

not the constituents, of memory and perception).

This statement sounds bald. Dr. Hawkins's method is to report, at each step, the views held by Descartes, Kant, the English philosophers from Locke to Hamilton, and occasionally others, and to sift them; when there is not much left of any of them, except Reid and Hamilton, he produces his own 'immediate awareness'; I think his positive argument, stripped of these destructive trappings, is almost as bald as the statement given. Undeniably, much thought has gone to the book; unfortunately intuition invariably solves the thought.

Does Dr. Hawkins confine his theory to the sense level? If so, why the chapter on knowledge of self and substance? If not, why no mention of an awareness of being? This latent ambiguity between the sensational and the intellectual may explain why his individual existent is so precariously like prime matter, and why existence becomes the principle of individuality (*not*, surely, the view of St. Thomas, as stated); it may also explain why "external" is taken as relative to the body, not to the mind, though I should have thought that once experience of the body was allowed the "problem of the external world", presented little difficulty. A good deal seems to turn, in the author's estimation, on the experience of voluminousness, that is, in our own bodies, of "a mass which is being compressed" (p. 108); this is distinguished from tactile sense-quality. I confess that I, for one (I have the unusual combination of Locke and the Schoolmen for me), cannot imagine a tactile sense-quality that does anything more than compress my bodily voluminousness.

COLUMBA RYAN, O.P.

L'IMAGINATION SELON DESCARTES. By Jean H. Roy. (N.R.F. Gallimard).

M. Gilson, towards the close of his study of the influence of medieval thought on Descartes, calls attention to the "*paradoxe cartésien*" that the proof of the real distinction of the soul and the body rests on the fact of their union, and that whereas the former can be thought clearly the latter can but be confusedly felt. M. Roy's book is a prolonged commentary upon this paradox; and it has to be, for according to Descartes the imagination is "a certain application of the knowing faculty to the body which is intimately present to it". A study of the imagination must, therefore, become a study of the relation of soul to body.

M. Roy ably analyses the notions involved, particularly that of the "image", which cannot, for Descartes, be a third reality between soul and body, but is explained by "*une théorie extrêmement poussée du symbole*". He denies that imagination, even as a passion, serves to prove the union of body to soul, as do the senses and other passions; rather the fact of this union lays the basis for the physiological explanation of one particular manifestation of the imagination, dreaming. Dreaming was the ever present threat to

the Cartesian system. In dreams the imagination is no longer at the service of thought, but becomes a passion, in some sort hostile to thought, dissolving thought. That it does not triumph so far as to loosen the very linch-pin of Descartes' certainty, the *Cogito*, becomes the subject of M. Roy's last two absorbing chapters. C.R.

THE CATEGORIES OF BEING IN ARISTOTLE AND ST. THOMAS. By Sr. M. Marina Scheu, O.S.F., M.A. (The Catholic University of America Press, Washington).

This dissertation is a compilation of the texts from Aristotle and St. Thomas that are more obviously relevant to their doctrine of categories. There is no attempt at originality, and interpretation is left to a few comments culled from very unequal authorities. It cannot be said that the author has penetrated deeply into the significance of what she studies; she presents material of interest, form seems lacking. Her conclusions favour St. Thomas at the expense of Aristotle, but too often by attributing to St. Thomas's genius what was common property of medieval scholasticism. C.R.

THE MORAL THEORY OF EVOLUTIONARY NATURALISM. By W. F. Quillian, Jr. (Yale Studies in Religious Education No. XVII). (Yale University Press; Humphrey Milford; 20s.).

Dr. Quillian publishes the substance of a doctorate thesis upon the rather dreary, but all too influential, ethical systems of such late 19th century evolutionists as Darwin, Leslie Stephens, Spencer, Westermarck, and others. He sketches the historical setting of their thought, then summarises their accounts of the genesis and character of morality. His criticism follows, and is effective in its main contention that these thinkers make an illegitimate transference from the descriptive theory to which their naturalistic method confines them to the normative morality to which their instincts prompt them; from "is" to "ought". All this is quite well, if neither very profoundly nor originally, done. But when he goes on to argue that there can be no normative morality without a supernatural or religious foundation, he welters in a terrible confusion of terms such as natural, supernatural, metaphysical, religious, and propounds a vague amalgum of seemingly second-hand Kantianism, Idealism and liberal theology that is not convincing. C.R.

MORAL THEOLOGY. By Heribert Jone, O.F.M.Cap., J.C.D. Transl. by Urban Odelman, O.F.M.Cap., J.C.D. (The Newman Bookshop, Westminster, Maryland; \$3.00).

This well produced pocket manual is in the main a translation of Fr. Jone's *Katholische Moraltheologie*, with additions and alterations where they are necessary, to adapt it to the laws and customs of the United States. The author's purpose, as stated in the preface, is "to provide priests engaged in parish work with quick and convenient answers to moral questions" and "to facilitate the preparation of the various examinations required in Moral Theology".