

his present relevance. Dr Simon correctly considers it the commentator's task to throw what light he can on both these factors.

As to the question of date (which is not given the disproportionate amount of space it has in most modern commentaries), he favours the view of C. Torrey which would place it much later than the time of Cyrus. Whether or not this is to be expected, the line of argument in this present book is sufficiently strong to render this view no longer one to be peremptorily ruled as out of court as it has been up to now.

R.T.

THINKING IN OPPOSITES. By Paul Roubiczek. (Routledge and Kegan Paul; 21s.)

'I accept the fundamental theses of Kant as my starting point in this book.' This is the cause both of its merits and of its defects. It makes no concessions to readers who are accustomed to the more light-hearted fashions of today, but well repays the effort required to read it.

Mr Roubiczek has made an acute and thorough investigation of the way in which human beings think. He believes that 'we apply opposites whenever we think at all, and accurate thinking, therefore, depends upon their correct application'. He maintains a fundamental opposition between internal and external reality, the respective realms of morals and science, but connects more closely than Kant did by showing that many concepts pass over from one to the other. The investigation also indicates that final knowledge of a metaphysical kind is impossible to an intellect which can never grasp unity because it is bound to use oppositions; but this deficiency is corrected by the use of feeling, through which we can experience unity without being able to think it. This refusal to identify man with his mind is an important modification of Kant's rationalism.

Nevertheless the whole study is limited by its Kantian presupposition that all thought is discursive. To justify the mind's power to think metaphysically is a long task, but in the present context we might suggest as a line of enquiry the opposition implied in this passage of St Thomas: 'The processes of metaphysical science are said to be marked with insight, for there most of all is to be found the fullest understanding. Reasoning differs from understanding as multitude from unity, as time from eternity, as circumference from centre. Reasoning is characteristically busy about many things, but understanding rests on one simple truth.' (*De Trinitate*; 6, 1.)

R.L.B.

TUDOR PRELATES AND POLITICS, 1536-1558. By Lacey Baldwin Smith. (Princeton University Press: London, Geoffrey Cumberlege; 32s. 6d.)

Historians have nowhere found objectivity harder to achieve than