

study, and by a sedentary life, he had greatly injured his health, so that he actually heard the noise "which the devil made to torment him;" and on one occasion he was certainly cured by exercise and medicines sent him by Spalatinus. Notwithstanding these things we are of opinion that any one who engages to prove him insane, wrongly measuring the style and habit of thought of one age by those of another age, will have to make use of arguments which, if they were worthy anything, would prove most of the great and earnest reformers whom the world has seen to have been insane also. Was not Socrates mad, in whose ears a demon constantly whispered what he should do? Numa could not have been of sound mind, inasmuch as a certain nymph, whom he called Egeria, appeared to him in a cavern. Would not such an acknowledgment be a decisive "fact" in any medical certificate? Was Mahomet sane, to whom an angel called Gabriel paid regular visits? We say nothing of George Fox; or of Ignatius Loyola, that "errant, shatter-brained, visionary fanatic." Of Oliver Cromwell's grievous madness some minds will entertain no doubt. Did not a spectre appear to him in the open day; and a strange woman open the curtains of his bed at night, to predict to him that he should be King of England? Moreover, he was subject to uncontrollable fits of laughter on serious occasions. "One that was at the battle of Dunbar," says Aubrey, "told me that Oliver was carried on by a divine impulse. He did laugh so excessively, as if he had been drunk. The same fit of laughter seized him just before the battle of Naseby." But we must make an end of instances, which might be multiplied indefinitely.

It may be well to conclude by suggesting for consideration this question, not whether some touch of madness may not be detected in every great genius, but whether, under the system of indiscriminate sequestration of the insane at present in fashion, some great genius, having a slight touch of madness, is not unnecessarily ending his days in an asylum. Can any one, after reading the autobiography of Benvenuto Cellini, doubt that, if that great artist had lived now, instead of three hundred years ago, he would have lived and died in a lunatic asylum, and that thus the world would have been defrauded of the best fruits of his genius?—*British Medical Journal*, May 18.

### *Recent Contributions to Mental Philosophy.\**

(See '*Journal of Mental Science*,' October, 1866.)

THE Nature of Things is a great subject, and one that solicits our attention in many forms.

It has happened to many of our readers to look into a shop, attracted by some article in the window, with the desire of buying one or two for trial, and to be met with the answer, Sir! we do not sell less than a dozen. It may be supposed that we have taken up this plan with respect to works in

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\* 1. 'Essays for the Times on Ecclesiastical and Social Subjects.' By J. H. Rigg, D.D. (Stock).—2. 'Faith and Philosophy. Essays on some Tendencies of the Day.' By the Rev. J. Gregory Smith. (Longmans and Co.)—3. 'The Commandments considered as Instruments of National Reformation.' By F. D. Maurice. (Macmillan and Co.)—4. 'Benedicite; or, the Song of the Three Children.' By G. Chaplin Child, M.D. 2 vols. (Murray).—5. 'The Rise and the Fall; or, the Origin of Modern Evil.' (Low and Co.)—6. 'Lectures on Greek Philosophy; and other Philosophical Remains of J. F. Ferrier.' 2 vols. (Blackwood and Sons).—7. 'The Philosophy of the Conditioned: comprising some Remarks on Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy, and on Mr. J. S. Mill's Examination

which psychology is predominant; and, after a sort, there is truth in the supposition. There is one important difference between us and our quarterly contemporaries: we deal more with books; they deal more with subjects. The treatises on branches of philosophy, or on the philosophy of branches, which pour from the press, cannot be dealt with subject by subject. Our contemporaries above mentioned, who may choose their books, and who may leave nine books out of ten unmentioned, may suit their own convenience, and need not fatigue their readers. But we are pledged to say something about every thoughtful production: and if we were to discuss every one, the nature of things would never be off our anvil. Works on this great subject pour from the press like novels, or rather as novels used to pour; for our fictions are now published piecemeal. It is not yet the fashion to administer deep psychology in weekly or monthly doses; but if the craving for philosophy should grow as it has grown, to such complexion—or complication—we may come at last. We now proceed to our authors.

1. Dr. Rigg's essays were—all but one—reviews. To join the words would have a twang of heresy: even *Essays* alone savours of the rational. So we have *Essays* for the *Times*; and the little reminiscences of old Tractarianism which linger about the second word neutralise the effect of the first word. Dr. Rigg is a Methodist, and his articles show that his sect is on the way to become very decidedly literary. The old spirit of Methodism is shown in an anecdote which we heard from a trustworthy source. A man of culture was talking to a Methodist preacher of the very ignorant class about his vocation. Have you never considered, said the scholar, that your religion was delivered in a foreign language, that the books are to be selected and authenticated, that the text, the translation, and the interpretation, are all matters of critical thought? &c. Lord! Sir, was the answer, what has all that do with salvation? To which the rejoinder should have been, Here is a question not answered in a moment, and one which eminently requires a clergy of moderate learning.

Dr. Rigg's papers on the Clergy, the Church, the predecessors of the Wesleys, Kingsley and Newman, Pusey's 'Eirenicon,' Manning and Pusey in their relations to schismatics, heterodox speculation, the Bible, pauperism, and education—are all readable, and something more. They are refreshing after the quantity of dogmatism which proceeds from quarters in which peculiar spiritual endowments are claimed under cover of peculiar temporal endowments. Not intending to review reviews, we turn to the matter of most interest which is new. It is a prefix of a few pages upon the character of Methodism. In answer to the wide-spread impression that Methodists are only just separated from the Establishment, and might be reunited without great difficulty, Dr. Rigg declares that there is not the remotest possibility of this absorption. He doubts if among all these hundreds of thousands there be a score of Methodists who would not smile at the proposal. He joins a distinguished colleague, the Rev. W. Arthur, who wrote ten years ago on the very point, in declaring that such a union would imply a sacrifice on the part of Methodism of its claim to be a Church, on the part of its

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of that Philosophy.' By H. L. Mansel, B.D. (Strahan.)—8. 'Inquisitio Philosophica; an Examination of the Principles of Kant and Hamilton.' By M. P. W. Bolton. (Chapman and Hall.)—9. 'The Reign of Law.' By the Duke of Argyll. (Strahan.)—10. 'The Elements of Deductive Logic.' By T. Fowler, M.A. (Clarendon Press.)—11. 'The Logic of Chance: an Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, with Especial Reference to its Application to Moral and Social Science.' By John Venn, M.A. (Macmillan and Co.)—12. 'The Elements of Molecular Mechanics.' By Joseph Bayma, S.J. (Macmillan and Co.)

clergy of their character as ordained ministers of Christ, and on the part of its adherents of all that is distinctive in its organisation, and of its highest and most cherished principles—one of these being the position of sisterly fellowship and evangelical communion in which it now stands towards all other Protestants, whether at home or abroad, *the Established Church alone excepted*. This is clear: but Dr. Rigg does not make it clear that it has always been so. On the contrary, he seems to us to show that there was, while Wesley lived, only a “virtual” separation, which has gradually widened. We do not doubt that Tractarianism and Ritualism have been the instruments of bringing about that, in our day, “the repugnance of Wesleyan Methodists to join the Church of England is stronger than that of Dissenters.” And yet, even now, Dr. Rigg does not say *other* Dissenters.

2. Mr. Gregory Smith's essays have also been published at different times during the last ten years; they are on various subjects of the day, and are to reconcile the apparently, but not really, conflicting claims of faith and reason. By properly distinguishing exceptional and ordinary confession, ministerial and judicial absolution, spiritual and material presence, it is hoped that, in spite of scepticism and fanaticism, it may be shown that there is a deep and essential harmony between the English church and the English nation. So we are to have a real presence, a confession, an absolution,—but of the right sort. We strongly suspect that the English nation—the bulk of its conformists and nonconformists—would give much the same answer as the life-guardsmen gave to Cuddie Headrigg's request to know which covenant his mother was to renounce, “Any covenant! All covenants that ever were hatched.” The English mind does nothing but carp at Confession, Absolution, and Real Presence; and we see we have an acrostic. Leaving this, we turn to Mr. Gregory Smith, and we take a proposal of his—and some others too—on the burial service. He would have a form of “joyful confidence” for communicants, and one “less expressive of hope and joy” for those who are not communicants. Now, considering that the Pharisees, the self-righteous, the covetous, and the hypocrites, form at least a good minority of the communicants, he must be a bold man, who, aiming at truth, would venture our present service over *all* communicants, as a thing which is to be held in doubt from *all* who are non-communicants. The proposal is, for our English community, very like what the recently manufactured sinlessness of the Virgin is for the Romish Church, a thing born out of due season. No such absurdity will ever be tolerated; the present plan is preferable: better to send all to heaven, than to attempt selection.

3. Prof. Maurice assigns a deep force of meaning to the Ten Commandments, claiming for them a more than Jewish character, treating them as the great barriers against presbyterial and prelatical assumption, and declaring “if we do not receive them as commandments of the Lord God spoken to Israel, and spoken to every people under heaven now, we lose the greatest witnesses we possess for the national morality and the civil freedom which these assumptions are undermining.” He objects to the omission from the Church service of the reference to Egypt, assigning to all Christians an Egypt out of which they have been brought. He disputes the Judaical character of the reward for honour of parents, on the ground that all the law possessed by man is given by God. In matters of pure morality he is often strong and never weak; but we think that in his mode of extending the domain of Jewish law as Jewish, he is not so fortunate.

Mr. Maurice is always readable and readworthy; but we seldom look into a writing of his without finding something very peculiar. We note one passage, as showing what a pity it is that all students are not made to study some elements of logic, were it only to learn the technical terms, which play a part in almost all branches of knowledge:—

“What we mean by the divine attributes I never quite understood. But if we mean what the word would seem to convey, that we ‘attribute’ certain qualities to God, then I say, that not only the Hebrew form of expression does *not* answer very nearly to what we mean, but that it directly contradicts what we mean. The devout Hebrew believed that his nation was called out of all nations to bear witness against those who attribute their thoughts to God.”

Mr. Maurice, a theologian, only knows the word *attribute* as a probable importation from common language into theology. It is an old technical term of logic, which in some systems—the famous Port-Royal, for example—is the word used for *predicate*. When we say, “God is omniscient,” we, in technical phrase, pronounce omniscience an attribute of God: when we say “the rose is red,” we pronounce redness an attribute of the rose. It has long been settled that we have not any knowledge of the *substance* of things; we only know attributes, or qualities. The theologians insist that we only know God by attributes; and often speak as if we knew more of other things. The consequence is that the old word has come to have, in common use, a special reference to the Deity. A recent logical writer says that he once heard a person, in mixed company, speak of the attributes of the vegetable world. Some were inclined to impute irreverence; and some half-suspected that the speaker worshipped leeks and onions. “When we talk,” says Mr. Maurice, “of God’s attributes, we assume, however unconsciously, that our conceptions are the ground of his being.” When we talk of the attributes of a rose, we surely do not assume that our conceptions are the grounds of *its* being. Mr. Maurice goes on to the following antithesis: “When we fear His Name, we confess that his being is the ground of our conceptions.” We shall not attempt to ascertain how this is: we only remark that Mr. Maurice, like some of his predecessors, has ideas about the *Name* which seem to us somewhat mystical. Nevertheless, we think any devout mind would be pleased with this book.

4. Babylon, the probable centre of Adam’s garden, now desolate, was the city in which Nebuchadnezzar tried to burn three young Jews: but his intended victims took no harm from the fire, in which they quietly sang the praise of God. There is a hymn, called the ‘Song of the Three Children,’ which tradition has given to those young Jews: it is part of the English prayer-book. But, as Dr. Child remarks, it is seldom sung, and is sometimes even omitted from editions of the Common Prayer: but he calls it one of the most suggestive and soul-stirring hymns in existence. To him no doubt, it was both; for it prompted him to write two volumes of comment. But perhaps it is held rather monotonous. It is, “O ye . . . bless ye the Lord: praise him and magnify him for ever;” the blank being filled up in thirty-two different ways, each way giving a verse. Thus, among other things, showers and dew, fire and heat, night and day, whales, fowls, and beasts, are instructed to bless God in this hymn of bidding praise. It is one poetical idea, very fit to be the subject of a hymn, rendered prosaic by undue repetition. Dr. Child treats the verses in the most prosaic way possible; he makes each one the heading of a chapter on physics. Thus, since night and day are to praise God, we are told that the earth revolves in 23h. 56m. 4s., giving rise to day and night: the perfect working of the machine being evident from Laplace’s demonstration that the day cannot have varied a hundredth of a second from the earliest ages until now. But it ought to have been shown how this rotation contrives our day of twenty-four hours exactly. And it is unfortunate that the perfect invariability of the day should be brought forward in proof of perfection, at the very time when there appears to be more than suspicion that a slow alteration has actually been in progress.

5. It is really too bad to write three hundred pages upon the origin of evil. The author will have it that man was not created holy, but only stainless, and without moral sense; he acquired a moral sense by some act represented as eating forbidden fruit; he thus became—not sinful but—capable of sin; and of course—we know him—began to sin immediately. How eating fruit “forbidden” by a competent authority should awaken moral sense we cannot understand, any more than how it should be anything but wrong. We once knew a young gentleman who, by interest, was admitted a mason when much under age: he wrote down all they told him on a paper, which he lost. He was in a dreadful fright, thinking the Masons would put him to death; but a friend of the craft to whom he confided his fears laughed and said, “Nonsense! if any one should find the paper he would not believe it.” We are in much the same position with respect to the origin of evil: if the true solution were to be found, no one would know it.

6. The first volume of Mr. Ferrier's remains consists of his lectures on Greek philosophy; the second is nearly all devoted to reprints of his articles in ‘Blackwood.’ His colleague, Prof. Veitch, says of him, “Metaphysic was his delight and his strength. The problem of Being, what it is; how to be analysed; how made intelligible; to get its principle and deduce its form.” He took, we are told, little interest in psychology or in logic; and had read but slightly in either. By the Powers!—we were going to say, but we check ourselves and substitute, By the weaknesses!—think of a man like Ferrier, who had a real head, setting to work upon Being, as Being; and this with little attention to the phenomena of mind or the laws of thought. To answer the question, What is IS? To settle how the possibility of such a question arises! Pure ontology is the cyclometry of psychology: we do not object to it; for in like manner as attempts to square the circle were very fruitful of better things in days gone by, so much good result is now produced from time to time by cracking the teeth upon the nut of pure being. Mr. Ferrier was a very able artist in this line; but, though he has left good exercises of severe thought, yet he makes it clear that he is in a state of hopeless belief in his own power to demonstrate existence, to account for it, and to deduce all things from it. But this chiefly in his work on metaphysics; in the volumes before us he comes down into our sphere, and is accessible to men of limited aspirations. A thoughtful reader is sure to be pleased and instructed.

7. Mr. Mansel begins by inverting Plato, who employs hypotheses, as steps, one upon another, and so *descends* (*καταβαίνει*) to the *unsupported* (*ἀνυπόθετον*). By using the word *unconditioned* and making Plato *ascend*, Mr. Mansel gives a turn which might have escaped notice, if he had not added the Greek word, and so made Plato seem to go up to the foundation. Mr. Mansel, over and above his task of remarking on Mr. John Mill, has to answer a little cloud of opponents. His name has become a word to signify the maintenance of the opinion that man can know nothing of God, and we have always held that he has been quite misunderstood, and unfairly treated. The crowd has confounded knowledge of God's nature deduced from thought and phenomena with knowledge deduced from premises furnished by God himself: and has made Mr. Mansel deny both in denying the first. His answer is not difficult: he can call spirits from the vasty deep, and they do come when he doth call for them. Accordingly, he charges at the head of Chrysostom, Basil, Gregory Nazianzen, the Cyrils of Jerusalem and Alexandria, Augustine, Damascenus, Aquinas, Hooker, Usher, Leighton, Pearson, Beveridge, and Leslie—who all express opinions similar to his own—and drives his opponents from their position. Perhaps, since Mr. Mansel was arguing with theologians, one reference—say Job xi, 7—might have settled the matter: but the fathers have spells of wonderful potency. To give any further

account of the work would require us to open the whole question between Mill and Hamilton.

8. Mr. Bolton's work will repay those who have so much learning that they can run it over with ease, and those who have so little that they would be glad to pick up miscellaneous knowledge in little time. Moreover we must say that we read with pleasure; but the convolutions become very much involved before we come to the end. What does Kant say? What does Hamilton say? What does Mill say? What does Hamilton say? What does Kant say? What does the reviewer say? What does Mill say? What does Hamilton say? What does Kant say? What does Mr. Bolton say? What does the reviewer say? What does Mill say? What does Hamilton say? What does Kant say? It is the house that Jack built; it is the gaping, wide-mouthed, waddling frog. This is too much the tendency of our time: it is the earth on the elephant which is on the tortoise, &c. This concatenation is very perplexing; beyond all question a full account of Mr. Bolton would require us to go from him to Kant through all the series. There is nothing like it anywhere else.

9. The personal reputation no less than the rank of the Duke of Argyll has drawn much attention to his work; and the perusal will increase the respect paid to both. The author is a true observer of nature in the field, in the museum, and in the book of description: he is also given to thought on creation and final cause. He is not very deep in mechanical science, as is proved by his reproduction of the old distinction of centripetal and centrifugal force in its old confusion. The work is on *law*; on the distinction of natural and supernatural, well illustrated; on *law* in different forms of action, material, mental, social; on contrivance and creation; plenty to agree with; plenty to differ from; nothing to be tired of. There is freedom of judgment in new matters, but not equal freedom in old ones. The Duke calls it mere idle play on words to explain thought by calling it *cerebration*, and to say that the laws of intellect are reduced to scientific expression when they are described as the working of the *cerebral ganglia*. Not a doubt about it: but there are various verbal transformations, sanctioned by usage,—to which he might equally object, but which nevertheless he employs without remark. From a person who thinks that he will *explain* thought, whether ganglionically or otherwise, and from a person who thinks he can *explain* the growth of a plant, we turn with equal despair of instruction. The *action* of the earth, air, and water producing leaves of one type on every branch, and seeds which are ready to repeat the process,—the *action* of the ganglia producing at last a full conviction that the middle term in a syllogism must not be ambiguous,—are things equally obscure. We derive as much explanation from either as from the description given of the engine on board the steamer by the scientific gentleman with the return ticket to Gravesend. "Sir! you see that thing which moves backwards and forwards; well, sir! that is the hydrostatic principle, which is worked by trigonometry!" The lady and gentleman to whom this view was addressed exclaimed, "How beautiful things are when they are explained!" The difference of our cases is this: relations of precedent and consequent, relations of analogy between phenomena, abound in botany: not one have we got in the ganglionic theory of thought. Let the promoters of this last speculation range animals in order of power on some one point, say inductive generalisation; let them show a chain of alterations in ganglionic phenomena, increasing in manifestation as we go up the chain of animals—and we shall then have one case resembling those of which scores are known in the physiology of plants. The time may come when this shall be done; but not a bit nearer shall we be to the *explanation* of thought.

10. Mr. Fowler's book is one of the Clarendon Press series. It is not overloaded, and the explanations are clear. Some approximation to modern views is made; but on the whole, the matter does not go much beyond

Aldrich. Technical terms are kept in due subordination to common language. Accordingly, though the work be intended for a University class-book, it will do perfectly well for a self-teaching student in the wide world; and, of all books equally good, it is the shortest.

11. Mr. Venn's work on the logic of chance is rather a misnomer; for, the meaning of the word once settled, he and his opponents agree in mode of deduction. There are two views of probability; the subjective, and the objective. In the subjective view, the word really means *brief*: and the questions which arise are such as this: If I have this degree of belief in event A, and that degree of belief in event B, what degree of belief ought I to feel that both will happen? In the objective view, the notion is derived from the *long run*, from the state of the cases: and the question is, if such a fraction of possible events contain A, and such another fraction contain B, what fraction will contain both A and B? Mr. Venn favours the second view, the *material* he calls it; in opposition to the first or *conceptualis* view. But we should be afraid, without reiterated examination and long description, to state his theory with attempt at precision: he is too long, and is not given to distinct summary; the nearest approach is in the 'Table of Contents.' For ourselves, we admit both views, each in its proper place, and in proper connection: and of course we do not agree with Mr. Venn in his contrasts and his oppositions. His book is one more attempt to put the subjective at war with the objective, and to make one destroy the other. No such attempt will succeed. Time and space will be both, in spite of Kant; chance will be both, in spite of Mr. Venn.

12. Dr. Bayma is a Jesuit employed at Stonyhurst. He has shown himself by previous publication, profoundly versed in the old philosophy: and he has given, in a paper on his subject in the Monthly Notices of the Royal Society, plenty of proof that he is a profound mathematician. He now gives a more extended view of his theory, which is nothing less than an attempt to deduce chemistry from molecular action, the shapes of the molecules having a great deal to do with the matter. We might be able to pronounce an opinion after a few months of study, or we might not: but beyond doubt we shall not attempt to judge as we are. The molecular theory is, most surely, destined to be a great branch of human knowledge; but it may be doubted whether the contemporaries of its Newton, when he shall appear, will know what manner of prophet has arisen.

And thus we end our list. We only aim at giving our readers an *aperçu*, as the French say, which may make one or another think that the book he wants is perhaps within his reach. In the meanwhile, the harvest is growing. —*The Athenæum*.

### *A Chancery Lunatic.*

THE admirers of Mr. Reade's novels are familiar with the opinion which he holds, that the law of lunacy is systematically made an instrument of oppression and wrong. Indeed, it would appear that this opinion is not held by Mr. Reade exclusively. There is, or was, in existence a Lunatic's Protection Society, which was got up by a gentleman who had been confined, as he considered, wrongfully in an asylum. Cases constantly occur in which it is alleged, not only by lunatics, but by some of their friends, that restraint is cruel and unnecessary. Evidence is usually forthcoming in such cases that the person so restrained is, in the opinion of the deponents, rational and inoffensive, and, in fact, a person whom it would be rather pleasant than otherwise to have for an inmate of one's house. Such evidence may, at the