

CORRESPONDENCE

TO THE EDITOR OF *Philosophy*

AN APPEAL

DEAR SIR,

A disastrous fire, during the night before Christmas Eve, destroyed a large portion of the Library of the University of the Witwatersrand, including many Philosophical and Psychological works.

The contents of the Library were only partially covered by Insurance, and the prevailing depression makes it difficult to find the money for promptly replacing the losses.

May I, in these circumstances, appeal through the pages of *Philosophy* to all fellow Philosophers and Psychologists, and especially to my friends and colleagues at British Universities, to help me in building up again, as soon as possible, an adequate collection of books for my students.

Every gift of author's copies or of duplicates—addressed to The Librarian, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa—will be gratefully acknowledged, and the donor's name, together with the occasion of the gift, will be recorded in the books themselves.

Yours faithfully,

R. F. ALFRED HOERNLÉ.

Head of the Department of Philosophy.

University of the Witwatersrand,
Milner Park, Johannesburg,
February 22, 1932.

TO THE EDITOR OF *Philosophy*

SIR,

Mr. Rex Knight, in the current number of *Philosophy* (April 1932), questions what I say in my review of Professor Stout's *Mind and Matter*.

Professor Stout writes that "from the time of Descartes the traditional and orthodox view has been that the secondary qualities do not qualify matter at all" (p. 127). I pointed out in my review that Locke, and probably Descartes, did not use the phrase "secondary qualities" in this sense. Mr. Rex Knight admits as much.

He defends its use, however, on the ground that it is the *traditional view*, and suggests that Professor Stout in referring to the traditional view is well aware of Locke's different usage. Whether the above passage supports that interpretation must be a matter of opinion. In any case, it might be asked whether the *traditional view* is anything else than a misunderstanding of Locke's view.

Mr. Rex Knight then asks where did Descartes assert that secondary qualities qualify matter. Nothing that I said requires me to answer.

I am,

Your obedient servant,

B. M. LAING.

The University, Sheffield,
April 30, 1932.