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## CORRIGENDUM

# Cooperation, Conflict, and the Costs of Anarchy—CORRIGENDUM

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In the original publication of this article, a portion of a footnote was improperly incorporated into the main text. On page 552, the final sentence of the second paragraph was meant to be part of footnote 73:

By a different mechanism, there is a parallel here to David Lake’s argument for why democracies may be “powerful pacifists,” in the sense of having little interest in territorial acquisition but strong military capability.

Additionally, the opening sentence of the same paragraph should be revised to the following:

With issue competition ( $\gamma > 0$ ) and simultaneous arms decisions, if state  $i$ ’s value for territory increases then  $j$ ’s equilibrium arms level tends to increase.

## Reference

Fearon, James D. 2018. Cooperation, Conflict, and the Costs of Anarchy. *International Organization* 72 (3):523–59. doi: 10.1017/S0020818318000115.