


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Abstracts

Managing the global commons

by *Per Magnus Wijkman*

When should internationally shared resources be subdivided and property and management rights to parts of the resource be distributed among nation states? Subdivision leads to inefficient exploitation and to an arbitrary division of benefits under three conditions: when property rights cannot be economically enforced; when the size and the value of the resource are unknown; and when exploitation involves external economies. The efficient use of such common property resources requires private or public regulation. Voluntary private regulation is likely to be effective only when few users are involved. In other cases, public regulation is called for. Some attributes of an intergovernmental organization designed to achieve efficient, equitable, and stable exploitation are presented. Current proposals for managing ocean resources, the orbit-spectrum resource, and Antarctica are considered.

Politics, economics, and U.S. participation in multilateral development banks

by *Lars Schoultz*

In the 1970s the U.S. executive branch was forced to make a significant change in the procedure it uses to influence decisions by the multilateral development banks. This procedural change—from exclusive reliance on behind-the-scenes pressure to open voting in bank councils—reflects two more fundamental alterations: the relative diminution of U.S. power in bank councils and, especially, the development of increased congressional interest in formulating U.S. policy toward the banks. As a result of these two changes, the United States has identified publicly many of the policies it seeks to promote through the banks. Taken as a whole, the U.S. voting record indicates an abandonment of the verbal commitment to the liberal concept of maintaining the banks as apolitical financial institutions. Since the concept has never been a reliable guide to U.S. behavior in bank councils, its abandonment does not signify a major change in the relationship between the banks and the United States government. Rather, it signifies an opening of the U.S. political process, one that encourages public debate and multiple advocacy in the making of U.S. policy toward the banks.

The state—landlord or entrepreneur?

by *Merrie G. Klapp*

The 1970s were a period of turmoil as governments in both developed and less developed countries tried to take the lead in national oil development. While gov-

ernments shifted from the role of landlord to that of entrepreneur, forming state oil companies, multinational corporate and private domestic industry groups blocked the way by switching from renters to political opponents. By the close of the decade, state oil companies had carved themselves a niche in multinational oil company operations but had been forced to make room there for other national industry groups as well. This article compares the process in Norway, Britain, Indonesia, and Malaysia, and tries to explain evidence that states in less developed countries (LDCs) gained more from multinational oil companies than did those in developed countries. Contrasting hypotheses concerning the ability of LDCs to harness multinational companies are explored. An alternative hypothesis is generated that relies on domestic rather than just international factors to explain the relatively greater gains of LDCs; it holds implications for the state's roles as landlord or entrepreneur. This explanation is contrasted with arguments that the coherence or strength of domestic structures explains relative state gains in the international economy.

Between dependency and autonomy: India's experience with the international computer industry

by Joseph M. Grieco

India's experience with the international computer industry serves as a key test of the "bargaining school" and the "Marxist-dependencia school" on relations between developing countries and multinational enterprises. India changed (and improved) its performance over time in reformulating its ties with the international computer industry. How did changes in international computer technology and industrial structure combine with Indian domestic institutional and political developments to yield an improved position for India in international computing? The case study illustrates the overall analytical superiority of the bargaining school over the Marxist-dependencia school. It also suggests a modest revision of the bargaining school's understanding of the speed at which certain developing countries are attaining the capability to negotiate successfully with multinationals in high-technology industries.