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International Organization

Matthew Evangelista

Transnational Relations and Security Policy

Avery Goldstein

Discounting the Free Ride in Alliances

Richard Price

A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo

Kenneth A. Rodman

Multinational Corporations and Economic Sanctions

Baldev Raj Nayar

Regimes, Power, and International Aviation

Geoffrey Garrett vs. Walter Mattli and Anne-Marie Slaughter

Debate on Law and Politics in the European Union

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(1) The maximum length of a manuscript acceptable for review is 16,000 words, including notes. Thus, if pages average 250 words in length, this limit would equal 64 pages; if the average page had 320 words, 50 pages would be the maximum. Please provide a word count.

(2) The manuscript must not identify the author after the title page. The author's own works may be cited as "author" for review purposes.

(3) We need four copies.

The journal's office will notify the author that the manuscript has not been accepted for review unless each of these guidelines is followed. An electronic mail address or fax number would speed communications if they are necessary and would be appreciated. A future issue of *International Organization* will also publish a fuller set of style guidelines.

Thank you for your cooperation.

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Articles

The paradox of state strength: transnational relations, domestic structures, and security policy in Russia and the Soviet Union
Matthew Evangelista 1

Discounting the free ride: alliances and security in the postwar world
Avery Goldstein 39

A genealogy of the chemical weapons taboo
Richard Price 73

Sanctions at bay? Hegemonic decline, multinational corporations, and U.S. economic sanctions since the pipeline case
Kenneth A. Rodman 105

Regimes, power, and international aviation
Baldev Raj Nayar 139

Dissent and debate

The politics of legal integration in the European Union
Geoffrey Garrett 171

Law and politics in the European Union: a reply to Garrett
Walter Mattli and Anne-Marie Slaughter 183

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Abstracts

The paradox of state strength: transnational relations, domestic structures, and security policy in Russia and the Soviet Union

by Matthew Evangelista

A transnational community of disarmament proponents achieved considerable success in influencing Soviet security policy in the 1980s on several issues, including two examined here: nuclear testing and strategic defenses. Fundamental changes in the Soviet domestic structure after 1989, however, had the paradoxical effect of making transnational actors simultaneously less constrained in promoting their favored policies and less effective in getting them implemented. Transnational relations and domestic structures in combination affect security policy. This interaction likewise has implications for theories of ideas, learning, and epistemic communities.

Discounting the free ride: alliances and security in the postwar world

by Avery Goldstein

The collective goods theory of alliances and neorealist theory yield conflicting expectations about the security policies of states. The former emphasizes the temptation to “ride free” on the efforts of others, while the latter emphasizes the incentives for self-help. In the cases of Britain, China, and France during the early cold war, the constraints identified by neorealist theory, reinforced by the advent of nuclear weapons, prevailed. Each discounted the value of the security benefits superpower partners could provide. The second-ranking powers’ decisions to shoulder the burden of developing independent nuclear forces are at odds with collective goods arguments that portray especially strong temptations to ride free in the circumstances that prevailed at that time—an international system dominated by two superpowers, each possessing large nuclear deterrent arsenals that could easily be employed on behalf of allies. This analysis suggests that present efforts to discourage additional states from acquiring nuclear weapons by offering them international security guarantees are unlikely to succeed.

A genealogy of the chemical weapons taboo

by Richard Price

How is it, that among the countless technological innovations in weaponry, chemical weapons stand out as weapons that carry the stigma of moral illegitimacy. To provide an adequate account of the prohibitory norm against chemical weapons use, one must understand the meanings that have served to constitute and delegitimize this category of weapons. Such an account is provided by genealogy, a method that examines the

interpretive practices around which moral orders are constructed and behaviors are defined as normal or unacceptable. The genealogical method yields insights that illuminate neglected dimensions of the chemical weapons taboo: namely, the roles that contingency, domination, and resistance have played in the operation of this norm as a symbol of “uncivilized” conduct in international relations.

Sanctions at bay? Hegemonic decline, multinational corporations, and U.S. economic sanctions since the pipeline case

by Kenneth A. Rodman

One of the lessons drawn by many scholars from the 1982 U.S. sanctions against the Soviet–European gas pipeline was that the decline of American hegemony and the global spread of American business placed the overseas networks of U.S. multinational corporations beyond the control of the U.S. government for the purposes of economic sanctions. Through systematically examining three subsequent sanctions efforts (Nicaragua, Libya, and South Africa), this study qualifies the generalizability of this “lesson.” In none of the cases was the United States willing to incur alliance costs through applying extraterritorial controls, nor was it able to persuade American firms to substitute public preferences for private ones. Nonetheless, in each case, the U.S. government influenced corporate decision making by augmenting corporate perceptions of risk so that prudent business strategies reinforced diplomatic preferences.

Regimes, power, and international aviation

by Baldev Raj Nayar

Measured against institutionalism and modified structural realism, realism provides the most coherent explanation of the international arrangements pertaining to the issue-area of civil aviation. Although institutionalized international organizations govern technical and safety issues, no single regime has emerged to govern the important commercial matters that bear on states’ relative gains and losses. Instead, since World War I states have entered into a multiplicity of denounceable bilateral agreements that in turn reflect the balance of bargaining power between them. States that have attempted to reorganize the system have been driven by their own interests and capabilities, with the stronger aviation powers professing a preference for liberalism.