

The Challenge of Political Right

R. D. Winfield

For politics to measure up to reason, two requirements have long been acknowledged: first, that the ends of political action be universal, and second, that the pursuit of such universal ends consist in political self-determination, that is, in self-government.

Aristotle set the stage for all further political inquiry by distinguishing political association through the universality of its end or good, while identifying the end of politics with political activity itself, an activity in which citizens rule over one another while presiding over all other associations, which fall under political dominion owing to the particularity of their pursuits. Aristotle joined the universality of politics with the activity of self-rule by recognising political activity to be an end in itself that is also a master end for the sake of which all other conduct is to be pursued. As such, politics was itself the highest good, making ethics possible by overcoming the hegemony of instrumental action, whose every end is devoid of intrinsic value, leaving conduct ultimately pointless (see Aristotle 1984b: *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1094a18-1094b12).

Two corollary difficulties, however, undermine Aristotle's enterprise. On the one hand, he is unable to give the universal end of political association a non-arbitrary content. Politics may claim universality by being both an end in itself and a master end, but this is just a recipe for 'might makes right', where any prevailing rule would be identical with the highest good. Appeal to a distinctly human function or to forms of rule that pursue the common good rather than the particular interests of some ruler can provide no remedy. Invoking a human function to reason and act reasonably only raises anew the task of determining what political action must be to accord with reason, whereas invoking a politics devoted to the common good leaves undetermined what that common good can be besides engagement in sovereign politics.

Aristotle's difficulty in providing an adequate content for the universal ends of politics is tied to his inability to conceive political self-determination. Although he recognises that political action is a master end in itself, undetermined by any other factor, he lacks the conceptual resources to delineate how citizens can exercise an autonomous sovereign activity and rule themselves. Instead of conceiving how citizens exercise the fully reflexive activity of self-rule, where ruler and ruled coincide, he substitutes a governance where citizens alternate in ruling over other citizens, rather than ever ruling over themselves. This reflects an inability to grasp the identity of determiner and determined, which surfaces throughout Aristotle's philosophy, as well as that of his teacher, Plato. Just as Aristotle conceives of the soul as divided into an active and a passive intellect, where one part rules over the other rather than

determining itself (see Aristotle 1984a: *De Anima*, 430a10-26, so he conceives of the 'self-movement' of animals as depending upon one part moving another, with the moving part receiving its impetus from the animal's metabolism with its environment (see Aristotle 1984c: *Physics*, 253a11-18 and 254b30-32). This follows the solution Socrates offers in the *Republic* to the 'paradox' of self-rule: because how the same factor can be agent and patient at once seems unintelligible, the polis and the soul must be divided into ruling and ruled parts, rendering rule an activity of craft, where an agent imposes form upon a matter different from itself (see Plato 1997: *Republic*, 430e-431a). The inability to conceive self-determination in biology, psychology, and politics is grounded in the ancient Greeks' tendency to conceive the universal as an essence, whose 'particularization' consists in secondary appearances, as well as in terms of other categories of essence such as form and matter. In all these cases, the universal determines something other than itself, giving rise to problems of 'participation'. Since the universal as essence is only reflected in the appearances in which it is manifest, the latter involve some given content extraneous to universality.

These difficulties are implicitly recognised by Rousseau, who seeks to connect the universality of genuine politics directly with the reflexivity of self-rule. His starting point is the acknowledgement that, so long as the state acts for particular ends, one part of the body politic imposes its good upon that of all others, turning rule into factional domination. Factional domination can be overcome and the universality of political action can be achieved only if what is willed by the state is willed by all citizens as action that applies to all. In other words, the state can pursue universal ends only if it realises political self-determination, which requires that citizens codetermine laws that emanate from all and apply to all. What undermines Rousseau's solution is the same formality that plagues Kantian ethics: the universality of politics is identified with legality, and political self-determination is identified with self-legislation. Legality and self-legislation have no particular content intrinsic to them and, for this reason, any specific content that distinguishes particular laws or differentiates office-holders from civilians or otherwise distinguishes groups of individuals raises the spectre of factional domination. This adherence to the formalism of self-legislation is an invitation to what Hegel would describe as the reign of Absolute Freedom and Terror. By directly identifying the universal will of the state with the self-determination of the individual, Rousseau is compelled to reject all intermediary bodies and sources of difference. Not only does he exclude political parties, parliamentary representation, political debate, and any market activity that would give play to particular interests, but Rousseau eliminates all political plurality by consistently maintaining that the only way the will of the state can immediately be the will of each citizen is if all citizens always will with unanimity. Otherwise, the will of the state is the will of a particular group, which, whether a majority or not, comprises a particular faction imposing its will upon the rest. By depriving universality of any

intrinsic particularization and by identifying freedom with formal self-legislation, Rousseau has no choice but to collapse politics into a monolithic unity of clones, incapable of achieving any real self-determination.

Hegel first provides the resources for enabling the universality of politics to coincide with self-government, while overcoming the dilemmas plaguing Aristotle and Rousseau. The solution rests upon Hegel's fundamental logical breakthrough, which consists in developing the logic of the concept as the logic of self-determination. Unlike the ancients, Hegel does not conceive universality in terms of categories of the logic of essence, such as essence and appearance or form and matter. Instead, he conceives universality, particularity, and individuality as self-determined determinacy. This is why, when Hegel discusses the self-determination of the will in the opening sections 5-7 of the *Philosophy of Right*, he does so in terms of the basic categories of the concept: universality, particularity, and individuality (Hegel 1991: 37-42). By thinking through universality, particularity, and individuality as self-determination, Hegel provides the logical basis for the autonomy of reason and the ability of philosophy to obtain new knowledge *a priori*. Insofar as the universal is self-differentiating, with particularity comprising the universal's own self-determination, thought is not empty, as Kant presumed. Rather, thought is pregnant with content and the autonomy of reason entails the liberation from bondage to particular contingencies, allowing the universal determination of conceptualisation to lay hold of what is independently determined in its own right. Modern philosophy through Kant considered objects to be conditioned (as mandated by the Principle of Sufficient Reason), precluding any knowledge of more than contingent appearances, not to speak of life or freedom.¹ Hegel's rethinking of universality allows the unconditioned totality of objectivity to be thought and individuality to be conceivable. Above all, Hegel's re-conception of the logic of the concept enables self-determination and universality to be thinkable without undercutting particularity and the plurality of free individuals.

Hegel exhibits this most adequately in his treatment of property and moral rights in the first two divisions of his *Philosophy of Right*. In each of these divisions, Hegel shows how individuals succeed in determining themselves by reciprocally interacting with other agents. This reciprocity manifests how the reality of freedom consists in structures of right, where individuals determine not just what they will but what agency they exercise. Socrates may well be correct in insisting that the individual cannot alone be both agent and patient at once. After all, every action of an isolated individual always involves exercising the given faculty of choice that is the precondition rather than the result of any volition. The atomistic individual may choose among given alternatives, but neither the faculty of choice nor those options are determined by that willing. By contrast, as Hegel shows at length, when two individuals reciprocally lay their wills in a recognisable way in different factors, they both will something to be their property and determine themselves to be owners.

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Similarly, when individuals interact by laying claim to responsibility only for what they do on purpose and for those consequences of their deed that they intended, they do not only determine what counts as the sphere of their moral responsibility but also determine themselves as moral subjects who hold one another morally accountable.

In a similar vein, individuals determine themselves as autonomous citizens by engaging in the political interaction in which they codetermine the operations of the institutions of self-government. In so doing, they do not act as clones, but rather participate as differentiated citizens whose coordinated plural political decisions comprise the workings of the emancipated state. Although each citizen is free to disagree with the political decisions of others, the reciprocity of right and duty ensures that, when individuals engage in constitutional political activity, their doing so does not prevent other citizens from exercising their correlative political opportunities.

What makes the ends of political freedom universal is that what citizens will in their political engagements is the determination of the whole order of the body politic, which itself presides over the other spheres of freedom so as to uphold the rights of owners, moral subjects, family members, and members of civil society, while ensuring that these other spheres do not impede political freedom. Hegel is adamant in distinguishing the universality of political action from the particularity of household affairs and activity in civil society. Although family members act on behalf of the joint interest of their household, their common end is still particular in comparison to the encompassing good of the body politic. Similarly, even the pursuit of shared interest by members of social interest groups in civil society is still limited to a particular welfare distinct from the universal end of the state, which upholds the totality of the reality of freedom.

This fundamental difference between political self-determination and the non-political engagements of the emancipated family and civil society is precisely what allows politics to pursue its own universal end without having to eliminate the particular affairs of household and social freedom. Because political practice is distinct from family and market activities, it can function without any necessary conflict with these other domains so long as the household and civil society do not impede their members from participating in politics on a par with others. Indeed, unless the household has been emancipated and a civil society has arisen, individuals will be bound to kinship and social relationships of servitude that are incompatible with self-government.

Reason in politics thus depends, as David Levine indicates, upon two corollary imperatives. On the one hand, citizens must act in pursuit of properly universal aims in the political sphere and not fall prey to 'mythologies' that deny the possibility of duly universal political engagement. On the other hand, household and civil institutions must be prevented from obstructing the political freedom of all citizens, either by limiting their political participation or by imposing particular interests upon

the state. Only when these conditions are met, can politics be rational and self-government be realised.

Although Hegel largely succeeds in developing property right and moral interaction, he fails to conceive the household, civil society, and the state in consistent conformity with the connection of universality and self-determination that he has otherwise established. Broadly speaking, Hegel does properly demarcate the general boundaries of the three spheres of ethical community, defining the emancipated family as a joint private domain whose members consolidate their property and care, and exercise the right and duty of codetermining the common weal of their household. Civil society, by contrast, is properly delineated as the ethical sphere whose members interact in pursuit of self-selected particular interests that are rightful insofar as they can only be realised in acting towards others so that they can achieve self-selected particular interests of their own. The state, then, stands as the encompassing ethical community whose members will the universal end of determining and upholding the entire framework of freedom, thereby exercising self-government.

Hegel violates the defining mission of each of these domains of right by specifying them in terms of natural distinctions reflecting the vestiges of pre-modern traditions that remained in his day and continued to distort his thought. First, Hegel defines the role of spouses in terms of a heterosexual relationship, thereby allowing naturally given sexual differences to restrict the freedom of marriage. He then further distinguishes family roles in terms of gender differences, privileging the husband as household head under whose dominion the wife is restricted to household chores, preventing her from participating equally in civil society or in self-government. On this basis, every relation of civil society and the state is tainted by the subordinate status accorded to women in the household. Moreover, Hegel allows estate groupings instead of economic classes to figure in the system of needs. This allows occupations determined by birth (for instance, those of nobles and peasant serfs) rather than by civil self-determination to intrude in the economy and restrict the freedoms of commodity relations. Estates then become the basis of corporations, which further restrict market activity by taking on the character of feudal guilds. Instead of conceiving corporations as social interest groups pursuing shared particular ends specific to civil society, Hegel retains groups whose common welfare is at odds with social freedom. Although he maintains that the corporations provide a common basis through which the universal end of politics can be connected to the particular interests of civil society, he subverts the distinction between state and civil society by treating the shared particular ends of corporations as if they could be equated with the universality of political action.

This deformation is carried over into Hegel's specification of the powers of government. By characterising the legislative branch of government as an estate

assembly, Hegel subordinates legislation to the pursuit of social interests, which themselves are deformed by being predicated upon naturally determined groupings that are antithetical to the freedoms of civil society. This leaves legislation prey to factions, subverting the reflexivity, universality, and autonomy of parliamentary action. Similarly, Hegel determines the head of state as a constitutional monarch, allowing the natural factor of birthright to deprive citizens of their right to codetermine the authorising power of government.

In *The Just Family*, I reconceived the emancipated household to remedy the shortcomings of Hegel's account, removing the restriction of marriage to a heterosexual union and eliminating any differentiations of family rights and duties by gender. In *The Just Economy* and *Law in Civil Society*, I similarly reconceived civil society, removing all the pre-modern vestiges that mar Hegel's account, rethinking commodity relations and capital in their proper universality, substituting class for estate differences, and accordingly rethinking the nature of social interest group activity and the public administration of welfare. In *The Just State*, I have completed the critique of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* by eliminating all traces of estate representation and hereditary roles and redeeming the universality of political freedom by giving due place to political parties, while rethinking the nature of legislative representation and the division of powers into legislative, authorising, and executive branches.

Traditional political thought from Aristotle through Hegel and beyond has completely neglected the role of parties and, in so doing, has failed to comprehend how political difference need not subvert the universality of political freedom. Particular political groups have perennially been treated as factions, as if political differences are equivalent to differences of interest. This reflects an inability to conceive how the universality of political freedom can be concrete and escape the immediate identification of the will of each citizen with the will of the state, an identification that eliminates political plurality. From Rousseau to Carl Schmitt, thinkers have failed to recognise how genuine political groups are distinguished not by particular interests, but by different political programmes. If political groups pursue particular interests, then politics becomes a competition between factions to control the state and impose their interest upon all others. Thereby, the reflexivity of self-government is destroyed, since rule becomes domination of one group over another. This equally subverts the universality of politics, by transforming rule into the hegemony of one particular interest. Thus, at one blow, politics loses its universality and the freedom of self-government. What saves politics from factionalism is the differentiation of political groups by differences in political programme rather than interest. Properly political programmes are all universal insofar as they comprise differing *political* views on how to realise the totality of freedom. Political parties can escape being factions by differentiating themselves not in terms of religious affiliation, social interest, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, or any other particular factor, but

rather by a distinct programme for governing the nation so as best to uphold the rights of all. When individuals participate in self-government by joining parties that have this properly political character, there can be reason in politics.

The fulfillment of the universality and self-determination of self-government equally depends upon legislative representation being emancipated from both bondage to particular interests and the immediate identity of citizen and state. On the one hand, legislators cannot function as representing the interests of particular groups (as in a corporate assembly) or even of geographically defined districts. If legislators acted just to promote the interests of their particular constituents, the legislature would become the battleground of competing factions, and legislation would comprise the victory of one faction or bloc of factions over the rest. As a result, law would no longer emanate from all and would not be universal in end. To avoid this outcome, legislators must instead represent the common good, namely, the upholding of the rights of all in face of the contingent conditions that call for new legislation. For this reason, legislators can engage in meaningful legislative debate about what laws best realise the totality of freedom in the present conjuncture. Instead of devoting themselves to pork barrel legislation on behalf of regional interest, they can legislate in accord with the universality and reflexivity of self-government, aiming to make laws that are good for the nation.

Exercising these legitimate prerogatives of legislative autonomy depends upon legislators being liberated from binding mandates, the spectre of recall and referenda, and any other device to assure an immediate identity between the will of the legislator and the will of the electorate. All such impositions upon legislative autonomy rest upon the Rousseauian conflation of the reflexivity of self-rule with the immediate identity of the will of each citizen and that of the state. None of these measures serve their purpose of uniting self-rule and the universality of political action unless political plurality is cancelled. Binding mandate, which requires legislative representatives to do in parliament exclusively what their constituents expected in electing them, can only secure self-rule if all representatives have identical mandates. If there is any diversity among representatives or their constituencies, the law becomes a factional rule, serving only the wills of the parliamentary majority. Or, alternately, if no group of representatives with the same original mandate is sufficiently large to pass its legislation, laws will be products of compromise leaving every constituent at odds with the resulting legislation. Of course, if legislators are bound to electoral mandates, parliamentary deliberation and debate become a charade, where no representative can succeed in persuading others to a new position or can change their own political view. The same problems afflict recall initiatives and referenda. Recalling representatives only renews the same discrepancy between the will of each citizen and their representatives, unless unanimity prevails, eliminating political plurality. Referenda cannot circumvent the alleged problem of representation since, so long as all citizens

do not vote as one, whatever referenda are adopted remain the initiative of some faction that succeeds in dominating everyone else, doing so without any intervening deliberative process that could determine what measure is put up for a vote.

The solution to these conundrums lies in how the autonomy of representatives is tied to the universality of their legislative aims. Insofar as representatives make law not on behalf of particular interests but in function of a specific political view on how to uphold the rights of all, what they legislate is the freely deliberated and debated expression of what their constituencies have chosen in electing them. To exercise self-rule, citizens elect representatives not to conform to their particular interests but to pursue a debatable political programme that, as such, is always intended to realise the freedoms of every citizen.

They can only do this by electing representatives who are free of all binding mandates and corporate identifications. For this reason, every elected representative legislates on behalf of all citizens, just as all citizens who vote codetermine the resulting legislation by selecting those representatives. They can only do so in this way, since any other more parochial or binding arrangement undermines the reflexivity and universality of legislative action and substitutes legislation by faction. If these features of political representation provide a genuine mediation between the will of citizens and the will of the state, they only do so on the basis of political action that succeeds in maintaining the conditions for equal political opportunity by regulating the relation between state and civil society so as to uphold the rights of owners, moral subjects, family members, and social agents in conformity with self-government.

One of the daunting mythologies thwarting reason in politics is the dogma that citizens cannot succeed in maintaining the supremacy of self-government over the interests of civil society. Hegel, of course, fought this dogma, which Marx and his followers have made an article of faith for generations who hold politics in contempt, dreaming of a withering away of the state. Carl Rapp is right to point to the extent to which the power of money has overwhelmed the American political process, subordinating democracy to domination by privileged interests in civil society. His remedy of lottery selection of government officials is, however, tantamount to a denial that equal political opportunity can be upheld in face of the accumulation of capital without sacrificing the ability to codetermine government policy. Certainly, selection by lottery eliminates the chance for electoral outcomes to be unduly influenced by privileged economic powers, be they wealthy individuals or corporations with widely dispersed ownership. However, in barring such domination of politics by the power of wealth, recourse to lottery substitutes blind chance for political self-determination. Lottery selection of officials deprives citizens of their right to codetermine who acts on their behalf in the legislature, in the authorising power, and in the executive branch of government. Rapp may describe this situation as one of opting for the call of public service, but submitting to a lottery for selective service is not an engagement in

political decision making. Although the opportunity to elect officials may appear to be an empty formality for those who subscribe to Rousseau's immediate identification of individual wills with the will of the state, it is an essential component of self-government. When the selection of government officials is no longer mediated by the will of every citizen, state functions are exercised upon the citizenry without their participation. Rule ceases to be self-rule.

If lottery selection were the only alternative to oligarchy or 'bourgeois democracy', self-government would be an unrealisable ideal. How, then, can oligarchy be prevented, without sacrificing political freedom to the blind fate of chance?

One essential *part* of securing equal political opportunity from the clutches of oligarchy is the state's empowerment of the public administration of welfare, which intervenes in the market so as to provide the conditions for equal economic opportunity in consonance with the upholding of family welfare. The market's continual generation of differences of wealth must be publicly regulated to prevent such differences from reaching the point of fostering economic domination, which impedes not only the social and household rights of individuals but their ability to engage in self-government on a par with others. Moreover, public authority must ensure that public goods are sufficiently provided, that the 'externalities' of commercial activity and general market failures do not jeopardise family and economic welfare, and that individuals are provided with the affordable health care, shelter, education, security, and environmental protections that enable them to exercise all their rights. Above all, it involves guaranteeing all willing and able individuals viable employment, be it through public works when needed. These efforts involve partial restrictions upon property rights, the favouritism of family relations, and market activity, all of which can be applied to differing degrees and with different balances of public and private engagement. As Robert Berman observes, in his contribution to this volume, this variability raises the question of whether such adjustments can be prescribed in any *a priori* fashion. Admittedly, if these measures were fully susceptible of *a priori* specification, they would fall within that part of the constitution mandating the necessary features of the non-negotiable edifice of right, which are determined by reason. That political freedom cannot exist unless citizens also enjoy their rights as persons, moral subjects, family members and members of civil society is indicative of how there can be no intractable conflict between the claims of the different spheres of right. Conversely, only the state can secure the non-political freedoms upon whose exercise the possibility of equal political opportunity itself depends, and only self-government can achieve this as an exercise of self-determination. For this reason, whatever partial adjustments of non-political freedoms are required for self-government are themselves necessary for the normative realisation of these same non-political freedoms. Consequently, reason does mandate the general principle that the freedoms of civil society should be subject to partial

adjustment for the sake of upholding equal political opportunity. Moreover, since equal economic opportunity is a precondition for equal political opportunity, it is equally *a priori* certain that property and family rights should be subject to whatever partial adjustments are required to ensure that individuals are all able to exercise their economic rights. In this regard, parents do not have the right to deprive their children of the education and health care they need to achieve autonomy and enjoy equal social and political opportunity. Indeed, without access to such resources, children will be disadvantaged with regard to securing their own future family's autonomous welfare.

Public regulation of civil society, thus, does not involve political prerogatives 'trumping' those of society, household, and ownership. In every case, the adjustments must be partial precisely because self-government cannot operate without citizens enjoying the other forms of self-determination, and because these adjustments serve to uphold in general the very freedoms that are impinged upon.

This is ignored by Hayek in his critique of the welfare state, which rests on presupposing the lexical primacy of property rights, in line with the logic of social contract theory (Hayek 1960: 253-323). Social security, graduated income taxes, and publicly guaranteed health care are all rejected on the grounds that they go beyond the basic provision of the survival needs of property owners. Hayek is willing to grant that property rights entitle owners to the basic security and livelihood that allows them to function as owners. What he denies is that individuals can have a right to any greater degree of welfare, such as would secure equal economic and political opportunity. Private insurance may spread risks, but it does so through voluntary payments by the insured, unlike the disbursements of social security and public health care, which serve individuals whether or not they have contributed and are in desperate need. Similarly, graduated income taxes apply a rule that appropriates an unequal proportion of wealth in supposed violation of the fundamental principle that persons should be subject to equal treatment. Yet, insofar as differences of wealth do affect social and political opportunity, as well as family welfare, a flat tax has very different consequences for those who are affluent and those who are not. The affluent are not disadvantaged by progressive taxation that levels the playing field of the less well off, whereas the latter are disadvantaged by uniform tax rates that disproportionately constrain their opportunities. If what matters is upholding the totality of self-determination, adjustments of property in the interest of equal opportunity in society and state are not restrictions upon freedom but, rather, enabling realisations of freedom. This consideration is what decides whether an 'opportunity cost' is a disadvantage violating equal opportunity.

Admittedly, the precise measures that need to be taken by the public administration of welfare are conditioned by the given present conjuncture of domestic and international affairs. Moreover, the outcome of any measures taken remains equally contingent upon what individuals choose to do socially and politically

at home and abroad, as well as upon natural events. For all these reasons, the mandates for adjustments in the interest of equal opportunity are matters for positive legislation and executive judgment, rather than measures that reason can exclusively determine. For example, it is always debatable whether the best way of insuring affordable health care in given circumstances is to generalise the system of the US Veterans Hospitals and create something like the British National Health Service, where patients pay nothing, health care providers are public employees, and hospitals and clinics are largely owned by the state, or to generalise the system of US Medicare and Medicaid and create a single payer system, where the state insures all individuals, leaving the provision of health care in private hands, or to generalise the system of private insurance, so that all individuals are required to purchase private health insurance, with subsidies provided for those who cannot afford to pay, as done in Germany and many other countries. Similarly, it is equally debatable whether social security can best be provided by a centralised government agency as opposed to private insurance plans that are sufficiently regulated and subsidised as to be protected from market fluctuations and available to all. Finally, it is open to question whether enlarging the public debt, raising taxes on those who spend comparatively less of their income and wealth, or printing money in some 'sovereign currency' can best fund increased government spending to overcome economic crises due to insufficient effective demand. A 'minimal state' may be precluded, but how big the just state must be hangs on considerations such as these.

All the above initiatives are inherently corrigible and, therefore, deserving of political debate. Even at their most successful, however, they cannot entirely resolve the problem of oligarchy haunting self-government. There are two challenges that remain to be addressed.

First, achieving equal economic opportunity may reduce some of the sources of the commercial domination of politics, but diminishing differences in personal wealth does not prevent economic organisations, such as publicly held corporations or groups of individuals in politically influential occupations, from disproportionately affecting political debate and electoral outcomes. Stock ownership may be widely distributed, allowing for diminished inequality of private wealth, without preventing corporations from wielding huge economic concentrations that, if allowed, can buy publicity, fund campaigns, and otherwise influence the citizenry to a degree that undercuts equal political opportunity. The same can be said of owners and employees of the media and other fields of special use in politics. Hence, the state must intervene to prevent such social factors from fostering political privilege.

On the other hand, the state must take measures to provide citizens with access to the resources they need to run for office and to get their message to the public, independently of their own private wealth and in consonance with the operations of properly constituted political parties. How this is achieved depends upon the

contingent circumstances that affect how self-government operates and how the electoral process unfolds. Once more, the measures to be taken cannot be prescribed by reason in any full detail. What can be said, however, is that public authority must provide the conditions for citizens to have equal opportunity to enter the political process and affect its outcome. Public subsidies to cover campaign expenses, public requirements that media offer sufficient access to all significant political forces, and restrictions on campaign spending and media ownership to prevent private interests from dominating political life, are some of the basic options that warrant consideration. It is these efforts that can counter the mythology that politics cannot reign supreme, that self-government cannot prevail over oligarchy, that political choice cannot triumph over the spin of the wheel of chance. *The Just State* aims to point towards how and why self-government is an ongoing challenge for which political vigilance can never rest.²

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Notes

¹ Although rationalists such as Descartes and empiricists such as Locke both maintain that there can be certain knowledge of one's own self and of God, Kant exposes the doubtfulness of these claims.

² I wish to thank David Merrill for organising the contribution to this issue of the *Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain*.

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