed a period of calm and concord in the dioceses, then, in terms of ecclesiastical politics, Abbot's arrival at Lambeth provoked conflict between opposing interests among the court prelates.¹¹⁶ However, what really destroyed the subtle balance of the mid-Jacobean church was not Abbot's heavy-handedness so much as the effects of the Thirty Years' War and the Spanish match.

¹¹⁴ DWL, RNC 38.34, pp. 188–98; Daniel Featley, *Cyanea Cantio: or learned decisions . . . delivered by . . . King James . . . a few weekes before his death* (1629), p. 38. For James's similar role in balancing court faction in pursuit of the Spanish match, see R. E. Schreiber, *The Political Career of Sir Robert Naunton, 1589–1635* (1981), pp. 68–88.

¹¹⁵ Bancroft patronized both Arminians such as Samuel Harsnett and William Barlow and strict Calvinists such as Robert Abbot and Thomas Ravis.

¹¹⁶ This argument should be put alongside Patrick Collinson's emphasis of the stability of the church in the dioceses under Abbot (*The Religion of Protestants* [n. 50 above], pp. 89–90, 283).

VI

The perplexing issues raised by the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War in 1618 produced tensions within the Jacobean church sufficiently powerful to shatter the unity for which James I had labored so long. The attitude of Archbishop Abbot typifies the views of many English Protestants. To Abbot, the events suggested the final struggle between the forces of good and those of the Antichrist: "That by piece and piece, the Kings of the Earth that gave their power unto the Beast (all the work of God must be fulfilled) shall now tear the whore, and make her desolate, as St. John in his revelation hath foretold." England as a Protestant nation had no option but to lend her support to God's chosen instrument, Frederick V of the Palatinate, in the unfolding of the divine plan.¹¹⁷ In contrast, James I had little patience with this apocalyptic interpretation of events. He denied both that Stuart dynastic interests compelled him to support the claim of his son-in-law Frederick V to the crown of Bohemia and that the resulting conflict in central Europe was a confessional strife. Instead, the king pushed ahead with a series of protracted negotiations in the belief that the proposed marriage between Prince Charles and the infanta of Spain and his influence with Frederick V would bring the two sides together. While Abbot was invoking the specter of the Antichrist, the king wrote to the pope as "his holy father" to request his cooperation in the restoration of European peace.¹¹⁸ Many Jacobean divines found James's policy unpalatable, for his unsuccessful mediation permitted Frederick V to be expelled by Spanish troops first from Bohemia and then from the hereditary lands of the Palatinate. Moreover, amid fears of the extirpation of Protestant communities abroad, James's support for the Spanish match seemed to presage the tolerance, if not the triumph, of Catholicism at home.

In the face of public criticism of his policies, James did permit a benevolence to be collected for the Palatinate in March 1620, accompanied by the instruction that in their sermons the clergy were not to represent the conflict "as one of religion, which would stir up all Europe."¹¹⁹ A royal proclamation was issued in December 1620, to be reissued in July 1621, against "the excesse of lavish and licentious

¹¹⁷ S. L. Adams, "Foreign Policy and the Parliaments of 1621 and 1624," in Sharpe, ed. (n. 46 above), p. 147.

¹¹⁸ W. B. Patterson, "King James I and the Protestant Cause in the Crisis of 1618–22," in *Studies in Church History*, 18, ed. S. Mews (Oxford, 1982), pp. 319–34.

¹¹⁹ PRO, SP 14/113/33–34. Abbot organized the clerical benevolence, but James appointed Neile and Andrewes as his assistants, presumably to check his zeal. We owe this point to Andrew Foster.

speech in matters of state,” and the London clergy were also warned not to touch on the Spanish match in their sermons.¹²⁰ In the event, these measures were largely ineffectual. From the press and pulpit alike, a sustained campaign was mounted against Spain, and although several pamphleteers and preachers such as Thomas Scott and John Preston escaped detection, a procession of other clergy were committed to the Gatehouse, the Fleet, and the Tower for preaching or writing on Bohemia and the Spanish match.¹²¹ In February 1621, the Spanish ambassador reported that James was dismayed and alarmed by the “Puritan” publications against him, and five months later, it was rumored that the king was contemplating the suppression of lecture-ships.¹²² In fact, not until the summer of 1622 was James goaded into further action. In April 1622, John Knight of Broadgates Hall lectured in Oxford on Pareus’s doctrine that an inferior magistrate might take up arms against his prince in defense of religion, a theoretical argument anathema to James, which in the context of the debate of the Spanish match carried an ominously contemporary message.¹²³ As a consequence, university divinity students were directed away from “the heretical doctrines of both jesuits and puritans” and toward the writings of the fathers and the Schoolmen; and in August 1622 the Directions on Preachers were issued in the provinces of Canterbury and York to control “the abuses and extravagances” of clergy preaching on matters of state and the doctrines of secular authority and of predestination.¹²⁴ These instructions may have dampened, but they did not still, discussion of foreign policy in the pulpit.¹²⁵

For James I, therefore, 1618 marked the resurgence of radical Puritanism, led by those popular “rash-headie preachers” whose challenges to the civil magistracy he had condemned in *Basilikon Doron*.¹²⁶ The higher echelons of the church contained a significant number of

¹²⁰ PRO, SP 14/118/39; Larkin and Hughes, eds. (n. 7 above), 1:495–96, 519–21.

¹²¹ PRO, SP 14/118/39, 120/13, 122/46, 123/105, 129/35–36; Birch, ed. (n. 75 above), 2:226, 232, 237, 265–67; G. Roberts, ed., *Diary of Walter Yonge Esq.*, Camden Society, 1st ser., vol. 41 (1847), p. 41; William Camden, “The annals of King James I,” in *A Complete History of England* (1706), 2:654, 658; Ball (n. 51 above), pp. 59–60; P. G. Lake, “Constitutional Consensus and Puritan Opposition in the 1620s: Thomas Scott and the Spanish Match,” *Historical Journal* 25 (1982): 805–25.

¹²² Loomie, ed., *1613–1624* (n. 56 above), p. 145; BL, loan MS 29/202, fol. 52. We owe this latter reference to Clive Holmes.

¹²³ PRO, SP 14/129/58, 62; 130/106, 138–39; Birch, ed., 2:329–30.

¹²⁴ Edward Cardwell, *Documentary Annals of the Reformed Church of England* (Oxford, 1839), 2:146–54; see John Hackett’s analysis in *Scrinia Reserata: a memorial offered to the great deservings of John Williams* (1693), 1:86–90.

¹²⁵ PRO, SP 14/137/27; 142/8, 22; 153/20, 38; Hackett, p. 90.

¹²⁶ McIlwain, ed. (n. 13 above), p. 6.

these “radicals,” as the events of 1620–21 indicate. In January 1620, Bishop Bayley of Bangor disobeyed royal orders and prayed publicly for the king and queen of Bohemia, an action that earned him a sharp reprimand from James I.¹²⁷ In July 1621, Dean Sutcliffe of Exeter and Archdeacon Hakewill of Surrey were imprisoned for their opposition to James’s foreign policy. Sutcliffe had won royal favor through his tireless writing against Presbyterians and papists, so it was appropriate that he was selected as first provost of “King James’s college at Chelsey” to lead the Anglican offensive against Rome.¹²⁸ Hakewill had also publicly defended the church against the papists and had even written an apologia for the rite of confirmation, in which precisionist and popish positions were refuted. In December 1612, Hakewill was the first chaplain appointed to Prince Charles’s new household, with the express charge of safeguarding him from the infection of popery.¹²⁹ Archbishop Abbot was the most eminent opponent of the match. According to Anthony Weldon, it was with his connivance that Hakewill presented a treatise against the match to Prince Charles in July 1621; two years later, Abbot led the opposition in the Privy Council to James’s wish to tolerate Catholicism under the marriage treaty with Spain and was silenced only by the personal intervention of the king. Abbot responded with a court sermon deploring the absence of the prince in Spain, wooing the infanta; simultaneously, a pamphlet appeared, purporting to be a letter from the archbishop to the king against the proposed match. Although Abbot privately denied the authorship, he did not publicly repudiate its content, for he was broadly in agreement with the anti-Spanish sentiments that it contained.¹³⁰

This vociferous opposition to the Spanish match revived James’s latent fear of Puritanism. His initial definition of radical Puritans had included those ministers who discussed the *arcana imperii* before the people from the pulpit. This element had become overlooked during the early and middle years of the reign, when conformity had dominated the king’s perception of Puritanism. The crisis over foreign pol-

¹²⁷ PRO, SP 14/112/10; Anthony à Wood, *Athenae Oxonienses*, ed. P. Bliss (1815), 2:529.

¹²⁸ *Dictionary of National Biography (DNB)*, s.v. “Matthew Sutcliffe”; Roberts, ed., p. 41; Camden, p. 657.

¹²⁹ *STC*, 12610, 12618; George Hakewill, *The auncient ecclesiasticall practise of confirmation confirmed by arguments* (1613), p. 9, and *King Davids vow for reformation of himselfe, his family, his kingdome* (1621), sig. A3ir; PRO, SP 14/122/46, 48; *CSPD*, 1611–18, p. 160; Camden, p. 658.

¹³⁰ Anthony Weldon, *The court and character of King James. Whereunto is now added the court of King Charles* (1651), pp. 217–18; Welsby (n. 84 above), pp. 108–10; Hackett, 1:143. Among the clergy imprisoned for their public disapproval of the match were three other royal chaplains—Andrew Willet, Daniel Price, and Thomas Winniffe (*DNB*, s.v. “Andrew Willet”; Birch, ed., 2:265–67; PRO, SP 14/129/35).

icy stirred this dormant aspect of Puritanism and thereby exposed a contradiction between the king's ecclesiastical and foreign policies. James may have succeeded in pacifying Puritan scruples over conformity, but he had not removed the virulent antipapal edge of English Protestantism. The hostility to popery expressed by many of his bishops had helped to conciliate many Puritan nonconformists after 1603.¹³¹ James's decision to maintain a pacific and ostensibly pro-Catholic policy after 1618 transformed this antipapal zeal at the center from an asset to a liability as members of his establishment publicly criticized royal policy. Moreover, the validity of his distinction between moderate and radical Puritans must have seemed dubious to James when leading churchmen defied his authority in the name of true religion. The king had palpably failed in his attempt to contain the threat of Puritanism.

In the face of this criticism, James was driven toward those divines whose theology allowed them to endorse his foreign policy. In July 1618 the Spanish ambassador recorded that James "has been thinking of removing from office all officials, whether ecclesiastical or secular, whom he believes are opposed to the [Spanish] marriage and that he will arrange it little by little."¹³² The Arminian bishops proved to be the beneficiaries of this shift in clerical power at court. Unlike the Calvinists Abbot, Bayley, Sutcliffe, or Hakewill, the Arminians made no public show of opposition to a Hapsburg alliance. Bishop Andrewes, for example, was enthusiastic enough to be considered as an envoy to Spain in December 1616, and it was he who answered Hakewill's claim in July 1621 that all papists were idolaters.¹³³ As a result, Arminian bishops came into greater prominence at the center after 1618. The deaths of James Mountagu of Winchester in 1618 and John King of London in 1621 removed two influential court Calvinists; Mountagu, in particular, described in 1605 as "the watchman of the King's soul," had enjoyed an unrivaled sway over James's theological views.¹³⁴ The emergence of John Young, the Calvinist dean of Winchester, did little to offset these losses, for Mountagu was replaced by the Arminian Andrewes at Winchester, and George Montaigne, a sympathizer of the Arminians, succeeded King at London.¹³⁵ Despite the

¹³¹ See, e.g., John Downname's commendation of Archbishop Abbot in *A Guide to Godlynesse* (1622), sig. A4.

¹³² Loomie, ed., *1613–1624* (n. 56 above), p. 113.

¹³³ Birch, ed., 1:447; PRO, SP 14/122/46.

¹³⁴ HMC, *9 Hatfield House XVII*, p. 271; Heylyn (n. 86 above), p. 125.

¹³⁵ For Young, see Ball (n. 51 above), pp. 53, 64; Richard Neile, *M. Ant. De Dnis Arch-Bishop of Spalato, his shiftings in Religion* (1624), passim; for Montaigne, see G. Ornsby, ed., *The correspondence of John Cosin, D.D. Lord Bishop of Durham*, Surtees Society, 52 (1869), 1:100; *DNB*, s.v. "John Young."

death of John Overall, the Arminian group under Richard Neile enjoyed greater royal favor, as exemplified by the rise of William Laud, after many years in the shadows, who received the bishopric of St. Davids in 1621 and narrowly missed further promotion in 1623. The old animosity between Laud and Abbot continued unabated.¹³⁶ The other leading court prelate was John Williams, bishop of Lincoln and lord keeper after 1621, who was no friend to Abbot, finding his strict discipline reprehensible and attempting to win the primatial see of Canterbury after Abbot's manslaughter of a gamekeeper in August 1621.¹³⁷ In the long term, the rise of the Arminian group enabled Richard Mountagu to find powerful supporters at court in 1624–25, and their role paved the way to the capture of the machinery of the church after 1625.¹³⁸

VII

With the growth of opposition to the Spanish match after 1618, James I was susceptible to a redefinition of Puritanism that would accord more closely with his present predicament. This Richard Mountagu attempted to provide in his two books *A New Gagg for an old Goose* and *Appello Caesarem* in 1624–25.¹³⁹ As a royal chaplain and canon of Windsor, Mountagu was well placed to gauge the king's religious opinions and his present polemical needs, to which he carefully tailored his argument.¹⁴⁰

It is no surprise that Mountagu's preliminary remarks in *A New Gagg* closely echoed the king's own stated position on the English and Roman churches. The attempt to monopolize the rhetoric of true catholicity and Christian peacemaking while at the same time vilifying the papists for maintaining the rent in the mystical body of Christ through their refusal to reform themselves and their defense of the papal supremacy were opinions entirely characteristic of James I's attitude to popery. But the thrust of Mountagu's argument was that, in order to substantiate these claims against Rome, the English church had to repudiate, as at best doubtful and at worst false, certain doctrinal posi-

¹³⁶ Laud (n. 81 above), 3:136, 151–53; *Eagle* (Cambridge) 17 (1893): 147; PRO, SP 14/137/5.

¹³⁷ Hackett, 1:97; PRO, SP 14/122/94; Welsby, pp. 94–95.

¹³⁸ Tyacke, "Puritanism, Arminianism and Counter-revolution" (n. 48 above), pp. 131–32.

¹³⁹ Richard Mountagu, *A Gagg for the new gospell? No: A New Gagg for an old Goose* (1624) (hereafter cited as *A New Gagg*), and *Appello Caesarem: a iust appeale from two iniust informers* (1625).

¹⁴⁰ *CSPD*, 1611–18, p. 552.

tions central to English Calvinism. In particular, he suggested that the Anglican church had not pronounced dogmatically on the precise relationship between predestination, grace, and free will in conversion and justification or on the allied doctrines of perseverance and assurance. These points of difficulty for Mountagu, where debate and disagreement were permissible, constituted for orthodox Calvinists the crucial doctrines of the reformed faith. Indeed, in the final and most revealing section of the tract, Mountagu openly branded such views as Calvinist, as Puritan, and therefore as schismatic.¹⁴¹

A *New Gagg*, in short, radically reduced the points of difference separating the English and Roman churches and redefined Puritanism in terms of schismatic Calvinism.¹⁴² The clear implication was that, if the English church was to retain a credible claim to apostolic catholicity, then James I should distance himself from doctrinal Calvinism and its concomitant antipathy to Rome. This position had certain attractions for the king, currently being maneuvered into a confessional conflict that he abhorred by an unholy alliance between his son, the duke of Buckingham, and a rabidly antipapal House of Commons.¹⁴³ Moreover, Mountagu's robust defense of the catholicity of the *Ecclesia Anglicana* must have pleased his sovereign, still smarting from the return to Rome of Antonio de Dominis, archbishop of Spalato, in 1622. De Dominis was a Catholic émigré who had come to England in 1616 to work for Christian unity, attracted by James's irenic writings and the status of his church as a true Catholic church. His departure for Rome in 1622 publicly embarrassed the king before a European audience since de Dominis claimed the English church was heterodox, upholding the Calvinist doctrine of grace, and therefore challenged the king's claims to defend a truly Catholic doctrine.¹⁴⁴ Mountagu's *A New Gagg*

¹⁴¹ Mountagu, "To the Reader," in *A New Gagg*, pp. 110, 157–72 (esp. pp. 158, 171), 177–88, 323–25.

¹⁴² Of the forty-seven allegedly Anglican doctrines cited by the Gagger, Mountagu admitted eight or nine belonged to the English church. He claimed that moderate men on both sides could reach agreement on many of the points at issue if the extremists (both Puritans and Jesuits) could be silenced. (See "To the Reader," pp. 50, 269–70, 319–21, and also *Appello Caesarem*, pp. 15, 110, 204.)

¹⁴³ Mountagu's denial that the pope was Antichrist took up James's earlier pronouncements and suited his present polemical needs (*A New Gagg*, pp. 73–77).

¹⁴⁴ W. B. Patterson, "The Peregrinations of Marco Antonio de Dominis, 1616–24," in *Studies in Church History*, 15, ed. D. Baker (Oxford, 1978), pp. 242, 248–52. See also N. Malcolm, *De Dominis (1560–1624): Venetian, Anglican, Ecumenist and Relapsed Heretic* (1984). Neile refuted the rumor that de Dominis was acting as James's envoy to the pope in his published account of the defection while making no attempt to conceal de Dominis's complaints against "over-strict Calvinists" among the bishops. We owe this point to Andrew Foster. (Neile, pp. 2, 11–13, 48.)

can be plausibly read as an attempt to vindicate the king's stated belief in the catholicity of the English church while blaming the Calvinists for the debacle over de Dominis's defection.

Mountagu was not the first divine to appeal to James's rhetoric of catholicity and Christian unity in order to convince him of the Puritan and schismatic nature of English Calvinism. That honor belongs to Benjamin Carier, a royal chaplain, canon of Canterbury, and fellow of Chelsea College. Carier had argued that the doctrine of the Church of England was far closer to Rome than to Geneva, and he identified Calvinism as inherently popular and schismatic.¹⁴⁵ In a sermon preached before the king in 1612, Carier appears to have shown the affinity of the English church with Rome on "confession, contrition and satisfaction," to the anger of orthodox Calvinists. In the light of James's view of the Roman church, Carier evidently hoped for a sympathetic hearing, notwithstanding the presence of his "utter enemies" at court. But the king remained unresponsive, and the following year Carier embraced Catholicism, claiming in his apologia that "the malice of the times" necessitated this.¹⁴⁶ The significance of the episode is that James had opinions almost identical to those of Mountagu available to him from court divines at least twelve years before the publication of *A New Gagg*; and if Carier failed to win over the king while Mountagu was successful, the reason cannot be, as Shriver has argued, that James himself had always held such views.¹⁴⁷ Rather, the position of Carier and Mountagu represented but one possible and partial reading of James's writings and actions, and if the king chose publicly to favor such a reading for the first time in 1624, the explanation must be in the political circumstances of the moment.

After his first book had been greeted with a hostile reaction from the Calvinist establishment, Mountagu replied with a second volume, his famous *Appello Caesarem*. Mountagu's correspondence indicates that the work was deliberately aimed at the royal ear, and the title itself honored James's own image as the nursing father of the church. Ac-

¹⁴⁵ *A Treatise, written by M. Doctor Carier, wherein he layeth downe sundry learned and pithy considerations, by which he was moved, to forsake the Protestant congregation, and to betake himselfe to the Catholike Apostolike Roman Church* (Brussels, 1614), pp. 3–5, 19–24, 27, 29–31.

¹⁴⁶ Loomie, ed., *1613–1624* (n. 56 above), p. 14. *A Treatise written by M. Doctor Carier . . .*, pp. 5–6, 14, 36. In 1615, John Howson claimed that Archbishops Abbot and King of London had effectively hounded Carier out of the English church (PRO, SP 14/80/113).

¹⁴⁷ Shriver, "The Ecclesiastical Policy of James I" (n. 15 above), pp. 195–98. According to the Spanish ambassador, there were at least five other royal chaplains with views similar to those of Carier (Loomie, ed., *1613–1624*, p. 14).

ording to Dean White, who licensed it for the press, the king saw and approved the whole manuscript.¹⁴⁸

In *Appello Caesarem* Mountagu embraced the abrasive anti-Puritan and anti-Calvinist language used by Carier and de Dominis (and by himself in private) to complete the redefinition of Puritanism in terms of doctrine. The Puritans were a faction within the Church of England who attempted to pass off their views as the settled doctrines of the church, which in truth were only “the private opinions of the informers and some classical resolutions of the brethren.” Predestination was the distinctive doctrine of Puritanism, and Mountagu deftly assimilated all predestinarian Calvinists to the existing image of the subversive Puritan. Moreover, where for James I ceremonial nonconformity had been the test of Puritanism, Mountagu was able to argue that the issues of conformity and church polity were beside the point. Conformity cloaked doctrinal heterodoxy, and conformist Calvinism was merely a Trojan horse to introduce Presbyterianism. Mountagu observed that the link between Calvinist and Presbyterian Puritans could be established through their mutual devotion to foreign reformed churches and the intrinsic popularity of their opinions.¹⁴⁹

In effect, Mountagu was suggesting that James could not hope to defuse the Puritan threat through a policy of incorporation and leniency and at the same time retain his moderate and irenic stance toward Rome. By redefining Puritanism in doctrinal terms, he rejected the basic premise of royal policy—that Puritanism could be defined primarily in terms of outward conformity—while manipulating James’s genuine fears of Puritan subversion. The polarization of religious opinions after 1618 lent more than a hint of truth to Mountagu’s analysis and gave the king a strong personal interest in accepting a rationale for repudiating religious impulses and opinions that were forcing him into a confessional strife that he disliked yet that was central to the religious establishment he had constructed. Simultaneously, Mountagu fostered the illusion that the king was being consistent and nothing had really changed.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁸ Ornsby, ed. (n. 135 above), 1:27–29, 65–66; Bodl., Rawlinson MS C 573.

¹⁴⁹ Mountagu, *Appello Caesarem*, pp. 6–7, 25, 39, 41–42, 44–45, 60, 72, 111, 118, 142, 305, 308.

¹⁵⁰ The Arminian nature and novelty of many of Mountagu’s opinions have been recently questioned by Peter White. It is clear that Mountagu’s personal views came closest to the remonstrant position on the doctrine of perseverance, although he was careful to distance himself and the English church from their opinions. To do otherwise, in the light of the king’s support for the counterremonstrant cause at and after Dort, would have been foolhardy. The novelty lay in Mountagu’s combination of an established anti-Puritan rhetoric that went back to Whitgift and Bancroft with a more risky and

James's death in March 1625 robs us of the chance to see how far he had been converted to Mountagu's view *tout court* and how far this was only another maneuver designed to distance himself from the policy advocated by Charles and Buckingham. The reign of his son marks the real change of direction in the English church, when anti-Calvinists and Arminians captured the central apparatus of the church and established a monopoly of control over policymaking. The ground for that palace revolution had been laid under James I, but it is difficult to see it as anything other than a defeat for his ecclesiastical policy.

VIII

In his management of ecclesiastical affairs, James I combined a detailed grasp of abstract theory with a native political shrewdness. This is in stark contrast to his predecessor, who, for all her gifts of prevarication and deception, showed no interest in doctrinal theory or its relationship with the formulation of policy. If Elizabeth did have a consistent ecclesiastical policy, it must be reconstructed from her actions.¹⁵¹ James, however, was always ready to explain the assumptions on which his actions were based, and such public expressions were a central plank of his whole strategy.

The king emerges as a subtle manipulator of men and as a masterly short-term political operator, able to keep his options open almost indefinitely and any number of people guessing as to his real intentions. Indeed, it is difficult not to be impressed by the skill with which he handled both anti-Puritan and antipapal stereotypes to create the ideological space within which the royal will could maneuver and policy be formulated. Yet in many ways his strengths were also his weaknesses. Personal contact and management were central to his style of kingship, but James could overestimate the impact of his personality and arguments.¹⁵² He clearly overrated his dialectical and political talents and won arguments because he was king rather than because he had convinced his audience. Thus in an interview in February 1625, William Crompton was not persuaded by James's defense of *jure divino* powers of bishops but thought it prudent to remain silent.¹⁵³ Moreover, the fair promises the king seemed to hold out to Catholics and

marginal anti-Calvinism. (P. White, "The Rise of Arminianism Reconsidered," *Past and Present* 101 [1983]: 36, n. 9, 45–48.)

¹⁵¹ P. G. Lake, "The Elizabethan Settlement," in *Queen Elizabeth I: Most Politick Princess*, ed. S. L. Adams, History Today Special (1984), pp. 16–19.

¹⁵² Wormald (n. 27 above), pp. 187–209.

¹⁵³ DWL, RNC 38.34, p. 191.

Puritans alike at his accession served merely to raise expectations that James never intended to fulfill, so that the resulting frustration delayed rather than accelerated the benefits of his policy of leniency and incorporation. If that policy worked, it is likely that its success owed as much to the personal interests and ambitions of the individuals and religious groups concerned as to any of the arguments employed either at Hampton Court or in the formal exchanges in the Oath of Allegiance controversy. Nor was James's predilection for the grand gesture, whereby the new Solomon would solve his church's problem at a stroke, always appropriate or successful. Certainly, his apparent mastery of the Puritans at Hampton Court contributed to his assumption that only dangerous radicals were not converted to instant conformity, so that the events of the winter of 1604–5 proved to be a rude awakening.¹⁵⁴

Above all, this overconfidence in his dialectical skills led James to underestimate the extent to which he had merely incorporated inherently antipathetic religious tendencies within his refurbished regime. James, it seems, confused what remained a marriage of convenience, dictated by his own distribution of patronage, with a genuine conversion of all parties to his view of true religion and the English church. This became painfully apparent with the sustained opposition to the Spanish match. James's desire to intervene dramatically to restore European peace came into conflict with the basic thrust of his ecclesiastical policy, the defusing of "radical" Puritanism and rabid anti-popery through the incorporation of evangelical Calvinism into the Jacobean establishment. Faced with a clear choice, the king failed to realize that the one aim precluded the other. He pushed ahead with the Spanish match and then, alarmed by the "Puritan" reaction this provoked, allowed himself to be wooed by the polemical writings of Richard Mountagu. How far the ensuing religious conflicts were an inevitable result of a national church dominated by too narrow a reformed ideology is an open question. One view, perhaps the more fashionable, would hold that the villain of the piece was William Laud and that the fate of the English church was only sealed by the fatal alliance between Laud and Charles I.¹⁵⁵ Another, which better accords with the line taken here, would claim that Laud was the product and representative of wider religious forces and that James I had done rather well to maintain harmony for as long as he did.

¹⁵⁴ See his triumphant letter to Northampton at the close of the conference (Cardwell, *A History of Conferences* . . . [n. 16 above], pp. 160–61).

¹⁵⁵ Collinson, *The Religion of Protestants* (n. 50 above), pp. 89–90, 283; Robert Ashton, *The English Civil War: Conservatism and Revolution* (1978), p. 110.