

## P.HERC. 1384: A BOOK OF CHRYSIPPUS' ON WAYS OF LIFE?

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P.Herc. 1384 preserves an ethical work focusing on the wise man's lifestyle. This work, which had formerly been attributed to the Epicurean Philodemus, has recently been proven to be Stoic instead, and has been assigned to either an early or a second-century BC Cynicising Stoic philosopher. This article, while confirming the Stoic authorship of P.Herc. 1384, shows that it can only belong to Chrysippus or one of his immediate successors and brings forward new evidence in favour of Chrysippus himself. In particular, several arguments allow us to advance an identification with book 1 of his lost *Peri biōn*.

P.Herc. 1384 is the upper part of a bookroll, which was unrolled using Piaggio's machine between 16 April and 15 May 1804. It consists of thirteen dark-grey and partially layered fragments of different sizes (max. 10.7 cm in height × max. 34.2 cm in length for a total extension of 2.39 m), which are distributed across five frames stored in the Officina dei Papiri Ercolanesi of the 'Vittorio Emanuele III' National Library of Naples.<sup>†</sup> It preserves the upper portion of fifty-one columns of text and contains – as far as we can judge – an ethical work having the wise man as its protagonist and focusing on whether he can become mad and angry, on whether he can fall in love, get drunk and engage in politics, and, finally, on his educational mission. In particular, the wise man is said to be exempt from madness (col. 1 Antoni) and (presumably) other irrational states such as dream delirium, drunkenness and unregulated love (cols. 2–5), to which consciousness and temperance are opposed (col. 4); political courage and audacity are commended (cols. 6–7); and the author praises the wise man's love for those making moral progress and distinguishes it from vulgar and shameful love (cols. 22–4). From col. 31 on we have an abrupt change of subject: the wise man's engagement in politics is described, with a focus on his rejection of trickery (col. 31) and his austerity (col. 32), his abnegation

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1 For information concerning the unrolling and the state of conservation of P.Herc. 1384 see Antoni (2012b) 25–7 and 37.

(cols. 32–3), his social and political virtues (cols. 36–7), his concern for future generations (cols. 40–1) and the philosophical education of youths (cols. 42–9). In this last regard, the usefulness of dialectic and physics, but also of medicine, geometry and poetry, is discussed (col. 44) and an enigmatic sharing of profits and goods (possibly between the master and his disciples) is alluded to (col. 45). The book closes with a quotation from Zeno of Citium consisting in the reworking of a famous Hesiodic passage (*Op.* 293–5), by which this philosopher highlights the superiority of learning from a good master over self-learning (col. 50).

Until the first comprehensive edition of the papyrus was published in 2012,<sup>2</sup> only fifteen columns of it (cols. 18–32) were known to scholars<sup>3</sup> and only one column (col. 22) had been edited.<sup>4</sup> On the basis of the content of just this limited portion of the text, Wilhelm Crönert proposed to identify *P.Herc.* 1384 as Philodemus' *On Love* (Περὶ ἔρωτος).<sup>5</sup> This identification, which endured among scholars until recently, was successfully questioned by the last editor of the papyrus, Agathe Antoni, who first suggested ascribing it to other works by the same author<sup>6</sup> and then, in a subsequent contribution, proposed on various grounds to assign it to a Stoic author.<sup>7</sup> In particular, Gilles Dorival, who has co-authored the latter essay with Antoni, argued for the attribution of *P.Herc.* 1384 to Chrysippus on the basis of the occurrence in it (col. 38.1–5 Antoni) of a *doxa* (actually a *chreia*)<sup>8</sup> also reported by Stobaeus, according to which this philosopher, ‘when he was asked why he did not engage in politics, replied: “because if one does so badly, he displeases the gods; if [one does so] well, he displeases the citizens”’.<sup>9</sup> More specifically, since according to him a similar refusal to engage in politics was voiced in Chrysippus' *On Ways of Life* (Περὶ βίωv)<sup>10</sup> and *On Things Which Are Chosen in Themselves* (Περὶ τῶν δι' αὐτὰ αἰρετῶν),<sup>11</sup> Dorival went so far as to advance a possible identification of *P.Herc.* 1384 with either of these works.<sup>12</sup> Finally, Antoni herself, in the framework of her critical edition of the whole

2 See Antoni (2012b).

3 These had been transcribed from the original by the Neapolitan draughtsman Francesco Celentano and had subsequently been engraved by Domenico Casanova, Ferdinando Ventrella and Luigi Corazza in *VH*<sup>2</sup> (1876), 52–66. The original drawings are kept in folder no. 1384 in the *Officina dei Papiri Ercolanesi* of the ‘Vittorio Emanuele III’ National Library, Naples. On the information concerning the drawings of *P.Herc.* 1384 see Antoni (2012b) 27–8.

4 By Sbordone (1965) 311–12.

5 See Crönert (1906) 35 n. 183.

6 I.e. either *On Rhetoric* (Περὶ ῥητορικῆς) or *On Ways of Life* (Περὶ ἠθῶν καὶ βίωv). See Antoni (2004) 35–8.

7 See Antoni and Dorival (2007) 103–6. The arguments sketched by Antoni in this contribution are very similar to those subsequently advanced in Antoni (2012b), on which see below.

8 I.e. an anecdotal sentence or a short exchange of sayings between two persons within a narrative context. See Searay (1998) 15–16.

9 Stob. *Flor.* 4.4.29 Hense (Chrysippus fr. 3.694 SVF) Χρυσίππου· Χρυσίππος ἐρωτηθεὶς διὰ τί οὐ πολιτεύεται, εἶπε· Διότι εἰ μὲν πονηρά [τις] πολιτεύεται, τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπαρέσει· εἰ δὲ χρηστὰ τοῖς πόλιταις. See also Stob. *Ed.* 2.31.76 Wachsmuth (Antisthenes fr. V A 173 SSR).

10 See Plut. *Stoic. repugn.* 1043a–b (Chrysippus fr. 3.703 SVF).

11 See Plut. *Stoic. repugn.* 1043b (Chrysippus fr. 3.704 SVF).

12 See Antoni and Dorival (2007) 106–9.

papyrus, confirmed the Stoic inspiration of the work contained in it, which she identified as an ethical–political treatise – whose *fil rouge* would be the education of morally promising youths by the wise man – by either an early Stoic thinker such as Chrysippus or a second-century BC Cynicising Stoic philosopher, or otherwise someone standing halfway between the two.<sup>13</sup> However, in this last contribution, Antoni’s former confidence in assigning *P.Herc.* 1384 to Chrysippus himself appears mitigated and, surprisingly, Dorival’s hypothesis of its identification as a specific work by this philosopher is not taken up or even mentioned. We shall see below why.

Now, the arguments which, according to Antoni, would lead us to exclude an Epicurean and a Philodemean authorship for *P.Herc.* 1384 can be summarised as follows:

(a) in the book there is no trace of the structure typical of an anti-commentary, namely a summary and rebuttal of one’s opponents’ views, of the sort characteristic of Philodemus’ and other Epicureans’ doctrinal treatises;<sup>14</sup>

(b) there is no polemical approach or reference to opponents or opposing doctrines. As is widely known, the Epicureans were considered inveterate polemicists and philosophical polemic was seen as typical of their school.<sup>15</sup> In particular, the systematic refutation of the views of one’s opponents as a dialectical means to build one’s own philosophical position had been a well-known tool of the Epicurean argumentative method ever since Epicurus’ *On Nature*;<sup>16</sup>

(c) the only exception to point (b) is represented by the polemical allusion to ‘those who [regard] pleasure as the end’ (col. 32.8–9). If these philosophers are to be identified as Epicureans, as seems likely, then the author of the book cannot be an Epicurean philosopher himself;<sup>17</sup>

(d) there is no reference at all to any Epicurean authorities or doctrines, whereas in Philodemus the opposite is normally the case;<sup>18</sup>

(e) the philosophical vocabulary is not specifically Epicurean or Philodemean, with the exception of certain words and expressions belonging to the Hellenistic philosophical *lingua franca*;<sup>19</sup>

(f) the extensive use and range of the poetic authors quoted appear to be distant from the Epicurean and Philodemean usage;<sup>20</sup>

13 See Antoni (2012b) 18–25 and also Antoni (2012a). On the uncertainty and the inconsistency of some of Antoni’s conclusions see below.

14 See Obbink (1996) 81–2 and n. 9; Janko (2000) 190–3, who refers in particular to Philodemus’ *On Poems*, *On Music* and *On Rhetoric*; Antoni and Dorival (2007) 106; and Antoni (2012b) 20–1.

15 See Cic. *Nat. D.* 1.26.72 (Epicurus fr. 72 Usener); Sedley (1976); and Antoni (2012b) 20–1.

16 See Antoni and Dorival (2007) 105 and Antoni (2012b) 20–1.

17 See Antoni and Dorival (2007) 105 and Antoni (2012b) 20–1.

18 See Antoni and Dorival (2007) 105 and Antoni (2012b) 20–1.

19 See Antoni (2012b) 21–3.

20 See Antoni (2012b) 21–3 and, on the specific case of Epicurus, who was credited with using only his own words without any quotations from other authors, Diog. Laert. 10.26 and 7.181. The first section of Philodemus’ *On Anger* (cols. 1–34.6 Indelli) and the second section of his *On Arrogance* (cols. 10–24 Jensen), which are full of literary

(g) from a stylistic point of view, the author would not appear to be concerned with avoiding hiatus, in contrast to Philodemus, who notoriously makes a systematic effort to avoid it.<sup>21</sup>

Conversely, among those features which, according to Antoni, hint at a Stoic and Chrysippean authorship for P.Herc. 1384, we may cite the following:

(i) the technical philosophical vocabulary, which appears to be Stoic and, more specifically, Chrysippean. Among the relevant lexemes, Antoni mentions *ὁ νοῦν ἔχων* (col. 24.3), one of the Stoic designations of the wise man, *περιστάσεις* or ‘circumstances’ (col. 1.5–6),<sup>22</sup> *ἐπιστροφή* or ‘attention’ (col. 3.5–6),<sup>23</sup> *ἀναστροφή* or ‘conduct’ (col. 4.2),<sup>24</sup> *προκόπτοντες* or ‘those making moral progress’ (col. 24.6–7),<sup>25</sup> *καθήκουσα* or ‘appropriate’ (col. 25.5),<sup>26</sup> *κοινὸς λόγος* or ‘common reason’ (col. 27.9),<sup>27</sup> *ἀκολουθητικοί* or ‘capable of following’ (col. 42.4–5),<sup>28</sup> *ὀρθὸς νόμος* or ‘right law’ (col. 42.4–5 – for Antoni a possible combination of *κοινὸς νόμος* ‘universal law’ and *ὀρθὸς λόγος* ‘right reason’),<sup>29</sup> *πρόνοια* or ‘providence’ (col. 42.6)<sup>30</sup> and *ἀφιλοτιμῶς* or ‘without ambition’ (col. 46.2).<sup>31</sup>

(ii) the extensive use and specific choice of the literary authors quoted (from Hesiod to Euripides via Solon and Ibycus), which fit in particularly well with Chrysippus’ literary usage. According to our sources, this philosopher’s works, differently from Epicurus’, were full of poetic quotations, particularly from Euripides, an author who played a distinctive role in the works of early Stoic thinkers, and especially of Chrysippus himself;<sup>32</sup>

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quotations, are no exception to this rule because they represent paraphrases and/or quotations from authors of a completely different philosophical inspiration (Cynic and Stoic in the former case, probably Stoic in the latter). See Ranocchia (2007b) and Ranocchia (2007a).

21 See Antoni (2012b) 21–3. On Philodemus’ systematic avoidance of hiatus see Strathmann (1892) and McOsker (2017).

22 See, on the Stoic doctrine of circumstances, Ioppolo (1980) 188–207.

23 See Plut. *Stoic. repugn.* 1039b and chs. 22 and 28; Sext. *Emp. Math.* 11.194; *Script. Stoic. Anon.* (P.Herc. 1020) col. 108.11–12 Alessandrelli–Ranocchia. According to von Arnim (1890) 492, *ἐπιστροφή* understood in this sense was ‘ein Lieblingswort des Chrysippos’. The presence of *ἐπιστ[ροφ]ομέ[νων]* immediately before (lines 4–5) produces a *figura etymologica*, which reinforces the concept.

24 See e.g. fr. 3.414 SVF.

25 On Stoic moral progress see e.g. fr. 3.217, 220, 226, 510, 530, 532, 534–6, 539, 543 SVF, and Ioppolo (1980) 137–41; Inwood and Donini (1999); Roskam (2005).

26 On the Stoic concept of *καθήκον* or ‘appropriate action’ see e.g. fr. 1.230–2, 576–86, 3.491–523 SVF; Panaet. *fr.* 92–103 Alesse; Cic. *Off.* 3.51–5.91; Diog. Laert. 7.124 and 129; and Sedley (1999). Here the participle *καθ[η]κ[ο]υ[σ]αν* agrees with *δι[α]θ[ε]σις* ‘disposition’ (line 4), another interesting term of (not only) Stoic moral psychology.

27 See e.g. fr. 1.537 and 2.599 SVF.

28 See e.g. fr. 2.318 and 989, 3.384, 462, 613 and 615 SVF. In our passage this adjective governs *τῶ[ι] ὀρ[θ]ῶ[ι] νόμῳ* (line 5), which immediately follows in Antoni’s list of Stoic lexemes.

29 See, on both expressions, fr. 1.537, 3.4 and 332 SVF. *ὀρθὸς νόμος* as such is only attested in Alex. Aphr. In Arist. *Top.* 224–5 Wallies–Reimer.

30 On Stoic providence see fr. 2.1106–86 SVF and Reydams-Schils (1999).

31 In fact, neither *ἀφιλοτιμῶς* nor the corresponding adjective *ἀφιλότιμος* or otherwise the noun *ἀφιλοτιμία* is attested in Stoic authors. See Antoni and Dorival (2007) 106 and Antoni (2012b) 21–3.

32 See Antoni (2004); Antoni and Dorival (2007) 106; Antoni (2010) 71–9; and Antoni (2012b) 21–3. See, in particular, Diog. Laert. 7.180–1 and 10.26–7, where Epicurus’ and Chrysippus’ literary usages are compared, and, on the latter’s exploitation of Euripides, Diog. Laert. 7.180. See also, on the systematic use of quotations from earlier

(iii) the commendatory quotation from the Stoic Zeno of Citium, reported by both Diogenes Laertius (7.25–6 = Zeno Cit. fr. 1.5 SVF) and Proclus (ad Hes. Op. 291 = fr. 1.235 SVF), which closes the book (col. 50);<sup>33</sup>

(iv) the reference to mythical exempla such as Odysseus and Philoctetes – two Stoic ‘heroes’ – (cols. 31–2) and, above all, the moral idealisation of Heracles, the patron saint of the Cynics, who also played a central role in early Stoicism (col. 30);<sup>34</sup>

(v) the exaltation of *πόνος* (cols. 6.3, 32.3, 34.2)<sup>35</sup> and the praise of *ἔρωσ* as an element of social cohesion (col. A), which are typical of Stoicism;<sup>36</sup>

(vi) some stylistic features such as the frequent use of the syntagm *τὰ παραπλήσια* governing a demonstrative pronoun in the dative (cols. 1.10, 26.2 and 8, 41.1) and sequences of adverbs such as *φρον[ίμως | [κ]αὶ εὐλαβῶ[ς οὐδέ] πολ[εμικῶς]* (col. 7.2–4), which were typical of Chrysippus;<sup>37</sup>

(vii) the likeness of the hand which drafted P.Herc. 1384 to that of P.Herc. 1020, which contains a Stoic text devoted to dialectics and centred on the wise man;<sup>38</sup>

(viii) the intriguing thematic and stylistic similarities with P.Herc. 1158, a likely Stoic text;<sup>39</sup>

(ix) the occurrence of a Chrysippean *chreia* concerning the refusal to engage in politics, also reported by Stobaeus (*Flor.* 4.4.29 Hense = Chrysippus fr. 3.694 SVF) and mentioned above (col. 38.1–5);<sup>40</sup>

(x) the presence in the Herculanean collection of a small nucleus of Stoic and specifically Chrysippean papyri such as P.Herc. 1020, 307, 1421, 1038 and 1380.<sup>41</sup>

From the above arguments Antoni draws a first, provisional, conclusion (1): ‘Since there are undoubtedly Stoic elements in P.Herc. 1384 which are proper to Chrysippus, it now seems much more plausible that the author of the roll was an adherent of the Stoa, who was contemporary with, or later than, Chrysippus.’<sup>42</sup> To that effect, she resumes as a main

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poets by Chrysippus to support his own views, fr. 2.890, 904–8, 911 SVF and Puglia (1993) 41, which have escaped Antoni.

33 See Antoni and Dorival (2007) 104–5; Antoni (2012a); and Antoni (2012b) 21–3. Here Zeno reworks a famous Hesiodic passage (*Op.* 293–5) to make his point (see above).

34 See e.g. fr. 2.1009 SVF; Sen. Ben. 1.13.3; Antoni and Dorival (2007) 105; and Antoni (2012b) 21–3.

35 See Antoni (2012b) 21–4.

36 See Antoni (2010).

37 On the former stylistic feature see fr. 3.113, 117, 471, 501 and 602 SVF, and on the latter e.g. fr. 3.563 SVF. See too Antoni (2012b) 21–3.

38 See Antoni and Dorival (2007) 103–4 and 106; Antoni (2012b) 23–4, 28 and 30. On P.Herc. 1020 see below.

39 Antoni (2012b) 23–4 and Puglia (1993). In particular, the topic of the self-sacrifice for the fatherland detectable in some fragments of this papyrus recalls, for Antoni, the wise man’s strenuous engagement in politics for the state’s sake, inferable from cols. 31–3 of P.Herc. 1384. Among the stylistic similarities between these two papyri, Antoni underlines the common presence of a great number of citations from poetic authors.

40 See Antoni and Dorival (2007) 107–8 and Antoni (2012b) 24–5.

41 See Antoni and Dorival (2007) 109 and Antoni (2012b) 24–5.

42 Antoni (2012b) 24. See also, on a similar, but more generic, conclusion (she only speaks of early Stoicism) Antoni (2010) 78–9. The translations from the French are my own.

argument point (ix) above, viz. the presence in the papyrus of a Chrysippean *chreia* (col. 38). However, given the rejection later in the text of physics and dialectics as useless (col. 44) – an assertion which is patently incompatible with Chrysippus’ teaching<sup>43</sup> – Antoni immediately reconsiders her initial conclusion by suggesting (2) that ‘a similar refusal would fit better with second-century BC Stoicism, which recovered the Cynic heritage and maybe also the criticism of “encyclopaedic” culture and those disciplines not directly related to the moral good’.<sup>44</sup> For Antoni, second-century BC Stoic thinkers rediscovered Cynic moral teaching (and, in particular, the praise of *πόνος* it entailed), taking it as the most authentic foundation of Stoic ethics.<sup>45</sup> Finally, in order to fit (1) with (2), she advances the hybrid conclusion (3) that ‘the author of the treatise preserved by *P.Herc.* 1384 might be a Stoic author . . . , who by retrieving Chrysippean elements, incorporated therein elements of Socratic and Cynic inspiration’.<sup>46</sup>

Antoni’s argumentation, as summarised above, is intriguing and challenging. To be sure, some arguments (points a–b, d–f and iv–vi above) are not as compelling as others. Besides, other points could have been argued better.<sup>47</sup> Finally, further evidence can possibly be added to points (i) and (vi).<sup>48</sup> Instead, what is almost completely missing in Antoni’s account (except for the exaltation of *πόνος* and the praise of *ἔργος* as an element of social cohesion – two typically Stoic commonplaces highlighted at point v) is a philosophical comparison between *P.Herc.* 1384 and the Stoic sources concerning the wise man’s behaviour and lifestyle.<sup>49</sup> But, in principle, points (c) (the critical allusion to ‘those who [regard] pleasure as the end’ – col. 32.8–9 – and who must be identified as

43 See, on the importance of physics for Chrysippus, Diog. Laert. 7.39–41 and 87–9; Plut. *Stoic. repugn.* 1035a (fr. 2.42 SVF); Stob. *Ecl.* 2.75.11–76.8 Wachsmuth; and Long and Sedley (1987) 266–7; on the role and the significance of dialectic, Cic. *Fin.* 4.9 (fr. 1.47 SVF); Diog. Laert. 7.180 (fr. 2.1 SVF), 182–4 (fr. 2.1 and 2.9 SVF); Plut. *Stoic. repugn.* 1035f–1037b (fr. 2.127, 129 and 270 SVF); and Long and Sedley (1987) 189–90.

44 Antoni (2012b) 24.

45 See Antoni (2012b) 24.

46 Antoni (2012b) 24.

47 At point (ii), for instance, it would have been useful to stress that early Stoics’ and Chrysippus’ well-known systematic exploitation of literary quotations from earlier poets – cherished as a treasure trove of ancient wisdom and often interpreted in an allegorical way – should be regarded not just as a literary or stylistic phenomenon, but as a coherent argumentative method used to support one’s own philosophical views, which was typical of early Stoicism. See e.g. Puglia (1993) 41.

48 In particular, to point (i) one should add at least *ὀξίωμα* ‘proposition’ (col. 3.2), a term probably introduced into Stoic logic by Chrysippus (see fr. 2.193–220 SVF), and the expression *φρον[ι]μίμως* | [*κ*]αὶ *εὐλαβῶ[ς]* ‘prudently and cautiously’ (col. 7.2–3). On *εὐλάβεια* ‘caution’, a positive emotion (*εὐπάθεια*) defined by Chrysippus as ‘reasonable avoidance’, and its derivatives see fr. 2.127, 270, 359, 3.90, 175, 264–5, 275, 411, 431 and 439 SVF. To point (vi) one should add at least the syntagm *ἀκολούθως* + dative, ‘in accordance with’ (col. 20.4), which was typical of e.g. Zeno (fr. 1.179 and 230 SVF), Diogenes of Babylon (fr. 1.116 SVF), Antipater (fr. 1.62 SVF) and, above all, Chrysippus (fr. 2.131, 528, 892, 895, 911, 989, 3.4, 6, 8–9, 149, 264, 294, 494, 548 and *App.* 2.28.1–2 SVF).

49 In the Stoic doxography reported by Diogenes Laertius at the end of the life of Zeno of Citium, for instance, we read, as much as in our papyrus, that the wise man will take wine, but not get drunk (Diog. Laert. 7.118; cf. *P.Herc.* 1384, col. 25), that he will not be liable to madness (Diog. Laert. 7.118; cf. *P.Herc.* 1384, col. 1), that he will take part in politics if nothing hinders him (Diog. Laert. 7.121; cf. *P.Herc.* 1384, cols. 31–41) and that he will feel affection for youths (Diog. Laert. 7.129; cf. *P.Herc.* 1384, cols. 22 and 24).

hedonistic philosophers)<sup>50</sup>, (i) (the philosophical vocabulary) and (iii) (the laudatory quotation from Zeno of Citium, which closes the book – col. 50) alone are enough to exclude an Epicurean authorship for *P.Herc.* 1384. Yet even points (i) and (iii) on their own are sufficient to prove a Stoic authorship. As far as the former is concerned, maybe none of the philosophically significant lexemes detectable in the papyrus, taken alone, can *stricto sensu* be regarded as exclusively Stoic, even though several of them were mostly used by Stoic authors with a technical meaning, while others (for instance, ἀκολουθητικός + dative and ὄξϊωμα) were only employed among philosophers by Aristotle and the Stoics. However, their mutual combination in an intrinsically coherent lexical system identifies a well-defined language which can only be Stoic. So, there can be no doubt about the Stoic authorship of *P.Herc.* 1384.

As for Antoni's conclusions, these are questionable for a number of reasons. First, the presence in the papyrus of a *chreia* explicitly attributed to Chrysippus by Stobaeus (col. 38.1–5)<sup>51</sup> is not sufficient *per se* to argue that *P.Herc.* 1384 was authored precisely by this Stoic philosopher. The surviving text of the column does not allow us to say with certainty whether the *chreia* is here advanced in the first person by the author himself, or whether it is a quotation from Chrysippus. In the latter case, the author obviously cannot be Chrysippus himself. Conversely, the rejection in the papyrus of physics and dialectics as useless (col. 44.1–14)<sup>52</sup> – a claim rightly regarded by Antoni as contrasting with Chrysippus' philosophy<sup>53</sup> – is not advanced by the author in his own voice, as Antoni seems to believe, but is ascribed by him to another person. The presence of ἔγραφε 'he wrote' immediately before (in line 3) and of the optative οὐδ' ἂν γέν[οι]το χρή[σι]μα (lines 6–7), whose grammatical subject is δι[α]λε|κτικὰ ... κα[ί] φυσικὰ (lines 4–5), clearly reveals that the author is here reporting, instead of his own position, that of another philosopher. So, this cannot be taken as a proof against Chrysippus' authorship of *P.Herc.* 1384, which remains perfectly possible.

50 The author contends polemically that politicians can endure difficult tasks (πόνους) better than hedonist philosophers. This sounds like a biased philosophical argument against the well-known Epicurean refusal to engage in politics. This is grounded, for the author, in the hedonistic principle, which makes Epicureans unable to undertake any difficult tasks. This is also the reason why other kinds of hedonistic philosophers (i.e. the Cyrenaics) should be excluded here.

51 '... μὴ || πολιτε[ύ]σασθαι διότι, ἐὰν μὲν χρηστὰ | πολιτεύηται, τοῖς [π]ο[λί]τ[αι]ς ἀπαρ[έ]σει, [ἐὰν] | δὲ [πονηρὰ], τοῖς θε[οῖ]ς' 'that he [i.e. the wise man] will not engage in politics, because if one does so well, he displeases the citizens; if [one does so] badly, he displeases the gods' (my translation). Even though the syntax is not identical in both sources (see Antoni and Dorival (2007) 107–8), there can be no doubt that we are dealing with the same *chreia*.

52 ἰατρικὰ καὶ γεωμε|τρικὰ καὶ ὀσού[τ]ως | ἔγραφε... α... | δὲ ταῦτα μὲν, δι[α]λε|κτικὰ δὲ κα[ί] φυσικὰ | οὐδ' ἂν γέν[οι]το | χρή[σι]μα οὕτε καὶ περὶ | γενομένων χρησ[ί]μων οὐ[τε] περὶ τῶν | ἠθικῶν[...] οἱ[.] | τῆ[ς] [σ]υγγρ[ά]μματ[ι]ς | [καὶ] τὰς πο[ι]τ[η]ρίων | [εὐ]χρηστώ[ς] . . . ου... | [σ]υγγρ[ά]μμα[τα] 'works about medicine and geometry and, in like manner, he wrote [...], on the one part, these, whereas, on the other, dialectics and physics would not be useful because they neither (focus on) what is useful nor on ethical issues [...] the treatises and the poetic compositions serviceably [...] treatises' (my translation).

53 See above on this.

The above shows that Antoni's conclusions (2) and (3) are not logically compelling. As far as (2) is concerned, even assuming that the rejection of dialectic and physics was advanced by the author himself, this would not necessarily make him an exponent of second-century BC Cynicising Stoicism, as Antoni suggests. It is well known that, within the Stoa, such a rejection was advocated for the first time as early as the morally rigorist philosopher Aristo of Chios (died post-230 BC), a pupil of Zeno, who excluded physics and logic (whereof dialectic was considered a part)<sup>54</sup> from philosophy and confined the latter to ethics.<sup>55</sup> Besides, second-century BC Stoicism was obviously not restricted to this Cynicising and morally rigorist position, as Antoni surprisingly assumes. This was indeed the position of Zenodotus and Apollodorus of Seleucia, two disciples of Diogenes of Babylon, who in the latter half of the same century fostered a return to 'the most manly Stoic philosophy' or a 'shortcut to virtue', which they identified with Cynicism and Zeno's earlier philosophical reflection and traced back to Antisthenes through the so-called Cynic–Stoic succession.<sup>56</sup> But this was just one of the two main and mutually conflicting positions attested within the school in this period,<sup>57</sup> and certainly not the most authoritative one. As is well known, one of the most prominent exponents of so-called 'Middle Stoicism',<sup>58</sup> Panaetius, who revised Stoic teaching in several respects<sup>59</sup> and was considered open to Platonic and Aristotelian influences,<sup>60</sup> was, on the contrary, hostile to Cynicising Stoicism and, in particular, Cynic ἀναιδέα. While promoting a morally moderate and universally accessible kind of Stoicism,<sup>61</sup> he did his best to

54 See Diog. Laert. 41–3 (frr. 1.48 SVF and 1.482); Sext. Emp. Math. 2.6–7 (fr. 1.75 SVF); Quint. Inst. 2.20.7 (fr. 1.75 SVF); Cic. Fin. 2.17 (fr. 1.75 SVF) and Orat. 32.113 (fr. 1.75 SVF).

55 See on this point Diog. Laert. 6.103 (fr. 1.354 SVF), 7.160 (fr. 1.351 SVF); Stob. Ed. 2.8.13 Wachsmuth (fr. 1.352 SVF); Euseb. Praep. evang. 15.62.7 (fr. 1.353 SVF); Cic. Luc. 123–4 (fr. 1.355 SVF); Sext. Emp. Math. 7.12 (fr. 1.356 SVF); Sen. Ep. 89.13 (fr. 1.357 SVF); and Ioppolo (1980) 49 and 59–63; on the rejection of dialectic, Diog. Laert. 2.79 (fr. 1.349 SVF), 7.163 (fr. 1.333 SVF); Plut. De tuenda san. praec. 133c (fr. 1.389 SVF); Stob. Ed. 2.2.14 Wachsmuth (fr. 1.392 SVF), 2.2.18 (fr. 1.393 SVF), 2.2.22–3 (frr. 1.391 and 1.394 SVF); and Ioppolo (1980) 63–7.

56 On Zenodotus see Diog. Laert. 7.30 and Nickau (1972), who identified him with Zenodotus of Mallus, a disciple of the grammarian Crates; on Apollodorus of Seleucia see Apollod. Sel. frr. 3.1–18 SVF and, in particular, Diog. Laert. 7.121 and 129 (frr. 3.17 and 18 SVF). See also Mansfeld (1986) 347–51; Hahm (1992); Alesse (2000) 55–61; Goulet-Cazé (2003) 137–81; Bees (2011) 263–8.

57 On these positions and the internal debate concerning the origins of Stoicism and its relationship to Cynicism see Cic. Fin. 3.68, 4.3, 14, 44–5 and 61, De or. 3.61 and Alesse (2000) 55–61.

58 The controversial expression 'Middle Stoa' or 'Middle Stoicism' – to be distinguished from early and Imperial Stoicism – is used to designate a phase in the school's history inaugurated by Panaetius and marked by receptiveness towards Platonic and Aristotelian doctrines. The expression was introduced by Schmekel (1892), who was followed by Zeller and Nestle (1928) 303–4 and Tatakis (1931). But against this historiographical paradigm, see the strong reservations formerly expressed by Pohlnenz (1959) 387–8 and, nowadays, by Frede (1999) and Tieleman (2003) 11, 199, 225 and n. 76, 226 n. 77, 240, 242–3 and 287.

59 See e.g., on his rejection of the idea of a periodical cosmic conflagration, Phil. Aet. mund. 76; on his criticism of astrology, Cic. Div. 1.6–7 and 2.88; and, on his adjustments to ethics, Cic. Fin. 4.23 and 79, Acad. pr. 2.135, Tusc. 1.79–80; Gell. NA 12.5.10; and Alesse (1994). On his substantial doctrinal continuity with Chrysippus concerning moral psychology, however, see Tieleman (2003) 245–50.

60 On his alleged fondness for Plato and Aristotle see Phld. Stoic. hist. col. 61 Dorandi; Cic. Tusc. 1.79; and Alesse (2000) 56–7.

61 See Alesse (1994) 16–21 and 23–162.

distance himself philosophically from this rigorist tendency and, historically speaking, from the original *κυνισμός* of the school.<sup>62</sup> For the same reasons another prominent ‘Middle-Stoic’ philosopher, Posidonius, seems to have dismissed Zeno himself as unworthy.<sup>63</sup>

Likewise, even if Antoni’s conclusion (3) were true, it would make no sense from a historico-philosophical point of view. Historically speaking, early Stoics after Chrysippus could never have adopted such a syncretistic position. Philosophers such as Zeno of Tarsus, Diogenes of Babylon and Antipater, while developing Stoic teaching in several ways,<sup>64</sup> essentially followed in Chrysippus’ footsteps.<sup>65</sup> At the same time, they were anything but Cynicising or morally rigorist Stoics.<sup>66</sup> Conversely, those Stoics, such as Zenodotus and Apollodorus, who after Antipater tried to recover Cynic and early Zenonian moral rigorism could only do so in contrast to Chrysippus, the one philosopher, within early Stoicism, who by confuting Aristo’s morally rigorist position tried to eliminate this original Zenonian standpoint from within the school.<sup>67</sup> Finally, ‘Middle Stoics’, such as Panaetius and Posidonius but also Mnesarchus and Boethus, who developed or, in some respects, even rethought Chrysippean Stoicism<sup>68</sup> were, for this very reason, neither *stricto sensu* Chrysippean nor by any means Cynicising or morally rigorist

62 See e.g. Cic. *Off.* 1.128; Ioppolo (1980) 54; Alesse (2000) 56–7; and Ranocchia (2007a) 76–8. This was also, in all probability, the reason why, according to Diogenes Laertius (7.34), the Stoic Athenodorus, the keeper of the library of Pergamum – a milieu where Panaetius himself had formerly studied and been active – was caught expunging from Zeno’s works (including, in all likelihood, the *Republic*) some passages he regarded as contrasting with true Stoic teaching. See Fritz (1972) 88–90; Mansfeld (1986) 344–5; Alesse (1997a) 209–210; Schofield (1999) 8–13. Certainly this was the reason which, according to Philodemus’ *History of the Stoa and On Stoics*, induced Stoics at different times to attempt to justify, downplay and criticise this work, or even to declare it inauthentic. See Phld. *Stoic. hist. col.* 4 Dorandi (but the text is partly conjectural), *De Stoic. passim*; and Dorandi (1982) 92–7; Schofield (1999) 8–13; Alesse (2000) 43–6; Bees (2011) 29–41.

63 See Phld. *De Stoic. col.* 13.15–16 Dorandi (but the name Ποσειδών[ιος] is conjectural) and Dorandi (1982) 93.

64 The most striking case in this sense is that represented by Diogenes of Babylon, who is credited by ancient sources with having performed an extensive revision of Stoic doctrine in several fields, such as linguistics, moral psychology, ethics, political philosophy, rhetoric and musical theory, and with having acknowledged Plato and Aristotle as important philosophical authorities. See Schäfer (1936); Barth and Goedeckemeyer (1941) 107ff.; Obbink and Vander Waerdt (1991) 355–9; Vander Waerdt (1991) 205–10; Isnardi Parente (1992) 596–619; and Nussbaum (1993) 120–1. But at least as far as moral psychology and musical theory are concerned, see the recent account by Tieleman (2003) 242–50, who has convincingly argued for a substantial doctrinal continuity between Chrysippus and Diogenes in these fields.

65 See, lastly, Tieleman (2003) 242–87.

66 To the contrary, moderate views in ethics are attested for most of them. Consider, in particular, Diogenes of Babylon’s revision of the early Stoic doctrine of the *telos* (Arius Didymus ap. Stob. *Ed.* 22.76.9–10 Wachsmuth; Diog. Laert. 7.88; and Clem. *Strom.* 2.21) and his justification of private property (Cic. *Fin.* 3.49–55 and Annas (1989) 151–73). Consider too Antipater’s defence of the moral and social value of marriage, the family and heterosexual love, which openly contrasts with some of the theses expressed in Zeno’s *Republic* (see Stob. *Ed.* 70.13 Wachsmuth = fr. 3.62 SVF, *Flor.* 67.25 Hense = fr. 3.63 SVF; Alesse (1997a) 210 and (2000) 45), and his (probably negative) view of Zeno’s *Republic*, by which he was certainly embarrassed (see Phld. *De Stoic. col.* 17.4–10 Dorandi and Alesse (2000) 44–5).

67 See Ioppolo (1980) 9–18, 33–8, 159–62 and 166–70.

68 On Panaetius see above; on Posidonius see Tieleman (2003) 242–87, who, however, argues for a substantial doctrinal continuity with Chrysippus in moral psychology; on Mnesarchus of Athens see Diels (1879) 615 and Fritz (1932) 2272–4; on Boethus of Sidon see Alesse (1997b) 359–83.

Stoic thinkers.<sup>69</sup> Hence – to the best of my knowledge – the philosophical stance that has been proposed by Antoni for the author of *P.Herc. 1384* in her conclusion (3) – ‘the author of the treatise preserved by *P.Herc. 1384* might be a Stoic author . . . , who by retrieving Chrysippean elements, incorporated therein elements of Socratic and Cynic inspiration’ – was never favoured by any Stoic follower, at least prior to Philodemus.

If Antoni’s conclusions (2) and (3) are unfounded, then only conclusion (1) remains valid: ‘Since there are undoubtedly Stoic elements in *P.Herc. 1384* which are proper to Chrysippus, . . . the author of the roll was an adherent of the Stoa, who was contemporary with, or later than, Chrysippus.’ Here too some observations are called for. If, as Antoni suggests, *P.Herc. 1384* contains Chrysippean elements and if its author is a contemporary of Chrysippus (281/277–208/204 BC),<sup>70</sup> then the most reasonable solution is to conclude that he is Chrysippus himself. That this author is a Chrysippean Stoic philosopher contemporary with Chrysippus but *different* from him is only theoretically possible, but it is historically fairly unlikely.<sup>71</sup> If, instead, he is to be identified as a Chrysippean philosopher later than Chrysippus, he could be one of the prominent early Stoics who followed him and remained – though with some differences<sup>72</sup> – essentially faithful to his thought, that is Zeno of Tarsus, Diogenes of Babylon or Antipater. After all, as we have seen, ‘Middle Stoics’ such as Panaetius and Posidonius, on the one hand, and Cynicising Stoics such as Zenodotus and Apollodorus, on the other, were not strictly Chrysippean and can even be thought of as anti-Chrysippean Stoic thinkers. But even in the case of the ‘faithful’ Chrysippeans certain restrictions are probably to be applied.<sup>73</sup> Be that as it may, it is difficult to imagine that the author of *P.Herc. 1384* is a Stoic philosopher prior

69 On Panaetius see above; on the similar case of Posidonius, Mnesarchus and Boethus, suffice it to say that Cynicising Stoicism represented for them – just as for Panaetius – the diametrically opposite side of the philosophical spectrum (with Chrysippus in between) and, from a historical point of view, the very target of the debate which had emerged within the school in the second half of second century BC. See above and Alesse (2000) 55–61.

70 See Dorandi (1999) 40.

71 The only Stoic contemporary of Chrysippus whom we know of was Sphaerus of Borythenes (ca 285–post-222 BC, see Hobein (1929) 1683–93 and Dorandi (1999) 40), a student of Zeno and then Cleanthes (Diog. Laert. 7.177 (fr. 1.620 SVF); Plut. *Cleom.* 2 (fr. 1.622 SVF); Ath. 8.354e (fr. 1.624 SVF); Phld. *Stoic. hist. col.* 37.6–8 Ranocchia). But could Sphaerus – whose philosophical teaching remains largely unknown to us – be regarded as a Chrysippean philosopher himself? His discipleship with both the school’s founder Zeno and the latter’s immediate successor Cleanthes, his rich and varied philosophical production (see Diog. Laert. 7.178) and even his biography (he eventually left Athens in 238/237 BC, or even earlier, when Chrysippus must have been in his late thirties or early forties, i.e. as the latter had yet to reach his mature years) seem, rather, to hint at a fairly independent philosophical personality. Likewise, the testimony of Cic. *Tusc.* 4.53 (fr. 1.628 SVF), in which Sphaerus’ and Chrysippus’ definitions of courage are contrasted and the former thinker is said to have been ranked by his school fellows as one of the best Stoics at providing definitions, possibly points in the same direction.

72 See above on this point.

73 In particular, the author’s praise of paederastic love (col. 22) – a topos of classical Greek culture – and his account of the wise man’s love for those who make moral progress (col. 24) appear hardly compatible with Antipater’s exaltation of heterosexual love and marriage against alternative forms of ἔρωϛ. See Stob. *Flor.* 4.22.103 Hense (Antip. fr. 3.62 SVF), 4.22.25 (Antip. fr. 3.63 SVF) and above. This makes Antipater not an especially good candidate for the authorship of *P.Herc. 1384*.

to Chrysippus, because – as far as we know – some terms found in this text are not attested before Chrysippus, or were probably introduced into Stoic philosophy by him.<sup>74</sup> In summary, the range of possibilities is quite narrow. We must be dealing here with either Chrysippus himself or one of his immediate successors: Zeno of Tarsus, Diogenes of Babylon or – less likely – Antipater.<sup>75</sup>

Now, two of Antoni's arguments (points vii and x above), if improved, can help us narrow the focus down on the possibility of a specifically Chrysippean authorship for P.Herc. 1384. As far as point (x) is concerned, we know that, beside this papyrus, another six Stoic papyri have survived in the Herculanean library, a collection which is otherwise mostly devoted to Epicurean authors and topics.<sup>76</sup> Four of them, which still bear the corresponding end-title (*subscriptio*) with the name of the author (Chrysippus), preserve works precisely by this Stoic philosopher. They are P.Herc. 1421 and 1038, which contain the first and the second book of his *On Providence*;<sup>77</sup> P.Herc. 307, which preserves his *Logical Enquiries*;<sup>78</sup> and P.Herc. 1380, which preserves a logical-linguistic work, *On the Elements of Speech*.<sup>79</sup> To these, another two papyri are to be added, namely P.Herc. 1158 and 1020, which, just like P.Herc. 1384, do not preserve any *subscriptio* but contain works of Stoic and – at least in the latter case – most probably Chrysippean authorship.<sup>80</sup> Now, the existence in the library of a nucleus of Stoic papyri,<sup>81</sup> of which most are certainly, and another one is likely to be, by Chrysippus, suggests, for reasons of coherence, that all of them – including P.Herc. 1384 – are by the same Stoic author and that, in reality, this surviving cluster of Stoic papyri belonged to a specifically Chrysippean section of Philodemus' library.<sup>82</sup> The importance of Chrysippus as the most renowned representative of the Epicureans' rival school and, hence, as their philosophical opponent par excellence, whose thought must be properly known in order to be refuted – or, as in Philodemus' case, even appropriated – has already been highlighted by scholars. In particular, the presence of some Chrysippean treatises in the Herculanean library might have served as

74 This is the case with ἀξίωμα[α (col. 3.2), here to be understood as 'proposition', as the logical-cognitive context (lines 4–6 ἐπιστρ[ε]φόμε[ν]ον ἐπιστρο[[φ]ήν) seems to confirm. As mentioned above, this concept was apparently introduced into Stoic logic, and was extensively used, by Chrysippus. See Chrysippus fr. 2.193–220 SVF and Alessandrelli (2013) 38–47.

75 See above, n. 73 on the case of Antipater.

76 On the Stoic works transmitted through the Herculanean papyri see Marrone (1987) and (1988); Puglia (1993) 42–3; and Del Mastro (2005) 66–7.

77 See P.Herc. 1421, *subscr.*, 1038, *subscr.* and Del Mastro (2014) 276–7 and 206–7, respectively.

78 See P.Herc. 307, *subscr.* and Del Mastro (2014) 114–17.

79 See P.Herc. 1380, *subscr.* and Del Mastro (2014) 61–70.

80 See, on P.Herc. 1158, Puglia (1993), who has proven with good arguments the distance of this text from Epicureanism and its closeness to Stoicism, and, on P.Herc. 1020, below.

81 The presence of Stoic works at Herculanean has usually been explained as providing documentary evidence for Philodemus' comparison between Epicurean and Stoic teaching and as a source and a target for, respectively, his 'historico-philosophical' (*History of the Stoa*) and polemical (*On Stoics*) works concerning the Stoics. This would also explain why so many of his treatises are full of quotations from Stoic sources. See Marrone (1988) 224; Puglia (1993) 42–3; Antoni and Dorival (2007) 109; and Antoni (2012b) 24–5.

82 See Alessandrelli and Ranocchia (2017) 10.

an authoritative textual basis for the composition of some of Philodemus' works.<sup>83</sup> This also explains why several treatises by Chrysippus are either amply quoted or paraphrased or otherwise circumstantially alluded to by Philodemus in treatises such as *On Stoics* and *On Anger*.<sup>84</sup>

As for Antoni's point (vii), the hand of P.Herc. 1384 – a unicum in the Herculanean collection,<sup>85</sup> which has escaped Guglielmo Cavallo's classification<sup>86</sup> and has been dated by Antoni to the second quarter of first century BC – bears a close likeness to that of another graphically atypical Stoic papyrus, viz. P.Herc. 1020,<sup>87</sup> which has been assigned by Cavallo to his 'Gruppo H' (post mid-first century BC).<sup>88</sup> This similarity strongly suggests that these two books belong to the same editorial project.<sup>89</sup> Now, P.Herc. 1020 contains not a generically Stoic work – as Antoni contends<sup>90</sup> – but an early Stoic text on the wise man's cognitive, moral and dialectical virtues,<sup>91</sup> which has been attributed on solid grounds by its *editor princeps*, Hans von Arnim, to either Chrysippus or, possibly, one of his immediate successors, Diogenes of Babylon and Antipater.<sup>92</sup> The assigning of P.Herc. 1020 to Chrysippus himself was confirmed shortly after von Arnim by Max Pohlenz<sup>93</sup> and

83 See Alessandrelli and Ranocchia (2017) 10.

84 In *On Stoics*, Philodemus refers to Chrysippus' *On Justice, Republic, On Appropriate Action, On the Beautiful and Pleasure, On Zeno's Proper Use of Names, On Those Things Which Are Chosen in Themselves and the otherwise unknown On the City and Law, On Life according to Nature and Against Those Who Understand Prudence in a Different Way*. See Dorandi (1982) and Mansfeld (1986). For this reason, Puglia (1993) 42–3 and Del Mastro (2005) 66 n. 49 and 67 do not exclude the possibility that at least some of these works were included in Philodemus' library. In the former part of *On Anger* (cols. 1–34.6 Indelli), Philodemus extensively quotes and paraphrases – along with Bion of Borysthenes' and Antipater's *On Anger* – book 4 of Chrysippus' *On Emotions* in a way which undoubtedly presupposes his direct knowledge and possession of this work. See Ranocchia (2007b).

85 See Antoni (2012b) 23: 'En dépit de certaines ressemblances, la main du P.Herc. 1384 reste jusqu'à ce jour une main unique parmi tous les papyrus d'Herculanum.'

86 See Cavallo (1983).

87 See Antoni and Dorival (2007) 103–4 and Antoni (2012b) 23 and 28–30. In particular, Antoni has shown that in P.Herc. 1020 all letters – with very few exceptions and despite the larger spacing, the smaller number of ligatures and the more open writing angle – have the same shape as the ones we find in P.Herc. 1384.

88 See Cavallo (1983) 34–5 and 52. Significantly enough, this graphic typology is rarely witnessed in the Herculaneum collection and some of its elements show divergency from the scribal hands of which it is composed. Note also that P.Herc. 1020 is the only non-Philodemian papyrus included in 'Gruppo H' and that its only relationship to this group is represented, according to Cavallo, by its generic graphic similarity only to P.Herc.1428 (Philodemus, *On Piety*).

89 An editorial project is an ancient edition of a single work by an author executed by the same hand, or very similar ones, and written in typologically similar graphic forms. In this sense, a single work may have come down to us through either one or more editorial projects, i.e. different copies of the same work (or parts of it) which are graphically uniform within themselves and have been written by the same hand or very similar ones. This is often the case within the Herculaneum collection. See Cavallo (1983) 58–65.

90 See Antoni (2012b) 23 and 28–30. Previously, Antoni and Dorival (2007) 106 and 109 had explicitly assigned P.Herc. 1020 to Chrysippus.

91 And not only or mainly 'dialectic', as Antoni and Dorival (2007) 104 and Antoni (2012b) 23 contend.

92 See von Arnim (1890), who edited the last eight text columns of the papyrus, and Arnim (1903), where P.Herc. 1020 is included among the testimonies concerning Chrysippus' dialectic (fr. 2.131 SVF) and is the object of some new conjectures.

93 See Pohlenz (1904) 1503.

Bruno Keil<sup>94</sup> on the basis of a passage from Isidorus of Pelusium<sup>95</sup> – which escaped von Arnim – where Chrysippus is explicitly credited with a definition of philosophy as ‘the exercise of the correctness of *logos*’, coinciding with that provided by the author of *P.Herc.* 1020 at col. 108.12–15 (ἐπι|τήδευσις λόγου ὁρ[θ]ό|τητος). Moreover, in more recent years Michele Alessandrelli and myself, in the framework of a re-edition of von Arnim’s text (= cols. 104–112 Alessandrelli–Ranocchia) based on our personal inspection of the original papyrus and propaedeutic to its first comprehensive edition,<sup>96</sup> have offered a new set of further arguments in favour of a specifically Chrysippean authorship for it.<sup>97</sup> So, even though in principle cases like this are always open to doubt (as mentioned, in *P.Herc.* 1020 no title survives), there remains no or very little room for acceptable alternatives to Chrysippus.<sup>98</sup> Now, if *P.Herc.* 1020 is by Chrysippus and if *P.Herc.* 1384 probably belongs to the same editorial project or work, it is reasonable to conclude that the latter is by the same author, that is, again, Chrysippus.

Another argument in favour of Chrysippus must be added to this picture. Diogenes Laertius tells us that ‘while Chrysippus holds that virtue can be lost, Cleanthes maintains that it cannot. According to the former it may be lost in consequence of drunkenness or melancholy; the latter takes it to be inalienable owing to the certainty of our mental apprehension.’<sup>99</sup> For Chrysippus, differently from Cleanthes, in order to avoid losing virtue and, hence, wisdom – whether permanently or temporarily we do not know – the wise man must pay ‘special attention’ (πλείων ἐπιστροφή) or ‘rational attention’ (λογικὴ ἐπιστροφή) to his assents ‘so that they take place, not randomly, but with understanding’.<sup>100</sup> So, for instance, he must avoid giving his assent to the representation

94 See Keil (1905) 155–8.

95 Ep. 5.558 (PG 78.1637 = FDS 2b).

96 See Alessandrelli and Ranocchia (2017). A new comprehensive edition of *P.Herc.* 1020 is a part of the EU-funded Project ERC Starting Grant 241184-PHerc (FP7, ‘Ideas’). See [www.pherc.eu](http://www.pherc.eu).

97 These can here be summarised as follows: (a) according to Diog. Laert. 7.122–3 (fr. 3.556 SVF), Chrysippus claimed that ‘the wise are infallible (ἀνομαρτήτους), since they are not subject to error’. The same term recurs in *P.Herc.* 1020, col. 108.4–5, again with reference to the wise; (b) at the end of the Stoic doxography conventionally attributed to Arius Didymus (Stob. Ed. 2.116.13–14 Wachsmuth) several works of Chrysippus are mentioned, which are considered to have served as a source for it. A section of it (Stob. 2.111.18–113.11 (fr. 3.548 SVF = fr. 89 FDS) shows impressive lexical analogies with *P.Herc.* 1020; (c) if, as seems likely, the source for Epict. Diss. 1.7 is Chrysippus (see Long (2002) 57), the intriguing, and sometimes compelling, lexical analogies between this text and *P.Herc.* 1020 might represent a further argument in favour of the latter’s Chrysippean authorship; (d) the existence in the Herculanean library of a nucleus of specifically Chrysippean papyri brings us in the same direction. See Alessandrelli and Ranocchia (2017) 9–10.

98 And this also because, as the recent research has shown, the other possible candidates, i.e. the early Stoics who succeeded Chrysippus, did not necessarily follow him in all respects. See Alessandrelli and Ranocchia (2017) 8–9 and above on this point.

99 Diog. Laert. 7.127. See also Diog. Laert. 7.128; Alex. Aphr. An. 2.161 (fr. 3.239 SVF); Simpl. In Arist. Cat. 10.402 (fr. 3.238 SVF); and Graver (2007) 115–16.

100 See *P.Herc.* 1020, col. 108.1–12 Alessandrelli–Ranocchia: τούτοις δὲ πάλιν | ἀκο[ο]υθεῖ καὶ τὸς | σοφο[ὺ]ς ἀνεξασπατή|τους εἶναι καὶ ἀνομαρ|τήτους καλῶ[ς] τε ζῆν | καὶ πάντα πράττειν | εἶ· διὸ καὶ περὶ [τάς] συν|[κα] ταθέσεις, ὅπως γίν[ο]σ<ο>νται μὴ ἄλλως, ἀλ[σ]<λ>ᾶ με|τὰ καταλήψεως, πλε|[ο]σ<ν> γέγονεν ἐ[π]ιστροφῆ. Virtue is not explicitly mentioned in the passage, but is indirectly inferable from the wise man’s asserted cognitive and



Plutarch.<sup>105</sup> This possibility should be taken into serious consideration for a number of reasons. The first reason is the occurrence, in one of Plutarch's direct quotations from this work,<sup>106</sup> of the very rare Chrysippean term εὐαπόσειστος 'so as to be easily shaken off,'<sup>107</sup> which is attested in Greek literature only here and in P.Herc. 1020, col. 104.8. The second is provided by the frequent allusions to the Stoic wise man detectable in Plutarch's and Diogenes Laertius' direct quotations from this work.<sup>108</sup> They are descriptions of the lifestyle typical of the wise man in all the various public and private spheres, which appear very similar to those contained in P.Herc. 1020.<sup>109</sup> Interestingly – and independently of the case of P.Herc. 1020 – in 2007 Gilles Dorival proposed to identify P.Herc. 1384 too as a book of Chrysippus' *On Ways of Life* on the basis of some supposed thematic analogies between the two texts concerning the wise man's political (in)activity.<sup>110</sup>

But what would a work *On Ways of Life* have looked like? As I have shown in a recent contribution,<sup>111</sup> the philosophical genre Περὶ βίωv was essentially different from the 'biographical' or anecdotal one.<sup>112</sup> It was mostly cultivated by Epicureans and Stoics, but also – at least from the late Hellenistic period onwards, and under the influence of Stoicism – by Academic and Peripatetic philosophers. By cross-analysing the information inferable from other sources<sup>113</sup> and the surviving fragments of Epicurus' and Chrysippus' *On Ways of Life* – the most famous and most representative examples of this genre – we may conclude with a fair degree of confidence that philosophical works Περὶ βίωv had the following characteristics: (a) they were moral pieces of writing belonging to the practical or applied section of ethics, rather than proper doctrinal treatises; (b) their protagonist was the wise man; (c) their subject matter consisted in issues related to the wise man's way of life in the most diverse fields of his individual and social action; this included both general lifestyles, which were described and contrasted, and more specific topics or courses of action such as whether the wise man will engage in politics or rhetoric, live together with kings and obey the laws, marry, do business and make money, play the Cynic and beg, fall in love, get drunk or commit suicide, how he will behave with pupils, and whether he will be knowledgeable or a good dialectician or

105 Plut. *Stoic. repugn.* 1033c–d (fr. 3.702 SVF), 1035a (fr. 2.42 SVF = fr. 24 FDS), 1036d–e (fr. 2.270 SVF = fr. 351 FDS), 1043a (fr. 3.703 SVF), 1043b–c (fr. 3.691 SVF), 1044a (fr. 3.579 SVF) and 1047f (fr. 3.693 SVF).

106 Plut. *Stoic. repugn.* 1036d (fr. 2.270 SVF = fr. 351 FDS).

107 See LSJ s.v.

108 See Plut. *Stoic. repugn.* 1043b–c, 1044a, 1047f, and Diog. Laert. 7.121, 129 and 188.

109 See Alessandrelli and Ranocchia (2017) 15–17.

110 See Antoni and Dorival (2007) 108 and above.

111 See Ranocchia (2021).

112 Pace Verhasselt (2016) 59–83, who has tried to reconcile both traditions. See, for my critique of Verhasselt's account, Ranocchia (2021).

113 See, in particular, the divisions of ethics by Eudorus of Alexandria and Philo of Larissa included in Arius Didymus' ethical doxography (resp. Stob. Ed. 2.7.2, pp. 44, 24–45, 2 Wachsmuth = Eudor. fr. 1 Mazzarelli and 2.7.2, pp. 39, 19–41, 25 = Philo Lar. fr. 25 Wiśniewski, fr. 2 Mette, fr. 32 Brittain) and the late Peripatetic discourse on the lives of the sage (Stob. Ed. 2.7.24, pp. 143–5 Wachsmuth).

orator; (d) their target was generally (but not always) the non-wise who, in this way, were furnished with an exemplary code of conduct to which to conform their lives, so as to make progress towards (or preserve) wisdom; (e) their purpose was to supply principles enabling the pursuit (or preservation) of the end, however this may have been understood.

In particular, we know from Plutarch that Chrysippus' *On Ways of Life*, while comprising different books and covering a wide range of topics, was a 'unitary treatise' (μία σύνταξις), which is probably to say an uninterrupted exposition having the same protagonist and preserving the same narrative scheme.<sup>114</sup> In particular, the first book focused on the possibility for the wise man to be, or live with, a king, to fight for a sovereign<sup>115</sup> and make profit by being in power, cultivating friendships and engaging in politics.<sup>116</sup> It also discussed the wise man's relationship with his pupils with respect to teaching and its remuneration,<sup>117</sup> the possibility for him to pay for doctors when ill and to commit suicide once deprived of his senses,<sup>118</sup> the issues of whether he will suffer injustice<sup>119</sup> and of whether – and with whom – he will fall in love,<sup>120</sup> and his political activity for the moral elevation of his fellow citizens.<sup>121</sup> The second book dealt again with his concern about profit-making.<sup>122</sup> We know nothing about the third book. The fourth book dwelt on the philosopher's life in the school, which was critically equated with an existence full of pleasures and free from political distress,<sup>123</sup> on the philosophical training of his pupils,<sup>124</sup>

114 See Plut. *Stoic. repugn.* 1043a (fr. 3.703 SVF).

115 See Plut. *Stoic. repugn.* 1043b–c (fr. 3.691 SVF).

116 See Plut. *Stoic. repugn.* 1043b–c (fr. 3.691 SVF, see immediately above), 1043e (fr. 3.691 SVF) and *Comm. not.* 1061d (fr. 3.691 SVF). See also *Stoic. repugn.* 1043e (fr. 3.693 SVF) and 1047f (fr. 3.693 SVF).

117 See Plut. *Stoic. repugn.* 1047f (fr. 3.693 SVF, see immediately above) and 1043e (fr. 3.701 SVF). But the attribution of this passage to book 1 is conjectural. See von Arnim (1903) App. 2.7, fr. 4.

118 See Plut. *Comm. not.* 1061d (fr. 3.691 SVF, see above).

119 See Plut. *Stoic. repugn.* 1044a (fr. 3.579 SVF). Inexplicably, this passage is not included by von Arnim (1903) App. 2.7 among the fragments of Chrysippus' *Περὶ βίωv*.

120 See Diog. Laert. 7.129 (fr. 3.716 SVF).

121 See Diog. Laert. 7.121 (fr. 3.697 SVF).

122 See Diog. Laert. 7.188 (fr. 3.685 SVF).

123 See Plut. *Stoic. repugn.* 1033c–d (fr. 3.702 SVF) αὐτὸς γοῦν Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ Περὶ βίωv οὐδὲν οἰεῖται τὸν σχολαστικὸν βίωv τοῦ ἡδονικοῦ διαφέρειν ('Chrysippus indeed himself, in his fourth Book of *Lives*, thinks there is no difference between a scholastic life and a life of pleasure'; tr. E. Goodwin). On the interpretation of this controversial passage see recently Bénatouil (2007) 1–13, who has convincingly shown that: (a) the criticism contained in it is directed against the Platonic and the Aristotelian conception of the absolute preferability of the contemplative life over the active one; (b) Chrysippus does not reject the scholastic life as such; (c) the Stoics admitted of three preferable ways of life, among which the scientific one (see Stob. Ed. 2.109.10 Wachsmuth = fr. 3.686 SVF and below); (d) on a higher level, for Stoic philosophers only the rational life or life according to virtue, viz. a mixed form of life combining the contemplative (i.e. scientific) and the active (i.e. political), is to be chosen in itself by the wise man (Diog. Laert. 7.130 = fr. 3.687 SVF). And the rational or virtuous life does not imply the choice of any specific way of life (since none is preferable in itself); rather, it simply dictates to the wise man what is best in any circumstance and what share of the active and the contemplative life he should have in general and in the different situations of his life.

124 See Plut. *Stoic. repugn.* 1035a (fr. 2.42 SVF).

on the wise man's doing nothing or little or what is proper to him,<sup>125</sup> but also on epistemological and dialectical issues, especially his use of anti-logical arguments and how to tackle the questions raised by Megarics and other insidious opponents in dialectical discussions.<sup>126</sup> This picture clearly shows that the main characteristic of the work was to describe the wise man's behaviour in every life situation. In any case, Chrysippus' *Περὶ βίωv* – the only work with this title to have been written by a Stoic philosopher – must have enjoyed considerable popularity in antiquity, since a specific section *Περὶ βίωv* is included – and described with Stoic terms and examples – in the Stoic-influenced divisions of practical ethics by Eudorus of Alexandria and Philo of Larissa reported in the ethical doxography conventionally attributed to Arius Didymus.<sup>127</sup>

Now, already in 2004, when she still believed in a Philodemean authorship for *P.Herc.* 1384, Antoni noticed that its text, while having the same protagonist, was arranged into different thematic sections.<sup>128</sup> This fact led Antoni to propose a possible identification of the papyrus as a book of Philodemus' *On Ways of Life* (*Περὶ ἠθῶv καὶ βίωv*), a treatise which includes at least *On Frank Speech* (*P.Herc.* 1471).<sup>129</sup> As mentioned, in 2007 Dorival – in the study co-authored by Antoni – tentatively proposed that we identify it, once again, with a work *On Ways of Life*, but this time by Chrysippus. In particular, our papyrus would correspond to book 4 of this treatise because here the author, as in *P.Herc.* 1384, maintains that the wise man does not engage in politics, concerns himself with few things and only minds his own business.<sup>130</sup> Although Dorival's argument for this kind of identification is different from Antoni's,<sup>131</sup> and is essentially flawed,<sup>132</sup> his intuition that *P.Herc.* 1384 may belong to this Chrysippean work, together with Antoni's suspicion that it may fall into the philosophical genre *Περὶ βίωv*, seems to go in the right direction.

125 See Plut. *Stoic. repugn.* 1043a (fr. 3.703 SVF).

126 See Plut. *Stoic. repugn.* 1036c (fr. 2.270 SVF).

127 See above and Ranocchia (2021).

128 See Antoni (2004) 38 and also Antoni (2012b) 19–20.

129 See Antoni (2004) 38.

130 See *P.Herc.* 1384, col. 38.1–5; Plut. *Stoic. repugn.* 1043a–b (fr. 3.703 SVF); and Antoni and Dorival (2007) 108.

131 No allusion to the thematic variety or the narrative scheme of *P.Herc.* 1384 is made by Dorival.

132 As we have seen, the author of *P.Herc.* 1384 never says that the wise man will not engage in politics, but rather the exact opposite (see cols. 31–41 and above). As to the presence in it (col. 38.1–5 Antoni = point ix above) of the Chrysippean *chrēia* quoted above (Stob. *Flor.* 4.4.29 Hense (Chrysippus fr. 3.694 SVF); see above, n. 9, for the Greek text), this probably refers to Chrysippus' personal choice of life. Indeed, in Stobaeus' version of this *chrēia* the grammatical and logical subject is Chrysippus himself, who 'was asked why he did not engage in politics', i.e. why he personally preferred the scholastic life to the political one. So, no reference is made in the *chrēia* to the wise man as such. On the other hand, Chrysippus in book 4 of his *On Ways of Life* (Plut. *Stoic. repugn.* 1043a–b (fr. 3.703 SVF)) did not claim – as Dorival contends – that the wise man will not engage in politics, but only that he 'is unmeddlesome and does little and that he minds his own business'. In other words, he contrasts *oligopragmosynē* with *polypragmosynē*, not with political engagement. See Keith (2013) 261–2 on this point. In fact, as we have seen, in book 1 of the treatise he maintained that the wise man will partake in politics, if nothing hinders him (Diog. Laert. 7.121 = fr. 3.697 SVF). See, on a similar misunderstanding, Verhasselt (2016) 73–4.

Like any other work *Περὶ βίων* and like Chrysippus' treatise by the same title, *P.Herc.* 1384 is not a real doctrinal treatise, but looks like a text on descriptive ethics with a prescriptive goal in the background. As we have seen above, its protagonist is the wise man, and the subjects it deals with are topics related to the wise man's mode of life in the various fields of his individual and social action. Its target are those who are receptive towards the teaching of a proficient master (col. 50), namely those progressing towards virtue or, to put it otherwise, the philosopher's pupils in the school.<sup>133</sup> From the above points it follows that its purpose, albeit not directly discernible, must deal with moral progress (col. 24) and the pursuit of wisdom. Just like Chrysippus' *Περὶ βίων*, *P.Herc.* 1384 is an uninterrupted exposition arranged into different thematic sections. Worth noting is the fact that three of the main topics it presents – those concerning the erotic, the political and the educational activity of the wise man – recur in the latter text as well, and in a similar fashion. In particular, in col. 24 of *P.Herc.* 1384 the wise man is said to cultivate love for moral progressors (τοῖς τε προκεκοφόσιν ἐπιβαλ[λ]εῖν τοῦτο [sc. ἔρωσι]), just as in Chrysippus' *Περὶ βίων* (book 1) he is said 'to love those youths who show a natural disposition to virtue (τὴν πρὸς ἀρετὴν εὐφυσίαν) in their outward appearance'.<sup>134</sup> In cols. 31–41, the wise man's active political engagement for the sake of future generations is described, just as in *Περὶ βίων* (book 1) he is said to engage in politics to stop vice and incite to virtue,<sup>135</sup> to the point that, if possible, he will become a king or live together with a ruler and fight on his side.<sup>136</sup> These claims are only apparently contradicted by the aforementioned *chreia* reported in *P.Herc.* 1384 whereby someone (most probably Chrysippus)<sup>137</sup> confesses that he 'will not engage in politics because, if one does so well, he displeases the citizens', but if [one does so] badly, he displeases the gods (col. 38.1–5).<sup>138</sup> In fact, this text alludes to Chrysippus' personal choice of life,<sup>139</sup> which need not necessarily coincide with the wise man's way of life as such.<sup>140</sup> Even if it did, the Stoics admitted of three preferable ways of life (kingly,

<sup>133</sup> See also Antoni (2012a).

<sup>134</sup> See Diog. Laert. 7.129 (fr. 3.716 SVF).

<sup>135</sup> See Diog. Laert. 7.121 (fr. 3.697 SVF).

<sup>136</sup> See Diog. Laert. 10.43b–c and e (fr. 3.691 and 693 SVF).

<sup>137</sup> See above, n. 132.

<sup>138</sup> See Stob. Flor. 4.4.29 Hense (fr. 3.694 SVF) and above, nn. 9 and 132.

<sup>139</sup> As we know, Chrysippus was an extremely busy philosopher and master who conceived of his philosophical activity as a mission for life and any other business as a distraction from it. Concerning his refusal to engage in an active life see the episode reported by Diogenes Laertius (7.185) according to which Chrysippus, differently from his fellow disciple Sphaerus (on whom see above, n. 71), disdainfully declined to join Ptolemy IV in Alexandria. See also above, n. 132.

<sup>140</sup> Chrysippus regarded neither himself nor any of his predecessors or disciples as a wise man and maintained that only one or two wise men at most may exist in the world at any given time. See Plut. Stoic. repugn. 1048e and Diogen. ap. Eus. Praep. evang. 6.8.13–14 (fr. 3.668 SVF). Moreover, he recognised that the Stoic ideal of the wise man is so lofty and superhuman as to seem like a fable to the people. See Plut. Stoic. repugn. 1041f (fr. 3.545 SVF). More generally, the Stoics maintained that wisdom is hardly achievable by men and that the wise man is rarer than the phoenix. See Alex. Aphr. Fat. 28, p. 199.7 Bruns (fr. 3.658 SVF) and Ioppolo (1980) 118–20. In particular, the evidence available to us on both early Stoics in general and each of them taken individually

political and scientific), which are either equally worthy of being chosen by the wise man or are hierarchically ordered so that the kingly and the political life generally take precedence over the scientific one. So, for Stoicism every wise man is free to choose for himself which of these three different lifestyles is best suited to him, according to his own inclinations and the different circumstances of his life. In particular, if he is not a king himself or if it is impossible for him to engage in politics, he will gladly choose the scientific life (to be identified with the scholastic one), being aware that, whichever way of life he adopts, only the rational life or life according to virtue is preferable in itself.<sup>141</sup> So, this *chreia* does not entail any contradiction whatsoever with the Stoic wise man's primary engagement in politics,<sup>142</sup> as described in both *P.Herc.* 1384 and Chrysippus' *Περὶ βίωv*, and in other ancient sources.<sup>143</sup> Finally, in cols. 42–9 of our papyrus, the wise man's educational mission and the philosophical training of his disciples are illustrated, just as in Chrysippus' *On Ways of Life* (possibly, again, book 1) his teaching activity and relationship with his pupils are discussed.<sup>144</sup> In both cases, a reference to the profit deriving from this kind of activity is made: in *P.Herc.* 1384, the author speaks of a share of profits and benefits, which given the context must refer to the relationship between master and pupils (col. 45.1–11);<sup>145</sup> in the *Περὶ βίωv*, Chrysippus discusses whether the wise man/master will expect to be paid for his lectures in advance or later on, on the basis of a specific agreement.<sup>146</sup>

What cannot escape the reader is that these three claims all come from the same book of Chrysippus' *On Ways of Life*, namely book 1 (although this is only a hypothesis in the case of the third claim).<sup>147</sup> Bearing in mind all the analogies between *P.Herc.* 1384 and both the philosophical genre *Περὶ βίωv* and Chrysippus' work by this title briefly discussed above (i.e. the fact that they share the same practical–ethical character, protagonist, range of topics, narrative scheme, target readership and purpose, along with very similar claims), the presence of some major topics and statements concerning the erotic, political and

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suggests that they did not consider themselves to be sages. For a thorough discussion of this point see now Brouwer (2014) 92–105, with further relevant references.

141 See Stob. Ed. 2.109.10 Wachsmuth (fr. 3.686 SVF); Diog. Laert. 7.130 (fr. 3.687 SVF); and above, n. 123.

142 On the wise man and politics see now Laurand (2005).

143 As is known, Plutarch in *On Stoic Self-Contradictions* is constantly concerned with detecting any supposed inconsistencies within Chrysippus' *On Ways of Life*, *On Appropriate Action* and *On Those Things Which Are Chosen in Themselves* and tends to misrepresent Chrysippus' positions so as to make them appear self-contradictory. See Keith (2013). For this reason Plutarch's account is to be interpreted with caution.

144 See Plut. *Stoic. repugn.* 1043e, 1047f (fr. 3.693 SVF) and 1043e (fr. 3.701 SVF). The attribution of the last fragment to book 1, while likely, is conjectural (see von Arnim (1903) App. 2.7, fr. 4 and above).

145 Pace Antoni (2012b) 89, the supplement δῆ τῶν χρ]ημά[των suggested by Richard Janko at lines 5–6 is both palaeographically and logically possible, given that only a few lines before (line 2) we have καρπ[οῦ]ς, 'profits'.

146 See Plut. *Stoic. repugn.* 1047f (fr. 3.693 SVF) and 1043e (fr. 3.701 SVF).

147 In fact there seems to be also a generic consonance between *P.Herc.* 1384, col. 44 (the role of dialectic and physics, as well as of medicine, geometry and poetry, in the education of youths) and book 4 of Chrysippus' *Περὶ βίωv* (the succession of logic, ethics and physics in the philosophical training of youths: see Plut. *Stoic. repugn.* 1035a (fr. 2.42 SVF)). But in the former case, as we have seen above, the author is polemically reporting not his own position, but that of another philosopher (the rejection of physics and dialectic as useless).

educational activity of the wise man in both P.Herc. 1384 and book 1 of Chrysippus' *Περὶ βίῳ* is sufficient evidence to propose a possible identification of our papyrus with this very book. One may wonder why these conceptual analogies are not supported by any textual overlap between the fragments of that book and P.Herc. 1384. But, in the first case, Diogenes Laertius' testimony cannot by any means be regarded as a proper quotation from Chrysippus' *Περὶ βίῳ*, because it is simultaneously ascribed by him to Zeno's *Republic* and Apollodorus' *Ethics*.<sup>148</sup> The second and the third Chrysippean testimonies, by contrast, do contain some direct quotations from book 1 of *Περὶ βίῳ*. However, given the small extent of the surviving text in P.Herc. 1384 – between one and two tenths of the original text, according to Antoni<sup>149</sup> – a possible textual match between Chrysippus' *Περὶ βίῳ* and this piece of writing should be regarded, statistically speaking, as a very fortunate coincidence.<sup>150</sup>

A possible identification of P.Herc. 1384 with book 1 of Chrysippus' *On Ways of Life* is reinforced by its comparison with P.Herc. 1020, which, as we know, probably belongs to the same editorial project and has recently been ascribed, on several grounds, to book 4 of the same treatise.<sup>151</sup> Without once again entering into the discussion of why this should be the case, suffice it here to say that its genre, protagonist, thematic variety and narrative scheme are the same as in the philosophical genre *Περὶ βίῳ*, Chrysippus' work by the same title and P.Herc. 1384. In particular, the main topics inferable from the portion of P.Herc. 1020 edited so far (cols. 104–12 Alessandrelli–Ranocchia)<sup>152</sup> – the wise man's cognitive, moral and dialectical virtues – fit in well with what we know about book 4 of Chrysippus' *On Ways of Life*. Just as in the latter the author addresses epistemological and dialectical issues, such as the use of anti-logical arguments and how to tackle the questions raised by Megarics and other opponents in dialectical discussions,<sup>153</sup> so in P.Herc. 1020 the author dwells on epistemology (cols. 104–8 and 112), dialectic and, in particular, on how to dialectically engage with formidable adversaries (cols. 109–10). In addition, just as in *Περὶ βίῳ* book 4, where Chrysippus discusses philosophy in general and its parts,<sup>154</sup> so in P.Herc. 1020 the author provides a masterly definition of philosophy

<sup>148</sup> See Diog. Laert. 7.129 (fr. 3.716 SVF).

<sup>149</sup> See Antoni (2012b) 35–45. According to her reconstruction, the original roll was ca 11.60 m long (excluding the initial *agraphon* and title), against the mere 2.39 m surviving today, and it contained about 213 columns of text, of which only fifty survive. In addition, of the original forty text lines per column, only between four and twenty are still surviving today. Finally, five columns are completely lost between Antoni's cols. 34 and 35; another two between cols. 39 and 40, i.e. exactly in the 'political' section of the book; and two more between cols. 42 and 43, namely in the 'educational' section.

<sup>150</sup> In particular, the scant fragments from book 1 of Chrysippus' *Περὶ βίῳ* with which we are concerned here might well have occurred in the lost lower portion of any column or in the columns that are missing in both the 'political' and the 'educational' section of the papyrus. See the preceding note.

<sup>151</sup> See Alessandrelli and Ranocchia (2017) 15–17 and above.

<sup>152</sup> The first critical edition of cols. 96–103, which immediately precede this section, is now being published by Alessandrelli and Ranocchia (forthcoming).

<sup>153</sup> See Plut. *Stoic. repugn.* 1036c (fr. 2.270 SVF).

<sup>154</sup> See Plut. *Stoic. repugn.* 1035a (fr. 2.42 SVF).

by contrasting it with one of its sub-sections, viz., again, dialectic (col. 108.12–27).<sup>155</sup> So, if P.Herc. 1384 and 1020 both belong to this Chrysippean treatise, they must coincide with books 1 and 4 respectively.

To be sure, here we are not dealing with strictly deductive pieces of proof, but with various kinds of arguments, whose synergistic combination points in the same direction, by corroborating this attribution hypothesis from different sides (philosophical, thematic, lexical, literary, stylistic and palaeographical). One only wonders where the two remaining books (books 2 and 3) of Chrysippus' *Περὶ βίωv* may have ended up and why they have not yet been identified in the Herculanean collection. As in the case of Epicurus' 37-book *On Nature* and several multi-volume works by Philodemus – of which several books, albeit not all, have been preserved – their loss must be considered merely accidental. However, as experience suggests, nothing rules out the possibility that they will be identified in the future.<sup>156</sup> If this argumentation is correct, the Stoic or, better, Chrysippean section of Philodemus' library also included, among the various works mentioned above, a complete copy of Chrysippus' famous treatise *On Ways of Life*.

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<sup>155</sup> Not even in the case of P.Herc. 1020 has any textual overlap with the (few) fragments belonging to book 4 of Chrysippus' *Περὶ βίωv* been detected so far. But it must be noted that, out of the more than a hundred columns originally to be found, only the last eight have been edited by scholars so far. Even in the already edited portion of it (cols. 104–12 Alessandrelli–Ranocchia), between eight and eleven lines are missing in the lower part of each column and, besides, one column (111) is entirely lost. See Alessandrelli and Ranocchia (2017) 30–3.

<sup>156</sup> In principle, these books could be among the ca 280 still unopened papyri in the collection. Alternatively, they could be found in the already unrolled papyri. In this regard, a good candidate could be P.Herc. 1158, an intriguing early Stoic text (on which see above). However, its poor condition and the fairly limited extent of the surviving text do not allow us to say anything certain about it. Only a new critical edition of this papyrus based on a stereo-microscope reading and the use of advanced techniques could disclose new promising information on its author, genre and content.

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