

THE PRESIDUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET  
OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

declares that it authorizes Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to sign the Interim Agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

Moscow, May 26, 1972

[Stamp of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet  
of the USSR]

Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR

[Signed] N. PODGORNÝ

Countersigned by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR  
[Signed] A. GROMYKO

THE PRESIDUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET  
OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

declares that it authorizes Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to sign the Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems.

Moscow, May 26, 1972

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of the USSR]

Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR

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26 August 1976

TO THE EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

I would like to take issue with Professor Leo Gross' view<sup>1</sup> that the decisions of the Security Council to invite the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) to participate in its debates were ultra vires the powers of the Council.

The Indonesia case is a precedent of primary importance. It is, of course, distinguishable in the sense that the Netherlands had given some de facto recognition to the Indonesian Republic, while Israel refuses to recognize the Palestinians. As Dr. Gross recognized,<sup>2</sup> the decision of the Council in the Indonesia case was without prejudice to the question of the sovereignty of that Republic. The principle of the earlier case is clearly relevant:

<sup>1</sup> Gross, *Voting in the Security Council and the PLO*, 60 AJIL 470 (1976).

<sup>2</sup> *Id.* 477.

that the Council will invite the participation of an emerging political entity—even if it does not yet possess all the requisites of statehood—if such invitation will promote the peaceful settlement of a serious international dispute.

There is a second procedural principle which has a bearing; drawn from the practice of civilized nations. Courts of Equity require that all the parties in interest should be brought before them, in order that a matter in controversy may be finally settled.<sup>3</sup> It is obvious that the Middle East controversy is not solvable without a representative of the interests of the Palestinian people. It was within the powers of the Council, under Chapter Six of the Charter, to allow the PLO to represent these interests, particularly following the recognition of that organization by the General Assembly.

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<sup>3</sup> See *Shields v. Barrow*, 17 How. 130 (1854).