

Of course this is a humanism impossible to the Christian. But it presents a challenge. The Kantian philosophy (perhaps more profoundly atheist than Kant himself realized) upon which Cassirer builds, is one that closely rivals the *philosophia perennis* precisely because it does take serious account of both the ideal and empirical character of man's thought. Other philosophers stress one side or the other; Kantians and Aristotelians, for all their divergence of approach and conclusions, respect the same imperious demands, and their systems often correspond to each other, crux for crux, whilst yet standing on their own irreconcilable positions. Professor Cassirer opposes his own functionalism to the static substance of traditional thought. But it should not be forgotten (as the Cartesian reduction of material substance to inert extensity inclines us to forget) that, in fact, the Aristotelian and Thomistic theory of substance was, in a full sense, functional, a theory of the dynamic source of beingness, conceived, as the formal always must be, with reference to finality. I think the real opposition is rather that in the older tradition function was already objective, whilst for Cassirer as a Kantian it is itself the "creative process" which effects objectivity. This is the same as saying that traditionally God was the source of the world's intelligibility, whilst for Kant the source was the conscious subject, man. But two stark facts seriously inconvenience the latter interpretation, the facts of other selves and of self's extermination in death. For this reason it is significant that the present "Essay on Man" embraces neither evil (a partial extermination of self, which has much to do with other selves) nor death. There is pathos in this. Straited by evil and set around by death, one is put in mind of Pascal's complaint against philosophers: "How should they give remedies to your woes who have not so much as known them?"

COLUMBA RYAN, O.P.

THE CRITICISM OF EXPERIENCE. By D. J. B. Hawkins. (Sheed & Ward; 5s.).

Dr. Hawkins's analysis of sensation and perception proceeds by steps. Knowledge, in general, is of reality, not of phenomena; sensation of secondary qualities is of the real, but of the real only as in the sensing subject; we have, however, an immediate awareness, not exactly of primary qualities, but of mass or voluminousness in our own bodies, and also a like awareness of a "now" that is not a point but a unit of finite duration; we have also an immediate awareness of ourselves as individual existents and dynamically inclined agents; we have an immediate awareness of voluminousness external to our own bodies, thus perception of the external world. The conditions of such perception are parallel with those of memory in which we are immediately aware of past events; these conditions are (1) that there be present an image or sense datum like the past event or external object, (2) that this be caused by the past event or external object. (These are the conditions,

not the constituents, of memory and perception).

This statement sounds bald. Dr. Hawkins's method is to report, at each step, the views held by Descartes, Kant, the English philosophers from Locke to Hamilton, and occasionally others, and to sift them; when there is not much left of any of them, except Reid and Hamilton, he produces his own 'immediate awareness'; I think his positive argument, stripped of these destructive trappings, is almost as bald as the statement given. Undeniably, much thought has gone to the book; unfortunately intuition invariably solves the thought.

Does Dr. Hawkins confine his theory to the sense level? If so, why the chapter on knowledge of self and substance? If not, why no mention of an awareness of being? This latent ambiguity between the sensational and the intellectual may explain why his individual existent is so precariously like prime matter, and why existence becomes the principle of individuality (*not*, surely, the view of St. Thomas, as stated); it may also explain why "external" is taken as relative to the body, not to the mind, though I should have thought that once experience of the body was allowed the "problem of the external world", presented little difficulty. A good deal seems to turn, in the author's estimation, on the experience of voluminousness, that is, in our own bodies, of "a mass which is being compressed" (p. 108); this is distinguished from tactile sense-quality. I confess that I, for one (I have the unusual combination of Locke and the Schoolmen for me), cannot imagine a tactile sense-quality that does anything more than compress my bodily voluminousness.

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L'IMAGINATION SELON DESCARTES. By Jean H. Roy. (N.R.F. Gallimard).

M. Gilson, towards the close of his study of the influence of medieval thought on Descartes, calls attention to the "*paradoxe cartésien*" that the proof of the real distinction of the soul and the body rests on the fact of their union, and that whereas the former can be thought clearly the latter can but be confusedly felt. M. Roy's book is a prolonged commentary upon this paradox; and it has to be, for according to Descartes the imagination is "a certain application of the knowing faculty to the body which is intimately present to it". A study of the imagination must, therefore, become a study of the relation of soul to body.

M. Roy ably analyses the notions involved, particularly that of the "image", which cannot, for Descartes, be a third reality between soul and body, but is explained by "*une théorie extrêmement poussée du symbole*". He denies that imagination, even as a passion, serves to prove the union of body to soul, as do the senses and other passions; rather the fact of this union lays the basis for the physiological explanation of one particular manifestation of the imagination, dreaming. Dreaming was the ever present threat to