

predominate among Catholics, using Msalow's S-I and SP inventories. The second study used the Allport-Vernon-Lindzey value scale to find out what sort of values (theoretical, economic, aesthetic, social, political, religious) matter most to Catholics. The last two studies used well-tried techniques of investigation, but with subject-matter specially devised for the present purpose. The idea of what people mean by 'a good Christian' was studied by presenting 72 carefully prepared descriptions of actions or attitudes, and asking the subjects to rate them as more or less characteristic of a good Christian, first by a forced-choice technique, then by an ordinary five-point rating scale. Finally a series of projection tests was used to discover the attitudes of children towards the Mass and their taking part in it.

Dr Lawlor's conclusions cannot be summarized here. They should be read in the context of the book itself, to appreciate how they were derived

and the weight to be given to each. These studies will be criticized, particularly for the sampling. But the important thing is that this book will form a point of departure for further studies. Dr Lawlor and her team deserve congratulations on their work, and on publishing so promptly. This is not just a piece of academic research, nor a preliminary to social engineering. As Dr Lawlor says in her final paragraph, her close analysis of the test results does not imply a scrutiny that is unkind or disparaging. We are all in this together, as members of the Church. We are all concerned (or should be) for the good of our neighbour and for the upbringing of our children, at home, at school, in the parish. We need studies of this kind to show the effects of that upbringing, not just in terms of examination results or material success, but of personality structure, individual values and emotionally-toned attitudes. This book makes a brave start.

Austin Gaskell, O.P.

THE POSITION OF WOMEN IN PRIMITIVE SOCIETIES, and Other Essays in Social Anthropology by E. E. Evans-Pritchard. *Faber and Faber, 35s.*

The second essay in this book is the one from which its title is taken. Otherwise it contains a general study on social anthropology, and a number of studies of particular elements of culture in central to east Africa, political organization, marriage, cannibalism, collective expressions of obscenity, names, ghost murders, etc. These are depth studies of one element in the culture of single peoples, without any attempt at wide comparison.

As such the book represents what might be called 'situation' anthropology, wider in outlook than pure functionalism, for the author is aware of the need of historical background to explain the state in which a culture pattern is found. Yet reading it, and with a particular joy in the inimitable way Professor Evans-Pritchard burrows into his matter and sums up his conclusions about the meaning of acts in their total context, one is left with a question, a vision of incomplete waves of thought.

This occurs particularly in connection with the first study, originally a Hobhouse Memorial Trust lecture on the comparative method in anthropology, on some of whose chief exponents the author is severe. I read it shortly after an immersion in Teilhard de Chardin, and thought of the waves in anthropology: evolutionism, the historical comparative method, functionalism and now this reserved humanism which is detached from the idea of a 'natural history' of man, from the geological to the theological level, which Teilhard sought. 'Would it be too temerarious to ask ourselves if we should not question the basic assumption which has so long been taken for granted, that there are sociological laws of the kind sought (i.e. as in general science, *supra*); whether social facts, besides being remarkably complex, are not so totally different from those studied in inorganic and organic sciences that neither the comparative method nor any other is likely to lead to the formulation of

generalizations comparable to those of the sciences?' This, the author mentions by the way, is a thought after forty years in the field.

I believe that leading anthropologists could, without losing their academic integrity, at least put forward some generalized hypotheses to assist those labouring in the field of sociology and social ethics. I remember getting my first structural idea of the reasons for the movement to socialization of modern man in a lecture on the landed Tikopia contrasted with the hunter Andamanese Islanders. The landed people could insure themselves and their 'social welfare' by individual ownership and heredity. The semi-nomadic men, as the modern industrial worker, used things more in common, needing, in their insecurity, a wider basis of life insurance. For the first time I began to demoralize the property question in its social components.

In this book one finds insights of a different kind. For instance the culture patterns described in the Sudan and East Africa are so like those in South Africa as to give one a tremendous sense of the unity of African culture south of the Sahara, the more surprising because of the great break in language unity from the Bantu line southwards. Yet in this tip of the African migrations one seems to find, historically, a more marked move to great centralized chieftaincies, even before the white man had intervened. This could be because of the influence of what Oliver and Fage call the Sudanic kingdoms spreading south from upper Egypt, passed by the Bantu in their migration south. But since the pattern jumps a whole host

of less organized tribes between, it is easier to associate the Zulu kingdom of Shaka, and others, with overcrowding in the tip of Africa when the migrations reached it. Here one might begin to look for another law.

The illustration of such social laws, if they exist, from outside the modern controversial atmosphere, from phenomena prefiguring such developments as U.N.O. and the welfare state right back in the roots of human culture, seems to be a contribution the anthropologist could make, at least as a sideline. Dr Evans-Pritchard says he should perhaps consider himself more an ethnographer than an anthropologist. Yet the only other generalized essay in the book, that on the position of women in primitive society contrasted with that in modern societies, while it does perhaps contain more statements one would like to see further evidenced than in the case of the other studies, is extremely interesting and provocative of thought. It may be that, as the data grows, we are due for a further evolutionary synthesis in anthropology, more careful than the first one. It is such an intensely human subject as handled by the author that one cannot help hoping this will be the case.

The reviewer must frankly confess to a moral and social-ethical interest in the book, rather than that of the professional anthropologist. But perhaps this is a useful reflection in a line slightly different from that in which it will have been reviewed elsewhere.

F. Synnott, O.P.

SUPERIORITY AND SOCIAL INTEREST by Alfred Adler, edited by Heinz L. Ansbacher and Rowena Ansbacher. *Routledge and Kegan Paul, 45s.*

Alfred Adler formed one of the trio with Freud and Jung who are the fathers of modern dynamic psychology. Like Freud he was of Jewish origin and was born in the city of Vienna. He joined Freud's circle in 1902 but ultimately broke with him some eight years later. Adler's departure was followed by that of Jung, Stekel, Rank and others, leaving orthodox Freudian

psychology to-day very much a minority group. The differences which led to the rifts are a combination of theory and the incompatibility of personalities. Psychoanalysis was in some ways a new faith which demanded absolute obedience to the founder. Not many could accept the authoritarian ways of Freud and departed.

Now all the major figures are dead and atten-