

tion differ from Scripture not only in the way it passes on truth but in the area of truth it covers? Are they two distinct sources of revelation, separate and parallel? Should they be called sources in the strict sense?

These and many other questions find some answer here but are not treated as burning issues. So far as it goes, the chapter on the relation between Scripture and Tradition would, I think, be acceptable to members of the Secretariate of Christian Unity.

Are there no blemishes? It is perhaps as well there is little Latin in the text. What there is is typographically very shaky. One could have wished Newman to make more than one appearance; likewise Lennertz.

I sincerely hope the author will extend his studies in the non-Catholic theology of Tradition. One would welcome more of his acute analyses in that field; Barth, for instance? His ability for patient honest synthesis over a wide area could also put us all in debt in view of the oncoming dialogue.

One last word. This book is important and not only because it is topical. The Catholic faith is a religion of Tradition, not accidentally, or just for this or that period of its growth, but essentially and permanently. Our Lord has made it live that way. To indicate adequately how this vital function takes place is to reveal a great deal about the Faith.

✠ THOMAS HOLLAND

FREEDOM AND THE WILL, edited by D. F. Pears; Macmillan; 16s.

This book is a collection of solos and ensembles by well-known philosophical virtuosos on this aged and intractable problem. B. A. O. Williams' introduction and final summing-up are perhaps particularly masterly, but there is no single page in the book that does not repay careful attention.

'The definition of determinism; the search for general conditions of responsibility; the nature of the will and its connection with what we call efforts of will; the scope and implication of different kinds of psychological explanation' (p. 12) constitute the nest of problems round which the discussion hovers. We are reminded that we exercise freedom in choosing, trying, making acts of will, and suchlike, and that it is thus misleading to treat the expression 'will' as though it were more than a vague pointer to these various activities. Two kinds of determinism are distinguished, physical and psychological; and we are taken some of the way towards seeing what it would be for either of them to be true, and of what difference knowledge of this would make to our ordinary ways of thinking and acting. It is tentatively suggested that even if we knew ourselves to be prisoners of physical laws, it might still be impossible to regard ourselves from within, as it were, as being constrained in all our actions, however willing we might be, and in fact are, to admit constraint in special circumstances. Our attention is also drawn, very properly, to the way in which a fairly definite

theory of what constitutes a responsible action underlies the legal notion of responsibility.

The philosophical technique displayed throughout is as scintillating as one would expect from the contributors, the issues raised much less academic (in the pejorative sense) than one might have feared. After all, everyone must be worried by the problem of free-will sometimes, and some people seem to be worried by it most of the time. Those who suspect that linguistic philosophy is necessarily devoted to trivialities might do well to defer a final judgment on the subject until they have read this book.

HUGO MEYNELL

ACTION, EMOTION AND WILL, by Anthony Kenny; Routledge; 25s.

If the marriage between Aquinas and Wittgenstein is blessed with offspring of this calibre, I cannot believe that the partners' difference in age, which was deplored by Mr C. J. F. Williams in a recent issue of *The Downside Review*, is of much account.

The book begins by considering the theories of 'the passions' advanced by Descartes and Hume, which, though by no means the most successful aspects of the work of their illustrious authors, have been so influential as to vitiate much modern experimental psychology. They thought of such emotions as anger, pleasure and desire as being definable solely in introspective terms, and therefore treated the fact that we are always angry *with* someone whom we regard as being disposed to us in a certain way, and always experience desire *for* what we believe will do us good of some kind, as merely contingent; as though it were logically possible for us to be angered at a benefit; or afraid of some event which we knew to have already happened. On this assumption, attempts have been made to isolate emotions such as anger in the laboratory, and it has been thought worthwhile to announce the inevitable result, that such sheer anger of a subject with no object is impossible, as though it constituted a discovery of empirical psychology. But in fact, as Aristotle and the Scholastics knew very well, one can be angry only *with* someone, and *withal* with someone *for* one of a fairly restricted range of reasons. Supposing every object of anger to be of the genus x , in such a way that 'I am angry because of a , and a is not x ' is logically contradictory, x may conveniently be termed, following the Scholastics, the 'formal object' of anger. Thus emotions are neither introspectible entities nor patterns of behaviour, but are definable only in relation to particular types of object and people's dispositions to act towards them, in certain ways.

That the formal object of burning is that which is inflammable is trivial; that the formal object of stealing is somebody else's property is rather less so. But that emotions have their formal objects is not trivial at all, since neglect of this philosophical truth has in fact led to a great deal of muddle and consequent wasted effort in psychology. That the formal object of thought is being