much to create; or his claim that the Razins and Pugachevs were only a "marginal phenomenon" in Russian history rather than important manifestations of social feelings and powerful determinants of governmental attitudes. Such misconceptions inevitably stem from such traditional approaches. Our understanding of the history of the Slavic borderlands is not promoted by exaggerating the "national dimension," still less by claiming spurious uniqueness for Ukrainian Cossacks.

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PROFESSOR RUDNYTSKY REPLIES:

Professor Longworth charges me with "claiming spurious uniqueness for Ukrainian Cossacks." The charge is refuted by his own admission that "Rudnytsky himself does not deny that the Cossacks of Zaporozhia, the Don, and the Yaik were 'sociologically similar.'" I feel no qualms about acknowledging similarities and parallels between Ukrainian and Russian Cossacks, whenever these common traits are to be found in the evidence. Historical uniqueness can, obviously, never be absolute, but only relative. Such relative uniqueness (or, to express it more accurately, distinct historical identity) I do, indeed, claim for the Ukrainian Cossacks —not as an aprioristic postulate but as an empirical conclusion, derived from the data of history. I must, however, remind the reader that I was writing a review, and not a treatise. Within the scope of a review article I could do no more than to point out certain shortcomings of Longworth's book and to suggest alternative interpretations.

Thus Professor Longworth misrepresents the nature of our disagreement when he makes me to be the "protagonist of the unique," while recommending himself as the explorer of "general parallels and relationships." Both the unique and the general are legitimate and necessary categories of historical cognition. I certainly have no objections of principle against broad, comparative studies. The weakness of *The Cossacks* lies not in the comparative approach to the history of various Russian and Ukrainian Cossack communities but in the faulty application of the method. Comparative studies can lead to valid results only when equal attention is paid to both parallel and divergent features. Unfortunately, Longworth displays a strange inhibition in dealing with those aspects of Ukrainian Cossackdom in which it differed from its Russian counterparts. I have cited specific instances in my review of *The Cossacks*, and I see no use in covering this ground a second time. I would, however, like to reassert my view that no discussion of the Ukrainian Cossacks may be considered satisfactory which accords to the Hetmanshchyna, the Ukrainian Cossack state of the second half of the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, the scanty and superficial treatment which it has been given in Longworth's book.

Two important and interrelated problems need to be additionally considered within the narrow limits available in this place. Longworth finds it difficult to understand what I meant by designating the Cossacks the "representative class" of the seventeenth-century Ukraine, and he denies a "national character" to Ukrainian Cossackdom.

The answer to the first question is simple. In the corporately organized world of seventeenth-century Europe, each country was, as a rule, represented by one

pre-eminent "estate." The Cossacks were the leading and representative estate of Ukrainian society in the same sense as, say, the *szlachta* in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, or the urban patriciate in the United Provinces. This precluded neither class conflicts between Cossack and non-Cossack strata of the community nor differentiation and tensions within the Cossack estate itself.

In dealing with the second question we obviously must be on guard against anachronistic application of latter-day concepts to conditions of a past age. The Khmelnytsky uprising was "national" within a seventeenth-century context, in a sense comparable to the preceding insurrections of the Netherlands against the Spanish and of Bohemia against the Austrian Habsburgs. In each of the three cases, social (estate-bound) and religious factors were of major importance, but the existence of a national dimension cannot be reasonably denied. By opposing the Turko-Tatars, the Poles, and later also the Russians, the Cossacks maintained the Ukraine as a distinct political entity. While failing to achieve full independence, the Ukrainian Cossacks created a body politic endowed with a social system, a pattern of institutions, and a type of culture clearly differentiated from those of the neighboring countries. In making this assertion, which to me at least appears a matter of historical common sense, I do not dream of artificially isolating the development of the Ukraine from the rest of contemporary Eastern Europe. Quite to the contrary, I consider the study of the numerous links, influences, interdependences, and parallels among individual countries, including those between Russia and the Ukraine, a primary task of historical scholarship. But I object to a reductionist approach to Ukrainian history, as found in Longworth's book.

We may push our inquiry one step further and ask whether the Ukrainian Cossacks were "national" not only owing to a number of objective traits but also by virtue of their own self-consciousness. We already know Professor Longworth's opinion on this subject. According to him, nationality has been retrospectively (and falsely) projected on the Cossacks by nationalistically minded modern historians.

Let me note in passing that although the class structure and social conditions in the Ukraine during the Cossack era, from the sixteenth through the eighteenth century, have been exhaustively studied by several generations of scholars, the history of Ukrainian social thought of that time remains an insufficiently explored field. It is not difficult, however, to demonstrate the erroneousness of Longworth's views. It will suffice to refer to one illuminating example. This is the classical work of Ukrainian Cossack historiography, the *Chronicle* of Samiilo Velychko (ca. 1670–ca. 1725), written in the early eighteenth century and covering events from the outbreak of the Khmelnytsky revolt in 1648 to 1700. (See Samoil Velichko, *Letopis' sobytii v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii v XVII veke*, 4 vols., Kiev, 1848–64. Volume 1 was republished by the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, *Skazanie o voini kozatskoi z poliakamy*, Kiev, 1926. This edition was reprinted in the Slavica-Reprint series, no. 74, by Brücken-Verlag in 1972.) In the words of a recent study, "The author has quite deliberately placed at the center [of his *Chronicle*] the historical concepts of the Ukraine and the Ukrainian people, as independent sociopolitical categories which have formed historically and which should continue to develop along their own pathway" (Ia. I. Dzyra, "Samiilo Velychko ta ioho litopys," *Istoriohrafichni doslidzhennia v Ukrainskii RSR*, Kiev, 1971, 4:209–10). Velychko includes in the "Ukrainian–Little Russian Republic" (*rich pospolyta Ukraino-Malorosiiska*) not only the Cossack territory on both sides of the Dnieper but also western Ukrainian cities, such as Lviv, Brody, and Dubno. He claims for the Cossack Ukraine direct

descent from the Rus' of St. Vladimir. The chronicler possesses a strong sense of a Ukrainian *raison d'état*, and he evaluates the hetmans and other Cossack leaders on the basis of how they served the interests of their country; he bitterly deplores destructive internal feuds of the post-Khmelnytsky era. Velychko designates himself as "Little Russia's true son and servant," and he invokes his readers to love their "beautiful," "dear," "poor," "unfortunate Mother Ukraine." In respect of the Ukrainian-Russian relationship, Dzyra says: "The chronicler mentions the Pereiaslav *Rada* in passing, calling it an 'alliance,' or 'league,' between Ukraine and Russia, and briefly describes the ceremony of oath-taking [of the Cossacks to the Tsar of Moscow, in 1654]. At the same time, Velychko stresses that the tsar undertook the obligation of respecting, without any infringment, 'the ancient rights and liberties' of the Ukrainian people. This thought, which constitutes the principal political idea of the chronicle, permeates the whole work, from the first to the last page" (p. 216).

I cannot delve here into the question of how representative Velychko's political outlook was of the Cossack elite in his time. The mere fact that ideas of that kind were voiced disposes effectively of Longworth's doubts concerning the existence of a national consciousness in the Cossack Ukraine.

It goes without saying that I respect Professor Longworth's scholarly integrity, and I would like to repeat what I have said in the original review that I consider *The Cossacks* generally valuable and stimulating, although disappointing in the Ukrainian parts. The reader will himself be able to form an opinion as to the merits of the controversy, on the basis of the arguments and counterarguments presented by Professor Longworth and myself. I hope the discussion will be useful by bringing into focus certain important and heretofore neglected problems of East Slavic history.

To the Editor:

Although like most authors I am all too aware of the shortcomings and strengths of my book, *Soviet Political Indoctrination*, I consider it important to comment on Erik P. Hoffmann's superficial and misleading review in the September 1973 issue of your journal.

The purpose of this book was to analyze the major developments in mass media and propaganda (primarily radio and television, the periodical press, and the agitation-propaganda apparatus) during the post-Stalin period, making use of documentary resources, personal interviews with Soviet citizens about their own audience behavior, and original studies done by Soviet sociologists and media specialists. I did not include interviews with Soviet journalists (Soviet journalism, contrary to Mr. Hoffmann's assertion, was not a major focus of the study), because I have conducted a number of them and found them singularly unimpressive in their contributions to a study of the purposes and effects of the media. It is always unfortunate when books with two different purposes are compared superficially without regard to their authors' intentions. Mark Hopkins's *Mass Media in the Soviet Union* is a useful, anecdotal work written for popular consumption, and its main value lies in the fact that it gives the reader a rare insight into an American journalist's view of the day-to-day operation of the mass media, leaving aside the agitation-propaganda apparatus and its role in the overall system of Soviet

political communications. It also contains a wealth of factual information. I find the following comment by Mr. Hoffmann particularly puzzling: "Most important, the author has not placed her personal stamp on the materials gathered. Her book is largely a pastiche of Soviet and Western research findings and assertions. . . ." It makes one wonder whether he has read the book at all. The first chapter (as can be seen by merely glancing at the table of contents) is the only effort in print to date at placing post-Stalin developments in public political communications in the context of broader changes in the Soviet system, particularly the regime's efforts at political socialization. Indeed, it is one of the few works in print at all to tackle the role of mass media in political socialization. His assertion that I have made "virtually no effort to analyze the various *purposes*" of the mass media and propaganda apparatus is absurd. Not only does the study devote a great deal of space to analyzing the purposes of the system with regard to public political communication but it also examines the changing relationships among the various media, and between them and the agitation-propaganda apparatus.

Finally, it is curious that Mr. Hoffmann characterizes the view presented of the political and ideological goals of the system as "static," since the entire book is devoted to documenting and analyzing changes in public political communication during the post-Stalin period. That the conclusion at the close of a careful study is "Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose" (one that is shared by Alex Inkeles and others who are knowledgeable about Soviet political communications) may not be to Mr. Hoffmann's liking is another matter. The post-Khrushchev resurgence in repressive policies concerning the media and interpersonal communication, especially that among dissenters (see "Political Communications and Dissent in the Soviet Union" in Rudolf L. Tokes, ed., *The Politics and Ideologies of Dissent*, forthcoming), would seem to bear me out.

Mr. Hoffmann's comments on sources that he thinks have not been used betrays that he has not read his footnotes carefully, nor has he taken into account the cut-off date for research.

All academics are busy, and when they are sent books to review that are not in their own specialized field, often tend to glance over them, setting up straw men to knock over; that is the easiest way to write a review and make oneself look good. It is not, however, a very responsible way to give prospective readers an idea of what a book contains and what to expect from it. I suggest that we all learn from Mr. Hoffmann's example and take care in reviewing our colleagues' scholarly products. If we are less knowledgeable in a field than we should be, or do not have the time to take pains to go over it thoroughly, we should either decline to review it or find the time to expand our background.

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PROFESSOR HOFFMANN REPLIES:

I am sorry that Professor Hollander felt compelled to write her letter. Although its tone surprises me, its substance gives me no reason to change my earlier evaluation. The author performs a useful service in bringing the findings of Soviet media research to a larger audience. But overall her book *is* a pastiche, and it *is* an inadequately researched, sketchy, repetitious, and none too insightful treatment of some