Introduction

State of the Art

The global Second World War caused major humanitarian catastrophes that necessitated relief for soldiers, military and civilian prisoners of war, as well as for other victims of the war, including refugees and displaced persons in Europe and in non-European war zones, particularly in Asia. To assist the ever-increasing needs of these diverse groups became a major task for established humanitarian actors, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), various national Red Cross Societies, the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee and the Quakers. They could resort to organisational knowledge and experienced staff, and professionalised more and more their war-related relief work in the course of the ongoing conflict.[1] However, just like during, and in the aftermath of, the First World War, the present global conflagration also saw the emergence of new humanitarian organisations, such as Oxfam and the Catholic Relief Service, that mobilised for special concerns or helped to facilitate potential political alliances.[2] Regardless of whether the humanitarian organisation was an established or a new one, non-state relief agencies entered into close, often co-dependent relationships with states during the war. States understood aid as significant due to moral concerns, but also to safeguard their political, economic and strategic interests, and hence strove to control, guide and coordinate humanitarian activities during and in the aftermath of the war.[3]

To alleviate the suffering caused by war and displacement in a coordinated, planned manner and to rebuild the post-war world, the Allied powers also set

up a new international, intergovernmental organisation, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), in 1943. Despite its short existence – the UNRRA was discontinued in 1948 – the organisation provided significant emergency help and was an important agency in the post-war reconstruction of European regions. Throughout the last two decades, scholars have duly noted its achievements.[4] Despite the magnitude of the UNRRA's relief mission, the emergence of this major humanitarian actor did not substitute the relief provided by non-state organisations and governments that continued to be important agents of humanitarian assistance in the context of post-war Europe, as a bourgeoning field of research has shown.[5]

What is striking about the allocation of international relief in the late phase of the Second World War and in its aftermath was its heavy focus on assisting people in Europe at the expense of aid to non-European societies. For example, the UNRRA operated in just four non-European countries: Ethiopia, the Philippines, Korea and Chiang Kai-shek's China. However, China was allocated the largest individual amount of relief funding.[6] The focus on Europe stemmed, first and foremost, as Silvia Salvatici has argued, from the assumption that the 'post-war rebirth could not but start from Europe'.[7] The devastation wrought by the war in Europe prompted a surge in humanitarian personnel and programmes in the region. However, other regions had also endured significant challenges and required humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation. Their experiences have been largely overlooked in standard accounts of humanitarian history, despite growing research on non-European contexts.

In the last two decades, historians have begun to analyse the relief efforts of non-state actors, intergovernmental organisations, and governments in war-torn and post-war Asia. Apart from studying the experiences of refugees and displaced people and initiatives to aid them,[8] scholarly work has addressed the question of rehabilitation and reconstruction of post-war Asian civil societies, for instance, in Malaya, China and Japan.[9] During and after the war, non-state organisations, often in close cooperation with governments and the Allied military command in South, Southeast and East Asia, aided wounded and disabled soldiers. After the cessation of fighting, they assisted liberated military prisoners of war and civilian internees, as well as other distressed groups such as war orphans.[10] The incorporation of these examples into the historical account of mid-20th-century humanitarianism would facilitate a shift away from a Eurocentric description and towards a more nuanced understanding of its polycentric nature.

It is argued here that one aspect of this polycentric nature was the enduring importance of empire in the provision of aid. In addition to national and international aid actors, intra-imperial aid constituted a significant element of the mid-20th-century humanitarian landscape. This will be demonstrated in the following two chapters with the example of British India. It is essential to emphasise that the relief provided within the British Empire was not inherently imperial in nature. Rather, Indian humanitarian aid was characterised by fragmentation, with alternative motivations and structures, including those that were nationalist in orientation and challenged the very notion of empire.

The first chapter of this section (Chapter 4) analyses the history of the Indian Comforts Fund (ICF), a British Indian humanitarian collaboration active in wartime Britain for Indian soldiers, prisoners of war and civilians in need. Focusing on this late example of an 'imperial' humanitarianism, the chapter not only scrutinises the Indian share in this venture against paternalistic notions of Britain's imperial responsibility, but also discusses gendered aspects of relief work. The second chapter (Chapter 5) turns to a nationalist relief scheme, organised by the Indian National Congress (INC) for the Indian diaspora community in Malaya in the transitional time between the end of the global Second World War, late colonial rule, and early decolonisation. Examining the formation and the humanitarian work of the Congress Medical Mission extends our understanding of the Congress's imaginations of India's postcolonial domestic and foreign policy set-up. Yet the chapter pays equally close attention to contradictions between the discursive framing of the Congress's ambitions and their implementations on the ground.

Taken together, the chapters in Part III address two key areas of analysis: first, the interplay between Indian and British humanitarianism and, second, the role of state and non-state aid from a colony in an intra-imperial context. They illustrate the importance of Indian aid provision during and after the war, and its impact on the colonial balance of power in South Asia.

Indian Contributions and Responses to the Second World War

After the outbreak of the Second World War in Europe on 1 September 1939, the Viceroy Lord Linlithgow (1887–1952, Viceroy 1936–43) pledged – without consulting the Executive Council, the Central Legislative Assembly or Indian (nationalist) leaders – India's support for Britain. Indian politicians

of the Muslim League and the Hindu Mahasabha decided to cooperate with the government, even though their support during the war years was conditional and ambiguous. The INC, although mostly in opposition to Nazi aggression, refused any cooperation unless India was granted more political rights; for some that meant nothing less than independence. The following prolonged negotiations did not lead to any successful agreement, as Britain repudiated any concessions during the war. The Congress responded with a comprehensive campaign of civil disobedience in August 1942: the Quit India Campaign. As Japanese forces advanced in Southeast Asia, the British took drastic measures against the nationalist movement, and, in consequence, the Congress leadership and thousands of nationalists spent the remaining time of the war in Indian prisons.[11]

The Congress's official anti-Axis stance was not shared by all Indian nationalists. In Southeast Asia, the Indian National Army (INA) was formed during the war. The INA was first under the leadership of the Indian Independence League (IIL), and, later, Subhas Chandra Bose became its commander. The INA attracted Indian soldiers who had been taken prisoners by the Japanese army as well as Indians living in Malaya, Singapore and Burma. It fought alongside Japanese troops against the Allied powers with the aim of freeing India from British colonial rule. Supported by parts of the Indian diaspora community in Southeast Asia, Bose also established the Azad Hind government, that is, the government of free India.[12] Indian opinion in Southeast Asia towards the Japanese and the war was, however, in no way unanimous. Neither all Indian prisoners of war nor even the bulk of the remaining Indian diaspora community joined the INA. From both groups of Indians, an unknown number was also conscripted to work for the Japanese. Some were sent to far-off New Guinea while others were forced to construct the notorious Burma–Thailand Railway.[13] With the armistices in 1945 and the British return to Southeast Asia, quite a few members of the former Azad Hind government and the INA were imprisoned by the colonial authorities; others who remained free found themselves in dire social and economic conditions.

Meanwhile, the Second World War and its outcome had also clearly changed the political situation in British India. Increasingly losing the power and will to control events on the subcontinent, Delhi realised its days were numbered and prepared to leave. Most of the Congress leadership had been cut off from Indian politics during their imprisonment. After their release in the summer of 1945, they found rival political parties, most prominently

the Muslim League, in an enhanced position. With the government decision to hold elections in the Central and Provincial Legislatures in the winter of 1945–46, the Congress had to restore its broad support to secure success in the upcoming election. One way of doing so was, as William Kuracina has argued, to support the INA personnel and their cause in British India, because after the war's end, they enjoyed popularity among the population.[14] The election was followed by complicated negotiations between the colonial government and Indian politicians, mainly from the Congress and the Muslim League, on the question of the 'transfer of power'. As an outcome of its massive election victory, a Congress-dominated Interim Government headed by Jawaharlal Nehru took up its work from September 1946. It remained in place until 15 August 1947, when India became independent.[15]

Notwithstanding the nationalist opposition, India fought at the side of the Allied powers against the Axis. Just as in the First World War, the country supplied men, materials and money on a major scale. During the war years, the number of soldiers in the Indian Army increased tenfold to more than 2 million men by September 1945. The Indian troops served in Europe, Africa, the Middle East and Burma. After the Japanese victories in Southeast Asia, waves of Allied troops poured into India and turned the country's eastern parts especially into a military base camp for the subcontinent's defence and the retaking of Burma. To clothe, equip and feed the Indian Army, first at the Middle Eastern fronts and later during the Burma campaign, India was asked to supply manufactured goods, such as guns and ammunition, boots, blankets, uniforms, sandbags and medical drugs.[16] Likewise, the colony was requested by Britain to contribute to financing the war. The agreement concluded between London and Delhi in February 1940 settled the financial liabilities of both sides in view of the costs for maintaining the Indian Army. As Britain failed to pay for the subcontinent's military service during the conflict due to the war's unpredictable expansion, India had turned from a debtor to a creditor country by 1945. To raise the money for the war, the colonial government resorted to three measures, that is, increasing the levels of taxation, borrowing from the public through saving schemes, and so on, and printing new money. Although all these measures paid almost equally for the war, Indian responses to the borrowing schemes were rather unenthusiastic, as the public's support for the war effort was muted.[17]

Reluctant responses also arose when the Indian public was asked to give to voluntary collections and to subscribe to special war funds. Similarly to debates that had occurred during the First World War, the question of the

voluntariness of donations was foregrounded in public discussions. As Yasmin Khan has convincingly argued, not all of these contributions were voluntary, and the organised collections for the War Fund especially, also called the Viceroy's War Purposes Fund, were widely resented. Understood as a sign of imperial loyalty by the colonial administration, Indians who gave money without being pressurised by the state often did so in the hope of receiving favours in exchange.[18] Yet this is not to say that Indian financial and material contributions to special war funds (and also to appeals directly made by relief organisations) were not equally motivated by patriotic feelings and humanitarian concerns. Besides, money from the Viceroy War Purposes Fund and other regional war funds co-financed the work of several Indian and British voluntary relief organisations and initiatives, such as the ICF, the British Red Cross Society, the St. Dustan's Fund, the Polish Children's Fund and the Young Men's Christian Association. These organisations assisted the ever-growing number of Indian and Allied soldiers and prisoners of war, as well as civilian victims of the war in need.[19]

Different 'official' war funds also supported the work of the Joint War Organisation of the Indian Red Cross Society and the Indian St. John Ambulance Association (Indian Council) (JWO [India]). However, so did also the endless number of individual donors and collective donating initiatives that responded to the direct Indian Red Cross appeals. Established shortly after the war's outbreak, JWO (India) would shape the practices and design of humanitarian war-work over the whole subcontinent.[20] In its work, the organisation closely cooperated with the colonial state but also brought together two major voluntary agencies, experienced in providing humanitarian relief. In doing so, it foreclosed any competition between the Indian Red Cross Society (IRSC) and the Indian Branch of the St. John Ambulance Association and strove to ensure that both 'in their war work operated as one harmonious unit'.[21] In its ever-increasing and diversifying relief work, the JWO (India), but also other non-state actors, could count on the time and labour that Indians next to British residents invested in humanitarian initiatives. Women in great part carried out relief-related activities. Their work comprised the fields of first aid, nursing, hospital visitation and library service. They ran canteens, drove ambulances, made garments and other comforts, packed Red Cross parcels, traced missing persons, and so on.[22]

Indian women also participated next to Indian men in Air Raid Precaution (ARP) schemes that were felt important against the Japanese advance in

Southeast Asia. To organise these schemes, the colonial government drew on the assistance of British Quakers who had gained experience in ARP during the London Blitz. The British Friends' Ambulance Unit (FAU) worked from 1942 in eastern India, where it trained official staff and volunteers in medical aid and ARP, and helped to set up air raid shelters and first-aid posts, fire-fighting units and ambulance services. While ARP work was also planned and trained by other actors, for instance, in Indian Divisions of St. John Ambulance Brigade Overseas, the question of whether Congress members should join these activities was hotly debated in nationalist circles. Stressing that official ARP measures should not be obstructed, Congress directives recommended setting up their own People's Volunteer Brigades to take on the same tasks.[23]

Keeping distance from the relief schemes that were closely linked to the imperial war effort did not prevent nationalist initiatives from working next to and cooperating with the colonial administration and other non-state actors in two of the major humanitarian crises that hit the subcontinent during the war years. Japan's attack on Burma in 1942 caused a mass exodus of Europeans, Anglo-Indians and Indians. Estimates of people leaving Burma for the subcontinent vary from 300,000 to half a million, of whom an unknown number died during the flight. The humanitarian emergency that unfolded was answered not only by the colonial government of British India, but also by a number of voluntary organisations, among them the INC.[24] The Congress financed and organised four units that provided medical aid and handed out food, clothes and blankets to refugees coming into Assam and Bengal. Facing a relief set-up that was shaped and controlled by the military and administrative structures of the British Indian state, the Congress in its work took pains to reconcile opposing ends. In order to be able to provide humanitarian aid to refugees, the Congress units had to cooperate with official authorities. At the same time, it strove to establish itself as an independent actor whose capabilities to take care of the Indian nation, even in times of crises, were beyond doubt.[25]

Within a few months, the noxious interplay of political and economic wartime conditions, coupled with a cyclone that ravaged parts of eastern India, led to another major humanitarian catastrophe in South Asia. Claiming an estimated 3 to 5 million lives, the Bengal famine led various non-state organisations and actors, including Indian nationalists of different persuasions, to mobilise relief. The mobilisation of nationalist aid throughout India brought with it a strong emphasis on the significance of Indian national

unity to fight humanitarian catastrophes now and in the future, a theme that would re-emerge in a slightly different garb during the relief campaign for Malaya in 1946 (see Chapter 5).[26]

The Impossibility to Help Burma: Indian Aid Efforts in the Early Post-war Years

Notwithstanding the growing significance and successful implementation of nationalist aid within an imperial framework, there were also instances in which the imperial context, and in particular the intervention of the imperial administration, served to impede the undertaking of such initiatives by colonised peoples. An example of this can be seen in the Congress's efforts to send a medical unit to Burma in 1945–46. The Japanese conquest of major parts of Southeast Asia during the Second World War and the Allied efforts to reconquer the region ravaged its political, economic and social life. The war brought severe distress, including death, to the population and caused waves of refugees and evacuees across and beyond the region. The Indian subcontinent and Southeast Asia had been closely connected through trade, religion, culture and migration, and Indians formed important minority diaspora communities in British-ruled Burma and Malaya, though their position in the respective societies differed in both countries.[27] In Burma, Indians constituted approximately 6 per cent of the entire population in 1941. Although a part of the community worked as labourers in agriculture and in the docks and mills, and largely carried out menial tasks, Indians were also prominently represented in the military police and in government service, for instance, in the postal and telegraph, railway and customs departments. Additionally, the Indian Chettiar community was an important player in trading, banking and land-owning in Burma, owning 25 per cent of all occupied land in 1938. The Japanese occupation of Burma, however, disrupted the pre-war set-up and led to a mass exodus of Indians of all classes. The majority of the Indian refugees who reached South Asia decided to stay on after fighting had ceased.[28]

As Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper have aptly stressed, after the reconquest of Burma, the British felt a sense of relief but also 'horror at the magnitude of the task of reconstruction'.[29] Relief activities for Allied soldiers in Burma had been coordinated by the JWO (India) in the later years of the war. After its end, the organisation continued to administer relief under the Supreme Allied Command Southeast Asia for the military personnel, but

now also reinforced its efforts to assist (recovered) prisoners and internees of war. Although the main focus of the JWO (India) remained the military, it also occasionally provided relief to civilian victims of the war and aimed to extend its activities even further.[30]

The post-war crisis in Burma was duly felt by all communities. Yet information about the impeded access to medical care, as well as the lack of basic amenities in Burma, especially in the case of former INA and IIL members, but also Indians in general, moved the question of Indian relief provisions to the forefront. After receiving a request from the Indian Medical Association in this matter, the Government of India immediately contacted the authorities in Burma to find out 'if there is an urgent need for such medical relief from India'.[31] The news coming from Southeast Asia also activated non-official organisations and actors to plan relief for Burma.

Among them was the INC that decided in mid-December 1945 to send a medical relief unit to Burma and therefore applied to the British Indian government for the permit to do so.[32] The Congress's request emphasised the purely humanitarian character of the planned relief work and opened a prolonged exchange with the government authorities and between London, Delhi and Rangoon. One contentious point in the multi-layered exchange was the current situation of the public health sector in Burma. The secretary to the Indian government representative in Burma had informed Delhi from Rangoon in December 1945 that 'there is a very acute and pitiable shortage of medicines in Burma' and had added that 'practically no private medical aid is genuinely available'.[33] The Congress organisers, who also made their own independent inquiries, had received a similar assessment from the Indian Chamber of Commerce. However, the colonial government in Rangoon did not share this view.[34]

Albeit disinclined to support any private medical relief for fear of a further communalisation of society in Burma, the Department of Commonwealth Relations in Delhi continued to discuss the question of medical assistance for Rangoon in late 1945 and early 1946. Feeling that 'Burma cannot have enough doctors to cope with the needs of the country', the idea to 'ask the Government of Burma to agree to such evacuees now in India who were medical practitioners in Burma before the war to return to the country' was put forward.[35] Since this suggestion was not pursued and the Department of Commonwealth Relations was still convinced of the acute shortage of medicines and medical practitioners in Burma, it cautiously began to support the proposal of the Congress to despatch a medical unit.

It was less hesitant after the organisers had assured the government that the mission would provide relief for all communities there.[36] Whereas parts of the Indian administration opened up to the idea of despatching an Indian nationalist relief unit, the India Office in London felt that the Congress's offer was politically motivated and hesitated to support the proposal. As a similar view prevailed in the British Colonial Office, the Secretary of State for India asked Delhi for advice.[37] The Viceroy of India informed the Secretary of State for India and the Governor of Burma in response that the Government of India would not object to a Congress Medical Mission to Burma.[38] At the same time, the Government of Burma and its medical advisors maintained that the country did not require any voluntary or official assistance in the shape of medicines or medical personnel.[39]

Yet in the end, Rangoon's stance prevailed, and the Congress received the official rejection of its offer in February 1946. The rejection letter explained that due to shortages in transport and accommodation, any foreign mission to Burma would only successfully function on the spot at the expense of 'arrangements that are already being made to provide medical relief which are directed towards Indians, no less than others'.[40] The carefully framed explanation only implicitly hinted at apprehensions shared by government officials in Delhi and Rangoon. In the preceding official internal exchange, there had been the apprehension that any Indian non-state medical mission sent to Burma would likely focus its relief provisions solely on Indians. This possible 'communalisation' of relief needed in their estimation to be avoided as 'Indians … as part of the local population are entitled only to such facilities as the Govt. of the country may make available to the local population'.[41] As the pre-war and war days had seen communal tensions between the majority Burmese and the minority Indian community as well as Burmese nationalist attempts to rid their country from any 'alien' economic, political and social influence, in particular from an Indian influence, any explicit favouring of Indians seemingly needed to be ruled out.[42]

Underlying this discussion, however, was the British intention of preventing any political overtures by the Congress as a unifying national force and (future) caretaker of Indian interests outside of South Asia.[43] Any interference by the Congress would have been highly inopportune as the post-war situation in Burma continued to be very tense. Next to the immense need for relief and reconstruction in the war-torn country, the struggle for power between the returning British colonial administration and Burmese political forces with Aung San leading the way, the (economic)

interests of non-Burmese communities and the presence of former INA members and supporters in Burma complicated the situation on the ground. Against this, the Government of Burma objected not only to the Congress's relief initiative, but also to any visit by Congress politicians, such as Jawaharlal Nehru.[44] The chapter on providing relief for Burma was closed first and foremost through its government's hostile stance to accept any outside help from India. While Indian humanitarianism for Burma was a failed project, initiatives for Malaya proved more successful, as Chapter 5 will demonstrate.

Notes

1. See, among others, Steinacher, *Humanitarians at War*; Glassford, *Mobilizing Mercy*, ch. 5; Lopes, 'Inter-imperial Humanitarianism', pp. 1125–47; Maul, *The Politics of Service*, ch. 8; Bazarov, 'HIAS and HICEM', pp. 69–78.
2. Barnett, *Empire of Humanity*, pp. 112–13, 117–18; Black, *A Cause for Our Times*, pp. 1–21.
3. Barnett, *Empire of Humanity*, pp. 108–9; Oppenheimer, 'Controlling Civilian Volunteering', pp. 27–50.
4. Reinisch, Special issue: 'Relief in the Aftermath of War'; Reinisch, 'Internationalism in Relief', pp. 258–89; Humbert, 'UNRRA and the Rescue of European Displaced Persons', pp. 606–34; Harder, 'The Politics of Impartiality', pp. 347–69.
5. Barnett; *Empire of Humanity*, pp. 108–18; Wieters, *The NGO CARE*, ch. 1; Kerenji, 'Rebuilding the Community', pp. 245–62.
6. Mitter, 'Imperialism, Transnationalism, and the Reconstruction', pp. 51–69. For India's connection with UNRRA, see Bhagavan, 'Toward Universal Relief and Rehabilitation', pp. 121–35; Kapoor, 'Removing the International from the Refugee', pp. 5–13; Khan, 'Wars of Displacement', p. 291.
7. Salvatici, *A History of Humanitarianism*, p. 119.
8. Dillon, 'The Politics of Philanthropy', pp. 179–205, 255–8; Naorem, 'Japanese Invasion, War Preparation', pp. 96–121.
9. Harper, 'The Politics of Disease and Disorder', pp. 88–113; Mitter, 'State-Building after Disaster', pp. 176–206; Mayo, 'A Friend in Need', pp. 54–92.
10. Pfeiff, 'Two Adoptions of the Red Cross', p. 198; P. K. Rao, 'Indians Overseas: The Position in Malaya', *India Quarterly* 2, no. 2 (1946), pp. 152, 154–5; Bergen, *The Dutch East Indies Red Cross*, ch. 3.

11. Khan, *The Raj at War*, pp. 5–11, 176–86; Bayly, '"The Nation Within"', pp. 280–3.
12. Bayly and Harper, *Forgotten Armies*; Bose, *His Majesty's Opponent*, ch. 8; Lebra, *Women against the Raj*.
13. Blackburn and Hack, *War Memory*, pp. 177–80, 198–205.
14. Kuracina, 'Sentiments and Patriotism', pp. 851–3.
15. Sarkar, *Modern India*, ch. 8.
16. Kamtekar, 'A Different War Dance', pp. 187–221, here esp. pp. 190, 194–5; Raghavan, *India's War*; Roy: *India and World War II*; Khan, *The Raj at War*, pp. 82–88, 167–72.
17. Kamtekar, 'A Different War Dance', pp. 196–201; Raghavan, *India's War*, pp. 341–55.
18. Khan, *The Raj at War*, pp. 51–4; From Our Own Correspondent, 'Collections for the War Fund', *ToI*, 3 September 1940, p. 7.
19. Anon., 'Viceroy's War Fund', *ToI*, 5 October 1940, p. 7; Anon., 'Bombay War Gifts Fund', *ToI*, 18 September 1944, p. 7. For the war-work of the YMCA, see Fischer-Tiné, *The YMCA in Late Colonial India*, pp. 75–6.
20. Indian Red Cross Society, *Annual Report 1939*, pp. 56–7; Anon., 'Satisfactory Response to Red Cross Appeal', *ToI*, 18 April 1940, p. 19; Anon., 'Men as Important as Machines', *ToI*, 24 April 1941, p. 8; Anon., 'St. John and Red Cross Work in India', *ToI*, 24 March 1943, p. 4; The Joint War Organisation of the Indian Red Cross Society and St. John Ambulance Association (Indian Council), *Eighth Annual Report*, p. 24.
21. Indian Red Cross Society, *Annual Report 1939*, p. 56.
22. Godden, *Bengal Journey*; BL, APAC, IOR/L/I/1/1020, File 462/78; The St. John Ambulance Brigade Overseas, Nursing Division, *Annual Reports of the Nursing Divisions*.
23. Khan, *The Raj at War*, pp. 108–11, 113–16; Symonds, *In the Margins of Independence*, pp. 7–15; Godden, *Bengal Journey*, pp. 9–14; BL, APAC, IOR/L/PJ/7/5201; St. John AA, Box unnumbered: St. John Ambulance Brigade Overseas (Empire of India): Quarterly News Letter. No. III, Sept. 1941, pp. 3–6; PMML, A.I.C.C. Papers, File G-10, Part I: Different Correspondence, esp. Letter by Office Secretary to G. P. Rajagopal, 11 June 1942.
24. Leigh, *The Evacuation of Civilians from Burma*, pp. 10, 17–36; Leigh, *The Collapse of British Rule in Burma*; BL, APAC, IOR/L/MIL/17/7/50: Major General E. Wood: Report on the Evacuation of Refugees from Burma to India (Assam) (January–July 1942), Calcutta, 1942; Marwari Relief Society, *Burma Evacuees*.

25. PMML, A.I.C.C. Papers, File 31/Burma Evacuees; PMML, BCRP, II. Subject Files, (B) Political, Files 99, 105, 107 and 108.
26. Siegel, *Hungry Nation*, pp. 30–3; Simonow, *Ending Famine in India*, ch. 6.
27. Amrith, *Migration and Diaspora*, chs. 1–3; Amrith, *Crossing the Bay of Bengal*; Bayly and Harper, *Forgotten Armies*; Bose, *A Hundred Horizons*; Chakravarti, *The Indian Minority in Burma*.
28. Tinker, 'Indians in Southeast Asia', pp. 39–41; Amrith, *Migration and Diaspora*, ch. 3, esp. p. 93.
29. Bayly and Harper, *Forgotten Wars*, p. 61.
30. The Joint War Organisation of the Indian Red Cross Society and St. John Ambulance Association (Indian Council), *Seventh Annual Report*, pp. 7–8, 13; A.P.I., 'Indian Red Cross Funds', *ToI*, 26 November 1945, p. 4.
31. NAI, Commonwealth Relations, Overseas, 1945, 61-8-O.S., 1945: Serial No. 1.
32. Congress Working Committee, 'Resolution on Medical Mission to Burma and Malaya, Calcutta December 11, 1945', in Zaidi, *INC*, pp. 221–2, here p. 221; see different letters in NAI, Commonwealth Relations, Overseas, 1945, 61-8-O.S., 1945; PMML, BCRP, II. Subject Files, (B) Political, File 113.
33. NAI, Commonwealth Relations, Overseas, 1945, 61-8-O.S., 1945: Letter by Y. D. Gundevia to R. N. Banerjee, 12 December 1945.
34. PMML, BCRP, II. Subject Files, (B) Political, File 117: Telegram by Mr. Manekji to G. L. Mehta, 17 December 1945 and Letter by G. L. Mehta to B. C. Roy, 18 December 1945.
35. NAI, Commonwealth Relations, Overseas, 1945, 61-8-O.S., 1945: Serial No. 7.
36. NAI, Commonwealth Relations, Overseas, 1945, 61-8-O.S., 1945: Letter by A.V. Pai to I. D. Scott, 11 January 1946.
37. BL, APAC, IOR/L/PJ/8/636: Telegram from Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, Repeated to Governor of Burma, 15 January 1946.
38. BL, APAC, IOR/L/PJ/8/636: Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, Repeated to Governor of Burma, 15 January 1946.
39. NAI, Commonwealth Relations, Overseas, 1945, 61-8-O.S., 1945: Letter by Y. D. Gundevia to R. N. Banerjee, 14 January 1946.
40. PMML, BCRP, II. Subject Files, (B) Political, File 112: Letter by G. E. B. Abell to B. C. Roy, 4 February 1946.
41. NAI, Commonwealth Relations, Overseas, 1945, 61-8-O.S., 1945: Serial No. 7.

42. Taylor, 'Politics in Late Colonial Burma', pp. 161–93; Chakravarti, *The Indian Minority in Burma*, pp. 154–68.
43. BL, APAC, IOR/L/PJ/8/636: Telegram by Government of Burma to Foreign Dep. New Delhi, 16 January 1946, and Telegram by Governor of Burma to Secretary of State for Burma, Repeated to Viceroy, 19 January 1946.
44. Bayly and Harper, *Forgotten Wars*, pp. 60–74, 85, 223–38; Leigh, *The Collapse of British Rule in Burma*, chs. 8–9; BL, APAC, IOR/L/PJ/8/636: Telegram by Government of Burma to Foreign Dep. New Delhi, 16 January 1946.