

TIMON OF PHLIUS: PYRRHONIST AND SATIRIST

The twentieth century has been so begrudging to Timon of Phlius that he could be forgiven for identifying himself with his misanthropic namesake. About a hundred and fifty of his 'glänzenden Sillen' (the phrase is Wilamowitz's) survive, but in Albin Lesky's *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur* Timon gets only a third of the space devoted to Anaximander from whom we possess one possible sentence.¹ Serious work on Timon largely came to a stop with Hermann Diels who edited the fragments and testimonia in *Poetarum philosophorum fragmenta* (Berlin, 1901), a book which is as difficult to come by as the older and much fuller study of Timon by C. Wachsmuth in *Sillographorum Graecorum reliquiae* (Leipzig, 1885).² In spite of his skilful parody of Homer and his Aristophanic versatility in language (some sixty neologisms, many of them comic formations, occur in the fragments),³ Timon has been ignored by those who give such generous attention to Hellenistic poetry. Many fragments raise at least one major textual difficulty. A new edition and literary study of the material is badly needed.⁴

This neglect of Timon is all the more surprising since his subject matter, the philosophy of Pyrrho, continues to attract considerable interest.⁵ Pyrrho wrote nothing, and no-one who studies Pyrrho can avoid Timon, whose summary of Pyrrho's views, as reported by Aristocles in Eusebius, is often taken as the starting point for discussion of early scepticism.⁶ The authors of two recent books on Greek scepticism, Charlotte Stough and Mario Dal Pra, have properly appreciated the unique importance of Timon's evidence for understanding Pyrrho;⁷ and Dal Pra follows his chapter on Pyrrho with a useful survey of Timon. But neither of these scholars makes systematic study of Timon the basis for discussion of Pyrrho. All Timon's surviving work is directly or indirectly a vindication of Pyrrho, and it is only when all the material is considered that the groundwork can be laid for grasping Pyrrho's significance, as represented by Timon.⁸ A question needs to be put which is as simple as it is basic. Is any ancient source about Pyrrho's life and philosophy uncontaminated by the writings of Timon? If the answer is negative, with little or no qualifications, as I believe, the study of Pyrrho must begin with the study of Timon. He stands even closer to Pyrrho than does Plato to Socrates.

Wilamowitz bears some responsibility for obscuring this relationship. In his influential book, *Antigonos von Karystos* (Berlin, 1881) Wilamowitz's enthusiasm for the biographer was unlimited. 'Alles wesentliche was wir von Pyrrhons Leben glaubhaftes wissen verdanken wir dem Antigonos' (p.31). Wilamowitz thought he could show that the first chapters of Diogenes Laertius' Life of Pyrrho (9.61-9) were principally derived from just one source, a biography by Antigonos, written in

about 225 B.C. – some fifty years after Pyrrho’s death; and that this source also lay behind the biographical information in Aristocles (mediated by Eusebius, *PE* 14.18. 26–28) and other ancient testimonia on Pyrrho. In his Pauly-Wissowa article on Pyrrho of 1963 K. von Fritz endorsed these conclusions, urging that Antigonus had ‘living memories’ of Pyrrho from his pupils.⁹ Perhaps so, but, as others have shown, it is difficult to reconcile Diogenes’ references, within that context, to the totally obscure Ascanius of Abdera and to Eratosthenes, with the hypothesis of Antigonus as his unitary source.¹⁰ Even if, however, Wilamowitz had been right, there is a more telling point to be made against him. Much of the serious information recorded by Diogenes Laertius, including the gist of his biographical anecdotes, is supported by the fragments of Timon; and this suggests that Antigonus is to be regarded as a compiler rather than a biographer of independent value.

Let me give examples. In D.L. 9.61 Pyrrho is alleged to have held that nothing is noble or base, but men are governed in their actions by convention; ‘for each thing is no more this than that’. Timon fr. 70 says: ‘but on the part of men these things are decided by intellect (or custom)’, and the source of the line, Sextus Empiricus, cites it to support the claim that nothing is good or bad by nature.¹¹ Timon’s use of ‘no more’ (οὐ μᾶλλον) is confirmed by D.L. 9.76.¹² D.L. 9.64 reports that many people envied Pyrrho his ‘freedom from occupation’ (ἀπραγμοσύνη) and supports this by quoting from Timon’s *Silloi* (fr. 48) five hexameters about Pyrrho’s ‘release from servitude to sophists’ opinions and empty-mindedness’ (κενεοφροσύνη), and three verses from the *Indalmoi* (part of fr. 67). There Timon praises Pyrrho for his imperturbability and freedom from care, and the first line of his *Silloi* is an invocation of all ‘busybody sophists’ (πολυπράγμονες, fr. 1).¹³ D.L. 9.67 states that Pyrrho liked to quote passages from Homer which illustrated the ‘inconsistency’ (ἀβέβαιον), ‘aimless desire’ (κενόσπουδον), and ‘infantile nature’ (παιδαριῶδες) of men. The fragments of Timon’s *Silloi* exemplify all three qualities: Pyrrho’s ‘complete consistency’ (fr. 67) is contrasted with the behaviour of other men (fr. 9), and κενός, once compounded, is one of Timon’s favourite words.¹⁴ D.L. 9.68 reports an anecdote from Posidonius (Edelstein-Kidd F287) concerning Pyrrho’s calm in a storm (γαληνός) when his fellow travellers at sea were all disturbed. Timon frs. 63 and 64 (= S.E. *M.* 11.141) use the word γαλήνη, almost certainly a reference by Timon to Pyrrho: ‘And then I saw him in a calm undisturbed by winds’.¹⁵ Two passages in D.L. 9 refer to Pyrrho’s concern with excellence: ‘teaching someone else to be good’ (63) and ‘training himself to be good’ (64). Timon fr. 68 is almost certainly Pyrrho’s supposed answer to a question by Timon (fr. 67) about the causes of Pyrrho’s untroubled disposition (see n. 8 above); and it refers to ‘the nature of what is divine and good’.¹⁶

We learn nothing credible about Pyrrho’s life style or attitudes, from Diogenes Laertius, which is not stated or implied by Timon.¹⁷ Where Diogenes usefully supplements Timon is in details about Pyrrho’s career – his association with Anaxarchus (9.61), an atomist famous for his ἀπάθεια and εὐκολία (D.L. 9.60),

whom Timon satirises for combining the appearance of 'Cynic strength' (κύνεον μένος) with hedonism;¹⁸ his going, along with Anaxarchus, on Alexander's expedition to India and consorting with the 'Gymnosophists' and Magi (9.61); his admiration for Democritus and Homer (which we might have inferred from Timon);¹⁹ and the high regard in which he was held by Elis, his town, and by his followers apart from Timon (9.64ff.). How much of all this was included in Timon's lost writings we cannot say. But the correspondence between the few fragments which we have and the Diogenes Life is close enough to support the remark by Sextus Empiricus (*M* 1.53) that Timon was the spokesman (προφήτης) of Pyrrho's views. In all probability Antigonus of Carystus and other biographers of Pyrrho drew largely upon the writings of Timon, embellishing them with genuine and apocryphal anecdotes to illustrate Pyrrho's character. It is equally probable that when Aenesidemus, in the first century B.C., revived the name of Pyrrho for his own sceptical philosophy the most authoritative source on which he could draw was Timon.²⁰

In his book *Pyrrhon et le scepticisme grec* (p.27) Louis Robin rightly drew a contrast between Pyrrho and Timon, but he expressed it in a misleading way. Commenting on the differences between the two men's careers Robin contrasted Pyrrho's 'calm and moderation' with Timon's various activities, as dancer, and sophist.²¹ Timon, he wrote, 'was the perfect model of a type loathed by Pyrrho', and he concluded that Timon's enthusiasm for Pyrrho may have distorted the way in which he represents him. Neither the moralising nor the distortion seems to me to be an appropriate remark. But Robin was right to remind us of the fact that Timon was Pyrrho's interpreter and not his double. However much or little Pyrrho was influenced by Indian fakirs he may be well described as a guru, a type of wise man which turns up in the Greek world from the sixth century onwards and increasingly, it seems, in the second part of the fourth century. Timon by contrast was a many-sided professional teacher, a man thoroughly at home in the life of the Hellenistic intelligentsia.²² Figures with whom Pyrrho has much in common, at least in Timon's estimation (as we shall see), are Diogenes of Sinope, Crates of Thebes, and Stilpo of Megara. They share a concern with self-sufficiency and freedom from disturbance which, in the opinion of our sources, they propagated as much by how they lived as by any formal teaching. The guru type of Greek philosopher, whose principal concerns are ethical, does not belong to a monolithic group. Stilpo for instance had strong interests in dialectic which the Cynics did not share, and one may argue about whether Socrates, whose influence on all the later gurus is certain, should be classed with them or not. But a sharp distinction can be drawn between the early Academic and Peripatetic concentration on systematic discussion and written exposition and the informal and more individualised teaching of Stilpo, Crates and others. By the end of the fourth century the early Academic and Peripatetic style of philosophy looks like becoming the exception. Zeno and Epicurus have begun to establish themselves; the Academy is apparently

concentrating upon ethics;²³ the Cynics and the dialecticians (of various kinds) are flourishing;²⁴ only in the Peripatos is there a lively continuation of scientific research. But if the future of philosophy seems to lie with the individual who has a charismatic personality, a brilliant style in arguments, and in most cases a powerful moral message, the sheer popularity of philosophy and the range of options available inevitably influenced the way in which avant garde philosophers or their disciples presented their views. This is particularly evident in the efforts philosophers made to align themselves with authorities from the past, so as to appropriate a respectable tradition for themselves: the early Stoics' interest in Homer, Hesiod, and Heraclitus is one example;²⁵ another is Arcesilaus' efforts to claim many pre-Socratics, as well as Socrates and Plato, as sceptical predecessors.²⁶ A further characteristic of the competing schools (too large and complex to be illustrated here) is their borrowing terms and concepts from one another. Another common feature of the times, stimulated by the same conditions, is intense criticism of contemporary rivals.²⁷ All of these are featured in Timon's learned, satirical, and vituperative approach to the Greek philosophical tradition and Pyrrho's place therein.

Timon of Phlius was about twenty years old in 300-290 B.C., years in which Greek philosophy reached perhaps its maximum diversification and general cultural influence.²⁸ At about this time he went to Megara where Stilpo was enjoying a considerable vogue. He was not the first man from Phlius to be attracted by Stilpo's reputation. In 317/6 Asclepiades of Phlius persuaded Menedemus of Eretria to join him as a pupil of Stilpo, and Stilpo, admittedly on the word of another Megarian philosopher, is said to have drawn pupils away from Theophrastus and many others.²⁹

The links between Stilpo and Timon, on the basis of extremely fragmentary sources, are so striking that some oversimplification and contamination in the doxographical tradition may be suspected. But there do seem to be genuinely close connections between them. Stilpo was a logician and a practical moralist; if Aristocles is to be trusted, he continued the Eleatic tendency of Megarian philosophers in asserting a strict monism and denying all change and movement.³⁰ Aristocles also attributes to Stilpo, along with Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno and Melissus the necessary condemnation of *aistheseis* and *phantasiai* and confidence in 'reason alone'. No fragment of Timon refers to Stilpo by name, but Stilpo's Eleatic predecessors (according to Aristocles) are among the few philosophers, apart from Pyrrho, who are partly or wholly exempted from criticism in the *Silloi*. Xenophanes' part in the poems was central (see further p.77). He answered Timon's questions about the philosophers in the second and third books (D.L. 9.111), and it is probably Xenophanes who says:

Fr. 44 'And mighty Parmenides, high-minded and not given to multiple opinions, who removed the processes of thought from the deception of appearance.'³¹

Fr. 45 'Zeno unfailingly powerful with his two-edged tongue, who trapped everyone, and Melissus superior to many illusions, and vanquished by few.'³²

Later Pyrrhonism certainly made no exception of reason in its denial of any demonstrable criterion of truth, and this was probably Timon's view as well. But the main object of attack in the *Silloi* is *doxai*, unjustifiable claims to truth or learned pretentiousness,³³ and we may take it as certain that Timon sought to present Xenophanes and the Eleatics as closer to the ideal Pyrrho than the 'busybody sophists' summoned in the first line of book 1. Here then we have the first possible mark of Stilpo's influence.

Virtually nothing about Stilpo's detailed contributions to logic is known. He is one of many philosophers reputed to have denied τὰ εἶδη, on the ground that a general term such as 'man' refers to nothing since it refers neither to this man nor to that one;³⁴ and he is said to have claimed that one thing cannot be predicated of another unless subject and predicate are identical; non-essential predication is disallowed because it supposedly detaches the subject from itself; in '(a) man is good' either good is the same as man, in which case good cannot be predicated of food; or it is different from man, in which case it is false to say that man is good.³⁵ We should not expect Timon to have been interested in such logical puzzles, but the one purely conceptual doctrine attributed to him has a thoroughly Megarian ring. Timon maintained that 'in a time which lacks parts nothing which has parts can happen, such as coming to be, perishing, and everything similar'.³⁶ Sextus Empiricus quotes this doctrine in two contexts where he is demonstrating that time is non-existent, whether we make it divisible or indivisible. He cites Timon in order to show that time cannot be indivisible. It is impossible to know whether Timon advanced this as a substantive position, which seems unlikely, or as part of a dialectical argument. If the latter is the case, he might have been proposing a dilemma in the Zenonian manner; or he might have been refuting attempts to combine temporal atomism (ἀμερεῖς χρόνοι) with 'infinitely divisible bodies and places', a doctrine attributed, probably incorrectly, to the Peripatetic philosopher, Strato of Lampsacus.³⁷ In any case Timon's remark about time and change was the kind of interest which a pupil of Stilpo might have developed, and it sets Timon within a regular talking-point of contemporary dialectic.

But it is in ethics and in terminology that the correspondences between Timon and Stilpo are most striking. The most widely attested anecdote about Stilpo concerns his tranquillity and rationality during the destruction of Megara, his country, by Demetrius Poliorketes in 308/7.³⁸ Stilpo lost all his property but when challenged about this is alleged to have said that 'he had lost nothing that belonged to him; no-one had removed his education, and he still possessed reason and knowledge'.³⁹ The Cynic style of answer is corroborated by many other reports of the man – his freedom (fr. 172), self-control (fr. 158), self sufficiency (fr. 195), his teaching that exile is not an evil (fr. 192).⁴⁰ Plutarch records Stilpo's reputation for 'mildness' (πραότης) and 'moderation' (μετριοπάθεια).⁴¹ The first of these is given by Diogenes Laertius as an alternative to 'freedom from emotion' (ἀπάθεια) as the goal of the Sceptics (9. 108). The second, μετριοπάθεια, is stated by Sextus

Empiricus to be the Sceptics' goal in matters over which we have no control (*PH* 1.30). Another term, attributed to the Megarians in general, is ἀοχλησία, 'freedom from disturbance', a synonym for ἀταραξία. This is recorded as the Megarians' explanation of the 'primary object of human impulse' (πρῶτον οἰκεῖον), and though ἀοχλησία itself may not be their term it associates them with that freedom from disturbance which Timon singled out as the supreme quality of Pyrrho.⁴² Our sources are divided on any written works by Stilpo: in one list of those who wrote nothing he is mentioned along with Pyrrho.⁴³ In his insistence on the emptiness of general terms Stilpo is credited with a Pyrrhonist cliché: τί γὰρ μᾶλλον τόνδε ἢ τόνδε;⁴⁴

I would not attach much weight to any one of the parallels between Timon and Stilpo, where they are taken in isolation, but cumulatively they strongly suggest a willingness, on Timon's part, to associate his representation of Pyrrho with features which were readily credited to Stilpo, Timon's first philosophical teacher. The question of the real Pyrrho's links with the Megarians need not be of any relevance here, though we should not forget that Diogenes Laertius (9.61) gave it as Apollodorus' opinion that Pyrrho, early in his career, studied under 'Bryson son of Stilpo'. But this is impossible, as it stands, since Pyrrho and Stilpo were of the same age.⁴⁵

The identity and philosophy of the Bryson who may have influenced Pyrrho are too uncertain to confirm Pyrrho's possible links with the Megarians.⁴⁶ So far as Timon is concerned however, the Megarians, with the possible exception of Stilpo, are not treated with the respect apparently accorded to the Eleatics. Timon or 'Xenophanes', attacked Eucleides, with a side swipe at the other Socratics as well:

'But I do not care for these wafflers, nor for any other (Socratic), not for Phaedo, whoever he was, nor for quarrelsome Eucleides, who implanted in the Megarians a frenzied love of contention.'⁴⁷

Timon may have been no more sparing of Stilpo than was Crates of Thebes in his satirical attack on his old teacher for pretentious and worthless argument.⁴⁸ Certainly Menedemus, another pupil of Stilpo's, is dismissed by Timon as 'supercilious, blusterer'.⁴⁹ My point is not to suggest that Timon treated Stilpo respectfully in his writings but that he found it appropriate (which is not to say historically accurate) to praise Pyrrho for qualities that were also associated with Stilpo.⁵⁰

Marriage followed Timon's stay with Stilpo, and he then with his wife joined Pyrrho at Elis.⁵¹ It is quite impossible to know the extent of Pyrrho's reputation at this time – say 295-290 B.C. Nor can we say why Timon went to him. Some scholars have thought that Timon's lost dialogue, *Pytho*, recounted his first meeting with Pyrrho at a shrine of Amphiaraus in Phlius when Pyrrho was on his way to Delphi.⁵² Others, much more plausibly, have treated the supposed meeting and its occasion as a literary fiction.⁵³ I am tempted to speculate that Timon's connecting

Pyrrho with Delphi may have been an attempt to recall the Pythian response to Chaerephon's question about Socrates, and to represent Pyrrho's total refusal to dogmatize about anything as the height of contemporary wisdom. If Wilamowitz was right in locating the Amphiareion at Oropus, in N.E. Attica, it may have been the famous oracle there which Pyrrho or Timon was consulting.⁵⁴ The *Pytho* was probably Timon's earliest work on Pyrrho; in it Timon described Pyrrho's disposition and expounded such characteristics of the Pyrrhonist life style as 'determining nothing' and 'not going outside convention'.⁵⁵

Timon may have stayed in Elis until Pyrrho's death about 270 B.C. Then 'finding himself without a livelihood', in Diogenes Laertius' phrase (9.110), he worked as a sophist in Chalcedon and there made enough money to retire to Athens for nearly all the rest of his life. What his sophistry involved is difficult to say, but the success of the Cynics at this time, and the strong Cynic elements in Timon's poetry, suggest that his lectures included Cynic themes. In addition to Stilpo's moralising influence the Cynics are directly and most emphatically represented in Timon's poetic style, thought, and language.

This was well recognized by Wachsmuth,⁵⁶ but there is much more to say on the subject, which has been almost completely passed over by later writers on Timon and early Pyrrhonism. Before commenting on the Cynic interest in parody of Homer and *spoudaiogeloion* I will say something about words and ideas in Timon which he shares with the Cynics. Given the loss of Cynic poems and diatribes it is again remarkable how closely we can document the links with Timon.

First, some pejorative terms which assume almost technical significance among the Cynics. *τῦφος*, meaning 'trumpery' and referring to self-importance and self-deception, was constantly attacked by the Cynics.⁵⁷ Pyrrho is contrasted in Timon with the erratic mass of mankind as *ἄτυφος*, while Zeno the Stoic is 'a greedy old Phoenician (fisher) woman in her dark *τῦφος*, desiring everything'.⁵⁸ Xenophanes is complimented on being *ὑπάτυφος*, 'partly free of conceit', and it is probably he who is said to prefer 'the thin dry shell of the Greeks' to luxurious food as that in which his poverty is *ἄπερισσοτρύφης*.⁵⁹ The Cynics preached the need to struggle against *τρύφή*, the prime source, along with *πολυτέλεια*, of all civic discord according to Crates.⁶⁰ Timon writes of the *τρυφερὴ φύσις* of Aristippus.⁶¹ *οἴησις* and *κενοδοξία* are Cynic synonyms for *τῦφος*, and they are found together in Timon's 'human bags of skin stuffed with empty conceit'.⁶² Timon praises Pyrrho for discovering release from the servitude of *δόξαι* and the *κενεοφοροσύνη* of sophists.⁶³ It would hardly be an exaggeration to remark that there are Cynic supports for every moral judgement, whether good or bad, which Timon makes in the *Silloi* and in his other verses. His attack on the intellectuals of the Alexandrian Museum (fr. 12) and on learning generally (fr. 61),⁶⁴ his criticism of scholarly controversy,⁶⁵ his attack on *doxai* both in the sense of fame and (worthless) belief, and *epithumia*,⁶⁶ more specifically, his criticism of Prodicus for love of money,⁶⁷ of Persaeus (Zeno's disciple) as a *kolax*,⁶⁸ of Arcesilaus for playing to the crowd,⁶⁹ all

these, and other failings belong to the Cynic repertoire of castigation.

The common ground is much too extensive to be explained as merely popular morality reflected by philosophers who have nothing else in common. But any doubts on that score must be resolved when we consider the form of Timon's *Silloi*. These poems, for all their explicit allegiance to Xenophanes, have a more immediate model in the work of Timon's elder contemporary, the Cynic philosopher, Crates of Thebes.

Only six fragments of eighteen lines in all have survived, but at least two of these (1 and 2 Diels) are identical in style and content to Timon's *Silloi*. Here is fr. 1:⁷⁰

'Next I looked on Stilpo suffering grievously in Megara, where they say is the bed of Typhos. He kept disputing there, and many comrades were around him. They wasted time in pursuing virtue by the letter'.

The first line is taken from *Od.* 11.582 substituting the name Stilpo for Homer's Tantalus.⁷¹ 'And I saw so and so' is a stock introduction for Odysseus' encounters with the various shades, and the same expression occurs in Crates fr. 3 Diels, where the person seen is probably not a philosopher.⁷² Wachsmuth was therefore almost certainly justified in assuming that some of Crates' poems parodied the Homeric *Nekuia*.⁷³ Timon uses the same formula in two of his *Silloi* (frs. 9 and 38), and while I have doubts about how thoroughly he adapted the motif of a *Nekuia* it is difficult on the evidence of Crates' practice, not to mention other considerations, to explain the similarities in Timon independently of a *Nekuia*.⁷⁴ Crates' second line takes all but its opening from *Iliad* 2.783, merely changing εἰν Ἀρίμοις, the home of Typhos, to ἐν Μεγάροις. Thus Crates gets a double pun, alluding to Megara by the Homeric word for palace, and to τυφός by locating Homer's Sicilian Typhos in Crates' home/country. The third line is largely borrowed from *Iliad* 8.537, leaving only the fourth as an original verse which makes the Homeric passages thoroughly incongruous by its Cynic criticism of theoretical ethics.

Timon's *Silloi* use just these techniques. Like Crates he may change only a word or two in consecutive lines. The cause of the 'word battle' between philosophers, which was described by Timon, is expressed with only two significant changes from *Iliad* 1.8-10: instead of 'son of Leto and Zeus' as the cause of Strife Timon writes 'Echo's thronging crowd'; and instead of 'angered with the king he aroused harmful sickness throughout the army' Timon wrote, 'angered at their silence it (sc. Ἥχοῦς ὄχλος) aroused a chattering sickness against men'.⁷⁵ As in Crates the Homeric context as well as the alteration of the Homeric text makes the satirical point. Or the parody may be more subtle: 'amongst them, crying like a cuckoo, rose Heraclitus, who reviled the crowd, the riddler'.⁷⁶ Here the content of the Homeric passage, Nestor's mediation between Agamemnon and Achilles, is largely altered.⁷⁷ But the opening and end of the first line and the same verb in the same position in the second are sufficient to identify Timon's model. For ἠδυσπῆς ἀνόρουσε he substitutes αἰνικτῆς ἀνόρουσε, and thus completely changes the tone of the

original. But in his praise of Pyrrho Timon merely alters the name of Odysseus, in order to have himself or Xenophanes say, 'no mortal could rival Pyrrho'.⁷⁸

It was certainly Cynic practice, outside the satirical poems of Crates, to ridicule other philosophers. Diogenes' attacks on Plato are well known, and Bion of Borysthene, who was about Timon's age, seems to have launched sardonic criticism against philosophers and intellectuals in general.⁷⁹ With his *παρησία*, and the form and content of his *Silloi*, Timon must have intended his readers to associate his attacks on the dogmatists and his eulogy of Pyrrho with Cynic attitudes and ideals. But we should not conclude from this that Timon wished to represent Pyrrho as a Cynic philosopher. Although none of the surviving *Silloi* attacks Diogenes or any contemporary Cynic by name, Socrates himself and his non-Academic followers, including Antisthenes, are satirised.⁸⁰ As I remarked earlier, the Megarians, in spite of the apparent affinity between Timon and Stilpo, are not spared. Although Timon's moral judgements accord so well with familiar Cynic preaching, there are many distinctive Cynic attitudes which Timon's fragments do not repeat: the high value set on *πόνος*, and *φρόνησις*; the insistence on *λόγος* as the only basis of human nature; the sharp distinction between *νόμος* and *φύσις*, a doctrine which seems completely opposed to the Pyrrhonist denial of any means to penetrate behind phenomena; the profession of *ἀναίδητα* which is also the opposite of the Pyrrhonist recommendation to observe the ordinary conventions of society. It is then a selective Cynicism on which Timon drew, which allowed him to omit certain themes and to admit others in his representation of the unique wisdom of Pyrrho. If this is Timon's technique we may begin to suspect that he is quite deliberately eclectic. He decided, I suggest, that in order to maximise Pyrrho's claims to be regarded as the wisest men of the age, he had to draw the fire of his main contemporary rivals and represent Pyrrho as someone to whom Cynics and would-be Cynics could give allegiance without facing an explicit challenge to all of their strongly held moral positions.

This point, and indeed the strong Cynic tone in Timon, was overlooked by Dal Pra, who argued that elements in the biographical traditional of Pyrrho, whether from Eratosthenes or Antigonos of Carystus, which show traits of the *adiaphoros* sage are influenced directly by the Cynic-Stoic diatribe.⁸¹ I would put it differently: such characterization of Pyrrho is due primarily to Timon, and *his* usage of Cynicism. Nor is there any good reason to exclude a direct Cynic influence on the development of Pyrrho's position. If Pyrrho had not been familiar with the Cynics before he went to India he must have been acquainted with Onesicritus, a pupil of Diogenes, who was also a member of Alexander's expedition. Just as Onesicritus interpreted a group of Indian fakirs as Cynics so Pyrrho may have gone one better and seen the fakirs as representatives of his own position.⁸² It is uneconomical to explain the attested Indian influence on Pyrrho as a direct product of the Stoic-Cynic diatribe.

Before I leave the Cynics it seems appropriate to mention Cicero's remarks about

Pyrrho. In the places where Cicero refers to Pyrrho he always writes of him in company with Ariston of Chios, the most Cynic of all Stoics. Ariston held that everything except virtue and vice is completely indifferent, and Cicero presents Pyrrho's views as similar. He criticizes both philosophers for 'making everything equal' (*Fin.* 3.11), claiming that Pyrrho regarded the wise man as not even aware of those things which are indifferent (*Acad.* 2.130). Scholars have been suspicious of Cicero's treatment of Pyrrho, largely because it says nothing about his scepticism, and it has seemed difficult to reconcile his Pyrrho, who has a unitary concept of virtue, with the evidence which withholds from him and Timon any notion of something naturally good or bad (see p.69 above). Instead of attempting to solve that difficulty here, which needs to be considered in the light of other fragments of Timon, I wish merely to observe that Cicero may not have been wrong to assert close ties between Pyrrho and Ariston.⁸³ Cicero never refers to Timon, and may not have read him. But the fragments of Timon I have already discussed give ample support to a connection between his portrayal of Pyrrho and the Cynics.

And yet there is a fundamental difference between them as well, which Timon makes very plain. Although Crates the Cynic was Timon's immediate model for the *Silloi* there is no evidence that Crates called his *paignia* (D.L. 6.85) by that name. Timon's more distant model was Xenophanes, and it is Xenophanes above all with whom he wished to align himself. This is proved both by the title *Silloi* and by the special place assigned to Xenophanes in Timon's verse. Whatever may have been Xenophanes' own name for his satirical verses, *Silloi* or *Parodies* or no particular description, we can scarcely doubt that by Timon's day they had come to be called *Silloi*, 'squint-eyed verses'.⁸⁴ It is likely in my opinion, that most, and possibly all, of Xenophanes' extant fragments in hexameters, as distinct from elegiacs, are from the *Silloi*. These include the well known attack on Homer and Hesiod for their immoral representation of the gods, the satirical treatment of each peoples' conception of gods in its own image, and passages which seem to outline Xenophanes' own theology;⁸⁵ last, but most important, his claims that no human being has had or will ever have a clear vision of his subjectmatter: 'for even if he should chance to speak, completely, what has been accomplished, he himself at least has no knowledge of it; but seeming has been wrought over everything'.⁸⁶

The last statement could well have been the inspiration for Timon's assertion in his poem called *Indalmoi* (Images):

'But the appearance is strong on all sides, wherever it goes.'⁸⁷

Whatever were the historical roots of Pyrrho's scepticism Timon marks out the special position of Xenophanes. Moreover, many of the qualities common to Crates and Timon were prefigured by Xenophanes. Some of these need no mention, but it is noteworthy that Xenophanes is said to have disagreed with Thales and Pythagoras, whose doctrine of metempsychosis he satirised, and to have attacked

Epimenides.⁸⁸ The tradition of Xenophanes' influence on the Eleatics, whom Timon, as we saw, apparently exempts from criticism, may be genuine and probably goes back at least to the fourth century. In the later doxographical tradition, as recorded by Aristocles, the succession of philosophers which ends with Pyrrho, 'who established the so-called Sceptic school', starts with Xenophanes.⁸⁹ Pyrrho could have acknowledged this, but the public recognition of such a tradition, which includes the Eleatics, Democritus and Protagoras, must have been largely, if not entirely, due to Timon.

Xenophanes played a role in the *Silloi* comparable to that of Virgil in Dante's *Inferno*. Like the virtuous pagan he falls short of the ideal, in this case Pyrrho, but his scepticism, if only partial, is praiseworthy and justifies his being chosen to be Timon's guide in his encounters with other philosophers. The first book of *Silloi* was a monologue by Timon himself. 'The second and third books have the form of dialogue. Timon appears questioning Xenophanes of Colophon about every philosopher, and Xenophanes describes them to him; in the second book he deals with the older philosophers; with the later ones in book three.'⁹⁰ Timon's two surviving fragments, which refer to Xenophanes, are both quoted by Sextus Empiricus in a context where he maintains that even someone who makes just one dogmatic pronouncement differs from a Pyrrhonist.⁹¹ He illustrates this by citing Timon: 'in many places he praised Xenophanes, so that he even dedicated his *Silloi* to him, but he made him grieve in these words': Xenophanes then speaks of himself as a would-be sceptic (ἀμφοτερόβλεπτος) who was deceived in his old age into thinking that 'all is one and the same'. A similar point is made in the second passage, where Timon calls Xenophanes ὑπάτυφος, 'partly conceited', because he mocked Homer's deception – for which he is to be praised – but then introduced a new theology of his own, thus committing the wrong of a dogmatist. ὑπάτυφος is more than a backhanded compliment. The only philosopher who is ἀτυφος is Pyrrho (fr. 9), so Timon, as Diels notes, is attributing something of his 'unconceited' character to Xenophanes.

If Xenophanes came closest in Timon to the ideal wisdom of Pyrrho this gives us a means of evaluating his few apparently favourable comments on other philosophers. I suggested earlier that the lines praising the Eleatics were spoken by Xenophanes himself, and this is consistent with Timon's attitude to Xenophanes. We should not infer, from the absence of any surviving critical reference to Parmenides or Zeno, that Timon himself did not make it, nor that he rated them superior to Xenophanes. A couple of lines record Timon's praise of Democritus:

'Such was wise Democritus who shepherded discourses (*muthoi*), undogmatic conversationalist, among the first I recognized.'⁹²

Pyrrho is alleged to have referred most of all to Democritus (D.L. 9.67), and his association with Anaxarchus makes it highly probable that Democritus' subjectivist interpretation of perceptual properties was a strong influence on

Pyrrho's scepticism.⁹³ But neither Pyrrho nor Timon can have had the least sympathy for atoms and void as real entities. Protagoras too is singled out by Timon or 'Xenophanes' for his honesty (ἐπιείκεια) in declaring that he knew nothing about the gods.⁹⁴ But Protagoras is also called a 'sophist', a pejorative term in the *Silloi*, and elsewhere in the poem Timon describes him as 'joining the fray well skilled in contention'.⁹⁵ It seems likely that all the philosophers in the *Silloi*, apart from Pyrrho of course and Xenophanes, are engaged in the battle of words; and this is the strongest indication of their falling short of Pyrrho's uncompetitive tranquillity. Among the philosophers whom Sextus Empiricus considers and rejects as having genuinely common ground with the 'Sceptics' are Heraclitus, Democritus, Protagoras, Plato, Xenophanes, and the Academics.⁹⁶ Aenesidemus and later Pyrrhonists will have had Timon's authority for considering all of these as potential candidates in support of Pyrrho, and for regarding none of them as properly satisfactory.

But before I attempt to assess the general significance of the *Silloi* as pro-Pyrrhonist propaganda we need to consider its treatment of other philosophers. In view of the fragmentary state of the poem it is extraordinary that only one later Greek philosopher of note, apart from Stilpo and the Cynics, is unmentioned in the existing material. The omission is Theophrastus. That may of course be pure chance, but 'Aristotle's painful aimlessness' is the only reference to the Peripatetics in any of Timon's extant verses.⁹⁷ If the Peripatetics were as prominent and influential in the early third century as some suppose it is at least surprising that their names do not make an appearance in the passages of Timon quoted by our main sources, Athenaeus, Diogenes Laertius, and Sextus Empiricus. Just how surprising becomes clearer when we survey the names which are attested: of the Presocratics – Thales (fr. 23), Pythagoras (fr. 57), Xenophanes (frs. 59,60), Heraclitus (fr. 43), Parmenides (fr. 44), Empedocles (fr. 42), Zeno of Elea (fr. 45), Melissus (fr. 45), Anaxagoras (fr. 24), Democritus (fr. 46); of the Socratics – Socrates himself (frs. 25,62), Xenophon (fr. 26), Aeschines (fr. 26), Plato (frs. 19,30,54,62), Phaedo (fr. 28), Euclides (fr. 28), Antisthenes (fr. 37), Aristippus (fr. 27); other fifth and fourth century philosophers – Protagoras (frs. 5,47), Prodicus (fr. 18), Anaxarchus (fr. 58), Diodorus Cronus (frs. 31,32), Speusippus (fr. 56), Aristotle (fr. 36); Academics in general (frs. 30,35); Arcesilaus (frs. 31,32,34,55); Stoics in general (frs. 13,14,39,65-6?), Zeno of Citium (frs. 38,39), Cleanthes (fr. 41), Persaeus (fr. 6), Ariston (frs. 6,40), Dionysius of Heraclea (fr. 17); Epicurus (frs. 7,51); Menedemus (frs. 29,31) and his pupil Ctesibius of Chalchis (fr. 16); and Philo (fr. 50) and Eurylochus (fr. 49), followers of Pyrrho. The greatest space, apart from Pyrrho (frs. 8,31,32,48,53), is taken up by Socrates, Plato and the Academy including Arcesilaus, on the one hand; and Zeno of Citium and the Stoics on the other hand. Clearly Timon wanted to reflect the greatest philosophical controversy of the third century, that between the Stoics and the Academic Sceptics.

As Diels, unlike Wachsmuth, recognized, one episode in the *Silloi* was a fishing

scene.⁹⁸ This showed the vain attempts of Zeno of Citium, ‘the greedy old Phoenician fisher woman’, to catch philosophical fish in a net of fine mesh, a satirical representation of Stoic dialectic.⁹⁹ One of the fish was certainly Arcesilaus whom Timon has saying: ‘I shall swim to Pyrrho and to crooked Diodorus’.¹⁰⁰ The leader of this shoal of fish was the eloquent and very large ‘mullet’ (πλατίστακος), Plato.¹⁰¹ Since Arcesilaus claimed to be an Academic in the true Platonic tradition it is appropriate that he should be led by the big fish Plato.

It is more difficult to decide on the correct interpretation of two further verses about Arcesilaus:¹⁰²

τῆι γὰρ ἔχων Μενέδημον ὑπὸ στέρνοισι μόλυβδον
θεύσεται ἢ Πύρρωνα τὸ πᾶν κρέας ἢ Διόδωρον.

Μενέδημον Diog. BF: -ου Diog. P, Numen. θεύσεται Numen.: θήσεται Diog. ἦ<’ς> Πύρρωνα Meineke.

‘Having Menedemus as lead in his heart, he will hurry either to the whole flesh, Pyrrho, or to Diodorus.’¹⁰³ μόλυβδον, ‘lead’, helps to confirm that this passage too is from the fishing scene. At *Iliad* 24.80-82 μολυβδαίνη is the lead weight mounted on ox horn (κρέας) ‘which brings death to fish’ (ἐπ’ ἰχθύσι κῆρα φέρουσα).¹⁰⁴ Timon’s first line is also modelled on *Od.* 5.346-7 τῆι δέ, τόδε κρήδεμνον ὑπὸ στέρνοιο (or στέρνοισι) τάνυσσαι / ἄμβροτον, Leucothoe’s instruction to Odysseus to leave his boat and swim, wrapping her veil around his chest. Both epic texts may help to interpret the description of Arcesilaus. Numenius, one of the sources of these lines, explains the reference to Menedemus thus: ‘Timon says that Arcesilaus received dialectic from Menedemus and was fitted out by him.’¹⁰⁵ Unlike Diels I do not think that Menedemus or Pyrrho or Diodorus are themselves represented as fish here:¹⁰⁶ we should suppose that Menedemus is a fisherman who has so attracted the swimming Arcesilaus that he has swallowed him, hook, line and sinker. Pyrrho and Diodorus represent alternative sources of nourishment for the fish Arcesilaus.¹⁰⁷ As ‘all flesh’ Pyrrho offers unrivalled attraction. But Diodorus should be, in Timon’s satire, quite different fare.

We have one line, quoted by Galen, of an unspecified ‘representation’ used by Timon: εικάζω, τί θέλεις; ὀλίγον κρέας, ὄσπετα πολλά.¹⁰⁸ ‘Slight flesh, many bones’ would make a most suitable contrast to the ‘all flesh’ Pyrrho, and I conjecture that it refers to Diodorus. It is likely that Ariston’s famous epigram of Arcesilaus, ‘Plato in front, Pyrrho behind, Diodorus in the middle’, was known to Timon.¹⁰⁹ But it is not in Timon’s manner to associate Pyrrho with any group of philosophers. He offers us a onesided relationship according to which only a few other philosophers, and not members of the Academy, may approximate to Pyrrho.

Timon was careful to distinguish Arcesilaus very sharply from Pyrrho. Arcesilaus is dismissed as a mere rabble rouser who gives himself airs with not the least justification.¹¹⁰ So far as I can judge, Timon does not present any member of the Socratic tradition in a kindlier fashion than he uses in handling the Stoics.

Although little of the general structure of the poem can be made out, Diels was certainly right to reject Wachsmuth's suggestion that the whole sequence of three books took the form of a *Nekuia*.¹¹¹ The greatest single source of parodied lines is *Iliad* 1-3, and Timon drew on these books, it seems, to represent the mass of philosophers as fighting one another in a futile battle of words. Imitation of Priam's questions to Helen about the Argive chieftans is the source of this question and answer:

'Who is this like a ram that goes about the ranks of men? A simmerer of verses, a stone from Assos, unenterprising mortar.'¹¹²

Ajax provides this allusion to Cleanthes, and many of our fragments probably come from this part of the *Silloi* which, in its imitation of the introduction to the *Iliad*, offered as good a way of introducing a series of named figures as the *Nekuia*.

The scope of this paper does not permit me to consider Timon's probable influence on Lucian, mediated by Menippus, nor many features of his style and language. But before concluding I should like to mention a further topic which needs research, his relationship to Greek biography and doxography. About half of our fragments come from Diogenes Laertius, and in most cases he found them in his sources. Antigonus of Carystus is almost certainly responsible for the quotations from Timon which Diogenes used in his *Life of Pyrrho*, and quite probably too for those in Diogenes' *Life of Arcesilaus*. As Professor Momigliano has so elegantly observed, 'Hellenistic biography was far more elaborately erudite than any previous biographical composition. It was also far more curious about details, witticisms, anecdotes and eccentricities'.¹¹³ Timon's *Silloi* could satisfy the biographers on all these counts, combining as they do, the doxographical, the satirical, and the anecdotal. Fantasy apart, Timon does not seem to have invented any of his pictures of the philosophers. His *Silloi* are a doxographical pastiche, rather than a travesty of philosophers' lives, but this made them no less welcome to Diogenes Laertius and his predecessors. It is difficult not to see an intrinsic connection between Sotion's commentary on the *Silloi* (n.9 above) and his influential *Successions of Philosophers* (c. 180 B.C.)

Timon in his turn was doubtless influenced, to a degree we can only conjecture, by earlier accounts of philosophers' lives as well as by the more austere summaries of doctrine most famously represented by Theophrastus. Aristoxenus' work on Pythagoras and other thinkers must have been known to Timon; and when we find Aristoxenus saying that Plato wanted to make a bonfire out of Democritus' writings, and Timon saying that the Athenians wanted to burn Protagoras' writings, the thought and expression coincide so completely that Aristoxenus' influence may be strongly suspected.¹¹⁴ Whatever his sources, Timon knew the history of philosophy well enough to be quoted, without apology, alongside much graver authorities.

Timon has a brilliant gift of economical caricature. His vignettes of philosophers

capture features by which they are still characterised nowadays: Empedocles' four elements, Anaxagoras' *Nous*, Socrates' irony, are some examples I have not so far mentioned.¹¹⁵ Other details are more esoteric, such as the dig at Plato for allegedly buying 'the *Timaeus*' at great cost from the Pythagoreans and modelling his own book on it.¹¹⁶ The *Silloi* formed a learned and witty poem, in the fashionable Hellenistic style.¹¹⁷ But the work's chief interest and importance, I believe, rests on its satire and its attempt to establish the pre-eminent *sophia* of Pyrrho by locating this within the whole history of Greek philosophy. Timon was quite comprehensive in his debunking of the dogmatists. His wit and criticism are neither ends in themselves nor mere embellishments but intrinsic elements in his assessment of other philosophers' achievements. From now on Pyrrho was not to be left as an isolated sage in Elis. The whole philosophical and epic tradition was drawn upon, by Timon, in order to place his hero in the proper sceptical perspective, with Homeric parody providing a mock heroic setting for the grandiose pretensions of his opponents. In that process some philosophers – Xenophanes, the Eleatics, Democritus, and, I would guess, some Cynics – were classified as honourable, if partly misguided, predecessors. So it could appear that Pyrrho, though the only model for happiness, was distinguishable in degree rather than in kind from some who had gone before him. He could, up to a point, be allied to principal moral standpoints of the contemporary Cynics, whose style of 'semi humorous' discourse so strongly appealed to Timon. But it had to be made clear that the new Stoic and Epicurean dogmatists, especially the Stoics, were futile wafflers; and that their opponents, Arcesilaus and his fellow Academics, though effective enough to demolish the Stoics, could no more rival Pyrrho than anyone else.

That these were Timon's aims in the *Silloi* is confirmed not only by the fragments themselves but also by the later Pyrrhonist tradition. Sextus Empiricus, in his long and often tedious doxographies, was developing a pattern first set by Timon. The chief purpose of Sextus was to establish that there are no grounds for assenting to any thesis; and one of his favourite techniques in this regard is to point out, like Timon, the 'disagreement' between dogmatic philosophers. He is often satirical at their expense,¹¹⁸ and, while not focusing on the personality of Pyrrho, as anxious as Timon to establish that his philosophy is the only rational option and the only source of happiness.

The *Silloi* of course can hardly have contained anything corresponding to the formal method of Pyrrhonist argument so carefully developed by Ainesidemus in the first century B.C.; and we have only a few hints about such a methodology in Timon's prose writings (see n.8 above and p.72). But it is likely enough that the traces of Timon that we can detect in Sextus Empiricus are due to the revived Pyrrhonism of Ainesidemus. Timon in any case is far too good and interesting a writer to deserve merely the passing references and footnotes which have been his fate in recent years. I hope that this paper will help to arouse further investigation of his importance both as a satirist and as the philosopher who started

the literary tradition of Pyrrhonism.

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NOTES

1. U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Hellenistische Dichtung in der Zeit des Kallimachos* (1924) 224; Lesky, *GGL* ed. 3 (1971) 195-6; 757.

2. All fragment references of Timon will be to Diels' edition whose judgements and conjectures are much superior to Wachsmuth's. A study by G. Voghera, *Timone di Fliunte e la poesia sillografica* (1904), is referred to by Mario Dal Pra, *Lo scetticismo greco* ed. 2 I (1975) 87, but I have been unable to find a copy.

3. Cf. Wachsmuth, *Sill. Graec.* 203-4.

4. It is good news that Hugh Lloyd-Jones and Peter Parsons will include Timon in their *Supplementum Hellenisticum* forthcoming from de Gruyter, Berlin, and after delivering this paper I had the good fortune to read a draft of their text. The principal accounts of Timon available at present are R. Hirzel, *Untersuchungen zu Ciceros philosophischen Schriften* III (1883) 19-63; V. Brochard, *Les sceptiques grecs* ed. 2 (1887) 79-91; E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen* ed. 4 rev. E. Wellmann III.1 (1909) 499-507; A. Goedeckemeyer, *Die Geschichte des griechischen Skeptizismus* (1905) 20-26; W. Nestle, *RE* sv Timon suppl. 12 (1937); L. Robin, *Pyrrhon et le scepticisme grec* (1944) 27-32; M. Dal Pra (n.2 above) 83-109.

5. See most recently, in addition to Dal Pra, Charlotte L. Stough, *Greek skepticism* (1969) 16-34; J.-P. Dumont, *Le scepticisme et le phénomène* (1972); M. Conche, *Pyrrhon ou l'apparence* (1973); A.A. Long, *Hellenistic philosophy* (1974) 75-88.

6. *Praeparatio evangelica* 14.18.2-4= Diels, *Poet. Phil. Graec.* 9A.2, 175-6. This text, discussed in all the standard books, purports to give Timon's three-fold 'headings' which have to be considered by anyone seeking εὐδαιμονία. The many problems it raises are too extensive to be discussed here, but I take the opportunity of making two points now: (i) Dumont (n.5 above) 140-47 rightly notes that Aristocles, Eusebius' source, is unlikely to be quoting Timon at first hand, cf. the reference to Ainesidemus at the end of the passage; (ii) I have no serious doubts that the passage is mainly an accurate report of Timon. It is likely that he wrote to this effect in his *Pytho*, a prose work describing Pyrrho's 'disposition' (D.L. 9. 67=fr. 79), from which D.L. 9.76=fr. 80 quotes τὸ μηδὲν ὀρίζειν, ἀλλ' ἀπροσθετεῖν. Aristocles knew the *Pytho* in whole or in summary (ap. Euseb. *PE* 14.18.14-15), cf. G.A. Ferrari, *SIFC* 40 (1968) 208.

7. Stough (n.5 above) 16, Dal Pra (n.2 above) 39-40.

8. Apart from the *Silloi*, with which this paper is largely concerned, Timon praised Pyrrho's 'unique' and 'godlike' guidance of mankind in the *Indalmoi* ('Images'), written in elegiacs, D.L. 9.65, S.E. *M.* 1.305, 11.1, put together by Diels as fr. 67. Timon's question there about the source of Pyrrho's utter tranquillity is probably answered by 'Pyrrho' in S.E. *M.* 11.20=fr. 68 (cf. n.16 below). From *Concerning Sensations* (Περὶ αἰσθήσεων), a prose work, one sentence is attested, τὸ μέλι ὅτι ἐστί γλυκὺ, οὐ τίθημι, τὸ δ' ὅτι φαίνεται, ὁμολογῶ D.L. 9.105=fr. 74. Three other works in prose are attested: *Against the physicists* (Πρὸς τοὺς φυσικοὺς), in which Timon seems to have challenged the procedure of ἐξ ὑποθέσεως τι λαμβάνειν, a line of attack constantly used by Sextus Empiricus, the source of the reference, *M* 3.1=fr. 75; *Pytho* frs. 77-80 (cf. n.6 above); and *Funeral feast of Arcesilaus* ('Ἀρκεσιλάου περιδείπνον), D.L. 9.115=fr. 73, a work 'praising' Arcesilaus, whom Timon strongly attacked during his lifetime (cf. frs. 31-4 of *Silloi*, and below p.80). For Timon's acquaintance with Lacydes,

Arcesilaus' successor as head of the Academy, cf. Athenaeus 10.438A= Diels, *Poet. Phil. Graec.* 9A.6, 181.

9. Vol. xxiv sv Pyrrhon (1) col. 89. Von Fritz does not properly distinguish between the writings of Timon, which were well known (cf. Sotion's commentary on the *Silloi*, Athen. 8.336d, a reference which seems to be absent from all standard works on Timon), and the oral testimony, if that is the word, of Philo of Athens (D.L. 9.67), a follower of Pyrrho whom Timon described (fr. 50, as he also described Eurylochus, a further follower, fr. 49), and Numenius (D.L. 9.68), whom some have identified with the Middle Platonist, though D.L.9.102 is against this. No written word about Pyrrho is quoted from any of his followers besides Timon, but cf. D.L.9.102.

10. Cf. Dal Pra (n.2 above), 42-3.

11. *M.* 11.140, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ταῦτα νόμοι κέκρικται. Hirzel, *Untersuch.* III 56 n.1 changed νόμοι to νόμωι, and was followed by Wachsmuth, 24. Diels' rejection of this reading is uncharacteristically dogmatic.

12. = fr. 80. The text, cited in n.6 above, is quoted to illustrate Timon's explanation of οὐ μᾶλλον.

13. For fr. 67 cf. n.8 above. Fr. 1=D.L. 9.112 (the ἀρχή of the *Silloi*, *ibid.*), ἔσπετε νῦν μοι ὄσοι πολυπράγμονές ἔστε σοφισταί is a parody of *Il.* 2.484 (of the Muses) and also, perhaps, of Hesiod *Th.* 114-15.

14. κενός frs. 11, 20, 21, κενεοφροσύνη fr. 48. κενεοσπουδία is attributed to Diogenes of Sinope by D.L. 6.26, and the other two qualities of men which 'Pyrrho' illustrated from Homer recall Cynic preaching (cf. D.L. 6.27 for 'good men nowhere, good boys in Sparta'). It was of course familiar Cynic practice to quote or parody Homer, and I argue later that Timon draws heavily on the Cynics in his representation of Pyrrho.

15. τὸν δ' ὥς οὖν ἐνόησ' ἐν νηνεμίησι γαλήνης fr. 64, drawing on *Od.* 11.575 and 5.392=12.169. This metaphorical use of γαλήνη is a moralist's cliché, especially in Epicureanism, cf. the material collected by H. Usener, *Glossarium Epicureum* ed. M. Gigante and W. Schmid (1977) 150-52. D.L. 9.45 uses γαληνώς in explaining Democritus' τέλος of εὐθυμία. S.E. *PH* 1.10 combines γαληνότης with ἀοχλησία (cf. n.42 below) in defining ἀταραξία, which is a still more familiar term common to Epicureans and Pyrrhonists. Timon's two references to Epicurus are contemptuous (frs. 7 and 51), but Epicurus himself is said to have admired Pyrrho (D.L.9.64), and frequently inquired about him from Nausiphanes who, before he influenced Epicurus, had been a follower of Pyrrho. In fact Pyrrho and Epicurus offered totally different routes to ἀταραξία, and the Epicureans opposed scepticism, cf. A. Barigazzi, *Assoc. Budé Actes du VIIIe Congrès* (1969) 286-93. But this is consistent with a positive influence from Pyrrho on Epicurus' moral philosophy, cf. D.N. Sedley, 'Epicurus and his professional rivals', *Cahiers de Philologie* ed. J. Bollack I (1976) 136-7; and, apart from their common interest in equanimity, the followers of Pyrrho and Epicurus were alike in treating their leader as a quasi divine and unique discoverer of its grounds.

16. Fr. 68=S.E. *M.* 11.20.

ἢ γὰρ ἐγὼν ἐρέω, ὥς μοι καταφαίνεται εἶναι,
μῦθον ἀληθείης ὀρθὸν ἔχων κανόνα,
ὥς ἢ τοῦ θεοῦ τε φύσις καὶ τάγαθοῦ αἰεὶ,
ἐξ ὧν ἰσότατος γίνεται ἀνδρὶ βίος.

These important lines have never been satisfactorily explained. According to one reading of verse 2, 'Pyrrho' (the presumed subject) claims to have 'a correct rule' consisting in 'a word of truth', and then makes a further dogmatic statement about the nature of the divine and the good: so Brochard 62f., Goedeckemeyer 9, Robin 31 (all n.4 above). Most of those who read the lines in this way refer to Cicero's interpretation of Pyrrho as a strict moralist (see pp.76-7), and suppose that Pyrrho and Timon did not extend their scepticism to cover practical morality, being convinced that they had found

the best way of life. But if this interpretation were correct, the claims here made about the φύσις of the divine and the good would glaringly contradict the view attributed to Pyrrho and Timon (main text above) that nothing is good *by nature*.

The interpretation rests on an unnatural reading. μῦθον ἀληθείης is best taken as the direct object of ἐρέω and not with ἔχων (cf. λέγω μῦθον A. Pers. 698, ἀληθείη παρὰ μύθοις Emped. D.-K. 31 B114.1). 'I will state a word (or myth) of truth, as it seems to me to be, who have a correct standard, that ...' The key phrase is ὡς μοι καταφαίνεται εἶναι, as S.E., the source of the lines, understood them (M. 11.19-20). He distinguishes between 'the existence of goods and evils and neither of these' and their appearance (τὸ φαινόμενον), which the Pyrrhonist is in the habit of calling good, bad, and indifferent. This permits us to regard the 'correct rule' as the stating of truth 'as it seems to (me) to be', and no unqualified existential claim about φύσις is made. The likelihood that this is the correct reading is confirmed by the fact that the lines belong to the *Indalmoi*, which probably gave later Pyrrhonists support for the notion that the criterion of conduct is τὸ φαινόμενον, S.E. PH 1.21-4. Cf. further Hirzel, *Untersuch.* III 46-53, Stough 24-6, Conche 88-9 (nn.4 and 5 above). Pyrrho's intense concern with ethics, underlined by D.L. (main text above) and by Cicero, is not contradicted by this reading.

It may be possible to improve the interpretation of the difficult lines 3-4. Mr. M.F. Burnyeat has suggested the possibility of deleting the comma, and taking 3 to be the predicate of the subject expressed in line 4: 'the source of what makes a man's life most equable is at any time the nature of the divine and the good'; i.e. the divine and the good are not set up as objective entities but are identified with just the phenomenal source of tranquillity. If this reading can be justified as Greek (and I do not wish to commit Mr. Burnyeat or myself to that claim), it would certainly be a great improvement on the normal reading: 'the nature of the divine and the good exists for ever...'.¹⁷

17. Notice too that solitariness and talking to oneself, attributed to Pyrrho by D.L. 9.63-4, are credited to his follower, Philo of Athens, by Timon, fr. 50=D.L. 9.69.

18. Further details about Anaxarchus in D.-K. 72 vol. II 235-9; on Pyrrho and Anaxarchus cf. Dal Pra (above n.2) 53-6, von Fritz (above n.9) cols. 94-5; Timon fr. 58= Plutarch *Virt. mor.* 446B.

19. D.L. 9.67, on the word of Philo of Athens. For Timon's 'praise' of Democritus cf. D.L. 9.40, the source of fr. 46.

20. That Ainesidemus wrote about Pyrrho's life as well as his philosophy is implied by D.L. 9.62.

21. He refers to Timon's life, as described by D.L. 9.109-10, which drew both on Antigonus of Carystus (111) and Apollonides of Nicaea who wrote a commentary on the *Silloi* in the first century A.D. (109).

22. Cf. the tradition that Timon taught Aratus (Suda sv Aratos), and the drinking party at which he and Lacydes commented on one another's alcoholic condition with quotations from Homer, Athen. 10.438A.

23. Cf. John Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* (1977) 39-43. I am not convinced by H.-J. Krämer's interesting attempt to demonstrate strong dialectical interests in the Academy at this time, *Platonismus und Hellenistische Philosophie* (1972) ch. 1.

24. On Megarians, 'Eristics', and 'Dialecticians', cf. D.N. Sedley, 'Diodorus Cronus and Hellenistic Philosophy', *PCPhS* n.s. 23 (1977) 75-77.

25. For Stoic interpretation of the poets cf. R. Pfeiffer, *A history of classical scholarship* I (1968) 237-8, and of Heraclitus, my article in *Philosophia* 5/6 (1975-6) 133-53. I hope shortly to publish a paper on 'The Stoics and their Authorities'.

26. Cic. *Acad.* 1.44, Plut. *Adv. Col.* 26.1121F with comments by B. Einarson and P. De Lacy in Plutarch *Moralia* XIV (Loeb ed., 1967) 156-8.

27. D.N. Sedley's excellent article (n.15 above) should be consulted for background reading as well as

for its demonstration that much of the abuse supposedly heaped by Epicurus on other philosophers has been misinterpreted and misattributed to him.

28. The main evidence for Timon's dates is a report that he was nearly ninety when he died (D.L.9.112), and the inference from his work 'Αρκεσιλάου περιδειπνον (ibid. 116) that he outlived Arcesilaus. Lacydes succeeded Arcesilaus as head of the Academy in 241/0 (D.L. 4.61), and Timon must be born early enough to study as a young unmarried man with Stilpo in Megara (D.L. 9.109). Stilpo is likely to have died by about 280, cf. K. Döring, *Die Megariker* (1972) 140. So Timon was probably born not later than 310. Pyrrho's approximate dates are 360-270.

29. D.L. 2.125-6=fr.170 Döring; D.L.2.113=fr. 164A Döring.

30. Ap. Euseb. *PE* 14.17.1=fr. 27 Döring.

31. D.L. 9.22 Παρμενίδου τε βίην μεγαλόφρονος οὐ πολύδοξον/δς ῥ' ἤπι' φαντασίας ἀπάτης ἀνεύεικατο νόσεις. ἐπὶ, though grammatically satisfactory, cannot be correct in view of Parmenides' philosophy and usage of νοεῖν/νόημα. Wachsmuth's ἀπό, accepted by Diels, is plausible, but perhaps ἐκ is a better correction with ἀναφέρειν. πολύδοξον is apparently a coinage by Timon, alluding to ἔθος πολύπειρον, Parm. D.-K.28 B7.3-5, the lines quoted by D.L. ad loc., and the erroneous δόξαι of men (D.-K.B1.30, 8.51). Timon's praise of Parmenides recalls his eulogy of Pyrrho (fr. 48) and fr. 9.3 may echo Parm. B6.6-7. His usage of the contemporary term φαντασία can be read as enlisting Parmenides as an enemy of Epicurean and Stoic empiricism.

32. D.L. 9.25. The description of Zeno as ἀμφοτερόγλωσσος, another neologism, was much quoted by later philosophers, cf. the texts cited by Diels ad loc. Wachsmuth *Sill. Graec.* 98f. sees a reference both to Zeno's dilemmas (cf. Plut. *Pericles* ch. 4) and to the tradition that Zeno was the inventor of dialectic. It may be Melissus D.-K.30 B8 which has inspired Timon's comment on him.

33. Cf. frs. 11, 12, 19, 20, 48, 54, 57, 59, 60, 66.

34. D.L. 2. 119=fr. 199 Döring. Similar criticism of (Platonic) εἶδη is attributed to Antisthenes (frs. 50A and C Caizzi) and to Diogenes of Sinope (D.L. 6.53). This proves that it was later regarded as a characteristic Cynic position, whether true of Stilpo or not.

35. Plut. *Adv. Col.* 22.1119C-D, 23.1120A-B, Simplic. *in Phys.* 120.12-17Diels= frs. 197-8 Döring. Whether the same doctrine should be attributed to Antisthenes and also to Menedemus of Eretria is controversial; cf. Zeller, *Phil. d. Griechen* ed. 4 II.1 (1889) 278f.; W.K.C. Guthrie, *A history of Greek philosophy* III (1969) 209-18; Döring, *Die Megariker* 154-5. Plato *Soph.* 251b ridicules the view of those who 'insist that we must not say a man is good, but only man is man and good is good'. This is identical to Stilpo's position, as reported by Plutarch above, and strengthens its genuineness as Megarian doctrine, cf. Guthrie op. cit. 217.

36. S.E. *M.* 10.197, 6.66= fr. 76. Diels attributes the fragment to the work Πρὸς φυσικούς, cf. n.8 above.

37. S.E. *M.* 10.155 whose accuracy is rightly questioned by D.N. Sedley, *PCPhS* n.s.23 (1977) 89 and n.83. Timon may also have been influenced by Diodorus Cronus' doctrine of ἀμερῆ, cf. Sedley op. cit. 84-89.

38. Frs. 151A-151I Döring.

39. D.L. 2.115= fr. 151A Döring.

40. D.L.2.134= fr. 172 Döring; Cic. *Fât.* 10= fr. 158 Döring; Sen. *Ep.* 9.1-3= fr. 195 Döring; Teles fr. III pp. 21.2-23-4 Hense ed. 2= fr. 192 Döring.

41. *Adv. Col.* 22.1119C= fr. 197 Döring.

42. Ps.- Alex. Aphr. *De an.* II 150, 34-35 Bruns= fr. 196 Döring. The reliability of this evidence is questionable, as Döring notes. It forms part of a list of philosophers' views on the *πρῶτον οἰκείον* which, originating as a Stoic concept, has typically become a jargon omniumgatherum in late philosophical writers. But the history of *ἀοχλησία* is very relevant to Pyrrhonism. The noun and the adjective probably originate as Epicurean terms: at *Ep. Men.* 127, the first certain instance, Epicurus uses *ἀοχλησία* to refer to desires which are necessary for the body's freedom from disturbance (cf. Alciphron's imitation, *Ep.* 3.55), and at *Sent. Vat.* 79 *ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἑτέρῳ ἀόχλητος* explains the man who is *ἀτάραχος* (further references in Usener, *Glossarium Epicureum*). Posidonius cites *ἀοχλησία* along with *ἡδονή* or 'some other such thing' as an instance of the *σκοπός* which is similar to that intended by those Stoics who contract τὸ ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν into τὸ πᾶν τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ποιεῖν ἕνεκα τῶν πρῶτων κατὰ φύσιν (F187 Edelstein-Kidd), cf. my remarks in *Phronesis* 12 (1967) 84-6. It is difficult to know whether Posidonius has any group of philosophers besides the Epicureans in mind here. But, possibly through the mediation of Timon, *ἀοχλησία* is used in later Pyrrhonism in a way which cannot fail to recall Epicureanism, cf. S.E. *PH* 1.10 *ἀταραξία ἐστὶ ψυχῆς ἀοχλησία καὶ γαληνότης*, and *ibid.* 29.

43. D.L.1.16= fr. 189 Döring; cf. frs. 187-8 Döring for the alternative view.

44. D.L. 2.119= fr. 199 Döring, which should be compared with 'Pyrrho' (D.L.9.61) and Timon fr. 80= D.L.9.76.

45. Cf. Brochard (above n.4) 52 n.1 and von Fritz (above n.9) col. 93. For Βρύσωνος τοῦ Στίλπωνος D.L. ad loc. Roeper suggested Βρύσωνος ἢ Στίλπωνος, but this hardly solves the problem.

46. According to the Suda article on Pyrrho= fr. 203B Döring the Bryson who taught Pyrrho was 'the pupil of Cleinomachus', a figure recently brought out of the darkness by D.N. Sedley, *PCPhS* n.s.23 (1977)176-7. Cleinomachus was reputedly the founder of the so-called 'dialectical' school (frs. 34-5 Döring). Unfortunately (a) Bryson is also recorded as Cleinomachus' predecessor, in the Suda article on Socrates. Döring has discussed the conflicting testimonies about Bryson fully (*Die Megariker* 157-63), concluding that one man only is meant – famous for his attempts to square the circle – who probably had no connections with Socrates or the Megarians. If this Bryson taught Pyrrho no traces of his influence survive. We hear too of a 'Bryson the Achaean', a teacher of the Cynic Crates of Thebes (frs. 205A-C Döring), whom C. Baeumker plausibly identified with Pyrrho's teacher, *RM* 34 (1879) 70-2.

47. Fr. 28= D.L. 2.107= fr. 8 Döring: *ἀλλ' οὐ μοι τούτων φλεδόνων μέλει· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλου / οὐδενός, οὐ Φαῖδωνος, ὅτις γένετ', οὐδ' ἐριδαντέω / Εὐκλείδω, Μεγαρεῦσιν ὃς ἔμβαλε λύσσαν ἐρισμοῦ. φλέδων*, which Timon also applies to the Socratic Antisthenes (fr. 37= D.L. 6.18), is attested elsewhere only in A. *Ag.* 1195 (cf. E. Fraenkel, *comm.* ad loc.), where Cassandra challenges the Chorus to call her *ψευδόμαντις*, *θυροκόπος φλέδων. φλήναφος*, a similar word, is commoner, and attributed to Diogenes of Sinope, D.L. 6.27.

48. The passage is quoted below, p.75.

49. Fr. 29 = D.L. 2.126: *ὠφρυωμένος, ἀφροσιβόμβας*. Timon also satirised Menedemus in fr. 31 (see p.80 below), and his follower Ctesibius in fr. 16 = Athenaeus 4.162E.

50. Dal Pra (above n.2) 88-9 recognizes that Timon's teaching was indebted to Stilpo, but he does not consider the evidence discussed above.

51. D.L. 9.109.

52. So Wachsmuth, *Sill. Graec.* 11-12, citing Pausanias 2.13.7, followed by Goedeckmeyer (above n.4) 20. The evidence is found only in Aristocles ap. Euseb. *PE* 14.18.14 = fr. 77, cf. n.6 above.

53. So Diels in his comments ad loc., supported by M. Untersteiner, *Rivista critica di storia della filosofia* 9 (1954) 284-7, who suggests that Timon located his meeting with Pyrrho at an Amphiareion in order to suggest a parallel to Amphiarus' advice to his son which, he thinks, formed a large part of the epic tradition of the 'Αμφιάρω ἐξελασία.

54. *Antigonos von Karystos* 38.

55. Fr. 79 = D.L. 9.67, fr. 80 = D.L. 9.76, fr. 81 = D.L. 9.105.

56. *Sill. Graec.* 72.

57. Cf. D.L. 6.7 Antisthenes, D.L. 6.26 Diogenes, D.L. 6.85-6 Crates, D.L. 6.83 Monimus = Menander fr. 215 Sandbach, a passage which appeals to common knowledge of the Cynics (cf. S.E. *M.* 8.5); ὀλβιότυφος D.L. 4.52 Bion = F7 *Bion of Borysthene*s by J.F. Kindstrand, *Studia Graeca Upsaliensia* 11 (1976), and see his note p. 195 for further references and bibliography. τυφος and τυφώ are used by Sextus Empiricus in disparaging reference to 'dogmatists', *PH* 1.62, 3.193, 237, *M.* 1.55.

58. Fr. 9 = Aristocles ap. Euseb. *PE* 14.18.19: ἀλλ' οἶον τὸν ἄτυφον ἐγὼ ἶδον ἢ δ' ἀδάμαστον/πᾶσιν...; fr. 38 = D.L. 7.15: καὶ Φοίνισσαν ἶδον λιχνόγραυον σκιερῶι ἐνὶ τυφῶι/πάντων ἡμεῖρουσαν, see further below p.80. For ἀτυφία cf. Antisthenes fr. 97A Caizzi (the τέλος) and Bion F16A Kindstrand.

59. Fr. 60 = S.E. *PH* 1.224, and fr. 3 = Athenaeus 4.159D. Both words are neologisms.

60. Cf. Plut. *De tuenda sanitate* 125F, and for other references Kindstrand (above n.57) 218.

61 Fr. 27 = D.L. 2.66.

62. ἄνθρωποι κενεῆς οἰήσιος ἐμπλεοὶ ἄσκοί fr. 11 = Aristocles ap. Euseb. *PE* 18.14.28, and cf. Timon frs. 20, 53. For the Cynic background see Kindstrand 221. S.E. glosses τυφος by οἴησις at *M.* 8.5.

63. Fr. 48 = D.L. 9.64. Cf. Crates' 'free kingdom for those unenslaved to pleasure', fr. 5 Diels.

64. Fr. 12 = Athen. 1.22D and fr. 61 = S.E. *M.* 1.53; for Cynic attacks on philosophers and learning cf. D.L. 6.11, 27-8, 101, 103-4, Bion F 3-10 Kindstrand; Wachsmuth, *Sill. Graec.* 66-7; D.R. Dudley, *A history of cynicism* (1937) 27-9, 44-5, 73.

65. ξρις in frs. 21-2, see below p.75; ἐρίζεσκεν of Stilpo in Crates fr. 1 Diels = D.L. 2.118; ὑπάτη ξρις of Archytas in Bion ap. D.L. 4.52 = F7 Kindstrand.

66. πάντων μὲν πρῶτιστα κακῶν ἐπιθυμῆ ἐστι fr. 71 = Athen. 8.337A. Timon attacks *doxa* in frs. 9, 48, 50, 57, and it is unnecessary to repeat other words he uses to censure trumpetry. For Cynic attacks on *doxa* in both the senses stated above cf. Kindstrand 223.

67. Fr. 18 = Athen. 9.406E: λαβάργυρος ὠρολογήτης, playing on the title of Prodicus *Horai*; cf. Diogenes ap. D.L. 6.50 τὴν φιλαργυρίαν μητρόπολιν πάντων τῶν κακῶν, and 6.28.

68. Fr. 6 = Athen. 6.251B. In Cynics cf. D.L. 6.51, 92.

69. ὄχλοάρεσκος fr. 34 = D.L. 4.42. In Cynics cf. D.L. 6.34, Stobaeus *Ecl.* 3.14.20.

70. D.L. 2.118: καὶ μὴν Στίλπων' εἰσεῖδον χαλέπ' ἄλγε' ἔχοντα / ἐν Μεγάροις, ὄθι φασὶ Τυφώος ἔμμενα εὐνάς./ ἔνθα τ' ἐρίζεσκεν, πολλοὶ δ' ἄμφ' αὐτὸν ἐταίροι/ τὴν δ' ἄρετην παρὰ γράμμα διακοντες κατέτριβον.

71. καὶ μὴν Τάνταλον εἰσεῖδον χαλέπ' ἄλγε' ἔχοντα; cf. Plato *Prot.* 315c8, Socrates referring to Prodicus.

72. Plut. *De vit. aere al.* 830C: καὶ μὴν Μικκύλον εἰσεῖδον. Crates fr. 2 = D.L. 2.126 refers to the philosopher friends Asclepiades of Phlius and Menedemus of Eretria.

73. *Sill. Graec.* 72-3; his claim was questioned by R. Helm, *Lucian und Menipp* (1906, repr. 1967) 20.

74. The Nekuia as the model for the *Silloi* was first suggested by A. Meineke in *Philologicarum exercitationum in Athenaei Deipnosophistas* (1843) 6-7. As Dr. M. Schofield reminded me, Plato draws on *Od.* 11 in introducing the sophists at the house of Callias, *Prot.* 315c-d (cf. n.71 above).

75. Fr. 22 = Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 5.1.11, II p.333 Stählin: τίς γὰρ τοῦσδ' ὀλοῆι ἐριδι ξυνέηκε μάχεσθαι;/Ἥχοῦς σύνδρομος ὄχλος, ὃ γὰρ σιγῶσι χολωθεῖς/νοῦσον ἐπ' ἀνέρας ὠρσε λάλην, ὀλέκοντο δὲ πολλοί. (Cf. the relation between fr. 21 = Clem. Alex. loc. cit. and *Iliad* 5.518, 4.440-3.) Diels ad loc. well compares Ἥχοῦς ὄχλος with the 'chorus' of Protagoras' followers, Plato *Prot.* 315a-b. In Timon fr. 47 = D.L. 9.52 Protagoras is ἐριζέμεναι εὐ εἰδώς.

76. Fr. 43 = D.L. 9.6: τοῖς δ' ἐνι κοκκυστής, ὄχλολοῖδορος Ἡράκλειτος,/αἰνικτῆς ἀνόρουσε.

77. *Iliad* 1.247-8: τοῖσι δὲ Νέστωρ/ἠδυσέπης ἀνόρουσε, λιγύς Πυλίων ἀγορητής.

78. Fr. 8 = Aristocles ap. Euseb. *PE* 18.17.17: οὐκ ἂν δὴ Πύρρωνι γ' ἐρίσσειεν βροτὸς ἄλλος. Cf. *II.* 3.223, οὐκ ἂν ἔπειτ' Ὀδυσῆϊ γ' ἐρίσσειεν βροτὸς ἄλλος.

79. Frs. 3-10 Kindstrand.

80. Socrates (fr. 25 = D.L. 2.19) is a 'chatterer about laws' (ἐννομολέσχης), the 'spell-binder of Greece' ('Ελλήνων ἐπαιιδός), 'one who makes men quibble' (ἀκριβολόγους ἀποφήνας); in μυκτηρ ῥητορὸρμυκτος, ὑπατικὸς εἰρωνευτής Timon has a dig at Socrates' fluency and irony. For Antisthenes cf. n.47 above; other Socratics are attacked in frs. 26-9 (cf. nn.47, 49 above).

81. *Lo scetticismo greco* ed. 2 I 58-9. D.R. Dudley hardly exaggerated when he wrote: 'were it not for his exposition of the philosophy of Pyrrho, we should class Timon with Menippus as the outstanding literary representative of the Cynic nihilism', *A history of cynicism* 107-8.

82. For evidence on Onesicritus cf. Jacoby, *F.G.H.* 134 (1929). Another Cynic who must be mentioned, in relation to Pyrrho, is Monimus of Syracuse (see n.57 above). Sextus Empiricus refers to a tradition which grouped together Metrodorus of Chios, Anaxarchus, and Monimus, as three philosophers 'who abolished the criterion' (of truth), *M.* 7.87-8. The influence of Anaxarchus is (one hopes) a decisive fact of Pyrrho's life (see above p.69), and the particularly interesting feature of S.E. loc. cit. is the claim that Anaxarchus and Monimus both likened τὰ ὄντα to σκηνογραφία. Sextus also lists Monimus as one who 'perhaps said that nothing is true, in declaring that all things are trumpery' (τῦφος), *M.* 8.5. Monimus was probably somewhat younger than Pyrrho, and the evidence does not establish any historical link between them. But allowing for the fact that in Sextus' eyes Monimus is not a Pyrrhonist but a negative dogmatist, it is instructive, for the Cynic background to Pyrrhonism, to note the existence of a tradition which associates Pyrrho and Monimus via Anaxarchus.

83. See n.16 above and my remarks in *Hellenistic philosophy* 76-8.

84. For evidence on the term, and for attributing *Silloi* to Xenophanes, cf. Wachsmuth, *Sill. Graec.* 5-8, 55-65. G. Voghera attempted to prove that Timon was the only writer of *Silloi*, and that it was due to his poems that the title *Silloi* was attached to Xenophanes, *SIFC* 11 (1903) 1-16. But it is absurd to deny this title to Xenophanes on the ground that none of his fragments corresponds *exactly* to Timon's *Silloi*, and Voghera failed to ask the basic question, why Timon took Xenophanes as his self-confessed mentor.

85. D.-K. 21 B11, 12, 14-16, 23-26. Also in favour of attributing all these lines to the *Silloi* are J. Burnet, *Early Greek philosophy* ed. 4 (1930) 115f. and W. Jaeger, *The theology of the early Greek philosophers* (1937) 40 and 210 n.11. Cf. also W.K.C. Guthrie, *A history of Greek philosophy* I (1962) 363-6.

86. D.-K. 21 B34.3-4: εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα τύχοι τετελεσμένον εἰπών,/αὐτὸς δῶμος οὐκ οἶδε· δόκος δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται.

87. Fr. 69 = D.L. 9.105 and S.E. *M.* 7.30: ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον πάντη σθένει, οὐπερ ἄν ἔλθῃ. The title 'Ἰνδαλμοί (cf. n.8 above) is clearly modelled on the epic usage of ἰνδάλλομαι, cf. Timon fr. 68.1 (n.16 above) with *Od.* 19.224, noted by Diels ad loc. Hirzel explained Timon's title by reference to the only other occurrence of the noun, in ps.-Hipp. 9.380 Littré = D.-K. 68 C5, *Untersuchungen*, III 21. But if there is any influence it is that of Timon on the writer of 'Democritus' letter to Hippocrates'.

88. L.L. 9.18 = D.-K. 21 A1 and D.L. 8.36 = D.-K. 21 B7.

89. Ap. Euseb. *PE* 14.17.10.

90. D.L. 9.111, probably drawing on the commentary on the *Silloi* by Apollonides of Nicaea, dedicated to the emperor Tiberius, which D.L. cites at the opening of his life of Timon, 9.109.

91. *PH* 1.223-4= frs. 59-60.

92. Fr. 46 = D.L. 9.40: οἶον Δημόκριτόν τε περίφρονα ποιμένα μύθων, / ἀμφίνοον λεσχῆνα μετὰ πρώτοισιν ἀνέγων.

93. Cf. Brochard (above n.4) 47-9; von Fritz (above n.9) 94-5, 104-5; Dal Pra (above n.2) 47-53.

94. Fr. 5 = S.E. *M.* 9.56f. The speaker is more likely to be 'Xenophanes' since this passage is attributed to the second book of *Silloi*.

95. Fr. 47 (cf. n.75 above).

96. *PH* 1. 210-35.

97. εἰκαιοσύνη ἀλεγεινή fr. 36 = D.L. 5.11.

98. *Phil. Graec. Frag.* 183. Cf. Wachsmuth, *Sill. Graec.* 39f.

99. Fr. 38, cf. n.58 above. I accept Diels' persuasive interpretation.

100. Fr. 32 = D.L. 4.33: νήξομαι εἰς Πύρρωνα καὶ εἰς σκολιὸν Διόδωρον.

101. Fr. 30 = D.L. 3.7: τῶν πάντων δ' ἡγεῖτο πλατίστακος, ἀλλ' ἀγορητὴ / ἠδευεπὴς ... On πλατίστακος cf. Athen. 3.118C, where it is claimed that the largest mullets are so called. M. Gigante prefers the reading πλατίστατος, Diogene Laerzio, *Vite dei filosofi* ed. 2. (1976) II 489 n.30, but this weakens the pun, and I do not agree that 'la vera lectio difficilior è πλατίστατος, forma non attestata e rara di superlativo'. πλατίστακος is accepted by Lloyd-Jones and Parsons in their forthcoming edition (n.4 above).

102. Fr. 31 = D.L. 4.33 and Numenius ap. Euseb. *PE* 14.5.12.

103. I am grateful to Dr. J.G.W. Henderson for writing to me about these lines. If I have failed to interpret them as he would wish, I have certainly benefited from his comments.

104. Professor Lloyd-Jones has proposed for line 2 of the fragment, the reading θήσεται ἢ Πύρρωνα τὸ πᾶν κέρασ This has many attractions in view of the *Iliad* parallel. My main reason for preferring θεύσεται ... κρέας is the belief that Arcesilaus must be a fish here and not a fisherman.

105. As cited in n.102 above.

106. *Poet. Phil. Frag.* 183.

107. At fr. 32 (n.100 above) Arcesilaus asserts his intention of swimming to them both.

108. Fr. 52 = Galen in *Hipp. Epidem.* VI comm. II 42, p.112 Wenkebach (*Corp. Med. Gr.* V 10.2.2). I follow the text of Lloyd-Jones and Parsons (n.4 above); Diels, reading εἰκάζων, did not regard the word as part of Timon's line. Others have thought a philosophical fish is referred to, cf. Diels ad.loc., Helm, *Lucian und Menipp* 303.

109. Quoted by D.L. 4.33, S.E. *PH* 1.234, Numenius ap. Euseb. *PE* 14.5.13. Ariston's epigram made L. Robin think that Pyrrho is the fish at the rear, 'protecting the whole band' (n.4 above) 30. I disagree.

110. Fr. 23 = D.L. 4.42 where ὀχλοᾶρεσκος is to be contrasted with ὀχλολοῖδορος, applied to Heraclitus in fr. 43 (n.76 above).

111. *Poet. Phil. Frag.* 182-3.

112. Fr. 41 = D.L. 7.170, closely parodying *Il.* 3.196.

113. 'Second Thoughts on Greek Biography', *Meded. d. Kon. Ned. Akad. van Wet.*, Afd. Letterkunde, Nieuwe Reeks 34.7 (1971) 14-15.

114. D.L. 9.40 = D.-K 68 A1 (Democritus); Timon fr. 5 = S.E. *M.* 9.56 = D.-K. 80 A12. I am grateful to Professor Momigliano for pointing this out to me.

115. Fr. 42 = D.L. 8.67, Fr. 24 = D.L. 2.6, fr. 25 = D.L. 2.19 (cf. n.80 above).

116. Fr. 54 = Aulus Gellius 3.17.4. Here again we may suspect the influence of Aristoxenus, cf. his claim that Plato largely derived the *Republic* from Protagoras' *Disputations* (*Antilogika*), D.L. 3.67 = fr. 67 Wehrli.

117. Timon is credited with epics and dramas (D.L. 9.110), and with assisting two tragedians (ibid. 113). Note also his supposed remarks (ad loc.) to Aratus criticizing contemporary corrected texts of Homer, cf. R. Pfeiffer, *History of classical scholarship* I (1968) 121f.

118. Cf. for instance *M* 7.320-6, arguing that no dogmatist is the criterion of truth because all dogmatists who have made such claims were equally old, hardworking, and intelligent, and therefore none of them can be differentiated in these respects. For Sextus' readiness to ridicule the dogmatists see n.57 above, and more generally my article, 'Sextus Empiricus on the Criterion of Truth', forthcoming in *BICS* (1978).