

(and died an early death because of) McCarthyism. I myself feel humbled by the sacrifices of my grandparents in the Great Depression (at one point my grandfather sold apples while providing for eight children), or by friends in socialist Poland who managed to bring up sizable families in two-room (not two-bedroom!) apartments. And why exclude scholarship? Throughout the postwar period dozens of individuals from the Soviet Union and east central Europe arrived on our soil often with little more than the shirts on their backs, but as a rule with huge stocks of cultural capital. They have made our field, and two of them, who have now joined this debate on collaboration, continue to enrich it in special ways.

But unlike Piotr Wandycz and Cienciala, I continue to value the intervention of Klaus-Peter Friedrich that kicked off this debate. As in the case of Jan T. Gross's *Neighbors*, the person who unearths questions long buried by common assumptions will hardly do so in ways welcomed by the local community. Friedrich is a *Ruhestörer* in the best tradition of our profession.

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Dr. Martin Dean chooses not to respond.

To the Editor:

In "Every Family Has Its Freak': Perceptions of Collaboration in Occupied Soviet Russia, 1943–1948" (*Slavic Review* 64, no. 4), Jeffrey W. Jones notes that "in the postwar years the line between heroes and villains in the Soviet Union remained unclear, with some unjustly repressed and several decorated heroes later revealed as betrayers of the Soviet cause" (749). Yet he goes on to note that "there were widespread anti-Soviet sentiments among the cossack population of Ukraine and the lower Don region" and that "many of them served as policemen for the Germans" (750–51n17), effectively negating his earlier perception of the difficulty of making any such assertion. Toward the end of his essay, Jones again notes that "there were strong anti-Soviet sentiments among the Don cossacks" (770). To support this contention, he relies entirely on one page of my book published in 1998, which does not in fact mention "strong," "widespread" "anti-Soviet sentiments" (*Freedom and Terror in the Donbas: A Ukrainian-Russian Borderland, 1870s–1990s*, 1998, 283).

That collaboration took place does not necessarily mean that "strong," "widespread" "anti-Soviet sentiments" existed. Based on what we know about collaboration, we can draw no direct link between repression and collaboration or between "anti-Soviet sentiments" and collaboration. This is a point that Tanja Penter makes in her contribution "Collaboration on Trial: New Source Material on Soviet Postwar Trials against Collaborators," referring to the same page of my book that Jones uses to reach a rather different conclusion! As Jones demonstrates, Soviet documents purport to show that many traitors were former kulaks or formerly repressed people or those whose relatives had been repressed, had fought in the Petriula (Ukrainian National) or White Armies, or had a history of anti-Soviet activity. Recent research suggests that some of these allegations were indeed true, for example, the case of S. (E.). V. Pavlov, a former Don cossack ataman (K. M. Aleksandrov, "Kazachestvo Rossii vo vtoroi mirovoi voine: K istorii sozdaniia Kazachego Stana [1942–1943 gg.]," *Novyi chasovoi*, no. 5 [1997]: 163–64) and another Don cossack, I. N. Kononov, a Communist Party member since 1929, three of whose brothers were executed by the Bolsheviks in 1918, 1934, and 1937 (K. M. Aleksandrov, *Ofiterskii korpus armii general-leitananta A. A. Vlasova 1944–1945*, 2001, 174–77). Kononov, the only Vlasov army general who was able to escape Soviet capture, was a Communist Party member from 1929 to 1941 (K. M. Aleksandrov, "Kazachestvo Rossii v 1941–1943 gg.: Neizvestnye stranitsy istorii," *Novyi chasovoi*, no. 3 [1995]: 91). (Oddly, Jones does not even mention these cases.) Among the famous Vlasov army officers, there were also those who had been repressed under the Soviet regime, for example, T. I. Domanov (Aleksandrov, *Ofiterskii korpus*, 137–41). Yet recent research also demonstrates that the picture is much more complex than a simple "repression-collaboration" formula.

Take the case of the Vlasov army leaders. Only two of the twelve tried by the Soviet Union in 1946 with the famous Red Army general turned Nazi collaborator, A. A. Vlasov, had been repressed under the Soviet regime: V. F. Malyshkin and V. I. Mal'tsev who were

arrested in 1938 and subsequently rehabilitated, although they still remained angry, feeling that they were not fully accepted by the Soviet regime. In the first interrogation after his arrest by the Soviet authorities, Malyskin testified that he had decided to fight against the Soviet government out of conviction, but at the (closed) trial he said that he had turned against the Soviet Union out of cowardice (“Iz zapisnoi knizhki general-maiora V. F. Malyskina [1945–1946 gg.],” *Russkoe proshloe*, vol. 6 [1996]: 380–81; *Voенно-istoricheskii zhurnal*, no. 6 [1993]: 26; and Nikolai Koniaev, *Vlasov: Dva litsa generala*, 2003, 308–9 and 440). The collaborators’ allegedly tainted past was a standard Soviet accusation and one not to be taken at face value. Vlasov himself had impeccable political records (even if he was a bigamist or “trigamist”). After he began collaborating with the Nazis, the Soviets searched for compromising evidence in his background but failed to find any (Konjaev, *Vlasov*, 6.) To complicate the picture, many suspected double agents or Soviet agents were among the “collaborators”; so many that Soviet citizens in occupied territories feared the collaborators as much as the Nazi exterminators.

The case of Vladimir Rodionov, who seems to have been a Soviet agent working for the Germans, is well known (Alexander Dallin and Ralph S. Mavrogordato, “Rodionov: A Case- Study in Wartime Redefection,” *American Slavic and East European Review* 18, no. 1 [1959]). A lesser known case involves the rehabilitation of N. S. Bushmanov. Apparently a Soviet agent in the Vlasov army who was Vlasov’s “roommate” in Germany at one point, Bushmanov was long thought to have been executed by the Germans, but recent research shows that this did not happen. The Germans kept him alive in an effort to discover his political convictions. In fact Bushmanov commanded a strong moral authority among his captors as well as among the Vlasovites. After the war, Bushmanov was arrested by the Soviets but survived in the camps. He claimed that he organized a Communist Party cell within the Vlasov forces. Although the Soviet security police were skeptical of his and others’ assertions, he was fully rehabilitated in 1958 after Stalin’s death (A. V. Oskorkov, “Delo Bushmanova’ ill sushchestvovalo li sovetskoe podpol’e v shkole propagandistov ROA,” *Materialy po istorii Russkogo osvoboditel’nogo dvizheniia*, 2d ed., 1998). There are other similar cases.

Yet the question still arises whether these collaborators actually fought out of a sense of conviction. Even if they later became convinced anti-Stalinists, in most cases there is no evidence that they were anti-Stalinists before they were captured by the enemy or that they betrayed their country because of their anti-Stalinist or anti-Soviet convictions. Moreover, one should not forget that in the course of the long war a large number of Soviet soldier-“collaborators” defected back to the Soviet side. As Dallin and Mavrogordato noted a long time ago, “a second switch back to the Soviet side—after some experience with the Germans, a change in Soviet propaganda themes, and a turn in the fortunes of war—took place more easily and more frequently that [*sic*] has at times been assumed (Dallin and Mavrogordato, “Rodionov,” 33. From June to December 1943 alone, more than 10,000 of the “Eastern Troops” had switched to the Soviet side with arms in hand. See A. V. Oskorkov, “Sovetskie spetssluzhby i russkoe osvoboditel’noe dvizhenie,” *Materialy*, 250). It is premature, therefore, to conclude that collaboration was a result of strong anti-Stalinist or anti-Soviet sentiments and convictions. Even in the case of the Don cossacks that Jones mentions, one needs much more careful analysis to reach any firm conclusion. (For recent research on the complexity of collaboration, see Alexander Statiev, “The Nature of Anti-Soviet Armed Resistance, 1942–44: The North Caucasus, the Kalmyk Autonomous Republic, and the Crimea,” *Kritika* 6, no. 2 [2005]; Amir Weiner, *Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution*, 2001; Tanja Penzer, “Die lokale Gesellschaft im Donbas unter deutscher Okkupation 1941–1943,” in *Kooperation und Verbrechen: Formen der Kollaboration in Südost- und Osteuropa 1939–1945*, 2003; and Karell C. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule*, 2004). The following 1944 report by the secret police in the Donbas quoted on the same page of my book on which Jones relies is instructive: “The Voroshylovhrad [today’s Luhans’k] NKVD, for example, reached a preliminary conclusion that kulaks and repressed people accounted for an insignificant percent of the 450 traitors the NKVD arrested shortly after the liberation of Voroshylovhrad. The majority, according to the NKVD, were those who at first glance had no reason to be disaffected” (Kuromiya, *Freedom and Terror in the Donbas*, 283).

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