

CORRESPONDENCE

TO THE EDITOR OF *Philosophy*

DEAR SIR,

My quotation from Professor Paton's work on Kant was limited to what I considered relevant to the issue raised. I am not aware that this constitutes a "misrepresentation." My "curious prejudice which vitiates" my argument throughout lies, I think, in interpreting Hume differently from Professor Paton. Hume's primary problem, as I indicated in the article in question, arises just within that region wherein Kant is said "to agree" with Hume, who was concerned in the first instance with the propositions that make up physical science in the generally accepted usage of the word. The problem concerning the causal principle is for Hume a derivative one, arising out of the primary one; evidently he thought that a solution to the former would help him to a solution of the latter; but he finds it necessary to turn to a consideration of the discovery of specific causes and effects. I should hesitate to accept an "answer" as an answer unless it were justified; and I still fail to see that Kant ever comes to grips with Hume's problem, especially as Professor Paton admits, if I understand him rightly, that the body of propositions making up "science" lie outside the scope of Kant's enquiry. What I was "demanding" was that he should have done so.

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(*Correspondence closed.*)