significant as the earlier psychopath classification had served, at least in part, as a basis for longstanding institutionalization and shock treatment, as well as for deportation from the country and exclusion from public service. Wuest shows that little, if anything, was inevitable about these shifts towards essentialized ideas of sexuality. Intragroup conflict and activists' choices over which issues to pursue are also important pieces of this narrative, both of which are sometimes overlooked in movement histories.

Even as challenges to DSM classifications may have been undertaken by liberals who positioned themselves as respectable citizens, radicals were sitting-in for marriage in New York City and elsewhere. Recognizing that an author can only cover so much ground in one book, I still found myself wanting to hear Wuest's take on the way that the categories of "liberal" and "radical" were not always discrete at this time, especially because her conclusions bend toward social democracy. Wuest convincingly demonstrates how science led to the development of the then-new BTW interest group model of LGBTQ politics and produced significant legal victories, thanks to key advocacy groups such as Lambda Legal and the ACLU. Given these developments, I could not help but wonder what the continuing collapse of the identifiers "right" and "left" in mainstream US politics in our own time may mean for the shape of LGBTQ politics going forward.

The second part of the book tracks the "Evolutions and Adaptions" of BTW essentialism as it becomes consolidated into mainstream law and politics through so-called "gay gene" studies as well as in debates about marriage and conversion therapy. Eventually, its reach extends to bisexual and transgender people in areas such as employment discrimination, prisoners' rights, bathroom bills, and participation in sports, all in the context of increasing threats from the right. The staying power of the official discourse around BTW essentialism is somewhat surprising, however, given increasing mainstream reporting about sexual and gender flexibility, particularly amongst younger adults.

And yet, scientific findings of gender and sexual variability are breaking through into mainstream discourse. The upshot of this development for the shape of the LGBTQ+ movement is not yet clear, though it is interesting to note that a moral panic about gender fluidity and sexual flexibility seems to be fueling recent state bans on medications for transgender children and other oppressive legislation in the U.S. Recent oral arguments at the U.S. Supreme Court in *Skrmetti v. U.S.* suggest a strong conservative desire to stabilize the increasingly wobbly sex and gender binaries.

Wuest concludes the book by discussing the promise of social democracy as an alternative to this moral panic and the legitimation crises of our times. She argues that science that moved beyond BTW essentialism could help the state to undermine these transphobic stabilizing projects as well as address the rampant inequality and political instability that fuel these panics in the first place. What catchy slogans in pop culture might replace Lady Gaga's "Born This Way," I wonder? Wuest believes that our desires are primary. They exist, sometimes long before individuals, science, and political systems recognize them. This, of course, begs the most fundamental question opened by this book: what desires are not yet being recognized that we ought to be imagining and anticipating politically? Social democracy has certainly been transformative in some of its iterations, leading to greater recognition of a multiplicity of desires and subjectivities. But in other iterations, its past has been decidedly mixed, as has the use of science in service to the state. Recent judicial discussions make it abundantly clear that politics could head in either direction: a further consolidation of BTW essentialism in service to right-wing authoritarianism, or a left-wing transformation that heads in a more liberatory direction. The shape these developments will take in the future, like the BTW essentialism that Wuest so skillfully tracks here, will remain contingent, to be worked out in legal, political, and scientific discourse over the years to come.

Democracy in Default: Finance and the Rise of Neoliberalism in America. By Brian Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 2024. 352p.
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There are few concepts that divide, befuddle, and antagonize scholars of American politics more than neoliberalism. The term is subject to interrogation in other subfields —theorists, comparativists, and students of international relations consider neoliberalism to be worthy of serious examination. In other domains of study, such as anthropology, sociology, geography, and urban studies, debates about neoliberalism as an ideology, epoch, or political project are common. Not so in American politics, where those of us who take neoliberalism seriously are few and far between. As Neil Brenner, Jamie Peck, and Nic Theodore note in their 2010 article in *Global Networks*, neoliberalism is a "rascal concept." In *Democracy in Default*, Brian Judge bravely puts his head above the parapet to offer an innovative account of the role of neoliberalism in shaping American politics and the American political economy.

Judge posits a novel argument about the relationships among liberalism, neoliberalism, and finance in the U.S. While many scholars have viewed neoliberalism as a sharp break with liberalism, especially in its New Deal and/or Great Society guise, Judge emphasizes important continuities between the centuries-old "liberal imperative of neutralizing distributive conflict" by diverting it from the political sphere to the seemingly apolitical economy (p. 7) and the more recent process of financialization, which "deploys neoliberalism" (p. 13) to resolve the new distributive conflicts that emerge in postwar America.

Among the more recent conflicts that financialization defuses are the inflation (chapter two) and attendant tax revolts of the 1970s (chapter five), and the fallout from the global financial crisis circa 2007–8 (chapter 6). For Judge, "financialization was not the result of an ideological imposition but a nearly spontaneous political reaction to distributive crisis. Accordingly, financialization is not originally an 'economic' phenomenon that later infiltrates 'politics,' but a new chapter in the old story of liberal depoliticization" (p. 106). Thus, rather than thinking about the momentous shift toward financialization as a result of "neoliberalism by design," Judge suggests that we should see financialization as a pragmatic response to crises, which in turn shapes neoliberalism.

Judge makes two especially useful contributions. The first is his multi-scalar approach. Whereas many studies of neoliberalism are located at the national or local levels, Judge offers insightful treatment of inflation at the national level; of the role of the California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) driving financialization and "shareholder value ideology" (p. 167) in the state of California; and of city-level neoliberalization using Stockton as a paradigmatic case (chapter four). At each of these scales, Judge sheds new light on the processes of financialization and neoliberalization and, crucially, highlights the connective material and ideational tissue that links these key developments at the national, state, and local levels. Second, Judge impressively breaches intra- and interdisciplinary boundaries, connecting political theory with political economy and drawing on a range of scholarly perspectives from geographers to political scientists to historians. In so doing, he offers a perspective that would have been too easily obscured by the usual disciplinary silos. Judge's capacious method of inquiry clarifies how contemporary forms of neoliberalization are rooted in the effort to depoliticize the market, which is a fundamental tenet of classical liberalism.

Despite these notable strengths, some of the key planks of *Democracy in Default* rest on foundations that are compromised by Judge's tendency to caricature arguments in the literature on neoliberalism. For instance, at the outset of the book, Judge presents his work as a challenge to the "conventional story" of the transformations in American political economy in the latter half of the twentieth century: "Neoliberalism, the common story goes, was enacted *by design*" (p. 3). As Judge explains, "From this perspective, neoliberalism is explained as an intentional policy paradigm serving the material interests of capital deployed to defuse rising labor militancy and reverse declining rates of profit" (p. 4). From here, Judge proceeds to examine the "major problems with this account" (p. 4), which include: that it "acquiesces to the neoliberal diagnosis" of the stagflation of the 1970s; that it "cannot explain the massively increased role and importance of finance" (p. 5) or the "seemingly limitless and totalizing reach of neoliberalism" (p. 5); that "neoliberalism by design misses the crucial role of democracy in supporting the neoliberal agenda" (p. 5); and that this perspective "struggles to explain" how neoliberalism survived despite its almost self-evident failure in light of the 2007–8 financial crisis.

While each of these claims can be readily contested, I will focus on two key concerns. The first is that most of those who work on neoliberalism, including those whom Judge cites, rarely limit their analysis to the "neoliberalism by design" mechanism, which in Judge's rendering places neoliberal ideology and class interests as the exclusive drivers of neoliberal political development. Indeed, when I coined the term "neoliberalism by design," it was explicitly intended to describe one of two crucial mechanisms of neoliberalization: *neoliberalism by design* and *neoliberalism by default.* I elaborated this account in a 2016 book, *Blazing the Neoliberal Trail: Urban Political Development in the United States and the United Kingdom*, and a 2018 article for *Urban Affairs Review*, "By Design or by Default: Varieties of Neoliberal Urban Development"—the latter of which Judge cites as the chief example of the "neoliberalism by design" perspective.

In one sense, Judge's argument that the neoliberalism by design frame is insufficient to explain fully the transformation of the American political economy is convincing. He is correct to say that the adoption of certain policy prescriptions, such as privatization, was not part of the original neoliberal vision and that neoliberal techniques, like the deregulation initiated by President Carter, were promoted even by those who were not ideologically motivated by neoliberal ideology. The difficulty, however, is these shifts—while not envisaged by neoliberals at the outset—were nevertheless wholly consistent with neoliberal thinking and served neoliberal goals.

The second problem regarding Judge's analysis of neoliberalism is his failure to acknowledge an alternative mechanism: *neoliberalism by default.* The key idea behind this formulation, seemingly in keeping with the spirit of Judge's argument, is that often neoliberal policies and practices were adopted by political actors who did not subscribe to the neoliberal worldview but conceded, or were forced to concede, that they had little alternative but to do so, either due to their own ideological blinkers, the constraints of coalition building, or the strictures of institutions such as financial control boards. Openness to this more subtle form of neoliberalization would resolve several of the examples on which Judge's account rests. The case of Stockton is instructive in this respect. As Judge details, the city's embrace of tax increment financing, privatization, and pension obligation bonds left it severely exposed to the financial downturn following the great recession. As a result, it imposed austerity measures that cut city services to the bone. Moreover, he is right to note that at neither stage in the city's neoliberalization were neoliberal

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ideologues in the driving seat. While Judge might credibly claim that Stockton's neoliberalization stands at odds with neoliberalism *by design*, this would appear to be a classic case of neoliberalism by default. Judge's failure to consider the *default* dimension of neoliberalism represents a missed opportunity and a surprise, given the book's title. Had he been more open to the alternative already laid out in the literature, the apparent contradictions with which the book grappled might have been more easily resolved.

Polling at a Crossroads: Rethinking Modern Survey Research. By Michael A. Bailey. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023. 320p.
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1985 marked the peak of survey research's golden age in the United States. Almost all households had a phone, and people picked up the line when a call came in. Answering machines were still novel, found in fewer than ten percent of households. When pollsters called a potential respondent and asked them to take a survey, more often than not they complied. Telephones freed interviewers to work across time zones from a central location. Unlike the days of face-to-face interviewing in the 1950s and 1960s, researchers did not need to physically go to the respondent; the respondent would come to them.

Over time, this golden age faded away. Caller ID made it possible for potential respondents to avoid unknown numbers, decreasing survey contact rates. Those people that could be reached became increasingly obstinate, refusing to participate in surveys altogether. By the late 1990s, it appeared that polls were in crisis, with response rates dropping precipitously with each passing year. The future became even more bleak with the rise of cell phones, which increased both the costs and the logistical complexity of conducting surveys. With the introduction of internet polling, the business of survey research became more complicated still. These changes have altogether upended the world of polling. With the apparent failures of recent elections in mind, some question whether it will be at all possible to accurately measure public opinion. Perhaps survey research is dead.

Or maybe not. In his thoughtful and timely new book, *Polling at a Crossroads*, Michael Bailey offers a systematic framework for approaching the polling enterprise as it stands today. Bailey advances our understanding of modern polling's challenges while providing practical solutions for moving forward, in what is a must-read for anyone interested in survey research in today's world.

Bailey's book examines the performance and practice of surveys through the lens of non-response—understanding polls by paying close attention to both those people who comply with our requests to be interviewed and those we cannot reach. Whether the distinctions between the groups are "ignorable" or "non-ignorable" becomes a critical factor, as this identification proves essential for understanding the challenges facing modern polling.

When pollsters draw samples that are not representative of the population on measured quantities—such as age or education—they can seek to adjust their samples to match known population distributions (drawn, for example, from the Census). As Bailey discusses, the most common tool to make such adjustments is weighting, that is, increasing the weight given to underrepresented groups and decreasing the weight of overrepresented groups. Weighting works well as a solution if the people we do not reach are just like the people we do reach. However, taking a survey is a choice, so this assumption rarely holds. People who agree, or indeed volunteer, to be interviewed are often systematically different from the people who opt out of a survey. These individuals may be more compliant, more engaged with the subject matter, or they may differ in a host of other ways that are difficult to quantify. This leads to a serious and less easily addressable problem—non-ignorable non-response. In practice, it is difficult to know if we have adequately captured the differences between our sample and the full population. These unknown unknowns can trip us up and skew our results. Put simply, under conditions of non-ignorable non-response, polls can fail spectacularly.

The bulk of Bailey's book takes head-on the practical problems arising from non-ignorable nonresponse. The first step is diagnosis. Bailey discusses different ways to examine polling data in a thoughtful manner to find evidence of non-ignorable nonresponse. While non-ignorable nonresponse depends on the correlation of unobserved variables, Bailey shows it can leave traces in the data, namely because survey averages will change as response rates vary. If, for example, respondents who are easier to reach are more supportive of a given candidate or policy, we can tell that we have a problem. With care, we can diagnose problems through careful analysis.

But *Polling at a Crossroads* does not stop at diagnosing non-ignorable nonresponse. The second half of the book tackles the more challenging question of how to fix these problems. How can we leverage information to account for—and adjust—differences between the people who happily take our surveys and the people who refuse?

Bailey begins by introducing bounding methods, which define the range of possible population values consistent with observed data. These methods enable us to characterize the uncertainty we have about our polling results. He acknowledges, however, that for most practical cases, these bounds are so wide as to be uninformative of the underlying picture of public opinion. To learn anything concrete from our polls, we need to turn to model-based approaches that articulate the assumptions that allow us to characterize public opinion.